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Abstract 
The project aims to explore the relationship between social origin, habitus and 
study selection of successful German Economics students in order to better 
understand the disciplinary reproduction of academic Economics as well as its 
current state. 
It uses Pierre Bourdieu’s field theory, as applied to the areas of education and 
science, to develop a sketch of a theory of study selection that mirrors the 
relational, structural and analogical character of this particular viewpoint. In this, 
the work differs from the rather substantialist and subjectivist literature on the 
topic to be found in contemporary British and German Social Science. It questions 
common sense assumptions about study choice such as the concepts of an ‘intrinsic’ 
or ‘extrinsic’ motivation, as well as an easily distinguishable ‘reflexivity’ of 
structures on the part of agents. Indeed, it questions the very concept of study 
‘choice’ in favour of a more relational approach.  
Combining in-depth interviews with successful and interested (‘recognised’) 
German Economics students about their educational trajectory and study selections 
with socio-demographic descriptive statistics, the project attempts in essence to 
suggest a theoretical sociological interpretation concerning the ‘subjective’ 
viewpoint of the specific groups that make up this rather extraordinary group. To 
this end, it formulates three ideal-typical models that each link social origin, 
habitus and study selection differently. The Inheritors, coming from a ‘cadre’ 
origin, tend to favour technical-mathematical thinking while at the same time 
rejecting more ‘literal’ approaches, both of which attract them to Economics and 
its orthodox thinking. The Fallen Nobles, who come from more bourgeois 
backgrounds which have however lost parts of their capital, are geared towards 
symbolic ostentation and partial revolution, which in academic Economics tends to 
be bound up, at least at the moment, with ultraliberal positions. Finally, the 
Parvenus, coming from more petit-bourgeois backgrounds, tend to have a very 
faithful, that is, indulgent and docile relationship to their chosen ethical-academic 
framework which varies considerably even within Economics. They end up with 
rather technical specialisations.  
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In summary, it is suggested that the study selection of a group of students who are 
all ‘intrinsically’ motivated can in fact be attributed to quite different sociological 
processes and relations. This opens up new ways and fresh empirical questions to 
view and assess study selection.  
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Chapter 1 - Introduction 
 
Not to laugh, not to lament, not to detest, but to understand. 
Spinoza 
 
Academic Economists and Economics seem to be constantly in the spotlight, 
especially (but not exclusively) after the outbreak of the financial crisis of 2008-9.  
They tend to be consulted, criticised, sometimes renowned, often despised, and 
almost always are a more or less manifest part of the wider discourse and 
knowledge circulation of western societies (Fourcade 2018). Economists have 
become part of ‘general culture’ and ‘general discourse’. Nowadays, many of us 
use, or at least hear on a daily basis, terms such as ‘interest’, ‘profit’, ‘human 
capital’, ‘investment’ or others from the vocabulary of economics, even when we 
speak of areas of our lives that were not considered within the sphere of economic 
reason (at least not in the narrow sense) before.   
 
Consequently, the Social Sciences have picked up on that interest, especially during 
the last 10 or so years. First of all, of course, there has been a process of reflection 
going on within Economics (see Piketty 2014; Krugman and Wells 2015[2005]; Jacobs 
and Mazzucato 2016), mostly dealing with its failures and general methodological 
preliminaries, and there have been quite heated debates as to how to reform the 
education and scientific direction of the subject on various levels (ISIPE 2014; Hill 
and Myatt 2010; Mirowski 2014). Before that there already was a steady stream of 
individual intellectual biographies that thematised (and consecrated) the lives of 
Economics’ most influential figures of recent decades  (Ebenstein 2001; Caldwell 
2003; Ebenstein 2007). Apart from this there has been the reaction within the other 
Social Science disciplines, such as Philosophy, Political Science, History and 
Sociology. These works often deal with underpinnings of the world-view of certain 
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influential Economists (or the schools they form), their standpoint. This might 
entail historical analyses of the ‘neo-liberal revolution’ within Economics (for 
Germany see Janssen 2006) or, more generally, its ‘rhetoric’ (McCloskey 1985; 
Klamer, McCloskey, and Solow 1988), or more philosophical-methodological-
ontological examinations  (Mirowski 1989; Blaug 2002[1980]; Lawson 2009; Morgan 
2012; Thieme 2013; Kapeller 2013). Or they take as their object the often numerous 
and intricate entanglements of these Economists with the outside world, with 
networks, think tanks, policy associations, parties and the like (Plehwe, Walpen, 
and Neunhöffer 2006; Stedman-Jones 2012). Often this research is performed from 
a historical viewpoint (Backhouse 2005; Mirowski and Plehwe 2009), proceeding 
chronologically and noting ‘what went wrong’ in the development of Economics, 
and the wider society in the last 40 or so years.  
 
The Internal and the External 
 
The list could very easily be extended and, just as many people are aware in one 
way or the other (should they frequent the relevant intellectual circles) about the 
discourse of Economists, they are also familiar with the discourse on Economists. 
But there are certain aspects of this discourse that are disconcerting to the critical 
reader. It seems to be structured along, on the one hand, an axis of substantial 
approval vs. rejection, and along another axis of autonomy vs. reduction to 
circumstances in terms of situating developments in Economics socially. Positions 
on both axes of analysis seem to coincide and to overlap, so that writers who 
approve of the content and direction of Economics  tend to concede a large degree 
of autonomy (or, perhaps better, indeterminacy) to its scientific outputs (Ebenstein 
2001; Caldwell 2003; Ebenstein 2007), whereas those who disagree with the 
coherence and outlook of prominent economic writing also tend to link it to outside 
interests (Mirowski 1989; Plehwe, Walpen, and Neunhöffer 2006; Mirowski and 
Plehwe 2009; Mirowski 2014). Philip Mirowski for example links the mathematisation 
of western Economics discourse in the early 20th century to “[…] a fervent desire to 
apply the scientific method to the social betterment of mankind […]“ (1989: 152) 
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but also to the availability of money and posts related to this research. More 
examples could easily be cited, such as Mirowski’s exposure of the ‘double 
standards’, inconsistencies of thinking, links to business, and other failures, of the 
‘neoliberal thought collective’ (see Mirowski 2014: 68-83), or again Plehwe and 
Walpen’s (2006: 27-50) analysis of the entanglement of the intellectuals of the 
Mont Pelerin Society with various think tanks and universities which makes for “[…] 
an expansive network that ranges across diverse institutional arenas, including 
academic, business, politics and media.” (ibid.: 39). 
 
It is evident that in these approaches what happens in the mind of these Economists 
and between them in closed intellectual discussions (the ‘internal’) and what sort 
of support and associations their intellectual products eventually draw in the wider 
world (the ‘external’) are everything but clear in their relationship to one another. 
If what these (and other) Economists thought is inconsistent, irrational, not backed 
up by facts and so on, why and how did they arrive at it anyway? Are they simply 
stupid, incapable of moving beyond an intellectual world in which everything has to 
be formalised and geared towards individual utility maximisation? Are they perhaps 
cynics who somehow act out what they preach, and take any opportunity to gain 
posts, money, status and power, whatever the cost? Or even both? These are 
important questions that, in my view, tend to be dodged when dealing with 
academic Economists. And one cannot help but to wonder whether the sarcastic 
undertones in which the writings of Philip Mirowski are drenched are not the signs 
of an essentially embittered, frustrated and deep non-understanding of those 
individuals whom he – and here he is a role-model for others in a similar 
predicament - so aggressively shuns and dismisses. 
The questions, however, remain. Why do mainstream Economists think what they 
think? What forces make them choose this kind of reasoning? How do they justify for 
themselves and others their links to businesses, parties, think tanks and the like? 
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The Task of Sociology 
 
It therefore seems reasonable to utilise specific intellectual tools that are capable 
of providing clearer and more fruitful answers to these questions, and which entail 
the taking up of a fresh attitude towards this object. Sociology, and in particular 
the Sociology of Knowledge, seems exceptionally equipped to this task. Unlike other 
disciplines, it tends to entail an empathetic understanding of its objects-subjects 
(Dilthey 1977), the process of ‘putting oneself into the shoes of the other’ by 
theoretical and empirical means, while also trying to situate the knowledge socially 
(Mannheim 1948[1929]). Indeed, the Sociology of Knowledge is the sustained effort 
to investigate and to understand the link between specific social conditions of 
existence and forms of thought which, especially when it comes to matters of 
science, are used to justify (directly or indirectly) forms of power or domination 
(Weber 1978[1922]). However, the complexity of these issues demands a 
multifarious approach: in for a penny, in for a pound. That also means that there 
will have to be numerous sociological specialities engaged in this endeavour, 
including the sociologies of culture, stratification and education. The point is to 
connect material conditions of existence with habits of thought, and so to develop 
a better and more scientifically grounded understanding, perhaps even empathy, 
for academic Economists.   
 
Yet, unfortunately, empathy seems not what most Economists can count on when 
being objectified by Sociologists, who tend to follow their colleagues from History, 
Philosophy and Political Science in the aggressive-rejecting attitude described 
above (see for instance Maeβe 2015, 2016). The empathy of Sociologists, more or 
less openly, in practice tends to be restricted to those groups with whom they can 
easily empathise. Within academic Economics, these tend to be heterodox, 
marginalised groups. In the course of this sociologists often enough become quasi-
Economists, engaging in the discourse for or against specific epistemologies or 
models, aligning themselves with heterodox Economists to bring about the 
‘revolution’ that they hope for. This often also implies a dilution of the original 
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sociological techniques and epistemological standpoints. Nevertheless, the 
discipline’s tools offer a great potential and treasure that is all too seldom tapped. 
Indeed, it seems that Sociologists have absolutely no reason to needlessly (that is, 
not coming out of their own logic of reasoning) imitate foreign approaches to 
objectification and verification, whether coming from Economics (orthodox or 
heterodox), other Social Sciences or from outside academia altogether (Inglis and 
Howson 2002). Sociology is truly a sleeping giant (and often, unfortunately, also a 
truly sleeping giant), and great gains can be made by putting its tools to work. I will 
therefore take a position towards my object that might be compared to that of a 
criminal defence lawyer towards the defendant in a trial (indeed, within social 
scientific discourse outside of Economics, a negative verdict seems to prevail 
before the hearings). I want to make better understandable to the reader why it is 
that Economists have this peculiar way of viewing the world, and what might be the 
sociological causes and processes involved. In doing so I hope to provide to the 
wider audience what might be called ‘mitigating circumstances’. Without denying 
the problems and harms that economic thinking can cause when applied to reality 
(MacKenzie 2008), I wish to make a contribution towards understanding how it 
comes about that Economists think and do what they do. That essentially entails 
the attempt to contextualise the views of Economists within their wider social and 
intellectual environment, beyond polemics and beyond the scientific consecration 
of prejudices. 
 
Confessions 
 
I have to confess that my choice of Bourdieusian field theory springs from my deep 
belief and perhaps almost reflex to link cultural practices to material interests, to 
‘economise’ them, so to speak. I know that, as somebody with a male petit-
bourgeois origin, this can lead to a short-circuit in which practices are reduced to 
their material interests, and the agents of these interests reduced in particular to 
devious theatre-players – and this all the more so with those agents who are 
dominant in a particular social field, in particular the one in which one is situated 
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oneself. Still, I also believe that there are ways to evolve from this position towards 
a more nuanced, more fruitful and more scientific position, as there are different 
paths for people with different social and sociological starting points that, I think, 
converge in the process of scientific maturation (something that can be viewed, I 
believe, with so many famous Sociologists of the most diverse schools). So I present 
to you the path taken here, without holding that this is the only path, but with the 
hope that we may meet each other ‘on the other side’.   
 
The second thing to notice is that in order to write about academic Economics in a 
sociological way, one should know it in terms of its discourses, basic schools, history 
and current topics. Unlike what Bruno Latour (Latour and Woolgar 1986[1979]) 
implies, it is not always helpful to be a stranger to universes that one wishes to 
investigate, even though it has its advantages. It would, however, be best if one 
could combine both a familiarity with academic Economics and the strangeness of 
view won by sociological objectification. I have to state right away that I have no 
advanced expertise in academic Economics. As an individual I shared the feelings of 
alienation and rejection of my colleagues in Sociology and elsewhere towards much 
of (western) academic Economics, the world-view that is attached to it and the 
methods used to control and to develop it. But I have not always thought in this 
way – indeed I did study Business Administration and Political Economy as minors 
during my initial degrees in Germany. Back then it seemed to me to be a pragmatic 
choice (Political Economy in particular), combining my interest in politics and wider 
societal issues with the decent professional prospects one (allegedly) has with this 
sort of knowledge certified in a Diploma.1 It kept all the options for future career 
tracks open, just as Sociology promised to do, according to the sources I consulted 
at the time. I originally pondered over studying History or Philosophy but did not 
take these in the end because they seemed too risky for me, not secure enough. 
Furthermore, my grades did not allow study of another interest of mine (veterinary 
medicine), whilst engineering subjects seemed to me too dry and formalistic, so 
                                                           
1 The Diploma (Ger: Diplom) was, alongside the Magister which was awarded in most Humanities 
disciplines, one of the pre-Bologna-reform degrees. It was roughly equivalent to a Masters-degree. I 
should clarify that these were students’ first degrees, rather than the Bachelor degrees that take 
this place in the Anglo-American systems.  
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that I went, in the end, with a combination of Sociology and Political Economy. This 
provided me with a thorough insight into academic Economics in terms of its initial 
education as well as with a certain further knowledge of the depths of academic 
Economics. Eventually, I came to wonder about how and why Economics students, 
especially those who seemed most successful and/or most at ease with their 
subject, came to this discipline at all, and in the end decided to approach this topic 
in the context of a PhD, the results of which the reader can assess here. I will also 
admit that, here too, my reflections comprised interests that were both pecuniary 
(for it was easier to obtain funding for a topic that involved academic Economists 
and the research into what they think) and intellectual (for I genuinely aimed at 
making a contribution to this knowledge within the realm of the Sociology of 
Science and Knowledge). In this respect the postgraduate choice was similar to my 
earlier choice of academic Sociology, thus trying to facilitate the convergence of 
my own intellectual interests with broader societal, or sociological, concerns. 
 
Choice of Subjects 
 
In the light of this it seemed necessary, in order to ensure a certain intellectual 
depth for the project, to shift the attention from the investigation of ‘mature’ 
Economists to those apprentice Economists whose level of education and actual 
practice I had most experience of during my initial studies. I therefore quickly 
lowered my sights - given the non-feasibility of researching what are often highly 
technical, mathematised symbols of a specific social universe - to the study of the 
formation of that taste and preference for just this way of thinking. This seems all 
the more important and necessary since the processes, the factors and decisions 
that form and compound these preferences are very important direction-setters for 
the eventual academic Economics that these scientists will produce (what Max 
Weber calls switches, see Ringer 2004: 146f.).  
 
We must first try to figure out how and why specific groups of people choose 
certain subjects and not others. That entails both a thorough engagement with the 
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existing (here: mainly British and German) literature on the topic, as well as its 
theoretical formulation of study choice. The reader will find both in chapters 2 and 
3, respectively. Against these approaches, I will, for the rest of the work, attempt 
to construct a Bourdieusian theory of study choice, developed on the example of 
certain German Economics students. This means first to formulate the specific 
epistemological principles of a Bourdieusian theory of the educational and scientific 
field which directs specific enquiries into the state of German higher education and 
academia, as well as Economics’/Economist’s position in it both in contemporary 
and historical terms (chapter 4). On the base of this ‘objective’ positioning of the 
subject and its representatives within German academia, it is possible to interface 
it with the ‘subjective’ world-views and attitudes of its up-and-coming scientists. 
Using semi-structured interviews with selected Economics students, this is first 
done with regard to other subjects (chapter 5), and finally with regard to the 
differences within Economics (chapters 6 to 8). These chapters represent first 
tentative steps towards a specifically Bourdieusian theory of study choice 
(Bourdieusian because three particular habitus are held to be central to explain and 
to understand the student’s selections and the state of German Economics). These 
tentative steps are summarised and their theoretical consequences, ensuing 
research questions and conditions for verification spelled out in the concluding 
section (chapter 9).   
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PART I - Objectivations   
 
 
You know, when I write, I fear many things, that is to say many wrong readings. 
That explains the complexity of my sentences, with has often been complained 
about. I try to discourage in advance the wrong readings that I can often predict. 
But the precautions that I insert in a parenthesis, an adjective or a use of 
quotation marks only reach those who don’t need them. And in a complex analysis, 
everyone selects the aspect that disturbs him least. 
Pierre Bourdieu – Sociology in Question   
[…] the intellectual world is a terrain where we are particularly exposed to using 
operational definitions as an unconscious manner of satiating social pulsions of 
categorisation, of labelling, and where the uncontrolled construction of the object 
allows us to exclude those who do not fit the image that we have, or would like to 
have, of ourselves.   
Pierre Bourdieu  - For a Socioanalysis of Intellectuals  
 
It is obvious that in order to say anything about study choice sociologically, 
one needs to turn towards the existing literature for advice and guidance, if only 
not to ‘invent the wheel twice’. But at the same time, as a Bourdieusian 
perspective was adopted for this research, I will try to formulate the usual critical 
assessment of this literature in the style of rational polemics in the Bachelardian 
sense (Bachelard 1980[1940]). I will proceed as follows: I will first describe what I 
perceive to be the conceptual divisions structuring the work hitherto on study 
choice and relationship to subject mainly in German and British Social Science2. I 
will try to show what I believe to be the partial quality and ethnocentric tendency 
of these concepts and their rootedness in a specific form of an individualistic 
                                                           
2 This includes contributions from Sociology, Psychology, Pedagogy, but also Economics. 
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philosophy/epistemology of the Social by embarking on an in-depth analysis of some 
characteristic studies of both currents of thought. I will attempt to trace each of 
them from their social philosophy and its inherent assumptions to the 
methodologies and research operations that give rise to the eventual results and 
interpretations of those results. For this I will use a form of presentation which 
operates on two levels: the first level offers a rather conventional reading of the 
existing literature. The second level represents a counterpoint to the first and is 
inserted in the form of framed boxes, in which I contrast what I believe to be 
genuine Bourdieusian epistemological positions with the ones used in the 
established literature.     
 
I will indeed argue that all of these positions are profoundly influenced by the 
original social philosophies that may be characterised as variants of subjectivism. 
These, I will hold, give rise to variants of ethnocentrism.  
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Chapter 2 – The German Literature on Study Choice 
 
The Break   
 
Identifying, and breaking with, unquestioned and unexamined presuppositions of 
thought is a vital starting point for any enquiry performed in the Bourdieusian 
spirit, especially when one deals with very self-confident, outspoken exponents of 
science and perspectives (see for example Fourcade 2009: 63-72).  
 
“All techniques for performing breaks- logical critique of ideas, statistical testing 
of spurious self-evidences, radical and methodical challenging of appearances- 
remain powerless, however, until one has overthrown the very principle of 
spontaneous sociology, i.e. the philosophy of knowledge of the social and of 
human action on which it is based. Sociology cannot constitute itself as a science 
truly separated from common-sense notions unless it combats the systematic 
pretention of spontaneous sociology with the organized resistance of a theory of 
knowledge of the social whose principles contradict, point by point, the 
presuppositions of the naïve philosophy of the social.” (Bourdieu, Chamboredon, 
and Passeron 1991[1968]: 15). 
 
It is obvious to many Sociologists and Social Scientists working in the field of the 
Sociology of study choice and/or academic Economics that one of the doxic 
assumptions of Economics discourse is its individualistic, monistic view as to how 
knowledge is arrived at and how and why people act. Much less often, however, is 
the critical gaze turned back onto those who themselves gaze critically at the 
‘bigger brother’ of Economics. Therefore, I want to first present, in a synoptic 
schema (Figure 1), what, in my view, are the major divisions structuring the 
perception and the work of German and British Sociologists as well as other Social 
Scientists when they think about the choice of academic discipline that young 
21 
 
people perform, the relationship they have to this subject when studying it, and in 
turn its relationship to their cultural traits and to the tradition of the discipline. In 
a word, these divisions seem to me to be a culturally idiosyncratic system of 
oppositions, interrelated but not completely (i.e. logically) reducible to one 
another, related in their kind to that what Bourdieu found for the Kabyles (for 
example in the Logic of Practice, 1992[1980]: 216-23). It is these dichotomies that 
immediately and ‘naturally’ seem to come to the mind of the Social Scientist when 
he thinks about study choice, student life style, relationship to subject and student 
cultures. They are, however, rarely reflected upon. 
 
Of these, the division between intrinsic and extrinsic study motivations and 
attitudes seems the most wide-spread, at least where German Sociological 
literature on the topic is concerned. Paul Windolf, for instance, in his article on 
disciplinary culture and study choice (1992) builds on the Parsonian 4-tier-typology 
of specialised vs. generalist knowledge and practice vs. theory (Parsons and Platt 
1973) to derive a model of academic disciplinary cultures to which there exists, he 
argues, an ‘elective affinity’ on the side of the students and their motivations, 
which are internalised ‘norms and values’ (Windolf 1992: 77f.)3. Developing the 
Weberian distinction of value rationality vs. purposive rationality, he effectively 
models students’ motivations after the subjective goals of practicing scientists: 
“The ‘pure’ scientist, who conducts his research without consideration of practical 
interests of application, follows a different rationality of action than a management 
consultant for whom ‘truth’ only in rare cases is a criterion of decision.” (ibid. : 77, 
my translation). Thus, the student who declares that she studies a certain subject 
out of interest in itself is to be seen as expressing an ‘intrinsic professional 
motivation’ (ibid. : 80, my translation), whereas the student who admits that his 
studies, for him, are a mere stepping stone towards “[…] success, high income, 
social ascension, prestige and a secure living perspective […]” (ibid.), is to be 
labelled as the ‘extrinsic’ type. 
                                                           
3 All of the English expressions taken from studies in German in this chapter have been translated by 
me. 
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Figure 1   System of Oppositions structuring the Perception/Investigation of 
educational or Study Choice and Relationship to Subject for German/British 
Sociologists and various Economists 
Intrinsic Extrinsic 
Soft  Hard 
Communicative Non-communicative 
Altruistic Egoistic 
Non-alienating Alienating 
Loose Rigid 
Reflexive Unreflexive 
   
 
In the same vein, Peisert, Bargel and Framheim (1988: 105-16), conducting a (still 
on-going, regular) nation-wide survey of students of all disciplinary groups, 
structure their empirical investigation after the same dichotomy: “It is often 
discussed whether students are led, in their choice of subject, more by their 
interests and talents or whether the applicability of the studies on the labour 
market is more important to them.” (ibid. : 105, my translation). In their 
preliminary discussion of the results of their study, they state: “Among the motives 
of study choice the interests and talents (intrinsic motivation) have a clear priority 
over income- and work-related ambitions (extrinsic motives).” (ibid. : 32f., my 
translation). 
 
Georg, Sauer and Wöhler (2009) make the same distinction: “. An extrinsic study 
motivation consists in the expected consequences of the studies, like income […], 
security of employment […], social prestige […] and a certain profession […]. The 
motivation thus springs from the use that the studies have for later career plans 
and less from the contents of the study subject. Intrinsically motivated are, 
however, students whose interests mainly relates to the study subject […] and its 
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knowledge stock. Here the scientific education and not a concrete career plan are 
in the foreground. The development of abilities and interests […], to expand one’s 
own horizon […] and to get a good scientific education […] are important for the 
students. Moreover, there is an interest in getting to know like-minded students 
[…].” (ibid. : 358, emphases in the text, my translation). 
 
Großmann’s analysis of study motivations (2012) uses the very same opposition as 
the base upon which to build his argument and empirical investigation. He describes 
the ‘intrinsic motivation’: “It is assumed that study motivations correspond with the 
value orientations of the bearer [of the motivations]. So that one will find that 
students with a general conviction of self-fulfilment have a study motivation which 
aims above all for the unfolding of one’s person and realisation of respective 
ideas.” (ibid. : 447, my translation). As opposed to this there is the ‘extrinsic 
motivation’: “The studies above all serve to get an academic degree, through which 
one hopes for better income chances, chances of ascent and good labour market 
chances. This type points primarily to a material direction and should also 
encompass interests in social security.” (ibid., my translation). 
 
This general perceptive lens seems very prevalent within German social scientific 
literature on the topic. Thus Preisser’s article on study choice (1990) also uses the 
same divide, for example distinguishing between (and thus empirically producing) 
‘inclination’ (the ‘intrinsic’) and ‘prestigious professional standing’ (the ‘extrinsic’) 
as options in an empirical survey on the topic (ibid. : 56ff.,this and all following my 
translation). Schölling (2003), in his work inspired by Bourdieusian thinking, uses 
the same categories. American scholars like Michèle Lamont (2009) , even though in 
reference to a slightly different context (that of committees deciding about 
research money), make a very similar distinction. 
 
It can be seen that this primary dichotomy is associated with secondary divisions in 
the German social scientific works on study choice and relationship to discipline. 
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Liebau and Huber most openly exhibit this combination of the antinomies when they 
contrast different disciplinary ‘cultures’: “It immediately […] suggests itself to 
grasp these [disciplinary] worlds as cultures, as distinguishable relationships, 
systematically connected in themselves, of perception, thought, evaluation and 
action patterns. […] The rough distinctions among the disciplines force themselves 
upon [the observer]. ” (1985: 315,all terms here and forthcoming my translation). 
Thus, they deem the Social Sciences and Humanities to be more ‘communicative’ 
(and less ‘hierarchical’) than the rather ‘non-communicative’ Economics and 
Engineering Sciences (ibid. : 319). Likewise, the former are more ‘loosely framed’ 
as against the ‘rigid’ latter ones (ibid. : 321). Study strategies in the former are 
more ‘independent’ and ‘integrative’ as opposed to the ‘utility-oriented’ and 
‘strategic’ orientation of Economics and Engineering students.  (ibid. : 322ff.). 
Similarly, Köhler and Gapski (1997) investigate the relationship of the Life-world of 
students to their disciplinary studies by taking one ‘hard’ discipline (chemistry) and 
one ‘soft’ discipline (history). Elsewhere, Peisert et.al. (1988: 147-49) also assign to 
the Humanities and Social Sciences the label ‘friendly-communicative’, whereas 
Economics and Law are characterised by their ‘rough climate of competition’. The 
same disciplines make up the distinction between politically apathetic vs. 
politically active disciplines (ibid.: 242f.). A similar division in regards to alienation 
was made earlier by Portele (1981: 138ff.). 
 
An analogous distinction can be found in much of the British literature on 
educational choice, which are very often pursued in a Bourdieusian vein. Here, 
however, the focus is on whether the observed practices are reflexive with regard 
to specific educational and social history of the persons or not. See, for instance, 
the works of Diane Reay and her colleagues (Reay et al. 2001; Reay, David, and Ball 
2005; Reay, Crozier, and James 2011) but also related works (such as Bathmaker et 
al. 2016).4 The reflexive-unreflexive (or determined) dyad, in this case, takes the 
place of the opposition between intrinsic and extrinsic motivations. 
                                                           
4 I will engage in a discussion about the meaning of ‘reflexive’ in the next chapter. 
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Thinking in these sorts of dichotomies is certainly not restricted to Sociology or 
Social Psychology or Pedagogy alone. Further examples of the intrinsic-extrinsic 
divide adopted and applied can be found in pedagogical work, such as in Liebau 
(Liebau 1982: 99) Liebau and Huber (1985: 322f.) and Portele (1981: 21, 76). It can 
be found in Economics as well when it deals with the relationships of its students 
and its teaching. But these dichotomies take on a different form there: Is studying 
or teaching Economics making people more egoistic or not? The question, posed 
among others by authors like Rubinstein (2006), Frank et.al. (1993), Marwell and 
Ames (1981) or Frey et.al. (1993), effectively also narrows down the way to view 
study choice, and the effect of studies exclusively in terms of mutually exclusive 
categories and concepts of thought. 
The list of authors using this basic dichotomy could easily be extended. What can, 
what must, study choice and relationship to subject inevitably be, to these authors? 
Here we have a forced choice, one between “[…] inward; genuine; inherent; 
essential, belonging to the point at issue […]” (Chambers 2011: 800) and “[…] 
external, not contained in or belonging to a body; foreign; not essential […]” (ibid.: 
548), that is imposed a priori to the topic of study choice and relationship to 
studies. What justifies this di-vision of student motives? Is it a Popperian-style 
context of discovery which does not need further elaboration since it is part of the 
‘private’, cognitive assumptions of the Social Scientist who merely needs to prove 
(or falsify) his theories? Or is it understandable, socio-logically, as an outflow of 
The habitus is a system of cognitive structures and guides that informs social practice and is 
produced by specific social structures, in a specific and limited, historically contingent culture. The 
habitus structures the perception of the social world and thus helps to (re-)produce it. It can be 
shown empirically that these cognitive structures are often organized around mutually exclusive, 
yet complementary dichotomies, such as the raw and the cooked, or male and female, or day and 
night (Levi-Strauss, Bourdieu). The arbitrary, contingent character of these dichotomies is often 
not apparent to those who apply them. They have become doxa. 
“Doxa is the relationship of immediate adherence that is established in practice between a habitus 
and the field to which it is attuned, the pre-verbal taking-for-granted of the world that follow from 
practical sense.” (Bourdieu 1992[1980]: 68, emphasis in the text).  
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social positions and judgements which are, or at least were, part of the same 
universes which are claimed to be grasped objectively? 
 
 
Doubt 
 
The divisions introduced in figure 1, though often enough part of a seemingly 
rigorous empirical, quantitative study, are themselves never really scrutinised. 
Instead, they seem rather hastily assumed. Nevertheless, it might be worth asking 
what it means to make an ‘intrinsic’, ‘altruistic’ or ‘egoistic’ study choice, to 
choose ‘soft’ or ‘hard’ subjects, or to be ‘reflexive’ of social structures, in the 
sociological sense. And that would imply to ask about the history of these concepts 
as well as their real explanatory power.  
At first, the answers to these questions seem obvious. An intrinsic study choice, for 
example, is evidently done for its own sake (like l’art pour l’art). Egoistic choices 
are done evidently for pecuniary or other gain. And, in terms of hard and soft 
subjects, one might refer to the evident degree of codification of the curriculum, 
for example how mathematised it is. Indeed, the literature discussed above takes 
the experiences of ‘actors’ as well as official common-sense definitions very 
seriously. 
 
 As we will see, the contentious point concerns the word ‘evidently’. In each of the 
divisions discussed above (and below), it refers to actions or attitudes that are 
seemingly clear in definition and meaning. Everybody (or most people, anyway) 
‘knows’ what an ‘intrinsic’ or ‘egoistic’ or ‘reflexive’ choice is. There is a certain 
everyday consensus that Social Science students are more ‘communicative’, ‘soft’ 
and ‘reflexive’ than, say, Informatics or Physics students. But that is exactly where 
the problem lies, in the common sense foundation of these concepts. The problem 
is one of nominalism (Kolakowski 1972[1966]: 13-16) or what Bourdieu called the 
effects of doxa.    
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Types of Students 
 
Who, then, are the more ‘intrinisic’, ‘communicative’,’non-alienated’,’altruistic’ 
students and disciplines, and what are the ‘softer’ sciences? What sort of empirical 
Social Science is erected on the basis of the divisions presented in the last section?  
The basic oppositions shown in Figure 1 are usually transformed into statements on 
study motivation, satisfaction with the curriculum, professional goals, political 
involvement at various levels, and other study-related issues that are put to the 
students, mostly in the form of surveys. I present here only one way to 
operationalise empirically the above stated system of oppositions on the question of 
study motivation as it is used by the Konstanz Student Survey, a long-term 
Germany-wide survey on students that has been running for 30 years now (see for 
example Ramm and Multrus 2014; KonstanzStudentSurvey 1983-2013). One 
immediately sees that options 1 and 3 – special interest and own talent, skills- are 
put to work in this survey as indicators for an ‘intrinsic’ motivation, whereas 
options 2 and 6 and 7 – income chances, secure employment and the chance to get 
into an executive position later on- are the operationalised indicators for an 
‘extrinisic’ motivation. The other options- fixed professional aspiration, variety of 
professional abilities, and 2nd choice option due to non-admission for 1st choice 
studies, are neither completely attributable to one or the other. What happens 
usually in these studies, then, is that certain ideal-types of study motivation are 
constructed or ‘discovered’ by way of exploratory statistical methods (i.e. factorial 
analyses) which are expressed in various statements like the ones shown in Figure 2. 
Paul Windolf (1992: 79-82), in his widely circulated study of 1st year-students in 
South-West Germany, for example, constructs four types of study motivation which 
allegedly match with what the researchers define as four ‘disciplinary cultures’:  
1. Career: Studies are here perceived as a mere tool, a stepping stone towards “[…] 
success, high income, social ascension, prestige and a secure life perspective […]” 
(ibid.: 79f., for this quote and all following my translation).  
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Figure 2   Question for Study Reasons as appearing like this or similar to this in 
many German sociological Surveys on Study Choice 
 
   How important were the following reasons for your decision to study your current subject? 
(from 0-very unimportant to 6-very important) 
 
 
 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1-Special Interest for the 
subject………………………………………………………………… 
       
2-Income Chances in later 
employment……………………………………………………… 
       
3-Own talent, skills………………………………………………………………        
4-Fixed professional aspiration………………………………………        
5-Variety of professional possibilities through these 
studies............................ 
       
6-Good prospects/outlook for secure 
employment........................................... 
       
7-Good prospects/outlook for executive position later 
on................................ 
       
8-2nd  Choice option, since not admitted to aspired 
studies.............................. 
       
 
 It is options 2 and 6 which, among other options, correlate very highly with this 
motivational pattern. Of course the motivational pattern, for Windolf, is clearly 
‘extrinsic’ here. Furthermore the students tend to be more ‘conformist’  
2. Lifestyle: Students here lack orientation, don’t know where to go in life, 
something that Windolf calls ‘anomie’. Neither science or professional practice are 
appealing to them. The type is represented by statements such as: “Via 
commencing studies I want to win time to come to grips with my future plans” 
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(ibid.: 80). In addition, students are labelled as rather ‘non-conformist’ because 
being a student becomes a ‘lifestyle’ in itself to them.   
3. Reform: The emphasis in this ideal-type is on the practical use of science for 
‘healing and helping’. Windolf attests a clear orientation towards ‘value rationality’ 
against the ‘extrinsic’ functionalism and purposive rationality of type 1. Clearly, for 
him there is “[…] an intrinsic professional motivation to be expected.” (ibid.: 81). 
This type correlates very highly with statements like: “I expect to gain insights 
about societal problems and relationships.” (ibid.). 
4. Science: Actors here are interested in ‘pure’ science ‘for its own sake’. There are 
very high correlations with options 1 and 3. Windolf thus concludes that “[…] there 
can be assumed to be an intrinsic motivation.” (ibid.: 82). 
 
As is to be expected, the types created or constructed do not vary too much in their 
outlook in other studies. Großmann distinguishes between the ‘status-oriented’ (a 
clear parallel to Windolf’s career-type), the ‘developmental/creative’ (the reform 
one in Windolf’s work), the ‘science-oriented type (very similar to type 4 above) 
and the ‘traditional type’. (Grossmann 2012: 447-50). Georg et.al., including not 
only study motivation but also other cultural preferences such as clothing and music 
taste, produce the types of ‘anti-conventional moratorium’ (close to Windolf’s type 
2), ‘creative cultivation’, ‘culture-distanced materialists’ and ‘career, prestige and 
high culture’ (the latter two being close to Windolf’s ‘careerists’ and Großmann’s 
‘status-oriented’) (Georg, Sauer, and Wöhler 2009: 358-65, as always my 
translation).  
    
The Ethnocentrism of a Profession? 
 
The empirical matching of the types extracted by ‘exploration’ from the students’ 
answers within the various disciplines reveals a quite uniform picture throughout 
the surveyed literature. In short, it is the Sciences, the Social Sciences and 
Humanities which are taken to have the least ‘extrinsic’ students, whereas Law and 
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the Economic Sciences have the most ‘extrinsic’ students. In Windolf’s study 
(Windolf 1992: 82-89), it is Economics and, secondarily, Law, which are chosen 
most by the ‘careerist’ type of students (type 1 above), whereas the students in the 
natural sciences are most likely to be ‘scientists’ (type 4). The Cultural Sciences 
and Social Sciences are likely to be ‘lifestyle’ or ‘reformer’ (esp. the latter) 
students (types 2 and 3 respectively). In any case, they “[…] have chosen their 
subject not in order to make a career […]” (ibid.: 84). In the same vein, Georg 
et.al. (Georg, Sauer, and Wöhler 2009: 362-65) find that most students that they 
classify as falling into the ‘anti-conventional moratorium’ type are Science (and 
secondarily Sociology) students. They attest that they have “[…] a proximity to a 
released protest culture and the rejection of established consumption-oriented 
disciplinary cultures (ibid.: 363). It is Sociologists which make up most of the 
students of the ‘creative cultivation’ type, a camp which, according to Georg et.al. 
exhibits “[…] style consciousness, creativity and cultural-social orientation […]” 
(ibid.). Again, it is Law students that most comprise the ‘extrinsic’ camp of ‘career, 
prestige and high culture’. They also have a high share of ‘culture-distanced 
materialists’ for which Georg et.al. formulate the ‘characteristic’ statement: “I 
want a good income, a secure employment and a high social status.” (ibid.). 
 
Preisser, who foregoes type-construction, nevertheless also records empirically the 
lack of agreement on the part of German Economics students (relative to those 
students of other disciplines) with ‘intrinsic’ statements such as ‘I study my subject 
out of special interest’ (option 1 in Figure 2) and the high level of agreement with 
‘extrinsic’ statements such as ‘I want to have a proper professional standing later 
on (1990: 56-60). Peisert et.al. (1988) make just the same observation, slotting 
Economics into the ‘extrinsic’, the Social Sciences and Humanities into the 
‘intrinsic’ camp: “The disciplines of the Social Sciences/Social Affairs (as the 
Humanities) form, with their eminently dominant orientation towards interests, the 
one pole, whereas the Economic sciences of both higher education forms [i.e. 
universities and polytechnics], with frequently ‘economically’-driven study choice 
motives, forms the other pole.” (ibid.: 32f.). 
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It is the Economists who draw a more nuanced picture of their own students, 
although they, too, acknowledge the differences between Economics students and 
others (Frank, Gilovich, and Regan 1993: 160f.; Frey and Meier 2003: 457f.; 
Rubinstein 2006: C3f.). 
 
On the other hand, educational scientists and social psychologists are perhaps the 
most outspoken and pronounced in their typology of certain groups of subjects. 
Liebau and Huber for example, in their Bourdieusian-inspired analysis of the culture 
of disciplines, group these into three main groups. First, there is ‘the cultural 
sphere’, made up by the Humanities. The orientation here is clearly ‘intrinsic’: 
“Within the students of these subjects orientations of professional autonomy, 
societal betterment and self-development prevail- overall, then, the emphatic 
study orientations for a professional practice, emphatically understood, prevail.” 
(Liebau and Huber 1985: 329). Then, second, there is ‘the social space’, epitomised 
by Law students. These are the ‘producers of order’, of norm-making through 
interpretation. Liebau and Huber find ‘power-related, strategic action’ here, and 
furthermore a ‘power-related internal structure’. The studies are largely 
‘instrumentalised’, the picture painted of these students- and the discipline- rather 
gloomy: “[It] is not the gaining of a new insight, rather the enforcement of one’s 
own opinion in the publications of the court which forms the main point of 
reference of ‘success’.” (ibid.: 331). Almost needless to say that they locate the 
discipline of Law and its students in the ‘extrinsic’ camp, since they have “[…] a 
largely functionally interpreted professional practice.” (ibid.). Lastly, they form 
‘the economic sphere’, including Economics, the Sciences and Engineering. Here 
they see ‘unified paradigms’, ‘pronounced’ hierarchies’, in a word, again ‘extrinsic’ 
motivations: “A strategic study and professional motivation oriented on individual 
utility […]” (ibid.: 332ff.).   
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As opposed to this, other sciences appear as a beacon of light: “[…] text 
appropriation with a view to the foundational meaning […] linking of ideas, 
association, analogy (relating ideas), intrinsic motivation, independent attitude 
towards the curriculum regulations, altogether ‘comprehension learning’ are […] to 
be found relatively more often with students of the Humanities, then also Social 
Sciences, than with those of the Natural and Engineering Sciences.” (ibid.: 322f., 
emphasis in the original). 
 
Gerhard Portele’s work on alienation with scientists comes to a conclusion similar in 
spirit: For him, it is the Humanities and Social Sciences which are ‘meta-
theoretical’, ‘critical’, ‘self-conscious’, in short non-alienated. On the other side 
are the power- and violence-riddled natural sciences, unable to reflect properly on 
what they are doing. (Portele 1981: 21, 76, 138ff.).  
 
Thus, from a taken for granted distinction between ‘intrinsic’ and ‘extrinsic’ study 
motivation and the associated oppositions, which is indeed ‘perfectly clear’ and 
intuitive, these Social Scientists have been led, via the ‘explorative’ construction of 
types of students and/or disciplines, to something that can be considered, from a 
sceptic’s viewpoint, as ethnocentric. What ‘protest culture’, ‘creative cultivation’, 
‘critical political attitude’, in short all the associated characteristics and concepts 
(and their negative counterparts), designate is always a specific culture which is 
presented as the epitomisation of scientificity and whose material basis and 
preconditions are not really investigated. This implicitly ethical position is reflected 
also in the very vocabulary used. The notion of ‘extrinsic’ study motivation can 
refer positively to a rationality of action which indeed sees one’s studies merely as 
a stepping stone towards money, status or whatever. But it can also carry a 
normative assessment in it as well that, unconsciously, devalues and derides these 
motivations as ‘not essential’, not ‘sincere’, indeed not ‘genuine’. The same is 
true, a contrario, of ‘intrinsic’. And it can be seen how these unchecked, 
ambiguous concepts produce empirical results and analyses which are equally 
ambiguous. Thus when Paul Windolf tries to answer the question what exactly 
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disciplinary cultures are by referring to “[…] a syndrome of attitudes and norms 
[…]” (1992: 96f.), this can refer to a sociologically pertinent group of 
characteristics that belong together, but also to a pattern of disease, of indicators 
of ‘being sick’ (Duden 2010: 1014). Eckart Liebau shows this even more clearly 
when he attests that Economics students have an ‘authoritarian syndrome’ (1982: 
103). Likewise, when Peisert et.al. declare Economics and Law students to be 
‘conventional democrats’ in their political engagement and orientations, opposed 
to the ‘critical democrats’ (which can mean ‘progressive’, ‘more scientific’ for 
example) who can be found in the Cultural Sciences and Social Sciences (1988: 
273), they refer to ‘sticking to existing conventions’ on a positive level. But they 
also inevitably also evoke the normative side of this phrase, i.e. being stiff, 
ordinary, usual, not special, not going to the heart of the matter (Duden 2010: 576; 
Chambers 2011: 340). And don’t Georg et.al. (2009: 363) use the term ‘culture’ 
inevitably both in the ethnological (positive) and ordinary (normative) way when 
they deem certain Sociology and law students to be ‘culture-distanced 
materialists’? This invokes such adjectives as vulgar, uncivilised, coarse. The same 
could be said about the label ‘apathetic’ which is attached to certain students  
(like those of Engineering in the study of Peisert et.al.,1988: 242ff.) when 
discussing their degree of political interest. The word, on a positive level, can mean 
indifference, but again refers to a defect, and thus carries a normative dimension.  
 
Of course, one does not have to see the normative dimensions of these scientific 
analyses in this particular way. The same is true of the basic oppositions such as 
‘hard’ or ‘soft’, ‘rigid’ or ‘loose’ which might be used with a different meaning or 
in a different set of oppositions. One just has to look at some Economists to see 
that contrary normative meanings can be attached to the same pairs of oppositions. 
Thus one professor during the pilot interviews conducted for this study (which are 
discussed in more detail later on) expresses his conviction that Economics 
“[...] teach[es] skills, right? It teaches a way of thinking, it teaches a way how to 
do things. It's very structured, right? And it's very cumulative.” Economists 'think 
differently', even more they have a 'unique skill set' which is 'hard to understand' 
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and “[...] this is something that employers like, they like this critical thinking 
[…].” “[...] the Economists as a group think that their level of understanding and 
their academic … integrity and the quality of research they do is vastly superior, 
right, and this is largely to do with the fact that […] it's much more empirical, it's 
much more mathematical, and, and, it's much more theory-driven, right? 
[Business Administration on the other hand is] just a hotch-potch of different 
ideas, different courses put together […] right? You know, one day they are doing 
this, the other day they are doing that.” 
 
Not much different in nature are statements by some of my informants that 
Sociologists want to ‘change’ things whereas Economists want to ‘rule’ (which is 
merely an abbreviated form of the type of the ‘reformer’ and the ‘careerist’ as 
described above). 
From whatever standpoint one looks at it, then, the initial divisions seem indeed 
justified and corroborated in their analytical worth by the empirical results.  
 
 
 
 
The different groups in a given society acquire, due to the different material conditions in which 
they grow up and live in, different yet interconnected (namely via doxa) habitus and so cognitive 
guides. The groups tend to universalize their material conditions in their specific mental 
representations about the social world and to judge other groups by their own standard. This is 
called ethnocentrism. Which group is successful in imposing its mental representation, its 
assessment of specific characteristics, onto others depends on various types of resources or 
capital – economic, cultural, social and symbolic- that are used in the struggle of the groups. One 
specific kind of ethnocentrism connected to an intellectual way of life and corresponding to high 
cultural capital is ‘scholastic ethnocentrism’ which “[…] leads [the intellectual] to cancel out the 
specificity of practical logic, either by assimilating it to scholastic knowledge, but in a way that is 
ficticious and purely theoretical […], or by consigning it to radical otherness, to the non-existence 
and worthlessness of the ‘barbarous’ or the ‘vulgar’, which, as Kant’s notion of ‘barbarous taste’ 
pertinently reminds us, is nothing other than the barbarian within.” (Bourdieu 2000[1997]: 51). 
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Doubt, again 
 
One may try to arrive at an interim conclusion after this review of type 
construction. It seems at first as if the concepts discussed so far – intrinsic, 
extrinsic, altruistic, and so on – can be used very fruitfully to explain different 
attitudes between students of different disciplines, as well as to explicate the 
cultures of these disciplines. But then these data, from a different epistemological 
standpoint, can be interepreted differently as well, namely as succumbing to 
ethnocentric definitions which cast substantial groups of students, and disciplines, 
into a realm of the ‘culture-distanced’. From this view, these distinctions are 
rather premature and essentialising differences which may have a common sense, 
but not necessarily a sociological, materialistic foundation. 
That is why a closer look has to be taken at the reasons for a rejection of a more 
materialistic explanation of study choice. 
 
 
Conjectures and Refutations  
 
Among the literature discussed here, quite a few authors bring into play an 
interpretation of study choice, disciplinary cultures, value systems and relationship 
to subject that is grounded in materialistic concepts such as gender, social class, 
and the educational trajectory of the students. Windolf (1992: 90-94) for example 
tests the influence of various determinants on study choice via a multivariate 
logistic regression: “The dependent variable is the study subject; the independent 
variables are the […] listed ‘determinants’ of study choice. The analysis is supposed 
to answer the question which variables have a significant influence on study 
choice.” (ibid.: 90). Likewise, Georg et.al. (2009: 365-67) perform a logistic 
regression to test the influence of social origin on study choice. They are not alone 
in this. Van de Werfhorst et.al. (2003: 41ff.) and Bratti (2006) also perform similar 
operations. All of these come to results that ultimately reject any (or at least a 
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strong) influence of social class on study choice: the analysis ‘shows’ that “[…] 
social origin only marginally has an effect on study choice.” (Windolf 1992: 93). The 
conclusion is similarly clear for Georg et.al.: “In no group does the social class 
[Schicht] of the father play a role for the affiliation to a latent [Lifestyle] class. 
This means that the [student] life styles develop independently from the socio-
economic situation of the family of origin […] The subject-specific socialisation has 
a distinctively more pronounced influence on the life-style than social origin […].” 
(Georg, Sauer, and Wöhler 2009: 469f.).  
 
This practice reveals another assumption that all of these studies, more or less 
explicitly take, namely the linear and substantial character of social mechanisms. 
For them, a phenomenon like study choice can and must be traced back to specific 
social characteristics. Furthermore, they imply that the statements with which they 
confront the students (such as ‘I did choose my subject because I want to have a 
high-status job later on’) all have the same meaning for all the students asked. In 
short, they are nomothetic (Kolakowski 1972[1966]). Any regression analysis 
assumes the existence of ‘independent’ variables which are seen and computed in 
isolation to one another and which have a separate influence on the ‘dependent’ 
variable. This would be true in this case, for example, for the relationship between 
two important influences on study choice, i.e. the overall A-level grade and the 
social origin of the student that receives that grade. Compare this assumption, 
however, to the way in which an Economics PhD student from my interview sample 
describes the relationship of these variables in his case: 
 
 “Yes, I had a very conflict-ridden school career. Hm, yeah, so from grade 1 to 
grade 4 I was at a school for children with special needs due to behavioural 
problems, hyperactivity. As the only one of my class I went to the Gymnasium 
[high school]. […] Some teachers also said to me I wouldn’t stand half a year at 
the Gymnasium, because it’s rather atypical that someone goes from the school 
for children with special needs to the Gymnasium. These are not the pre-defined 
career paths that a student of this school should follow. Also relatively 
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clear[cut], so this I realised only afterwards, where you see how strong our 
educational system is dependent on parents. Right? Two parents who care a lot 
about education, who of course campaigned for me to make this rather atypical 
leap and to achieve it, and yeah, let’s say until grade 10 [chuckles] I was 
permanently in danger of being put off school […] As a child you don’t 
completely get what’s going on but my parents had to absorb a lot, and always 
did this […]” (Economics PhD student, app. 30 years old, male, Eastern German, 
Father PhD Engineer, executive employee at large company, Mother PhD 
engineer, executive employee at state institution, interview 24) 
 
This example, in line with much anthropological research (for example the overview 
of the manifold meanings of various symbols in different archaic cultures, see Levi-
Strauss 1966[1962]) casts doubt both on the assumption of the linearity of singular 
variables with the phenomenon at hand as well as the supposed unanimity of 
meanings for all subjects in a given society and time. 
 
One can see therefore that it is reasonable to be sceptical – both based on both 
theoretical and empirical grounds - about the separation of variables which in 
practice might operate together – in this case, the verdicts of the school system are 
counter-balanced and neutralised by their rejection on the side of the upper class 
parents, a fact that would be very different if the parents were of a different class, 
or if the same student had better grades. 
 
 
Any habitus/cognitive guide operates within culturally and temporally specific spheres of action 
and social struggle for dominance, or fields (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992: 94-115). This means 
that within these fields, a specific action or practice has a certain meaning only within it, in 
relation to it, its inhabitants and their habitus. Any practice therefore is relational and may change 
its meaning with the change of the field. The bearers or agents of habitus – the structured 
structure that is a structuring structure at the same time – tend to react to changes of the field in 
accordance with their habitus, by activating their resources, their capital, to struggle for the 
improvement or preservation of position within the fields.       
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We can therefore see that the initial individualist and substantialist epistemology is 
indeed consequently extended towards techniques of verification, and also to the 
researchers themselves. The sociologist, observing study choices statistically from 
the ‘outside’, merely records and interprets faithfully with the help of Weberian 
ideal-types what the students tick on the survey that he hands them. He deems 
himself independent, is assumed to be independent a priori due to his status.  
 
 
Interpretations without Alternatives 
 
What are the practical consequences if the aforementioned substantialist and 
individualist perspective is taken? I want to show to what kind of empirical analysis 
and interpretation it leads? For this I use data from the Konstanzer 
Studierendensurvey (KSS), a Germany-wide survey of students of all higher 
education institutions (universities and polytechnics), subject groups, semesters 
and degrees (up to the PHD degree), that has been carried out since 1983 
(AG_Hochschulforschung 1983-2013) . Of the 12 waves that have been collected in 
the meantime, I will use the last 5 (wave 8-200/2001 to wave 12-2012/13), mainly 
to assure comparability. The KSS waves contain a sample of about 39,000 students 
which is, according to the conductors of this survey, roughly representative in terms 
of regional distribution and gender-distribution of the whole German student body 
(measured against the numbers of the German federal statistical office). 
 
Each social practice has two dimensions to it – a practical, implicit and an official, explicit or 
symbolic one. Both are knowledge in the wider sense of the term, both “[…] are the product of the 
same generative schemes [habitus], [but] obey a different logic.” (Bourdieu 1992[1980]: 200f.). In 
a field, a dominant group with a high amount of field-specific capital tends to impose its specific 
combination of practical-implicit and explicit-symbolic representation of it. It has an interest (as 
any other group) in a specific symbolic representation of reality which, again, will change 
according to habitus and specific field environment. But this interest in its sociological reality will 
be usually unknown to the agents which is why it has to be recreated theoretically, with the help 
of ideal-types that might be called structural (Bourdieu, Chamboredon, and Passeron 1991[1968]: 
49f.).         
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Let us, once again, have a look at the distribution of the motivational structure of 
‘intrinsically’ and ‘extrinsically’ motivated students as they are operationalised in 
this often-utilised data-set: i.e. special interest for the subject- and - income 
choices in later employment (Figures 3 and 4). At first, it surely looks as if the 
originally presumed opposition has been ‘proven’ by the facts. In other words, it 
appears that you can clearly see differences between the different subject groups. 
On the one hand, there are the ‘intrinsic’ subjects of the Humanities and Social 
Sciences (secondarily perhaps the Sciences) where the students (or many of them, 
at least) score high on the special interest scale, but low on the importance of 
income scale. On the other hand there are the ‘extrinsic’ subjects such as Law, 
Engineering and Economics whose students score relatively low when it comes to 
the special interest in the discipline, but high when it comes to later income 
chances. Other subject groups like Medicine (which comprises human, veterinary 
medicine, and dentistry) tend to rank somewhere in the middle. All this is very well 
in line what the authors stated above have found. 
 
Of course all this is also premised on the assumption that all the students of all 
subject groups understand the same thing by the terms ‘special interest in subject’ 
and ‘later income chances’. Now, how are these empirical divisions of ‘intrinsic’ 
and ‘extrinsic’ disciplines to be explained? 
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Figure 3   Answers on the assigned Importance of special Interest in the Subject for 
choosing one’s Subject, various Subject Groups and higher Education Forms5  
Figure 4   Answers on the assigned Importance later professional Income Chances 
for choosing one’s Subject, various Subject Groups and higher Education Forms6  
 
                                                           
5 KSS waves 8-12 
6 KSS waves 8-12 
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The answer seems to be oscillating between two options: 1.The values are, 
somehow, preadapted to the disciplines. They are ‘cognitive orientations’: “These 
orientations and the connected forms of the rationality of action are not acquired 
at the university, that is, late on, but are already mediated by the familial and 
school socialisation. Contemplative or ascetic forms of lifestyle, the idea of ‘vita 
activa’ or the ethos of a professional career have their roots in societal norms and 
values, which have minted the orientations and expectations of the students, long 
before they have matriculated at university. The various academic disciplines offer 
different possibilities to realise such ‘life plans’.” (Windolf 1992: 77, my emphasis). 
2. The other hypothesis which these researchers uphold is that, with the ongoing 
progression of studies, individual values and lifestyles adapt to the disciplinary 
cultures, if this was not already the case (see for example Georg, Sauer, and 
Wöhler 2009: 369f.). 
 
Thus, according to this latter argument the discipline and its culture ‘rubs off’ on 
the students, their values, life-styles, political orientations and so on, and the 
detectable influence of variables of social origin tends to disappear as the 
individual personality of the student is absorbed, adapted or even ‘vanishes’ into 
the discipline’s values and standards of thinking and behaviour. This makes sense 
from the standpoint of linear, substantialist causality and fits with the assumption 
of singular meanings since the change of original values automatically signals a 
cessation of the influence of social origin variables (principle of non-identity). On 
the other hand, a continuity of these values would, in this mode of perception, 
signal the persistence of influences like class origin, gender and/or ethnic origin. 
 In Bourdieusian epistemology, the dominant symbolic representation of reality tends to be 
inculcated as a norm and ideal of excellence by way of education (Bourdieu and Passeron) into all 
members of a given field, and thus tends to become doxa, even if practical, implicit practice is 
different from its symbolic representation. One must therefore follow a ‘principle of non-
consciousness’ (Bourdieu, Chamboredon, and Passeron 1991[1968]: 15f.), leaving the Sociologist 
to ask and think about the ‘surplus meaning’ in social practice.  
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One arrives at a model of change or adaptation which must be called mechanistic, 
since it is either the student that changes her or his fixed-meaning attitudes via 
studying the respective disciplines or not. A scenario where a student changes her 
values towards education and still, precisely through this change, expresses her 
social origin, is impossible and might be seen as metaphysical speculation by the 
proponents of this epistemology, since there is nothing that is taken to exist 
analytically beyond the assertions of individuals. One is therefore left, depending 
on the results of the statistically discernible, static relationship of social origin, 
values and disciplinary choice, with two options of interpretation: if the data 
‘show’ regularities between all three (or at least between social origin and one of 
the other two) then one infers a pre-adaptation of students to their discipline which 
is quasi-deterministic. 
 
 If the data, on the other hand, ‘show’ no regularities to this effect (i.e. no 
significance between social origin and values), then one is obliged to grant either 
freedom from any social origin, or one may again interpret this as a quasi-
deterministic adaptation to a new social environment (the discipline) with new 
values and rules. Either way, one only has a choice between radical continuity or 
radical discontinuity with regards to previous conditions and values on the level of 
the individual student.  
 
But it seems doubtful that this actually provides a very adequate picture of how 
human beings make their choices, whether and how they adapt. For example, in a 
study on the effect of studying Economics at various universities in Israel and the 
United States, Rubinstein (2006) finds a strange variation in the answering pattern. 
He asked students of multiple disciplines to put themselves into the shoes of a vice 
president of a company in market trouble. Having to decide between doing the best 
for the company (by laying off a certain percentage of people) or for the employees 
(by taking losses), the students had to decide, hypothetically, how many employees 
were to be laid off. But Rubinstein asked the question twice, once in a verbal way 
(perhaps one might say ‘social scientific’ way), with a table at the end showing the 
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possible outcomes, and once in a mathematical way (the ‘Economic’ way), showing 
a formula instead of the table. He shows that the recommended number of layoffs 
is much higher (and thus different) in all disciplines when the question is asked in a 
mathematical, ‘Economic’ way (ibid.: C3-C7). This clearly speaks against the 
assumption of static values that only change slowly, and for the existence of 
something that might be called a creative response, ‘activated’ in the students only 
in particular contexts, indeed present tacitly all the time from the very beginning. 
The interpretative categories of change vs. consistency do not seem to be able to 
grasp this reaction. Could the same accrue to values and their relationship to 
cultural environments such as academic disciplines? 
 
 
 
Homologies and unexplained Phenomena 
 
It cannot be denied that much of the German literature on study choice and 
disciplinary cultures, by its comparative character, constantly produces data on 
attitudes which form homologies, in the sense of “[…] a complicated network of 
similarities overlapping and criss-crossing […]”, as Wittgenstein describes it for 
various language games (Wittgenstein 1958[1953]: 32e). The overlaps are  
summarised in Figure 5. Certain subject groups correlate very highly, or ‘occur’, 
alongside distinctive study motivations, gender composition of student body, 
general and specific political orientation, attraction to alternative styles of living, 
Part of the adaptable strategies of agents is analogical reasoning which uses available cultural 
resources to give a certain, yet limited coherence to their symbolic representation of their own 
practice (Bourdieu 1992[1980]: 201-23). 
Agents in Bourdieusian epistemology are cunning, creative beings that are able to react to 
changes of circumstances very quickly without necessary (or even likely) full consciousness of 
what they are doing. They tend to bend the specific norms of the field in which they are, and they 
do so in strategies that spring put of their habitus and corresponding interests  (Bourdieu 
1992[1980]). 
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view of the social climate among students, aspired professional areas, and quite a 
bit more. 
 
From the individualistic, linear-substantialist epistemology this proves and extends 
the validity of the original theory and model as it was laid out in Figure 1 and 
already applied empirically to the student’s reason of study choice itself. This 
perspective then sees the superimposition of this dichotomy with others as the 
empirical discovery of the link of ideal-typical groups of free individuals with 
distinct life-styles, job, salary and political preferences to specific disciplines. This 
reminds one of the associations usually described in the political arena. Still, what 
one faces when taking this viewpoint is: one needs either to accept a substantial 
loss of explanatory power (in the case of non-pertinence of social origin variables) 
or taking away completely human agency (precisely when this pertinence occurs). 
Moreover, it also leaves us with quickly-changing phenomena that are produced but 
not accounted for. 
 
Peisert et.al. for example are astonished about the ‘profound dissent’ (Peisert, 
Bargel, and Framheim 1988: 265) in terms of political preferences between students 
of different disciplines. They also show how the range of agreement or 
disagreement with various political orientations within subject groups, diminishes 
sharply as one moves from the ‘left’ sciences of Cultural and Social Sciences to the 
‘right’ sciences of Law and Economics (ibid.: 258-60). In the former the degree of 
acceptance of social-democratic ideas is much higher than for Christian-
conservative ones.  
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 Figure 5   The theoretically and empirically constructed Homologies of academic 
Disciplines, Types of Doxa and various Traits and Attitudes of the Students, 
Synopsis of various empirical Studies 
 
 
 
Other open questions concern the consistently low awareness of gender 
discrimination for all subject groups, even among female students (Peisert, Bargel, 
and Framheim 1988: 149f.), and the degree of acceptance of the received grades, 
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which comes as a surprise to the authors: ”Astonishingly, even with the lower-
graded students, only one fifth is completely dissatisfied with the achieved formal 
grades (12% are even totally satisfied). In this group, then, the disappointed 
expectations of achievement turn only partially into dissatisfaction with 
performance results.” (Peisert, Bargel, and Framheim 1988: 176). 
 
These and other sorts of phenomena, such as the change in expressed political 
attitudes within disciplines over a course of various decades, or the 
‘extrinsification’ of formerly ‘intrinsic’ disciplines, pose a serious problem for this 
sort of individualist-substantialist epistemology, since it entails the frequent re-
adjustment of the ideal-types formed to account for these changes. Astonished 
recording of ‘data’ is therefore a constant companion of this sort of Social Science. 
Could this data perhaps be constructed, and therefore used, in a different way? 
What became increasingly clear during the last sections are the differences 
between a Bourdieusian epistemology and the epistemology applied in this sociology 
of study choice regarding the unanimity of concept meaning to survey participants, 
regarding the possibility of causal isolation of individual variables and their 
influence on study choice. 
 
The Problem of Class 
 
Part and parcel of the production and interpretation of data is of course the 
classification model used for social origin. Here, too, one may see the pervasive 
influence of an individualist-substantialist social philosophy and epistemology. This 
is true for both short-term and long-term considerations of the potential 
relationship of social origin with study choice. 
 
What is usually used in the above-mentioned studies are one-dimensional models 
based on a single category which is more or less differentiated. For example, both 
Windolf (1992) and Georg et.al. (2009) use scales that essentially combine various 
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categories and sub-categories of rather abstractly formulated professions (Workers, 
Employees, Civil Servants, Self-employed, Others) to model their ‘independent’ 
variable of ‘Social Status’. Georg et.al. (ibid. ) use an ‘autonomy of action scale’ of 
Hoffmeyer-Zlotnik (2003: 119-21), which groups together ‘varying degrees’ of 
autonomy of action in an attempt to measure ‘social layers’7 more ‘economically’. 
This one-dimensional scale encompasses diverse groups such as higher civil servants 
(which includes university professors), very highly qualified executives, free 
professionals with more than 10 employees and big entrepreneurs that are all put 
into one single category (‘high autonomy of action’). Another sociologist, working 
along the same ordering idea of ‘autonomy of action’, puts together the ticket 
controller, the small retail shop owner, the physician with her own practice and 
assistant nurse, the farmer with 40 hectares of land and the foremen of the 
construction company into a single category (ibid.2003: 121). 
In the same vein, Windolf (1992) uses Mayer’s scale of Social Status (Mayer 1979: 
106f.), which assigns scores to various occupational categories, with the free 
professions and higher civil servants at the top, which represents a further 
generalisation from the initial abstraction. Yet other models construct the 
‘educational origin’ of the student’s parents by combining their professional status 
with their highest educational qualification. The problem with all these 
classifications, it seems to me, is their arbitrariness and their nomological 
character. The scales are either overtaken from state statistical classifications or 
constructed alongside abstract categories which seem to have little real grounding 
in the actual living conditions of the people grouped together.  
Hence it is barely surprising to see, at least apparently, a rather fundamental social 
equality between disciplinary groups in many of these studies or data sets (see 
Figures 6 and 7). Social class origin, as well as disciplines (which are also grouped 
                                                           
7 This is a term prominent in the German sociological literature on stratification. See Geißler (1992) and Hradil 
(Hradil 2001) as standard references. 
In Bourdieusian epistemology, social classes represent general, abstract tools of cognition that are 
understood in terms of their position in a specific social space, or field, and which may have very 
different phenomenal expressions at different times and places. Classes therefore are a type of 
structural ideal-types. (Bourdieu 1985) 
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together alongside state statistical categories), in the epistemological world of 
these study choice Sociologists, are peculiarly external to the individuals and their 
decisions, either as ‘independent’ or ‘dependent’ variables. They are not 
theoretically connected to study choices, which forces these Sociologists to 
concede direct ‘dependence’ from social class in case they find statistically 
‘significant’ differences between groups of students and/or disciplines, or direct 
‘independence in the absence of these ‘significances’.   
     
 
Figure 6   Composition of Student Bodies of various Subject Groups by ‘educational 
Origin’ (Bildungsherkunft), according to the Social Survey of the DSW8 
(DeutschesStudentenWerk 1951-2016), ranked from low (niedrig) to middle (mittel) 
to elevated (gehoben) to upper (high)   
 
 
                                                          
8 2012 report, p.98, picture 3.14 
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Still more, there are further problems if one looks at long-term processes which 
some of the data sets (like the KSS and the ‘Social Survey’ of the federal German 
student services) and researchers aim to cover. If one makes no guess about the 
meaning of the relationship between social class, or social origin, and study choice 
at the moment, then one runs into even greater difficulty when looking at it over 
time.  
Naturally so, because professional and educational structures and stratifications 
change over time with cultural and economic changes.     
 
 
Figure 7   Social Status of Father cross-tabulated with Subject Groups9. Shown is a 
differentiated Classification along the Lines of Worker – Employee – Civil Servant – 
Self-employed -Other, most of which are segmented into lower, medium, and 
higher.  
 
                                                           
9 KSS waves 8-12 
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Therefore, in Germany as elsewhere, these changes during the last decades have 
led to the significant decline in what is called the ‘industrial’ or ‘second sector’ in 
favour of the ‘service’ or ‘tertiary’ sector (for example Schmidt 2010: 538), leading 
to massive changes in the numerical relations of various professional groups. This 
quite likely explains the high share of what is called the ‘employee’ category 
among all students. For example it can be shown that the share of the 
manufacturing workers within the whole working population in Germany decreases 
from about 30% in 1991 to about 20% in 2009 (the span is even bigger for Eastern 
Germany, see  FederalStatisticalOffice 2012: 25). The same downward tendency is 
true for agricultural production and construction employment. 
 
On the other hand, employment shares of public and private services and especially 
finances, renting and commercial services (in short, services) rose from a combined 
35% to about 47% of the work force in the same time span (and the difference 
would be higher if the time span was widened). Millions of people (most likely 
represented within the surveys discussed here) have therefore changed their 
occupational types of activity within their working lives, and switched from a 
manual job of the ‘secondary sector’ which would likely fall in the ‘workers’ 
category or perhaps into the ‘clerk’ sub-category, into the ‘Employee’ camp. At 
least some of them are likely to have also undergone re-training or further training 
to meet the new demands of the labour market, a process which makes them 
formally ‘qualified Employees’. The picture gets blurred even further when one 
knows that formal self-employment can likely disguise a quite different real 
occupation (like the parents of the 3rd year Economics student I interviewed who 
work on an assembly line but who are, officially, self-employed in order for the 
employer to save social security contributions). These socio-occupational changes 
show through also in the relevant statistics, so that it can be shown that for the 20-
year span from 1993-2013 the highest professional degrees of the parents of 
students taking part in the Konstanz Student Survey (KSS) changed considerably 
towards higher education certificates (an increase of 10% alone for university 
degrees) and away from employee or worker-related certificates (apprenticeship 
and especially master craftsmen exam holders decreasing accordingly in the same 
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time span). It is likely that with the change of profession and education comes a 
massive change of attitudes and general outlooks on politics, the possibilities in 
life, education, culture, and many other aspects of life.  
 
But what to make of all this? Without a theoretical exposition of how social groups 
are connected and dependent upon each other, and how this relationship changes 
over time, there is little more one can do than to register the changes, if indeed 
these changes are captured with the given instruments of measurement. 
It is not surprising that other scientists that observe similar processes therefore 
tend to largely see phenomena of ‘individualisation’ and ‘de-traditionalisation’ 
occurring in the social structure in most recent times                                                                                                                              
(Clark and Lipset 1991; Giddens 1991; Pakulski and Waters 1996; Beck and Beck-
Gernsheim 2002). But what parts or aspects of the original relationship has been 
retained, and how? What does that mean for grouping classes, or social origins, for 
the 21st century? How are these changes linked to the study choice of contemporary 
students? The perspective of study choice remains quiet on these questions because 
they do not appear from its point of view. 
 
 
What one may  therefore say, as  an intermediary summary, is that the 
epistemology of the literature discussed in this chapter is, so to speak, rather self-
confident. It believes in the unanimous and valid definition of its concepts and the 
class distinctions it applies to make sense of ‘study choice’. Qualitative designs of 
method seem to be regarded as preliminary, which is why it seems appropriate to 
engage in a further (and last) critical examination of a slightly different Sociology 
on educational choice, mostly rooted within the British context.
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Chapter 3 – A (slightly) different World of Sociology 
 
Unlike in the German literature on study choice or motivation the general focus of 
British authors lies more on admissions – often with regard to prestigious 
institutions of the stratified British system. This is perhaps due to different reasons 
that lie both in the factual differences of the educational systems that exist 
between the two countries as well as in differences in the sociological traditions of 
both.  
One influential body of literature that attempts to give a sociological answer to the 
challenge of educational expansion for class analysis - and which is rather close to 
the German approaches just discussed - is that of John Goldthorpe (Goldthorpe 
2010[1996]; Breen and Goldthorpe 1997; Goldthorpe 2007). He tries to cultivate his 
own style of rational action theory – in part developed against what he terms 
‘culturalist’ approaches, under which fall the works of Bourdieu as well as that of 
Paul Willis. For Goldthorpe, these attempts are unable to single out the factors that 
explain sufficiently the continuation of what he calls “[…] the persistence of class 
differentials in educational attainment.” (Goldthorpe 2010[1996]: 314). This is 
because, for him, they are stuck in a kind of circular argument in which class 
cultures influence the performance of children in school which in turn serves to 
cement the different cultures that classes live in. This seems to be a variant of the 
charge of ‘determinism’ that is often levelled at Bourdieu’s work. It is therefore 
Goldthorpe’s goal to look for “[…] evidence of the independent variable that is 
sufficiently removed from what constitutes the dependent one […]” (ibid.: 331).  
Goldthorpe attempts to distinguish both by approaching the topic of educational 
attainment from a theoretical angle of methodological (‘though not ontological’) 
individualism and rational choice. Class differentials in educational attainment 
therefore have to be explained by recourse to “[…] the action and interaction of 
individuals.” (ibid.: 315), actions that can be modelled as being rational: “I assume 
that actors have goals, have usually alternative means of pursuing these goals and, 
in choosing their courses of action, tend in some degree to assess probably costs 
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and benefits rather than, say, unthinkingly following social norms or giving 
unreflecting impression to cultural values. I also assume that actors are to a degree 
knowledgable about their society and their situations within it – in particular about 
opportunities and constraints relative to their goals – rather than, say, being quite 
uninformed and ideologically deluded. In sum, I take it that actors have both some 
possibility and some capacity for acting autonomously and for seeking their goals in 
ways that are more or less appropriate to the situations in which they find 
themselves.” (ibid.: 315). Given this epistemological starting point, Goldthorpe 
then tries to construct a theoretical argument in relation to educational expansion 
that accommodates the ‘enlarged opportunities’ it creates while nevertheless also 
preserving inter-class differences. He does so by distinguishing, following Boudon 
(1974), primary from secondary class effects on education. The former designate 
rather direct influences of class culture onto early school achievement (such as in 
primary school), the latter the influence of class-formed aspirations and 
evaluations on future professional ‘destinations’ and trajectories within the 
numerous ‘branching points’ of the educational system. Goldthorpe’s theoretical 
focus is on the secondary effects. It is there where, for him, differences in ‘cost-
benefit balances’ in the various paths open to people at various points of their 
educational career produce the empirically visible class differences in educational 
attainment. In these differences of attainment Goldthorpe perceives transformed 
original class differences. By doing so, Goldthorpe wishes to account for the fact 
that the educational system re-defines and indeed relativises aspirations (ibid.: 
320). By this is meant that a specific aspiration at a particular junction of the 
educational system, such as at the point of deciding for what university and 
discipline to apply – say, for the famous Politics, Philosophy and Economics degree 
at Oxford – are de facto different in magnitude for students with different class-
backgrounds. This is due to the differing distance of class cultures to develop the 
aspirations needed to study PPE at Oxford – a very large gap to fill for students of 
working class origin, a much smaller gap from those students who come from the 
‘service class’.     
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To my knowledge, there is no empirical validation of this specific theoretical 
approach by Goldthorpe himself. Nevertheless, it seems that his approach has had a 
profound influence on the way in which the sociology of higher education entrance 
and progression was, and is, conducted in Britain and elsewhere.  
The epistemological position that Goldthorpe asserts seems (apart from the 
different focus on ‘attainment’ rather than ‘choice’), in fact, not so different from 
the German ‘study choice’ literature. Both approaches start from a rather wide-
spread interpretation of Weberian Sociology (see Bourdieu 1987[1971]) which 
entails a principle of unambiguousness and, in a sense, timelessness, of meanings 
and concepts. For example, it is assumed in the German study choice literature, as 
we have seen, that professed and measured ‘intrinsic’ and ‘extrinsic’ choices are 
generally, across times and across social ‘layers’ and disciplines, the same. They 
are seen as comparable. On the other hand, it is assumed with just as much 
confidence that a ‘natural’ distinction of concepts can be made between ‘intrinsic’ 
vs. ‘extrinsic’ study choice, or again between influence of ‘social origin’ vs. 
influence of ‘disciplinary socialisation’. In the same vein, Goldthorpe, and all those 
who follow him in this, assumes an equally unequivocal meaning and possibility of 
separability of notions like ‘primary’ and secondary’ class effects on educational 
attainment, of individual ‘cost-benefit analyses’ across classes, or of ‘continuity’ 
and ‘change’. The meaning of these concepts is always clear and ‘obvious’ – it 
seems to be inherent, intrinsic in them. Connected with this seems to be a rather 
outdated, rather philosophical epistemological position that blends epistemological 
with theoretical propositions (see Bourdieu 1991: 30; Polanyi 1974[1958]: 361-64). If 
concepts and terms mean the same across time and space, then so do the resulting 
theories that use them to formulate specific hypothesis about such topics as class 
origin and educational attainment. 
From this vantage point it is then logical that Goldthorpe rejects the Bourdieusian 
theory of cultural reproduction as well as one of its constituent concepts, that of 
cultural capital, as being at best outdated, outdone by the developments that have 
taken place ever since the 1960’s. This is because for him “[…] educational 
expansion […] implies not the reproduction of cultural capital but rather its very 
substantial growth.” (Goldthorpe 2010[1996]: 319). John Goldthorpe is unable to 
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think together change and reproduction other than in a way which sees the former 
as an ‘illusion’ to the latter, as he is unable to think together symbolic violence or 
consecration with lack or existence of ‘ability’ and ‘talent’, or the ‘primary’ 
influence of the family with that of ‘secondary’ considerations (Goldthorpe 2007; 
and Fowler forthcoming for a defence of the Bourdieusian theory of 
transformation). Those concepts ‘naturally’ should be separated, he seems to hold. 
It is this clinging to ‘obvious’ meanings and categories which, rather than his exact 
theoretical stance of rational action, he has already bequeathed on current British 
approaches to the question of study choice. Given the usual division of intellectual 
labour, these studies understandably tend to narrow down their focus – away from 
theoretical critique and consideration towards a more straight-forward acceptance 
and empirical execution, and elaboration, of the substantialist-realist 
epistemology.10 
This disposition can clearly be seen in the works of Alice Sullivan (Sullivan 2001; 
Zimdars, Sullivan, and Heath 2009), who, for the casual observer, seems to apply a 
Bourdieusian theory to the British case. Others (Boliver 2011, 2018) exhibit it as 
well. A closer look, however, clearly reveals her epistemological kinship with 
someone like Goldthorpe.11 To begin with, she expresses her disapproval of a lack 
of precision in Bourdieu’s work, “[…] about exactly which of the resources 
associated with the higher-class home constitute cultural capital, and how these 
resources are converted into educational credentials.” (Sullivan 2001: 894). Here 
one can once again see the desire to clearly distinguish and to catalogue 
‘independent’ from ‘dependent’ variables, to find complex causal procedures which 
presumably cannot be found in the ‘crude’ and ‘confounded’ (Zimdars, Sullivan, 
and Heath 2009) bivariate analyses as Bourdieu and colleagues performed them. 
Out of this, Sullivan and her colleagues construct a kind of reproach while thinking 
                                                           
10 This may be interpreted, from a different viewpoint, as a certain tragedy of the Goldthorpian 
research programme which started out from such a promising, and wide-ranging , open perspective 
(Goldthorpe et al. 1968ff.). This pattern of ‘regression‘ can be found with other Sociologsts as well – 
just compare the early (1975[1933]) with the later (1955) work of Paul Lazarsfeld. Mills (1959: 74f.) 
calls these “[…] abdications of classic social science.“  
11 This is not restricted to British or German studies alone. There is now a whole body of literature 
that starts from a very similar epistemological position and which attempts to compare educational 
inequalities across a large variety of countries. See for example Shavit and Blossfeld (1993). 
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about applying Bourdieusian categories to British cases: “Simply looking at the 
bivariate association between private schooling and acceptance at Oxford would 
merely tell us that there is a link between the two, but does does not allow us to 
assess whether private schooling increases the chance of admission to Oxford for 
children of the same social class background. The relationship between social class, 
private schooling, and Oxford entrance, is something which restricts the extent to 
which we could analyse this relationship. This sort of blanket rejection of a 
particular research method is unfortunate, acting as a barrier to informal critical 
engagement across research traditions.” (ibid.: 651).  
In consequence, they proclaim that they will narrow down (to ‘limit’) both the 
topic of research – educational attainment thus boiling down to admission to 
universities12 – as well as the tools to investigate it – cultural capital thus boiling 
down to specific practices that can be, or are, almost always gathered in surveys, 
such as reading, book ownership, museum attendance or TV viewing habits (Sullivan 
2001: 899; also Boliver 2018: 40-42). The end-result of these successive 
simplifications and restrictions are the ‘data’ – sometimes acquired by a survey 
conducted on one’s own, sometimes simply borrowed for secondary purposes from 
state institutions - such as the University and Colleges Admissions Service (UCAS). 
These ‘data’ are then usually subjected to rigorous multivariate-causal statistical 
techniques, above all regression analysis Sullivan (2001: 900); (Zimdars, Sullivan, 
and Heath 2009: 657; Boliver 2018: 44). Out of this standardised procedure emerge 
‘facts’, for example the ‘fact’ that high grades in secondary school, ceteris paribus, 
tend to increase the offer for admission at a Russell Group university (Boliver 2018: 
44), or the ‘fact’ that reading or TV habits, ceteris paribus, indeed count as cultural 
capital in Britain and help to ‘explain’ educational attainment (Sullivan 2001: 909-
12), or the ‘fact’ that social class, male gender and white ethnicity by themselves, 
ceteris paribus, do influence the admission to Oxford university (Zimdars, Sullivan, 
and Heath 2009: 659-61). But all of this is neither new, nor is it surprising. Nor does 
it show sufficient depth to go beyond simple social engineering recipes, such as to 
                                                           
12 Indeed, researchers like Vikki Boliver seem to write about little else than university admissions, 
conceived in a rather narrow sense. See https://www.dur.ac.uk/sociology/staff/profile/?id=9700, 
last accessed April 22, 2019. 
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push for some kind of positive discrimination (Boliver 2018: 46-48), or to suggest 
policy programmes to increase the number of books in a household (Sullivan 2001: 
909-12; Zimdars, Sullivan, and Heath 2009: 661). But this kind of research does not 
really contribute much to our understanding of whatever social processes are at 
play, and therefore neither helps us to change things effectively for the better: 
“The particular relations between a dependent variable […] and so-called 
independent variables […] tend to mask the complete system of relationships which 
constitutes the true principle of the specific strength and form of the effects 
registered in any particular correlation. The most independent of ‘independent’ 
variables conceals a whole network of statistical relations which are present, 
implicitlty, in its relationship with any given opinion or practice.” (Bourdieu 
1984[1979]: 103).13  
Indeed, it seems to me that it is not the researcher who is serving to finding out 
something about the object at hand. On the other hand, it is the object - after it 
has been mutilated and cut down to handy bits and pieces – that seems serve the 
needs of the researcher. This is what Charles Wright Mills calls the ‘methodological 
inhibition’, the “[…] pronounced tendency to confuse whatever is to be studied 
with the set of methods suggested for its study.” (1959: 51), and that under more 
or less disregard for “[…] the historical and structural confinement […]” (ibid.: 51f.) 
a problematic is embedded in, which ultimately results in what Mills calls ‘thin 
results’.    
What this kind of research does is to abstract from the real processes of the 
relationships between class, or social origin, and educational trajectories so much 
that what results is a more or less fine-grained, and overall rather irrelevant, ‘dust 
of facts’ produced by a conspicuously meticulous methodological and statistical 
procedure (‘The Scientific Method’, as Mills calls it). The preliminary logical end- 
point of this more administrative-bureaucratic than scientific development seems 
                                                           
13 See also the examples given from the engineering policies of the then socialist bloc in Bourdieu 
and Passeron’s The Inheritors (1979[1964]: 68f.). The quote above also implies that Bourdieu (and 
Mills both also push for a ‘falsifiable’ empirical procedure, but one that is more systemic, and in a 
way more risky. This is because it is a whole set of hypotheses, put together into a model, that is 
tested in an empirical validation attempt rather than simply a conjecture of a relationship between 
two singular, isolated variables.     
58 
 
to be the various forms of regression analysis, or what we might call, following 
again Mills, ‘THE METHOD’. All of the followers of Goldthorpian epistemology 
discussed above solemly use THE METHOD, THE WHOLE METHOD and nothing but 
THE METHOD to empirically ‘explore’ and to test their proposed relationships14. 
There are neither in-depth interviews nor ethnographic elements in these works. 
Nor do those seem to be used in any serious way to inform or question the 
categories and distinctions employed. In other words, what one finds in these works 
is a ritualised science (ibid.: 71f.) based on a dogmatic use of a specific and 
arbitrary epistemology which, to be sure, may be economically bolstered as having 
“[…] commercial and foundation value […]” (ibid.: 72, one may add political value 
here as well), but which in the end “[…] eliminates the great social problems and 
human issues of our time from inquiry” (ibid.: 73). Zimdars’ et.al. indignant protest 
against Bourdieu’s “[…] blatant rejection of a particular research method […] acting 
as a barrier to informed critical engagement across research traditions.” (Zimdars, 
Sullivan, and Heath 2009: 651) may therefore be read as only another sign of their 
dogmatic epistemological position which views any deviation from THE METHOD as 
an unforgivable lapse15. I must therefore in advance apologise to those readers who 
are inclined to THE METHOD that this work will not be able to satisfy their needs of 
‘precision’ and ‘scientificity’. All I can say at this point, again with Mills, is that 
“[…] no one need accept this model as a total canon. It is not the only empirical 
manner.” (Mills 1959: 73).  Are there, then, perhaps other ways to empirically 
engage with the relationship of social origin and social class?               
 
I will now focus on the work of educational sociologist Diane Reay and her 
colleagues, particularly on choices in secondary (Reay, Crozier, and James 2011) 
and higher education (Reay, David, and Ball 2005). These works extensively draw 
on, and use, Bourdieu’s notions of habitus, class, field and capital to make sense of 
                                                           
14 They are not alone in this: see for example Noden and colleagues (Noden, Shiner, and Modood 
2014) on issues in educational admission related to ethnicity. 
15 Or, in Bourdieu’s own words: “ [the critics] don‘t criticise my work, but the imagination of it 
which has been priorly distorted. All this because one constantly measures my work with forms of 
thought, especially differentiations, opposites, dichotomies, which it precisely wishes to destroy and 
to transcend.“ (Bourdieu 1989, my translation).  
59 
 
the data they produce which consists mainly of large in-depth interview samples 
(150+ interviews) and contextual information (on class, from informants etc.). 
 
Just as with the German literature on study choice, this body of work operates with 
a model of disciplines arranged around antagonistic dichotomies as well. Here, 
however, the decisive opposites are not ‘intrinsic’ and ‘extrinsic’ – as with the 
literature discussed above - but rather ‘reflexive’ vs. ‘un-reflexive’ approaches to 
study choice, as well as well as structure vs. agency.  
 
No Construction Work 
 
The first thing to notice about these works is the peculiar approach to object 
construction, the specific use of Bourdieusian ideas. In the field of educational 
choice the authors pose, families and individuals have been interviewed to “[…] 
explore the effects of individual, familial and institutional influences and processes 
on choice-making.” (Reay, David, and Ball 2005: 11). The major goal of the 
research is thus the exploration of relationships and meanings. Moreover, the 
adopted definitions of social origin, especially social class, are taken from pre-
defined state statistics (ONS 1994-2010) and are conflated into two classes – middle 
class and working class (Reay, David, and Ball 2005), so that in the 2011 book we 
find teachers of any kind (primary, secondary, university), businessmen, 
accountants, media executives, government officials, journalists, barristers and 
trade union executives put into the ‘middle class’ category. From this perspective a 
more nuanced class scale indeed makes little sense since it nevertheless 
homogenises the very plural, and in a way incommensurable, experiences of the 
interview partners, so that Reay et.al. stick to the rather crude classification:   
 
“Although we are working with what are, in effect, notions of an upper, lower 
middle, as well as working class, based on educational background and 
occupation, we would caution that such simplistic divisions convey only a 
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fraction of the story of social class. Rather, we try, through our qualitative data, 
to tell a more nuanced, inflected tale.” (ibid.: 16). 
 
Hence, while the German sociological literature on study choice, mostly 
quantitative, is content with the socio-demographic classifications offered by 
federal statistics and sociologists of social structure, this much more ‘qualitative’ 
approach wishes to complement this classification, but not to replace it: “So our 
shorthand division of the qualitative sample, particularly in relation to an upper, 
middle and lower middle class, are further overlaid by attempts to read class in a 
range of practices of distinction and reproduction. These focus as much on affective 
responses to the higher education choices process, such as sense of security or 
insecurity, familiarity or unfamiliarity, and attitudes and inclination, such as 
solidarist or individualist tendencies, among the working class students […]” (ibid.: 
16). We also see this approach when they talk about cultural capital which, for 
them, “[…] is much more than the high status activities that have traditionally been 
operationalised in empirical research within education […]” (ibid.: 20). 
 
Reay and colleagues criticise the existing class classifications as too narrow, as 
necessarily omitting important aspects of social life and experiences, against which 
they want to put a “[…] wider and deeper conceptualization of class […]” (Reay 
1997: 226). This for them means utilising Bourdieusian ‘cognitive tools’ such as 
habitus, class or reflexivity as templates that help to structure the otherwise 
unstructured, empathic and ‘free’ interpretation of the interview material. In that 
sense, their epistemology slightly diverges from classical grounded theory 
approaches. Even though they criticise the deficiencies of the existing class 
distinctions for their crudeness, Reay and colleagues are forced to use these same 
distinctions as interpretative guides. Working classes have a habitus of necessity, 
middle-classes one of ambition. But whether, and how, these abstract 
characteristics of the classes are confirmed in the concrete cases at hand is up to 
the interpretative judging of the researchers. And these interpretations are not 
undertaken with a view toward developing new tools which might explain the 
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phenomena at hand, but are rather a purely descriptive effort to map out practices 
and experiences as seen by the researchers: “As interpretivists we reject the notion 
of objectivity and absolute truths.” (Reay, Crozier, and James 2011: 169).  
 
At the same time, paradoxically, they seem to have no problem citing ‘objective’ 
statistical studies that run counter to this epistemological principle (see for 
instance Reay 2017: 175ff.), which of course makes it look as if Reay et.al. are 
happy to cite empirical ‘evidence’ so long as it conforms to their pre-conceived 
moral values and assumptions, no matter how this ‘evidence’ was obtained or 
produced. It can be seen that these researchers are moved by strong commitments 
and values to give oppressed groups room to make their voices and experiences 
heard in scientific, and public, discourse. This strategy in itself would lead to an 
endless recording and re-recording of specific, unclassified and unclassifiable - as 
well as hardly comparable - practices. It would make it extremely hard to utilise 
the analyses generated in this way from another perspective, or to compare them 
with findings from a different national or temporal context.  
 
Of course, there is nothing wrong with these critical intentions of ‘lending a voice’ 
to marginalised groups. This is always commendable and understandable in itself. 
However, it seems to me that both the critique of Bourdieusian ideas as well as the 
‘inflected’ use of his concepts are based on an essential break with his 
epistemology, namely the distinction of a theory to construct theories (or meta-
theories) as against theories (or perhaps descriptions) of social phenomena or 
spheres. Tools such as habitus, class or reflexivity as such always belong to the 
former and are put, in Bourdieusian epistemology, into a specific theoretical model 
that is quite coherent logically. It ‘rationalises’ the values and commitments the 
researcher brings into the field. It thus makes a certain set of predictions about the 
specific practice or experiences of the groups of agents in focus. Through the 
production of facts that this model generates (in method as well as in things to look 
for, and their interpretation in the model), it itself, and the values at its base, can 
be tested for their explanatory power, their use as tools.  
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Hence when Reay simply demands, for example, that we need “[…] to include race 
and gender differences […]” (Reay 2004: 436)16 in habitus, she is stating her 
personal values that inform her meta-theoretical standpoint. She believes that race 
and gender are just as important as class, against which there is nothing to say at 
all. However, this would call for a, however preliminary, construction of a 
theoretical model that spells out a demonstration how gender and race are on par 
with class in a particular field. It still implies a need to reduce, to simplify, the 
influences that are supposed to explain social phenomena, to distinguish the most 
pertinent (like presumably gender, race, and class) from the less and least 
pertinent factors (like presumably eye colour, body weight, degree of physical 
disability or sexual orientation), and to conjecture how they intersect and are 
expressed in a particular field and time. To reject that sort of modelling in the 
name of a supposed ‘complexity’ and ‘inflection’ (if only this is an outcome of 
one’s study) in effect means to deprive oneself of any possibility of scientifically 
grasping this complexity. It means to pick out of the infinite complexity that reality 
already is bits and pieces that are not held together by meaningful, coherent 
relationships, but rather by vague impressions, by one’s emotions that are put into 
research practice rather without being subject to any checking first by way of 
objectivation. No ‘qualitative’ research design, however comprehensive, will ever 
be able to record the full complexity of social reality. But if it is not a coherent 
theory that gives orientation as how to navigate in this ‘sea of facts’ (Elias 
2002[1969]: 63) where does this orientation come from? It must have a more or less 
pre-scientific character. It therefore seems likely that it includes common-sense 
notions.  
 
                                                           
16 see Hradil 1989 for an early, German, realist critique of Bourdieusian categories.  
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Thus, what one finds in this British literature on study selection is a bit of a mirror 
image to that found in the German one: rather than an individualistic model of 
study choice there is no real model at all; rather than more or less total trust in 
survey methodology and data there is rather total distrust and conspicuous 
rejection of all ‘objectifications’. This is often justified by reference to 
representing repressed groups or people which is, from this viewpoint, best done by 
bringing their narratives to publication as fully and undisturbedly as possible. 
Therefore the objectives of this kind of literature are as much scientific as they are 
political.Consequently, one needs to turn critical attention to the relationship of 
values to one’s scientific practice. 
 
Values and the Model 
 
Perhaps one must examine this inflected epistemology in action to see how it fares 
in actual research practice. In my view, the practical consequences of the confusion 
and conflation of meta-theory and theory are two-fold: first, the inability to 
identify and distinguish different habitus in adequately rigorous terms, which is 
identical to the inability to verify the (missing) model. And second, the compulsion 
to oscillate, in the interpretation of data, between determinism and voluntarism 
according to one’s own unchecked value-judgments, paradoxically not unlike the 
German authors discussed previously. 
Bourdieusian epistemology always distinguishes between a theory aimed at constructing theories 
(or meta-theory) and a theory of specific social phenomena or areas (Bourdieu et.al. 1991: 30). 
Construction of the latter is necessary because “[…] the sociologist who refuses the controlled, 
conscious reconstruction of his distance from the real and his action of reality may not only 
impose questions on his subjects that their experience does not pose them and omit the questions 
that it does pose them, but he may also naively pose them the questions he poses himself about 
them, through a positivist confusion between the questions that objectively arise for them and 
the questions they consciously pose themselves. Thus the sociologist is spoilt for choice when, led 
astray by a false philosophy of objectivity, he undertakes to nullify himself as a sociologist.” 
(Bourdieu, Chamboredon, and Passeron 1991[1968]: 38)  
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This can be shown in the work on middle class parents’ secondary school choices for 
their children. Reay and colleagues conduct a large number of interviews with 
parents on this topic. They admit there are structural restraints in study choice and 
choice of secondary schools by middle class parents: “The spatial representation 
maps out a geography of taken-for-grantedness, possibilities, improbabilities, 
relationships and identities.” (Reay, David, and Ball 2005: 50f.). These however 
remain unclear and vaguely defined. They also group the parents into the rather 
crude classifications of social origin mentioned before. These are of course already 
the beginnings of a model (based on a more Weberian class schema). But this is not 
followed by the construction of a more precise model which maps out, for the 
concrete British case of contemporary parental choice of secondary schools, the 
factors that allegedly contribute most to this choice process via the habitus. The 
interview data seem to be interpreted and judged by the ‘subjective’ criteria of the 
interviewers. This is because the slimmed-down version of a (rather Weberian, that 
is, one-dimensional) model (ONS 1994-2010) is so loose and vague that 
interpretation is checked only by the assumption (and presumption) of empathy and 
understanding of these parents rather than a consciously constructed model - in 
other words, by the author’s personal values and views. This leads Reay et.al. to 
point out the alleged movement, reflexivity, change in habitus and behaviour of at 
least some of their respondents. The decision by some ‘middle-class’ parents to 
send their children to state rather than private schools is thus interpreted as an 
awareness of their own habitus, as genuine reflexivity with regard to structural 
constraints, in short “[…] a great departure from their family habitus […]” (Reay, 
Crozier, and James 2011: 39). The authors see a new ‘collective, moral vision’ of 
‘reciprocity, care, empathy’ on the rise within some respondents, at least 
potentially (ibid.: 167), as a consequence of their becoming ‘sociologically 
conscious’ of what is going on. They call these ‘out of habitus’ thoughts and actions 
(Reay, David, and Ball 2005: 71-73).   
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But this assessment seems not to be embedded within mapped out assumed 
relationships of a proper model, but, quite simply, on the impressions that these 
authors have of the answers of their interlocutors. The reference to a change points 
to an earlier state of the educational field (rather than to the practices of other 
groups in the same field) and thus is, in itself, no evidence of a change of habitus. 
Here one sees how the meta-theoretical – the level of the tools of theory-
construction - and the theoretical level - the level of data-production - are 
conflated. The weak and flabby class model is effectively brought in as an excuse to 
dispense with model-making altogether under the guise of criticism of 
‘objectivism’, and thus serves to sanction the direct, unchecked submission of 
interview data to the value-driven interpretation of the authors. The result of this 
procedure is, of course, the seeming affirmation of these values of reflexivity and 
change, congealed here in the notion of ‘out-of-habitus’-experiences. 
 
In a straight Bourdieusian perspective and corresponding specific model, out-of-
habitus experiences17 would be simply impossible since we cannot get out of our 
habitus, our very own - and only- perception of reality (in the same way as we 
cannot screw out our eyes and put in another, foreign, pair). Habitus 
transformation is then only possible within and through itself, in other words by 
controlling it after having become aware of it, after it has already changed to a 
certain degree. This can happen by way of reflection and experience which, again, 
must be theorized properly in their practical context, theoretically rather than 
merely meta-theoretically. This does not mean that one denies the existence of 
reflexivity, or of habitus-changing experiences. But it should be explained 
theoretically, taking account of the concrete conditions of context in which these 
experiences occur, before it is proclaimed as such.  
 
One would need to ask questions like these: 
                                                           
17 These are to be distinguished from practices where habitus, after thorough reflexivity of one’s 
dispositions, is controlled consciously. This practice is at best a consequence of experiences which 
make one reflect upon, and then potentially change, one’s habitus.  
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What about checking statistics about the school choices various fractions of the 
middle classes take? What about possible changes in the ranking of certain private 
schools vs. certain state schools? What about the school choice of other social 
groups and classes? Reay and colleagues refuse to deal with these questions under 
the notion that their analyses are not generalisable and not reproducible (Reay, 
Crozier, and James 2011: 172f.). There is no interest in refining their model, for 
example by introducing theoretically a dimension of capital volume and 
composition, or age, into it in order to better account for these school choices. To 
do so, of course, would generate questions that can be checked empirically: do 
middle-class parents with higher cultural capital take different school choices than 
those with higher economic capital? How do they justify that? Which statistics 
would be able to show that? One would get definite answers to these questions 
which would then induce further questions: If there are no detectable differences 
in school choices of middle-class parents with different capital compositions, 
perhaps a further distinction has to be made, for example by ethnicity? Could it 
otherwise not be that school choice is not even part of a field in the Bourdieusian 
sense? What would that mean for the role of education in the theory of 
reproduction? And so on… And so the dialectics of theoretical questions and 
empirical answers would be induced, a process that seems to me to be at the 
genuine heart of Bourdieusian epistemology and which is short-circuited by Reay 
and colleagues).     
 
Perhaps one must briefly discuss another concrete example, the school choice of 
John, a middle class lawyer, for his children, to reiterate the characteristic method 
that follows from this perspective (Reay, Crozier, and James 2011: 32f., 36): 
 
“Whilst habitus reflects the social position in which it was constructed, it also 
carries within it the genesis of new creative responses which are capable of 
transcending the social conditions in which it was produced […]. John, speaking 
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of his brother who became very ill during schooling, reflects ‘public school was 
supposed to make upper-middle class men of us but it crushed my brother’. A 
strong family tradition is therefore challenged by his experiences and those of his 
brother, leading John to declare that private schooling is ‘something you just 
would not contemplate for my own children’: 
 
‘I knew I never wanted that for my own children. Pat [his partner] must have told 
you about my parents’ trust fund for the children. Well I knew despite any trust 
fund that I didn’t want either private or selective schooling for my own children. 
But then it was so difficult because that was the accepted behavior in my family, 
that’s just what everybody did in my family, go to private school. And I think the 
seminal moment came when I read that Daniel Day Lewis had been to an urban 
comprehensive. I remember thinking that’s alright then. I don’t know how many 
qualms his father had but he’s come out creative and and fairly sussed so you can 
choose that for your kids and they can survive. And I do remember thinking when 
I read it- and the children were very young at the time- this is good.’ 
 
John worked as a criminal lawyer, a job that needed empathy with a wide range 
of people and a capacity to deal quickly with difficult situations. He was 
adamant that it was not his schooling per se, but the witnessing of his brother’s 
illness and some subsequent voluntary work (translating benefit claim forms and 
rules for claimants) that had equipped him for his work: ‘People just know. They 
can see …if you are some middle-class kid with no depth, or you have got a 
sympathetic approach, you know, someone who is going to listen.’ Despite his 
established middle-class background, John’s assessment is that private schooling, 
and even the more selective kinds of state-schooling, were to be avoided. As he 
put it, ‘I wanted (my own) … kids not to be detached from society really.’ 
 
This last point, rather than specifically negative experiences of the sort outlined 
by John, was the most common reason for parents to react against their own 
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schooling as part of the making of choices and decisions for the education of 
their children. […] 
 
In these and similar cases there are middle-class families making similar kinds of 
school choice but with differing underpinning rationales: put most simply, for 
some families the choice of an ordinary state school might amount to an 
opportunity to avoid history repeating itself, whilst for others the same choice 
can provide an opportunity for making history repeat itself. Yet in both sets of 
cases, there is also a strong common feature – the desire for contact with social 
diversity. Examples like these illustrate the importance of background social 
class locations in shaping current practices, but they also suggest that even with 
something as specific as against-the-grain secondary school choice, it is much too 
simplistic to think of ‘the middle-classes’ in an undifferentiated way.” 
 
Witness how their perspective forces Reay and her colleagues to abandon any real 
attempt to explain and to understand why people like John choose the schools they 
do for their children. Even though the authors end on a warning of the simplicity of 
certain classifications, their own analysis does not lead to any suggestion as to how 
to change or refine these classifications. In fact, the ‘undifferentiated’ classes that 
form the de facto model of these authors - their incomplete and weak theoretical 
construction of the school choice of these parents - serves nevertheless as the basis 
behind which their unchecked, indeed arbitrary impressions of the interviews are 
disguised as an inflected ‘Bourdieusian’ interpretation. This is the case when Reay 
and colleagues claim the ‘transcending’ of ‘social conditions’ of the initial habitus 
of John and other parents in this study, or when they claim that there is a close link 
between ‘middle-class backgrounds’ with forms of selective schooling, against 
which John turns, or when they claim that this choice is “[…] against their own 
schooling […].” (ibid.: 33). It is obvious that the overtaking of some (but, as we 
have seen, by no means all) Bourdieusian epistemological principles, forces them to 
adopt a perspective in which they must distinguish different groups of parents along 
‘pertinent’ principles. The principle in this case is obviously the hopelessly crude 
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notion of the ‘middle class’ which serves as a surrogate for a real explanatory 
model. Again, the very crudeness of this notion allows for the surreptitious return 
of rather arbitrary, unchecked impressions and thus particular, and limited, values, 
creeping into the cracks and gaps of the weak, flabby model provided by the given 
categories (that are collated from NS-SEC). The yardstick for whether history is 
made to ‘repeat itself’ is simply the general, traditional practice of private-
schooling.   
 
 It now also becomes clearer how contradictory these operations are: If Reay and 
colleagues call themselves interpretivists, why do they hold on to this weak model 
which they themselves call ‘undifferentiated’? If they really did not believe in 
objectivity, they should shun these classifications altogether, and simply interview 
and record parents on study choice at random, or take the model as a stepping 
stone towards a better model. But the adopting of Bourdieusian tools such as 
habitus or class indeed forces them to adopt at least some sort of model. Having an 
interest in retaining their interpretivist principles, they thus, very creatively, 
choose the least specific (or least determining, explanatory) model and 
classifications, an operation which they obfuscate, most likely to themselves as to 
others, through widely accepted criticisms of these very same classifications.  
 
In fact, to more fruitfully say whether the choice of this and other parents really 
transcends the social conditions in which it was created18 (and of course, social 
conditions should be understood here in relational rather than substantialist terms, 
which would be almost banal to say), whether the school-choices really evaded a 
                                                           
18 It may be wondered how, and if, it is possible at all to transcend the social conditions in which 
one is immersed. Does that not entail an ‘out-of-habitus’-thinking which is eschewed above? It 
seems to me that there is no necessary antinomy between being immersed in social conditions and 
transcending their usual consequences, at least partially, in thought and in practice. In fact, 
reflections that spur far-reaching transformations of their initial environment seem to have very 
definite social pre-requisites, as the rise of modern science, among others, shows. But if the 
question is not if there can be a connection between social conditions and their transcendence it is a 
question of how, i.e.: what precise dynamics and conditions produce individual or group reflections 
that take as their object not the objects of the world, but the objectivators of the world? That is, of 
course, an empirical question, not a philosophical or teleological one. 
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middle-class background, whether these groups actually acted “[…] against their 
own schooling […]” (ibid.), a much more refined model has to be put to the test of 
the facts. This could cover, for example, the inclusion of educational expansion into 
the model: What impact does that have on the reproduction struggle of the classes? 
Do they develop new strategies compared to 30 years ago to reproduce their 
capital? Do they then also adopt new strategies of justifying this choice? Does the 
expansion of education and struggle within education not mean that one might 
need to look for a more nuanced differentiation within the middle classes, such as 
in terms of level of education, age, gender, or ethnicity? Most importantly, one 
would need to situate these answers within a specifically British context, on the 
basis of its specific, and dynamic, history of class conflict in and through education, 
its specific, changing meanings and lines of distinction, one that goes beyond basic 
distinctions of Oxbridge vs. the Rest or independent/private vs. state schooling. In 
short, one should create a model that is fitter for reality, that has a better chance 
of explaining the produced facts more sufficiently, to be successful in competition 
with positivist models, so to speak.  
 
One might therefore say that the initial refusal of constructing a more precise 
model forces a production and interpretation of data that has to take answers at 
face value (practical reflexivity is basically equivalent to sociological reflexivity, 
see above). But that does not exclude the possibility that the specific values of the 
researchers have entered into their interpretation and classification of these 
results. In this these authors, once again, are not too far away from their German 
counterparts. 
 
 
The Ethnocentrism of a Profession? 
 
The actual ‘objective’ results coming out of these studies, understandably then, are 
rather meagre: for instance the finding that middle-class children from private 
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schools have more support in getting into Oxford and Cambridge than working-class 
kids, or that “[…] the sorts of constraints [on higher education choices] vary 
enormously.” (Reay, David, and Ball 2005: 49), or that the middle classes would 
have the symbolic capital to challenge the established order (Reay, Crozier, and 
James 2011: 166; see also Bathmaker et al. 2016). 
 
In terms of interpretative results, these studies are forced, due to the absence of a 
rigorous model, to switch quite arbitrarily in the assessment of the produced 
interview statements between either a liberation, a process of “[…] avoid[ing] 
history repeating itself […]” (Reay, Crozier, and James 2011: 166; see also Reay 
2002) or simple reproduction, that is “[…] making history repeat itself […]” (Reay, 
Crozier, and James 2011: 33; also Reay 1997). In the end, within the flexible 
theoretical model provided by crude statistical classifications, it seems to be at the 
discretion of the researcher and her value-informed impressions of her interview 
material whether practices are to be labelled ‘liberated from’, or ‘chained to’, 
structures. Consequently, it is hard to see why a concept like habitus, which is 
supposed to be the theoretical counterpart in the model of the practical mediation 
of structures and agency in specific circumstances, should be a central or important 
pillar of this perspective.19       
 
Rather, it reminds one of the attempt and wish to recuperate/to revitalise the free, 
unrestrained individual as evident, for example, in Sartre’s philosophy (Bourdieu 
1992[1980]: 42-46). Even though Reay et.al. often start out with the ‘determined’ 
subject, somehow ‘misfirings’ emerge eventually, and ‘reflexivity’ and ‘creativity’ 
shine through the iron cage of determinism via the clash of the multiple ‘habituses’ 
(individual, familial, institutional) 20. It can be shown that this Sociology “[…] 
                                                           
19 Bridget Fowler’s critique of Derek Robbins’ interpretation of Bourdieusian ideas finds a somewhat 
similar gap to the core of Bourdieusian thought, which consists in combining both objectivist and 
subjectivist moments instead of privileging the latter (Fowler 2007: 370f.). 
20 Once again, this is against the Bourdieusian claim of the existence of only one habitus within a 
single agent. This might be cleft in itself- and once again, this would have to be shown within a 
proper model applied to specific circumstances that allows for systematic validation. 
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constantly oscillates […] between an objectivist vision that subjects freedoms and 
wills to an external determinism or an internal, intellectual determinism and a 
subjectivist, finalist vision […]” (Bourdieu 1992[1980]: 46). With regard to this 
‘transcendental overcoming’ (ibid.: 44f.), see exemplary the stories of Shaun (Reay 
2002) or Christine (Reay 1997) for respective analyses of this kind of human 
constraints21, is at least possible and appearing to start within the near future. 
Thus, for Reay et.al., we could also apply what Bourdieu writes about Sartre whose 
“[…] typically Cartesian refusal of the viscous opacity of ‘objective potentialities’ 
and of objective meaning leads him to entrust the endless task of tearing the social 
whole, or the class, from the inertia of the ‘practico-inert’, to the absolute 
initiative of individual or collective ‘historical agents’ such as ‘the Party […]” 
(Bourdieu 1992[1980]: 45). This tendency of eagerness seems, in the work of Reay 
and her colleagues, especially applicable to subordinate groups, whether these 
come from petit-bourgeois or working-class backgrounds. 
 
This can be seen, for example, in the readiness with which school choice is 
interpreted as reflexivity or in the way in which the reflections of working class 
students on their place in university are read as revealing an awareness of being a 
‘fish out of water’22 (Bathmaker et al. 2016) which is then construed as leading to a 
                                                           
21 Another example of this mode of thinking would be Angela McRobbie’s analysis of British TV 
fashion programmes (2004: 99-109). An object – here certain TV-shows- is given deterministic powers 
over the subjects that are exposed to it, in line with the needs of abstract social fields: “My claim 
here is that [Bourdieu’s] writing allows an understanding of how social re-arrangement along gender 
lines takes shape within media and popular culture by means of habitus adjustment to ensure 
conformity with the contemporary requirements of the fields of employment, consumer culture and 
sexuality.” (ibid.: 108). But what are the historical, and social, conditions of affirmative reception 
of these TV-programmes? What sort of habitus, in what aesthetic field, is spoken to by these 
programmes? All these questions, once again, remain unanswered, and so one seems to be left with 
a statement of dislike that claims objectivity with little, if any, means to check its validity and to 
respond to it in terms other than pure taste- I don’t like that! Very quickly, then, it seems to me, 
one is tempted to leave sociological discussion altogether and enter the world of smart, pointy 
essays. See Bourdieu and Delsaut (1975) for a proper theoretical model of the French field of fashion 
at the time.    
22 Once more, one must point towards the fact that it is neither clear how the ‘fish’ stands against 
the other ‘animals’, or who these animals are anyway, and what exactly makes them so adapted to 
their ‘natural environment’. With the de facto flabby model used, to say that ‘working class’ 
children are ‘fish out of water’ in certain educational establishments without clarifying first what 
this ‘water’ is in which working-class children are supposed to move smoothly, has the same 
cognitive value as simply stating that dinosaurs are unfit to live in our contemporary Eco-system.   
73 
 
form of ‘resistance’23. The direct exposure of interview statements to the 
unchecked values of the researchers in this perspective becomes especially visible 
when the authors reflect on their own practice24: hence Mellor et.al. (2014), using 
the same crude middle- and working-class model, are forced to express not much 
more than their likes and dislikes among the statements of their interlocutors: “[…] 
feelings of unease, irritation or bitterness […]” (ibid.: 142) when ‘middle-class 
students’ describe their privileged upbringing, ‘warmth and intimacy’ when 
‘working-class’ students “[…] discussed very difficult backgrounds and present 
circumstances without shame […]” (ibid.), and again ‘frustrated’ and saddened’ 
when ‘working-class’ students are disgusted with friends of theirs (ibid.: 143f.).25 In 
the absence of a proper theoretical model or an intention to construct such a 
model, these idiosyncratic interpretations can, then, lead very quickly to an 
imposition of the specific meanings and cultural values of the authors onto the 
statements of the subjects they claim to understand. This, too, has its predecessors 
in sociological thought. This danger was seen, too, in the case of German literature 
on the topic. 
                                                           
23 Once more, it has to be asked: ‘Resistance’ against what, from what original initial point, 
conditions of existence and habitual dispositions, and in which social context? 
24 These authors seem to be in tune with a wider tendency within current British Sociology. This 
tendency consists in claiming an objective disadvantage (such as belonging to a particular group, for 
example the ‘female working class’) in fields like higher education. This makes them outsiders or 
‘fish out of water’ which have to fight their way up against adversity and the odds. But where is the 
proper evidence that this applies to these groups within British academic Sociology, the ‘water’ in 
which these ‘fish’ swim and live? At the very least, then, one should clarify what or who is meant by 
‘water’ and ‘fish’. Otherwise, one might say with just as much justification that a very peculiar 
‘water’ it must be where ‘fish’ like these can survive, and even thrive, by continuously claiming to 
be ‘out of water’.  
25 Once again, for a more thorough reflexivity, it would need to be asked how the specific habitus of 
the authors and interviewees are expressed in the academic field of British Sociology and in the field 
of study choice. These expressions would then need to be related to each other to arrive at a more 
sociological reflection of one’s own feelings against interviewees during the research process. Once 
more, one needs to construct theoretical models.  
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And so, one final consequence of taking up an individualist and subjectivist social 
philosophy and epistemology of this kind also seems to lead to a kind of 
scientifically proffered assessment of social space. It seems to reflect and to exalt 
more the tastes of the researchers than making sense of the subject’s attitudes or 
norms. 
One may now see more clearly the differences between a Bourdieusian 
epistemology and the method applied in this literature on study choice. The latter 
rejects the reductions of reality into models via reference to a sort of Weberian-
style intellectual that is, in their view, artificially remote from the struggles and 
suffering of the everyday life. The former, on the other hand, defends the right and 
necessity to reduce and hopes, nevertheless, that this can go together with political 
efficacy and solidarity with the weakest. 
  
Another kind of ethnocentrism connected to intellectual living conditions and corresponding 
habitus is ‘scholastic populism’ “[…] which leads some to credit working-class people with a 
‘popular aesthetic’ or a ‘popular culture’ […] it performs a tacit universalization of the scholastic 
viewpoint which is not accompanied by the slightest real intention of universalization of its 
conditions of possibility. […] One cannot, in fact, without contradiction, describe (or denounce) the 
inhuman conditions of existence that are imposed on some, and at the same time credit those 
who suffer them with the real fulfillment of human potentialities such as the capacity to adopt the 
gratuitous, disinterested posture that we tacitly describe […] in notions such as ‘culture’ or 
‘aesthetic’. (Bourdieu 2000[1997]: 75). This by no means implies disrespect for lower classes or 
marginalized groups, to the contrary. It acknowledges as completely as possible the material 
conditions of production and reproduction of culture by being aware of the dual nature of social 
reality which has an ethnological dimension, where popular cultures exist, and a sociological 
dimension, where a clear, empirically discernible hierarchy reigns and specific cultures are 
devalued. “The social world, with its hierarchies which are not so easily relativized, is not relativist 
… .” (ibid.: 76).   
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Conclusion – Beyond epistemological Obstacles – towards a new Formulation of 
Study Motivation 
 
I do think that both main bodies of social scientific literature discussed here – the 
German and British studies of educational choice – have assumptions at their base 
with which a rigorous rational polemic would take some issue. The mainly German 
tradition26 starts out from a thoroughly individualistic viewpoint which grants 
students (as well as themselves) independence from their social surroundings, at 
least until proven otherwise. It also assumes unambiguous and clearly discernible 
meanings of statements on study motivation for all participants of its studies. 
Lastly, it believes in the linearity and possibility of isolation of potential causal 
triggers that can influence study choice and motivation. These assumptions make 
for a Social Science that constructs ideal-types of study choice along a distinction of 
‘intrinsic’ and ‘extrinsic’ study choice. This distinction depicts certain patterns of 
educational attitudes that distinguish disciplines. It sometimes can also link 
variables of social origin to these attitudes and choices. On the whole, however, it 
frames educational attitudes at universities as rather autonomous processes 
happening solely with respect to scientific disciplines. The perspective thus 
oscillates between radical individual freedom and deterministic tethering of 
‘actors’ to structures (whether it is that of social origin or the attitudes of their 
discipline of choice). Its principle of unambiguity of meaning (both in its theory and 
in the interpretation of student’s understanding of, and relationship to, statements 
and concepts) induces it to construct educational choice as a more or less radical 
discontinuity, both in the short and long terms.     
 
                                                           
26 One might include the British examples of John Goldthorpe or Anett Sullivan, although of course 
there might be very different sociological mechanisms and habitus behind this work. 
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On the other hand, the mainly British interpretivist strand27, at first glance 
seemingly diverging from its German counterpart, emphasises the relative and 
multifarious nature of ‘truth’. This, together with a strong belief that moral-ethical 
values and scientific practice should and can be closely intertwined28, leads it to 
engage in mainly in-depth interviews and ethnographic research on educational 
choice that focusses on individual struggles against the odds, on reflections of the 
educational system as well as strategies for succeeding in it. While there are no 
ideal-types constructed, the interpretation of interviews or ‘stories’ is, peculiarly, 
also ending up with a similar form of oscillation. The interpretivist-empathetic 
stance taken induces the authors in question to attribute interviewees and 
statements (at least implicitly) to one of two poles: on the one hand mechanistic 
chaining to structures or, on the other hand, their transcending and challenging by 
developing fresh strategies of coping with the difficulties. Furthermore, due to the 
absence of any serious model, the researchers are forced to take interviewee’s 
statements at face value. In this is expressed a strong moral argument, celebrating 
‘resistance’ and ‘resilience’ on the one hand (for example Bathmaker et al. 2016: 
93-100), condemning ‘elitism’29 on the other. 
 
Aside from obvious differences like chosen methodology (largely quantitative vs. 
largely qualitative), there seems to exist a number of deep-seated commonalities 
between both epistemologies. Both in effect have an individualistic philosophy of 
the social which applies to both themselves and to the students they study (albeit 
in different ways). Both, consequently, do not enquire into the nature and origin of 
                                                           
27 Again one finds proponents of it in the other country as well, for example Bremer and Teiwes-
Kügler (2007), undoubtedly again inflected by national intellectual tradtions, such as objective 
hermeneutics. 
28 “I often despair. But I have an anger about the unequal way things are that is still as strong as it 
was 50 years ago. I will continue to struggle against social class injustices, and this book is part of 
my struggle.” (Reay 2017: 195) 
29 This seems to be the case not only within educational research. Witness the frequent declarations 
of solidarity with what is imagined as ‘working-classes’ and their suffering and the condescension 
and ridicule of some of their practices, such as misogyny or racism, which can be seen in the 
disgusted reactions to the Trump or the Brexit vote. The point here is not to condemn the political 
position-takings of Sociologists, but to challenge them to supplement, and perhaps even somewhat 
to replace, these political stances with a more scientific understanding of what they criticise or 
celebrate. Presumably, what might be found through this reflexive procedure, may be a cultural 
distance to these vulnerable groups that is larger than expected or assumed at first. 
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their concepts of distinction (intrinsic vs. extrinsic here, reflexive vs. not reflexive 
there) that help to produce and assess their data. It remains a pending problem to 
explore these issues further in a sociological-reflexive study.30 Nevertheless, the 
individualistic philosophy of the social can be framed as an obstacle to scientific 
progress, as two variants of ‘subjectivism’ that need to be overcome(Bourdieu 
1992[1980], 2000[1997]). Bourdieu’s theory holds that the effect of scientists’ un-
reflected assumptions is such that such that they tend to be smuggled into the 
objectivating operations of their science. The results, then, are inevitably partial 
and biased. A critical examination indeed shows that this criticism can easily be 
sustained here. The German authors tend to systematically consecrate a specific 
disciplinary culture and relationship to the educational system (namely, their own) 
through their substantialist definition and objectivation of ‘intrinsic’ and ‘extrinsic’ 
study choice. The British authors tend to systematically consecrate a specific type 
of reflection of the educational system (namely, one which conforms with their own 
reflections and that of their own discipline). What we have here, I argue, are two 
forms of empiricism. “Sociology cannot constitute itself as a science truly separated 
from common-sense notions unless it combats the systematic pretensions of 
spontaneous sociology with the organized resistance of a theory of knowledge of 
the social whose principles contradict, point by point, the presuppositions of the 
naïve philosophy of the social.” (Bourdieu, Chamboredon, and Passeron 1991[1968]: 
15). But what does this epistemology look like? We must bring together the hitherto 
dispersed epistemological boxes into a more coherent standpoint that might serve 
as an alternative to the subjectivisms discussed so far. 
 
Towards a new Mode of Thinking 
 
The first major difference of this epistemology to the paradigms discussed before is 
its rejection of the assumption of individualism: Instead of free-floating monads, 
individual beings are embedded in particular, culturally specific environments 
                                                           
30 I am thinking of works like that of Stefan Collini (2006) that enquire about the national peculiarity 
of British intelllectuals vis-à-vis their western counterparts. Its historical habits and traditions 
arguably lie in a relatively moral colouring and motivation of science.  
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(more or less prosperous, more or less educated, and so on). These environments, 
that can be classed and classified, entrench themselves not necessarily in a unified 
ethic, but rather, preceding such a thing, in a system of dispositions that tends to 
be adapted to its original socio-cultural environment and which tends to be hidden 
from conscious view (if not necessarily unconscious either). The agents that carry 
this system of dispositions (which can also be classed and classified) into new social 
environments with more or less different rules and conditions as well as their own 
forms of struggle (i.e. the fields). This is the normal case in highly differentiated 
societies. But through this change of environment what also changes is the 
relationship to the system of dispositions, the habitus. In each new environment the 
formerly acquired dispositions adapt, but adapt within their own limits, not 
endlessly or arbitrarily. That also implies that the same or similar dispositions (like 
that of cultural good-will of people of a petit-bourgeois origin, for example; 
Bourdieu 1984[1979]: 318ff.) can be expressed in different ways in different 
environments, or in terms of a different ethic.  
 
But that poses new problems: if the original system of dispositions, the ethos, is not 
really consciously known to the individual that bears it, neither is its adaptation to 
a new social environment. First, this opens up a new, partly sub-conscious 
dimension which operates clandestinely but which nevertheless is expressed in a 
specific, visible position-taking in a specific field. The job of the Sociologist is now 
to decipher this expression, to uncover and discover its dispositional root. Second, 
this fundamental insecurity about the meaning of a practice questions established 
certainties of meaning – the same practice may mean different things according to 
its different embeddedness, and different practices may mean the same thing. The 
point is to search for, and find, these hidden differences and similarities through 
theoretical construction. Hence this perspective rejects the singularity of meaning 
assumed by both perspectives discussed above. Instead of substantialist 
interpretations of practices, it leads us towards a more multidimensional, structural 
view (much like with the theory of the planetary system). All that is solid melts into 
air. It leads us to question and to rethink received groupings of individuals and 
practices.  
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How is one to do this then? This perspective encourages thinking in models, 
comparing models of thinking. The eventual goal is to reconstruct objectively the 
system of dispositions expressed in the field-specific position-takings, to dare to 
construct its most important aspects and material influences31, and then to show 
how this particular habitus reacts to the particular field in question to bring about 
the empirically observable position-taking. Instead of rejecting the construction of 
models or in producing linear models, one must therefore engage in producing 
models that reproduce abstractly the practical dispositions that make agents do 
what they do. I will attempt to sketch such a model in the closing part (chapter 9) 
of this work. 
 
Furthermore, the introduction of particular dispositions, their preceding conditions 
of existence and their relative distance to each other introduce a dimension of 
relativity that allows for the comparison of different historical worlds and times. In 
other words, once a model that links specific dispositions with a specific ethos and 
position-taking in a specific field has been constructed, this relationship may be 
compared with those of other times, agents and fields. This method of comparison 
can even be used to construct the model for the field in question in the first place. 
This analogical reasoning is another important difference to the subjectivist 
epistemologies depicted above.  
 
“The ars inveniendi therefore has to aim to provide the techniques of thought 
that make it possible to perform the work of hypothesis construction in a 
methodical fashion while minimizing its inherent risks through an awareness of 
the dangers of this undertaking. The reasoning by analogy which many 
epistemologists regard as the first principle of scientific invention is called upon 
to play a specific role in sociological science, the specificity of which is that it 
                                                           
31 That no doubt means to exclude other influences, which might earn this perspective moral charges 
of neglect and discrimination. But, to the contrary, it is through this objectivation of our own 
assumptions that, in this perspective, has the most chances of escaping ethnocentrism.  
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can only constitute its object by the comparative approach. To escape from 
idiographic consideration of cases that do not contain their own reason, the 
sociologist has to multiply the hypotheses of possible analogies until he 
reconstructs the family of cases that gives an adequate account of the case in 
question. And to construct these analogies themselves, he can legitimately make 
use of the phenomena already given form by other sciences […]” (Bourdieu, 
Chamboredon, and Passeron 1991[1968]: 51).    
 
In summary therefore, this alternative vision of understanding and investigating 
upon human practice proposes its thorough embeddedness in specific times and 
places. It assumes systems of dispositions that are acquired in specific conditions of 
existence that mark differences to that of other conditions of existence. These 
dispositions or ethos are transferrable to other contexts or fields in which they 
‘react’ differently. This opens up the question of meaning of various practices or 
position-taking in fields, of the underlying structural mechanisms that act in and 
through the ‘free’ dispositions of the agents. It thus forces us to question the 
doctrine of singular, substantialist meanings, and to work towards constructing 
models that make visible just this link between structures, habitus and position-
taking. But in order to be able to do this we must first determine what exactly the 
structures, both of the field and of the agents within it, are in their historical and 
local specificity. Before one can start explaining things, one needs a framework 
(i.e. the epistemology) of a certain puzzle, and, of course, one must start 
collecting pieces. That is exactly what I will try to do in the upcoming chapters. 
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Chapter 4 - Preparing a Bourdieusian Theory of Study Choice and its Application 
to the German Case 
 
It is clear that different groups can be involved with the same cultural items and 
yet take different homological meanings and effects from them. It is also clear 
that what a particular group makes of a particular item can change over time, so 
that what was once accepted is rejected. A particular item is not, then, 
changeless, absolute and specific in its cultural meaning. It is not as if a fully 
constituted ‘content’ always draws forth a predictable response. Objects, artefacts 
and institutions do not, as it were, have a single valency. It is the act of social 
engagement with a cultural item, which activates and brings out particular 
meanings. On the other hand, there is not a limitless scope for the production of 
cultural meanings. I argue for a more structural analysis of the ‘objective 
possibilities’ of particular items in an assessment of their role in cultural 
relationships. 
Paul Willis – Profane Culture  
 
After having highlighted the differences of a Bourdieusian approach with that of 
established subjectivist perspectives on study motivation, we must now transmit its 
principles to the concrete object at hand. What are the basic epistemological 
principles of a theory of study choice, and what forms of enquiry does it lead it to? 
We may know now that this approach is relational and structural, that it works by 
way of controlled analogies, but how are these applied to the ‘bread and butter’ 
issues of the German academic or educational field? For our purposes this is the 
relationship between the social field and the scientific/academic field, with its own 
peculiarities and laws. This implies that we are concerned with exploring the 
question of the degree of fit of habitus and disciplinary environment, and the 
objective distinction of individual students according to differentiating degrees that 
are reflected in the minds of students. But what specific habitus could that be, and 
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to what academic field precisely do they fit? To put more flesh to the bones, 
answering these questions necessitates us to enquire about the longer-term 
constitution of habitus of both students and the general outlook of the discipline 
which they study (here it will be Economics). In short, we must first construct the 
way we look at things ‘from the outside’ (Smith 2012: 99) before we look at how 
others look at things ‘from the inside’.32    
 
Habitus and Field(s) 
 
No seriously Bourdieusian perspective can do without a proper application of 
Habitus and Field to its specific object of study. Any agent within this perspective 
owns, and tends to be owned by, a habitus which is the product of definite social 
origins and definite social trajectories. These mental dispositions are therefore 
objectively formed as well as giving rise to ‘subjective’ attitudes. But as such, 
these dispositions and their origin are likely to be, at best, vaguely known to their 
bearers (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992: 121f.). But a habitus, historically minted and 
situated, only functions within “[…] a network […] of objective relations between 
positions.” (ibid.: 97) , definite relations that represent, themselves, a historical 
process of genesis and change. A habitus can only be understood and explained 
properly within a concrete, specific field, when its specific expressions and 
position-takings vis-à-vis the position-takings of other types of habitus validate the 
theoretical construction which it represents in the first place. Hence it is vital to 
define specifically both habitus and field and the relationship between the two.  
 
In this perspective study choice is one expression of habitus. Contrary to what is 
assumed by a subjectivist epistemology, study choice is a priori not viewed as the 
free choice of individual tastes or talents, and neither (as in objectivism) as purely 
                                                           
32 This perspective also assumes, by default, a primary importance accorded to the national academic field vis-à-
vis international relations. It is true that the international field is very important in Economics, particular via its 
American pole (Hesse 2012). Nevertheless, it is also true that, in a Bourdieusian perspective, it is only through a 
specific national field and its groups of agents that this international influence is executed.  
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determined by social structures, but is a decision guided by the sense of one’s place 
within society, and, later on, within the specific profession that one takes up 
(understood as a field in the Bourdieusian sense). Study choice is then an expression 
of the specifically cognitive and substantive interests of the particular social group 
from which the particular student comes, whether conscious or not. It can be posed 
that, by choosing a certain discipline and a certain institution, a student acts as if 
she or he is making an investment, similar to an as-if-investment in life-style 
(Bourdieu 1984[1979]) or the marriage market (Bourdieu 1992[1980]). The 
educational trajectory of any student can be conceptualised as a series of manifold 
choices (whether to opt for elementary school A or B, whether to learn or not to 
learn, whether to take this or that subject for specialisation in his Abitur exams33, 
whether to study this or that discipline, whether to focus on this or that sub-field of 
his discipline, and so on), where the preceding choices influence the later choices 
as part of one’s trajectory. This work aspires to explore the sociological meaning of 
the choices that occur during the last (the tertiary) phase of a student’s subjection 
to the educational system, i.e. the choice of the discipline and specialisation.  
 
From Study Choice to Study Selection – the Link of Structure and Position-taking 
 
We must pause for a minute and spell out the theoretical implications of the 
relationship of habitus and field, and also of different forms of habitus between 
each other. It is helpful for this purpose to employ a simplified model (see Figure 8) 
that captures the basic propositions of a Bourdieusian perspective.  Thus we have 
two agents, A and B, endowed with different habitus and amounts and/or forms of 
capital (whatever they might be) within social space, successively entering, through 
continuous choices in the same direction (such as the choice to take a research 
Masters in political economy rather than in political sciences, or the choice to take 
up occupation of a tutorship assisting a professor rather than doing an internship in 
a company, and finally the choice to make an application to do a PhD in 
                                                           
33 The final secondary school exams in Germany to gain unrestricted access, in principle, to all university 
disciplines. It may be viewed as the analogous exam to the British A-levels. I will henceforth refer to these in its 
German form as simply the ‘Abitur’. 
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Economics), the specific field of academic Economics and thereby paying what 
Bourdieu (2006: 50f.) calls the ‘entrance fee’ (signified by the bold line in front of 
disciplines I and II in Figure 8, which could be filled with any concrete disciplines of 
course). This fee is nominally, but not practically, the same for everyone making a 
choice towards field membership.34 It depends on the (mis-)fit between the specific 
and intellectual dispositions of the agents and the relevant disciplinary 
requirements and traditions. 
 
Figure 8   Model of differential Selection or Fit in different academic Disciplines 
according to Field Theory35  
 
                                                           
34 Very much like competitors in any economic market are de jure, but not de facto equal. 
35 Following Bourdieu and Passeron (1990[1970]: 71-106) 
Social SpaceA B
Social Scientific Academic Space
Discipline I
(fit to A)
Discipline II
(fit to B)
Goodness of Fit+-
A + B-
B+ A-
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As such, the process of choice is akin to the practice of the mature scientist-
professional: “Each scientific act, like every practice, is the product of the 
encounter between two histories, a history embodied, incorporated in the form of 
dispositions, and a history objectified in the very structure of the field and in 
technical objects (instruments), writings, etc.” (Bourdieu 2006: 35). It is obvious  
that, whether there is an elective affinity or not between the two histories, the 
process of choice itself transforms the habitus in that new, more fitting dispositions 
to the new field are, peu à peu, developed and grounded in it, more or less 
depending on the number and commitment of the choices and the length of 
exposure to inculcation within the new universe. But to simply record these 
transformations, and differences between fields, and to declare a person’s own 
reflections on them as a source of reflexivity with regard to social structures per 
se36 in my view dodges a whole host of difficult empirical questions that instead 
should be focussed upon first37. Questions, for example, such as the position the 
students take, or plan to take, within their new field, and how far there exists a 
homology, despite and beyond phenomenal differences, to the position in the field 
of origin, or in how far the student invests in the field at all.38  
 
Within this very abstract model, agent A chooses discipline I over discipline II 
because her capital composition, his habitus in the contemporary social field and 
                                                           
36 In Bourdieu’s model agents constantly reflect upon the social world and their place within it, but 
very often within the perspective of their habitus, and it is yet another question whether this 
reflexivity actually includes one’s own perspective, and thus habitus. Mostly, this kind of reflexivity 
is only fostered in times of deep and enduring mismatch of habitus and field, both of which have to 
be shown empirically rather than simply asserted. See Bourdieu (Bourdieu 2010[2008]: 322-34) for a 
proper analysis of reflexivity of social structures.  
37 Once again, one can see here, in my view, the disposition to bend Bourdieusian concepts towards 
an interpretation of interview data that seems heavily favoured value-wise by the authors - namely 
agency and structural liberation of ‘working class’ respondents - rather than to stick to the implicit 
principles of enquiry that Bourdieusian concepts call for. It seems to me that these scholars fall into 
one of the traps that await the critical scholar when, as Nancy Scheper-Hughes says, in “[…] writing 
against cultures and institutions of fear and domination” (Scheper-Hughes 1992: 533) they emphasise  
agency as against structures, which has its rather unfortunate logical flipside: “[…] [I]n granting 
power, agency, choice, and efficacy to the oppressed subject, one must begin to hold the oppressed 
morally accountable for their collusions, collaborations, rationalizations, ‘false consciousness’ […]. 
With agency begin responsibility and accountability.” (ibid.). 
 
86 
 
his view of the academic field incline him to do that (while it is exactly vice versa 
for agent B). This is obviously an objectivist statement, and needs to be 
supplemented by the ‘other side of the coin’, the particular impressions and 
assessments this habitus produces that lead to the decision to study a discipline like 
Economics and no other under these particular circumstances. More 
probabilistically, one might say that agents ‘like’ A – in terms of their origin and 
capital endowment – are likely to choose like her. In any case, if it is true that 
study choice is an encounter of ‘objectified history in bodies’ and ‘objectified 
history in institutions (Bourdieu 1992[1980]: 57f.), then the discipline ‘chooses’ the 
student (for varying reasons) as much as the student ‘chooses’ the discipline, 
somewhat similar to Marx’s remark land that inherits its owner (ibid). To represent 
this relational39, indeed two-sided quality of this process, means rejecting notions 
of both pure agentic power to choose and a slavish bearing of structures. Here it 
seems reasonable to use the term study selection rather than choice. No doubt this 
term is more ambiguous in definition and usage, but, following the logic of the 
model, it reflects better the twofold practical realities in that it draws our 
attention to both the student’s selection of their subjects, and the disciplinary 
selection of successful students..   
 
The Implications of the epistemological Framework 
 
What are the consequences and implications of the relationship of different habitus 
with the academic field? The first is the opening up of a ‘degree of accordance’ 
that is always between the two poles of optimal and minimal accordance, the 
former one representing the famous ‘fish-in-water’-case and the latter the ‘fish out 
of water’. This means that, all other things being equal, the probability of entering 
the field declines steadily if one moves from one pole to the other. That implies 
that a certain habitus with a certain amount of capital (of whatever provenance) 
                                                           
39 As far as I can see the meaning of ‘relational’ in this perspective is rather different from its use in 
recent theoretical developments such as that of ‘relational Sociology’ – which appear, in their 
rejection of structural influences on direct interpersonal relationships, as a remake of interactionist 
approaches. See (See Depelteau 2018). 
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represents a sort of minimum de facto necessary to enter the field. Agents 
equipped below this amount of capital will tend to be excluded, either by 
themselves and/or by the representatives of the field (in other words, their habitus 
will tend to discourage them from entertaining the possibility of a career in 
scientific Economics, likely supported by external discouragements such as 
mediocre or bad grades as well as subtle, yet unambiguous ‘practical’ signs 
expressed by Economics staff and representatives). What that minimum is, is of 
course an empirical question. It is the habitual equivalent to the institutionalised 
‘entry fee’ that needs to be ‘paid’ to enter the field. 
 
It follows from this that a certain percentage of the students within a discipline, 
depending on the minimum capital required to enter that discipline, will be 
excluded from entering it, both objectively (detectable via statistics) and 
subjectively (via the experience of the student of his studies). They will orient 
themselves towards different fields, and consequently their statements about their 
studies will, the more so the longer they study, mean and express sociologically 
divergent aspirations or memberships of different fields. Their relationship towards 
Economics therefore can be anticipated to be different from those who have the 
(more or less) fitting habitus to pay the ‘entrance fee’.  
 
One might consider an analogy with the field of politics, understood in a 
Bourdieusian way. A ‘democratisation’ of higher education without the 
accompanying democratisation of means to appropriate the various dispositions 
required in the disciplines will, in this logic, lead to a rather passive (i.e. ‘ill-
fitting’) majority of students. This majority tends to follow the prevailing 
disciplinary ideals of excellence without really having internalised them. This is not 
unlike the relationship of the classes as described by Bourdieu in Distinction 
(Bourdieu 1984[1979]: 397-465; also Bourdieu 1993[1984]: 149-57), except perhaps 
with a more comprehensive integration of the lower classes through the 
‘conservative school’ (Bourdieu 1974). This integration, slowly but surely, 
transforms the empirical indicators of exclusion, from simple abdication to 
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something like ‘don’t know’ answers in surveys (Bourdieu 1984[1979]: 399-405). 
This of course at the same time indicates a move towards new or more subtle forms 
of exclusion. Like with the selection of parties, different groups select disciplines 
nominally for the same reason, behind which are different trajectories and 
strategies. 
 
Therefore, one may make a first conceptual distinction between those able and 
willing to ‘play the game’ of academic Economics and those not able and willing. 
From this, concrete empirical questions arise: what does the ‘entry fee’ look like in 
German academic Economics? What does it consist of? In what ways does it 
correspond with the amounts and forms of capital of those who are able, and 
willing, to pay it? What amounts and forms of capital are these, i.e. from what 
conditions of existence do they derive, and what are its structural-historical 
antecedents? How are these conditions of existence transformed into an 
‘Economics’ perspective of the world? What may be pertinent empirical indicators 
for distinguishing those able/willing to pay the entry fee from those who aren’t? 
One can see that a Bourdieusian epistemology sensitises us to issues of fit which 
would be given rather short measure by epistemologies portrayed in the last 
chapters. 
 
Then, of course, there are the conceptual divisions to be made between those who 
are able and willing to pay the fee for entrance for the field, but do so in different 
ways and styles. These are obviously A and B in our simplified model. Here, too, 
there are differences in fit to the subject at hand, but since the general price of 
entry has been paid, these differences will express themselves differently than was 
the case when considering the discipline as a whole. The most obvious, ideal-typical 
expressions within an academic field, in a Bourdieusian framework, are obviously 
those of orthodoxy and heterodoxy. Both are, as is the selection of the discipline 
itself “[…] guided by taken-for-granted assumptions interactive with practices, as to 
what constitutes real and important problems, valid methods, and authentic 
knowledge.” (Bourdieu 1991: 3f.). In other words, this selection, too, is guided by 
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habitus, even though it may be phenomenologically very different from the 
selection of the whole discipline in the first place. The selection of orthodoxy 
represents a choice for established, recognised views and methods of the specific 
field at hand. Hence “[…] the profits awaiting those who realise the official ideal of 
scientific excellence through limited innovations within authorised limits […].” 
(Bourdieu 1975: 30). On the other hand, heterodox strategies aim at the overthrow 
of the established symbolic order and are therefore risky since, for the heterodox, 
it “[…] will not bring them the profits accruing to the holders of the monopoly of 
scientific legitimacy unless they can achieve a complete redefinition of the 
principles legitimating domination […]” (Bourdieu 1975: 30; also Bourdieu 2006: 
35f.)40. These two groups struggle for dominance in a scientific field and thus 
constantly force each other to innovate their products in order to hold or to 
improve their positions. 
 
But in doing so, they form a collective, social censorship: “[…] the conservatives 
and their ‘radical’ opponents are objective accomplices who agree on the essential 
point: from the one-sided points of view which they necessarily adopt on the 
scientific field, by opting, unconsciously at least, for one or the other of the 
opposing camps, they are unable to see that control or censorship are not effected 
by any specific institution but the objective relationship between opposing 
accomplices who, through, their very antagonism, demarcate the field of legitimate 
argument, excluding as absurd, eclectic or simply unthinkable any attempt to take 
up an unforeseen position […]” (Bourdieu 1975: 39f., emphasis in the text). This is 
of course, at the same time, a specific definition of doxa in the scientific field. 
Immediately, these antagonisms come to mind when thinking about Economics – for 
example neoclassical vs. Keynesian Economics, or supply- vs. demand-side social 
policies, but also theoretical-led Economics vs. Econometrics, and so on. An 
                                                           
40 This is obviously a reconfiguration of Weber’s theoretical distinction of priest and prophet in his 
Sociology of religion, which, from Bourdieu’s perspective, is another field that is highly charged 
symbolically. See (Weber 1968: 439-51). 
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empirical question we can draw out of this is what the doxa could be that students 
of Economics that have paid the ‘entrance fee’ agree upon.  
 
The question is now how the selected Economics students develop their stance 
towards one of these two ideal-typical positions. What can be derived from the 
basic model above is that for discipline I students with a specific capital amount 
and composition that comes close to that of agent A will fit better with the 
discipline’s cognitive preconditions than with that of agent B. This of course, in this 
logic, means that, all else being equal, agent A will tend to experience a smoother 
adaptation to the new field than agent B, and students with his or her specific 
capital composition should be more numerous, statistically speaking, measured by 
their share of the whole population, than students closer to B’s capital 
composition. That also implies that the farther a student is away from the optimal 
capital composition, the higher the degree of selection will tend to be, and 
consequently the better adapted the student will have to be in relation to those 
who ‘inherit’ the discipline (Bourdieu and Passeron 1990[1970]: 72-89; Bourdieu and 
Passeron 1979[1964]). But how can this be seen in the ‘subjective’ experience of 
the students themselves? And what methods need to be applied to bring these 
experiences to the light of the day?  
 
 If there indeed exists a primacy of structures over individual will, and if thus the 
meaning of a practice is to be derived from the history and current field position of 
the agent that performs it, then it follows that comparison between practices, and 
consequently their grouping into ideal types, must be organised along structural 
lines rather than substantialist ones. That means that we cannot simply compare 
direct expressions of ‘extrinsic’ or ‘intrinsic’ or ‘reflexive’ motivations along or 
even within disciplines any more, but must affiliate them with specific states of 
relations of historically grown habitus and historically grown fields. Methodically 
this implies that we need to carefully distinguish, especially when it comes to the 
recapitulation of an educational trajectory via in-depth interviews, reference to 
different fields, to be assessed and interpreted differently. The ideal types can 
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then be constructed along structurally homologous cases (Bourdieu and Wacquant 
1992: 233f.).   
 
 
So far, we have conceptualised study selection as the meeting of two histories, one 
personal-embodied and one institutionalised in a scientific discipline or a field. 
Both histories have specific objective characteristics, specific idiosyncrasies vis-à-
vis their respective ‘fellow travellers’ (other students and scientists here, rival 
disciplines there) that need to be singled out and emphasised. The objective degree 
of matching between the two should give us the particular groups ‘fitting’ to a 
particular discipline. This distinguishes them objectively from other groups that fit 
less well, and opens up the possibility of diverging meanings (or reference systems) 
of statements in surveys on ‘study choice’ (such as on the matter of ‘intrinsic’ and 
‘extrinsic’ ‘choices’), leaving the empirical rapport of both groups as an expression 
of adaptations to a disciplinary environment that have different roots and 
meanings.  Contrary to the epistemologies discussed in the preceeding chapters, 
this approach is therefore non-substantialist – the meaning of a ‘choice’ is not 
accorded by some ‘intrinsic’ meaning of a statement or word (‘intrinsic means 
intrinsic’), but by attempting to relate it to a specific position in a  specific space 
and a specific habitus. The same logic applies to the differentiation of groups that 
fit well with the discipline of Economics, where formerly ‘secondary’ 
characteristics of habitus might play a role. Hence, one may construct analogies of 
position in the academic fields (such as A in discipline I and B in discipline II), or 
analogies of original social position expressed in different academic fields (such as 
A in discipline I and A in discipline II) based on the relationship between the so-
constructed social field and academic field(s).  
 
But it is here where epistemological guidance ends and data collection for a proper 
theory of study selection of contemporary German Economics students commences. 
Considering the principles just discussed, we therefore must ask the empirical 
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questions: What are the fields with which these study selections are situated? Who 
are ‘fitting’ students in Economics, and what distinguishes them from ‘ill-fitting’ 
ones? What is these ‘fitting’ student’s position within the social field? What is their 
specific form of capital? What is the historically grown position of German 
Economics within the wider academic, or social scientific academic field? The point 
of the following sub-chapters is to provide an objective empirical, historical and 
sociological context with which the ‘subjective’ views, experiences and attitudes 
that are eventually discussed can be knotted together to forge a proper theory of 
study selection. Two aspects are looked at for now: first, the recent 
transformations of the educational field and the potential changes that follow from 
them for the interaction among, and behaviour of, a student population. Second, 
the specific field of academic Economics, and its historical embeddedness in the 
broader German academic field.  
In short, Bourdieusian epistemology has led us to consider contextual aspects of the 
problem of educational choice which tend to be neglected by the subjectivist 
epistemologies discussed in the preceding chapters. The main reason, once again, 
for this is that for a Bourdieusian epistemology the meaning of selections emerges 
from the relationship of a habitus to its specific environment, and not by simple 
(individually or collectively) free determination, like with decisions ‘in private’ or 
after ‘rational’ debate in parliaments. 
 
Epistemological Objections and their Ripostes 
 
Apart from the more or less implicit critiques made by empirical Sociologists on 
Bourdieusian epistemology I here wish to shortly discuss a few (more abstract) 
objections against this way of doing Sociology. In this I will mainly concentrate – in 
view of the occasion of this thesis - on those contributions made by the Sociology of 
Science. I will also try to show the alternative empirical solutions to which this 
leads. This critique essentially41 consists of pointing towards the alleged 
                                                           
41 I will forego all the jibes at and unfair critiques of Bourdieu’s work and person and concentrate 
here on what I think is the core issue at stake.  
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epistemological reductionism inherent in Bourdieusian methodology, indeed the 
very kind of reduction that has been advocated in the preceeding pages. This is 
where critics of the most diverse theoretical patronage converge in their critique of 
Bourdieusianism. That is the case for Michael Burawoy, for instance, who laments 
the allegedly hermeneutical closure of Bourdieusian works: “It is not that some 
social orders lead to mystification and others to transparency, but all social orders 
reproduce themselves through the inculcation of habitus and necessary 
misrecognition. We are all fish in water unable to comprehend the environment in 
which we swim […]” (Burawoy 2012: 192). This essentially entails a questioning as 
to whether misrecognition really is as widespread as is posed by Bourdieu, whether 
this is not to be too ‘pessimistic’ about the possibilities for consciousness, 
especially that of dominated groups and agents. Against this, Burawoy wishes to 
recuperate some individual room for maneuver, and he does so by conceptually 
pushing the incarnated social structures out of the body and the individual while 
proposing a rather strict re-distinctioning between social structures and ‘the 
individuals’ (ibid.: 198). In other words, this amounts to a rejection of the concept 
of the habitus because it, for Burawoy, allegedly holds that “[…] we are 
programmed to act out the social structure.” (ibid.). In other words, it is a kind of 
ahistorical determinism allegedly not unlike that of Parsons (see Burawoy and von 
Holdt 2012: 11f.) with which Bourdieusian analysis is charged here. Burawoy then 
assembles the interpretation of some of his ethnographic work on industrial sites in 
the USA and socialist Hungary to buttress his hypothesis (e.g. Burawoy 1979; 
Burawoy and Lukacs 1992). The historical relationships of domination in the west 
are relatively stable, whereas in actually existing socialism they are fraught with 
resistance movements. These eventually contributed to the downfall of the 
communist regimes in eastern Europe which lets Burawoy conclude that capitalist 
relations of production ‘produced consent’ whereas state socialism ‘produced 
dissent’. (Burawoy 2012: 203f.).  
The work of Andrew Sayer (1999, 2005), which is otherwise of a more theoretical 
(that is, critical realist) provenance, however comes to similar conclusions with 
regards to Bourdieusian epistemology. For him it subjects the subject to an unfair 
reduction, one which makes us “[…] no more than products of their position or self-
94 
 
interest.” (Sayer 2005: 6). This reduction affects the resistance people muster 
against structures of domination, as well as their feelings.  The habitus, for Sayer, 
leaves little place for freedom or resistance: “This is a model of a perfectly 
malleable human, a mode which makes it impossible to understand how anyone 
could react against and resist at least some parts of their habitat.” (ibid.: 31). This 
is the reason why Sayer wishes to emphasise the ethical or moral dimension of the 
habitus, for which he utilises Adam Smith’s moral philosophy. But these 
‘modifications’ of Bourdieusian theory remain, as far as I know, in the abstract, 
theoretical realm, in the name of a sort of defense mode against some vaguely 
perceived ‘sociological imperialism’ (ibid.: 33).  
Closer to the topic of this thesis are critiques posed by Sociologists, or Philosopher-
Sociologists, of science, such as Bruno Latour (2005). Rather than from a position of 
moral indignation and outrage he hails from a relativist epistemological standpoint. 
In fact, this relativism is rather extreme and entails a transgression of many known 
distinctions of hitherto social science42, including its Bourdieusian variant, such as 
object vs. subject, human vs. non-human, or sociologist vs. non-sociologist. This is 
done in the name of a critique of epistemological and empirical reduction. The 
ordinary ‘sociology of the social’ a la Bourdieu, it is said, tends to unduly ‘impose 
meanings’, to suggest ‘false independence’ of the analyst, to ‘determine action’of 
the analysed. To remedy this alleged fault, sociology is to let go of basically all the 
traditional distinctions that gave it structure and meaning – in other words, to level 
the playing ground of social science: “[…] ANT has tried to render the social world 
as flat as possible in order to ensure that the establishment of any new link is 
clearly visible.” (ibid.: 16). Rather than thinking in categories of ‘the social’ a la 
Bourdieu, sociologists are to follow ‘associations’ and ‘links’ which lead to networks 
of various human-non-human actors or actants – hence the name Actor-Network 
Theory (ANT). This line of argument is also also followoed by sociologists of science 
like Michel Callon (1998) and originally worked out by Latour and Woolgar 
(1986[1979]).  
                                                           
42 See exemplarily Merton (1968[1949]: 585ff.). 
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Similarly, the work of Karin Knorr-Cetina (1981; 1999) attempts, although from a 
phenomenological starting point, to expand the understanding of scientific activity 
beyond what she calls the ‘objectivism-realism’ of Mertonian sociology of science 
(Knorr-Cetina 1991[1981]: 17-23). This entails embracing a relativism with regard to 
the distinction of truth and falsehood and the methodological choice to the hitherto 
ignored ‘context of discovery’, to idiosyncratic traditions of schools or laboratories. 
This leads her to the adoption of an economic theory of scientific practice, and 
hence to her discussion of Bourdieu. Despite what she terms his ‘quasi-economical’ 
approach, Knorr-Cetina criticises the lack of consequentiality in this approach 
because it still reduces scientific activity to a scientific community (Knorr-Cetina 
1981: 70-73), while all of her ethnographic research shows the contrary, namely the 
existence of ‘variable transscientific fields’, that is, the thorough intermingling of 
scientific people, methods, actions, with non-scientific ones (Knorr-Cetina 1981: 
81-93).  
I now wish to briefly discuss what empirical consequences follow from this criticism 
of reductionism for the various authors and schools discussed. For it is only through 
the practical usefulness of certain epistemological formulas that a theory and 
method so composed can actually tell us something about the object of which we 
want to know something more. The point I wish to make is that the reduction 
criticised in Bourdieu’s writing tends to conceal reductions made by the critics 
themselves. What follows is that epistemological and theoretical reduction is a 
necessary part of any sociological theory – the point is rather whether this reduction 
is controlled or not, and whether it helps us to explain the object we wish to 
explain.  
Burawoy’s hypothesis is that of an ‘open’ domination within socialist regimes. 
Exploitation is somehow ‘transparent’ due to the party state’s unkept promises and 
the difference between its ideology and the dismal reality. This, for Burawoy, 
explains the protest and inherent instability of socialist regimes vis-à-vis that of the 
capitalist west. However, this argument is based on definitions of exploitation, 
protest and resistance that are unambiguous and clear to see for everyone who 
studies them. In other words, Burawoy’s structuralist argument (the ‘relations of 
production’ are ‘independent’ of the individual) is complemented by an empiricist 
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and substantialist use of his ethnographic material. Against this, it should be 
pointed out that in Bourdieusian epistemology structure and the individual are more 
tightly interwoven, which makes the definition and assessment of exploitation, 
protest and resistance more difficult. There can be hidden exploitation and 
integrated protest, and whether this protest is integrated or not can only be 
decided when the specific relationship of mutual composition of structure and 
individuals is theorised.43 Not to do that seems to me to succumb to some kind of 
negative teleology which essentialises the downfall of real socialism and actually 
mystifies the persistence of real capitalism, and the role of the ‘independent’ 
individual in it.  
As for the theoretical and empirical consequences of Sayer’s critique: it is not 
possible to assess the latter because there simply are no substantial empirical 
applications of his modification of Bourdieusian epistemology, at least not to my 
knowledge. The best one is able to find seem to be theoretical conjectures that 
seem rather vague, such as the fact that societal equality needs to be 
institutionally backed up, that privileged social groups sometimes refuse to grant 
recognition, or that domination is never complete (Sayer 2005: 58ff.). There seem 
no practical suggestions as to how to fruitfully widen Bourdieu’s concepts that helps 
to explain a specific reality better than Bourdieu’s original concepts did. The body 
of literature I have found that comes closest to this is indeed the Sociology of 
Education that evolved around Diane Reay. These authors frequently refer to Sayer 
as a theoretical inspiration. Their sociology – including their problematic use of 
‘reflexivity’ - has already been critically examined at length earlier in this thesis 
(see chapter 3). 
Finally, there are the radical constructivists such as Latour and Knorr-Cetina. What 
are the theoretical and empirical consequences of their refusal to reduce? If one 
ceases to construct epistemological and theoretical divisions out of a concern not to 
                                                           
43 See Darnton (2009[1984]) for an empirical example of integrated revolt and Bourdieu (1984[1979]: 
143-47) and again Darnton (1968) for more revolutionary forms of resistance. From these empirical 
examples it becomes very clear that in Bourdieusian epistemology change and reproduction of social 
structures are complexly interwoven with individual reproduction, and therefore can only be 
understood and explained in each case rather than posed theoretically for eternity, as Burawoy 
seems to do. 
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‘distort’ or ‘stifle’, that means that one is exposed ad hoc to the constructions that 
one faces in one’s field work. But that then only offers the two options of either 
rejecting these constructions on one’s own purely personal or moral terms or to 
accept them without critique. But this means to “[…] merely report the scientists 
view on the matter.” as Yearley and Collins (1992: 316) aptly put it. And that, 
obviously, leads right back to the empiricism or positivism against which this 
epistemology was aimed in the first place, the “[…] rule-bound description, 
adopted from scientists and technologists, that we once learned to ignore.” (ibid.: 
322). The same argument may be made about Knorr-Cetina’s ‘transscientific field’ 
which ‘overcomes’ the reduction of attention paid in the sociology of scientific 
activity (to which Bourdieusian Sociology of Science holds on after all) to the role of 
the scientific community. The point made by her, that the products of individual 
researchers are incommensurable with one another, essentially pulverises scientific 
actions and actors. But this then leaves only two theoretical choices: either one 
tries to re-group these actions ex post under some category, or one must leave 
them as they are, as idiosyncratic actions that each warrant their own theory and 
method. As Gad Freudenthal (1984: 291f.) has argued, this latter decision leads to 
an empirical method which “[…] almost irresistibly gravitates towards the most 
extreme brands of positivism.” (ibid.: 291). It ignores the essential consensus 
presupposed by Knorr-Cetina’s own concept of ‘tinkering’ with data (Knorr-Cetina 
1981: 33-48), methods, instruments and the like. Once again, the results of this 
‘anti-reductionist’ epistemology seem rather traditional and positivist.  
Similar consequences can be observed once the popular epistemological principle of 
non-distinction of ‘objects with agency’ (Latour 2005: 63-86) is examined. Via the 
following of ‘associations’ between humans and non-humans, ‘social life’ is 
breathed into the latter. But it comes at a price because it means that one can not 
follow other humans in their relationships to each other, their struggles or alliances 
and the like. Rather, it means to indulge, in the end, in what Simon Schaffer (1991) 
calls ‘hylozoism’, the practice of defining things or animals as ‘wilful actors’. 
Hence, in the end one comes once again full circle towards an essentially positivist 
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(or ‘disabling’, as Schaffer calls it, ibid.) practice, from the brilliant genius of 
Mertonian science to the witty acting things or animals of Latourian ANT.44 
Closer to the topic of this thesis, the consequences of this extreme constructivism 
can be seen in some of its prominent empirical applications. Yuval Yonay and Daniel 
Breslau, for example, adopt constructivist principles in their study on the 
‘epistemological culture’ of Economics (2006). Insisting at first that they wish to 
overcome the ‘hiatus’ between the supposedly autonomous knowledge and its 
surrounding reality, they invoke radical constructivist principles that point towards 
following struggles and ‘associations’: “Applied to economics, this view suggests 
that economic theory has likewise evolved through a series of trials of strength. The 
truth of economic statements is thus the product of economists’ success in enlisting 
the support of other economists, data, whole economies, mathematics, and other 
agents, rather than adherence to an established and rule-based method […].” 
(ibid.: 349). Despite this initial commitment to the disenchanted and economistic 
vision of a Latour or Knorr-Cetina, the authors nevertheless also draw attention to 
more Mertonian aspects of science, namely their “[…] set of shared beliefs […]” 
(ibid.: 350) or “[…] cultural conventions and meanings […]” (ibid.: 351), and with 
good reason. This is because their ethnographic material regarding academic 
economists (which seems to be more a collection of in-depth interviews) and their 
assessments of the field constantly seems to point them towards these conventions, 
such as ‘precision’ or ‘simplicity’. Hence, in the end of the paper, after having 
described the ‘intuition’ procedures of academic economists at face value and at 
length, they sound more like Mertonians rather than radical constructivists: “The 
criteria [of excellence in economics] are not explicit, and economists act according 
to them intuitively, but the intuition is based on their familiarity with the 
disciplinary norms; the assumptions about people’s behaviour should appeal to 
colleagues […].” (ibid.: 370). Because they have denied themselves any proper 
theoretical construction up-front, they are forced to take over the representations 
the economsists portray to them. That leaves them no choice but to allude vaguely 
                                                           
44 Certain forms of Feminism, like that of Donna Harraway (2016), seem to follow the same practice.  
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to the ‘contingent’ character of these norms in time and space45, in an attempt to 
justify their initial epistemological choice, by labelling this clearly value-propelled 
practice as ‘marketing models’. What kind of marketing it is, and why these 
economists do it in this way and not otherwise, we do not really learn.  
Another prominent sociologist of economic thinking, namely Donald MacKenzie, also 
utilises the constructionist approach in his assessment of the ‘performativity’ of 
economic thinking (MacKenzie 2008). Following Callon (1998) he asks the question 
how ‘effective’ economic finance theory was and is in the actual economy. He 
wishes to overcome the internalist reductionism of the hitherto sociology of science 
to date: “If the history and sociology of technology of the last 25 years have had a 
single dominant theme, it is that the view of technological change as following an 
autonomous logic is wrong, and the stark choice between conformity and refusal 
that it poses is an impoverished one.” (MacKenzie 2008: 26). His work consists in a 
very detailed tracing of a ‘historical case study’, the emergence and diffusion of 
the modern theory of finance, complemented by in-depth interviews with relevant 
protagonists. While the description of the development of and struggles around 
modern finance theory is excellent, it is, once again, marred by the lack of a proper 
theoretical construction or hypothesis about how and why things evolved in this 
way and not otherwise. Why, for example, do Franco Modigliani and Merton Miller 
develop an abstract ‘unrealistic’ and ‘pure’ rationalistic model of firms (ibid.: 38-
45)? Why do many practicioners of finance initially reject it while a few adopt it 
(ibid.: 74-80)? MacKenzie has no real answer for these questions, except for general 
commonplaces that, at best, shift the problem. Of course, it is true, as he says at 
the beginning of his book, that “[u]ltimately, the development and the design of 
technologies are political matters.” (ibid.: 26). But how do politics and convictions 
interact? In the case of the adoption of modern finance theory by the practioners, 
the answer is, once again, rather simple for MacKenzie: “The US financial markets 
are, if nothing else, places of entrepreneurship, and so it is not surprising that some 
                                                           
45 Others also recognise the tendency to play down the role of values in radical constructivist 
accounts: “Only a mind predisposed to conspiratorial thinking […] will believe that the [success of 
economic thinking in the economy] is held together entirely by the mesmerizing words and numbing 
mathematics […] of a few game theorists. ([ANT-scholars] are wont to discuss ‘beliefs’).” (Mirowski 
and Nik-Khan 2007: 213)  
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practicioners began to see ways of making money out of finance theory.” (ibid.: 
82). But this explanation attempt is quite similar to the one given by Werner 
Sombart (Sombart 1915) for the historical emergence of capitalism in the west (see 
a critique of this in Weber 1991: 126-29), in that it uses ‘universal tendencies’ to 
explain particular processes.  
One may therefore conclude that even if this digest46 of critiques of epistemological 
distinctions and reductions have their justification (namely in pointing to 
deficiencies and reifications of traditional Sociology) they not always lead to a 
better or more fruitful explanation of the objects at hand. Quite ironically, the 
decisions leading from the epistemological breaks, via different routes, lead back to 
forms of perception and interpretation that are rather traditional in nature, namely 
positivism, substantialism and essentialism. These patterns may also alternate and 
represent nothing else than reductions themselves. This, then, means that some 
kind of epistemological distinctions are necessary in order construct a fruitful and 
explanatorily potent theory. Indeed they seem to be inevitable – the question 
merely is whether one makes them consciously, in a controlled manner, or whether 
they are made by others (like one’s interview partners) or one’s own political 
and/or social dispositions. In the following sections and chapters, I will therefore 
stick to some basic epistemological prinicples as they were laid out at the beginning 
of this chapter – such as the relational and structural aspect of human behaviour 
(which implicitly accepts the preference given to humans over non-humans) or the 
acceptance of relatively autonomous and historically47 grown fields, which 
preserves a specific internal interpretation of social behaviour while at the same 
time permitting its modelling as a specific economic practice. Of course, in the end 
I do not know whether sticking to these principles will yield proper results. Like 
                                                           
46 One might also include other critiques like that of Bernhard Lahire who, in rather Weberian 
fashion, points towards the lack of detail given to habitus formation in Bourdieu’s writing (Lahire 
2003). In particular he wonders about the ‘core dispositions’ that give rise to distinguished practices 
(ibid.: 333). If this is a problem of focus, one may defend Bourdieu on the grounds that he merely 
provides first sketches. If this is a problem of epistemology, then one may conclude that this re-
focussing can lead not to a sophisticated Bourdieusian epistemology, but a non-Bourdieusian one 
closer to Weberian social psychology. 
47 “Bourdieu had the historian’s passion for the concrete, the specific, the singular; he had curiosity 
and a gift for observing things from a distance- a capability that good anthropologists share with 
good historians:”  (Hobsbawm 2016: 39f.) 
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other epistemologies, it is what Yves Gingras (2016) calls a ‘bet on the future’. It 
pays off only in contributing to explain and to understand the object it wishes to 
grasp. And so we must turn to the study of the concrete object at hand, study 
selection, and do so via conceptualising it as a meeting of two histories: one in the 
the student and the other one in the discipline. Both need to be portrayed for the 
German field now.                
   
 
4.1 The Great Transformation – Population Changes in the Educational and 
Academic Field  
 
 
Students are not studying and working in a void: they are part of a larger group of 
people that form a student population which is tightly linked to the academic field. 
Hence, in order to get an idea about German Economics students’ selections, we 
must extract their specific characteristics vis-à-vis students of other subjects. This 
includes not only the numerical changes at different levels of the academic 
hierarchy, but also investigations into specific socio-demographic characteristics of 
Economics students, such as class and gender. 
One obvious change within the educational field during the last half a century is its 
quite consistent expansion. This expansion has affected especially parts of the 
secondary and tertiary sectors of the system. In short, there are more students, 
more staff, more professors (see Table 1), but also many more types of universities 
and especially disciplines to study. In conjunction, there has been a massive 
differentiation within various disciplines, as can be seen in the multiplication of 
sub-field- or even sub-sub-field-associations or working groups within them. One 
can safely say that, in absolute terms, there have never been as many people from 
all social origins engaged, or employed, in the educational system.48 The question is 
                                                           
48 It still remains a question of sociological importance just how equally spread this increase of 
enrolment rates has been across classes. There is some evidence that lower classes have 
participated less in the rise, although one cannot say with more precision due to statistical 
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how to make sense of that change, to grasp it sociologically, and to find parallels 
and constancies in comparison with earlier times (Ringer 1979). 
 
The number of students of practically all Social Sciences, for example, has 
increased over the last 30 or so years, albeit at quite different rates. In Sociology 
the increase is roughly two-fold, whereas in Political Economy it is rather moderate 
with roughly one and a half as many students in 2013 as in 1983. Other economic 
sciences such as Business Administration have more than tripled their student 
population. In Law, on the other hand, the rise is very moderate at just about 25%. 
  
                                                           
categories that tend to mix up structural successors of the working classes with those of the petite 
bourgeoisie due to the rise of the service economy (see the section on ‘the problem of class’ in 
chapter 2). See also Willis’ early findings (1986: 163) for the British case. 
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Table 1   Numerical changes of selected German Social Science disciplines on 
various stages of academic qualification 1983-201349  
Discipline/Year Students Graduated PhD’s Assistants Professors 
Sociology 
1983 
2013 
 
10.863 
19.150 
 
91 
199 
 
1.012 
2.063 
 
356 
371 
Political Science 
1983 
2013 
 
10.847 
30.290 
 
113 
307 
 
1.200** 
2.256 
 
350** 
370 
Business Admin 
1983 
2013 
 
66.319 
222.594 
 
190 
629 
 
1.644 
15.642 
 
888 
2.747 
Political Economy 
1983 
2013 
 
17.086 
22.572 
 
125 
267 
 
847 
2.014 
 
160*** 
543 
 
Law 
1983 
2013 
 
84.958 
107.199 
 
470 
1.430 
 
2.795*** 
7.628 
 
745*** 
1.448 
 
The very same growth process can be observed in terms of PhD positions as well as 
scientific Assistants and professors. We observe in each case at least a doubling of 
all figures, while with the assistants, in some cases (Law, Business Administration) 
it is much more than that. The number of professorships, however, offers a more 
differentiated picture again as disciplines such as Sociology and Political Science 
have barely grown numerically at all while Law and especially Business 
Administration and Political Economy have seen rather steep increases of their 
                                                           
49 Source: Federal Statistical Office, data series 4.1, 4.2 and 11* 
* The category of ‘Assistants’ includes Lecturers, Teaching and Research Assistants as well as Tutors, 
both full and part-time. The category of ‘Professors’ includes both permanent and temporarily 
appointed professors of all career stages.  
** these numbers are estimated due to the amalgamated statistics of Political Science with Sociology 
until the early 1990’s.  
*** the year 1984 chosen, to correct for aberrations 
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numbers. The more interesting thing is to have a look at what pace these positions 
increase relative to each other, both in terms of disciplines and between levels 
within them. From that, what one can clearly see is a sort of double-movement: 
while the possibilities at the bottom ranks of a discipline (that is, PhDs and 
Assistant positions) have actually increased during the last decades for those who 
start studying a discipline, they have tendentially decreased when it comes to the 
top positions, measured in the ratio of professors to assistants.50 Therefore, while 
in earlier times the temporal structure of chances of those studying a discipline to 
advance to a high level (that is, the degree of selection and exclusion taking place 
at different career stages) overall was rather flat (a high degree of selection early 
in the system, follow by a rather low one, see Ringer 1979: 56f.), the system seems 
to have become much more uneven, ‘bulky’ (that is, a low degree of selection at 
early stages, followed by very high degree of selectivity later on). It is as if the 
system has moved, if one wants to use a metaphor, from the structure of a hip flask 
to that of a carafe. There are, obviously, rather steep differences between 
disciplines in which this bottle-neck from assistantship to professorship is rather 
sharp (as in Sociology) and rather wide (Economics as a whole). The same might 
well be true for professional areas other than academia, of course. For Economics, 
and Political Economy in particular, we can see that there seems to be 
comparatively manifold opportunities within the German academic field for 
students and early career researchers.  
 
So far, the analysis, despite its use of empirical-numerical indicators, remains 
rather abstract. When we calculate the chances of students taking on a specific 
position at a later point in their trajectory, we assume these persons to be 
interchangeable, uniform. This is obviously a fiction. We must therefore take into 
account different dimensions of inequality and start with gender, the easiest 
                                                           
50 This is a makeshift measure since it makes a lot of assumptions that are not safeguarded: such as 
the fact that only assistants of a specific discipline can and will apply for professor jobs within their 
own field – something not very realistic for disciplines like Sociology and Political Science. Or the 
fact that there exists a stable, and uniform time and age of appointment and time on a professorial 
chair across the disciplines. Nevertheless, one might take it as a rough indicator of how chances 
within and between disciplines are distributed.  
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difference to obtain empirically. One can see that there do exist massive 
differences in terms of gender participation in the Social Sciences under scrutiny 
here. In disciplines like Sociology or Political Sciences the last decades have led to a 
very thorough feminisation of the discipline up to professorship levels (the more so, 
the younger the cohorts). The student population there is predominantly female. 
Sociology is, in the disciplines observed here, by far the most feminised one, with 
its assistants being about 50% female and the professorships hovering around 40%. 
On the other hand, there are disciplines like Business Administration, Law or 
Political Science or Political Economy that are still very much male-dominated, at 
least statistically speaking. The unevenness there tends to become more pressing 
(and more uneven) the more one moves up the professional ladder, so that in 2015 
in Political Economy only 17% of professors were female, a change from a mere 3% 
from 1982 (Figure 9), whereas in Sociology it was 39% (from 5.6 % in 1982).   
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Figure 9   Development of Proportion of Professorships held by Women of selected 
Social Sciences in Germany during the last 30 or so Years in Percent51  
 
 
Hence, in these disciplines, the process of feminisation has taken place, compared 
to others, very much with the brakes on, and tends to be confined to the lower 
echelons of the professional structure. In Sociology, by contrast, this process 
succeeded much more thoroughly, particularly in the last 10 to 15 years.  We might 
also have, within Economics, a closer look at gender distribution within 
specialisations of research. We can do so by counting the share of female members 
of the sections of the German Economic Association (Verein für Socialpolitik) where 
they are available (see Table 2).        
                                                          
51 Source: Federal Statistical Office, Staff Statistics 
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 We can see that, above all, historical and, secondarily, sections with a political 
denomination tend to have below average participation rate. On the other hand, 
educational development and organisational Economics are substantially above this 
average. Nevertheless we can also see that the span between the section of highest 
vs. lowest female participation is relatively rather low, i.e. around 20%. Of course, 
the degree of selection is not really comparable between the two areas – on the 
one hand we have graduates, on the other, elected professors of a specialised 
institution. Generally, one can infer from this that, in terms of gender, men, given 
everything else being equal, have much better chances of succeeding in obtaining a 
job in academic Economics than women, and all the more so the higher the rank of 
the position concerned. Economics, unlike Sociology, still is predominantely a man’s 
world.  
Table 2   Female Shares of selected committees of the German Economic 
Association (GEA)52,  
Type of Committee German Economic 
Association (Selection) 
Female Share in % (share in absolute 
numbers) 
Foreign Trade Theory and Politics 9.3 (8/86) 
Educational Economics 26.2 (17/65) 
Development Economics 20.5(16/78) 
Evolutionary Economics 9.4(8/85) 
Monetary Theory and Politics 8.5(6/70) 
History of Economics 7.4(5/68) 
Macroeconomics 10.0(7/70) 
Organisational Economics 21.4(12/56) 
Regional Theory and Politics 11.0 (8/73) 
Environmental and Resource Economics 15.3(11/72) 
Corporate Theory and Politics 11.3 (7/62) 
Economic History 4.8(3/62) 
Economic Systems/Institutional Economics 5.7(4/70) 
Economics and Ethics 15.8(9/57) 
[…]   
OVERALL Shares 12.4 (121/974) 
                                                           
52 Source: GEA websites as of June 13, 2018*, https://www.socialpolitik.de/, last accessed August 
13, 2018. 
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*  The shares were calculated using member lists from those committees that 
provided them. Single individuals are often members of more than one committee. 
 
Another very important dimension of social inequality that might structure the 
chances of students to attain high positions is obviously that of class, in both its 
economic and cultural dimensions. Unfortunately, the available data here is far less 
comprehensive. To say it with Möller: “The higher the stage of qualification, the 
more sparse are differentiated analyses [and data] about the profile of origin of the 
groups of persons available.” (Möller 2015: 48, my translation). As we have seen in 
chapter two, the social origin of students as it is usually measured (i.e. as the 
professional status of parents) seems very much equal across disciplinary groups, 
which also holds true across time. In the decade beginning 2010 one observes in 
many Social Sciences subjects that the distribution of students according to 
parental occupation shows a similar pattern: 40-45% employees, 15-20% workers, 
15% civil servants and another 20% self-employed persons. These shares are also 
quite stable over time. This is different with the education of parents. Here we see, 
over the past 30 or so years, a rather massive increase (by around 15-20%) of the 
share of students with at least one university-graduated parent, and a 
corresponding decrease or stagnation of all other categories, in particular that of 
secondary modern school (see Figure 10). 
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Figure 10   Development of Parents’ highest educational Qualification of Economics 
and Political Economy Students in Percent53,  
 
*  - The number of cases for the last year (2012, n=161) seems a bit too low to 
exclude statistical variations. For the same reason Economics and Political Economy 
as single disciplines were merged in this calculation. 
 
Compared to other subjects like Sociology and Political Science54, the Economics55 
student population has a slightly lower share of university-educated parents as of 
2009 (38% as against 45%) but a higher share of polytechnics (18% as against 16%) 
and secondary modern school graduates (6,4% vs. 3,7%). Sociology and Political 
                                                          
53 Source: Konstanz Student Survey (KSS); waves 1-12 
54 I have combined the two for the sake of obtaining sufficient numbers of cases. 
55 Merged from Economics and Political Economy for the very same reason. 
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Science are quite similar in this to Law. Business Administration on the other hand 
is closer to Economics - it has the highest proportion of lower class origin students 
of any subject under consideration here with regards to the total student 
population, with a mere 32% of parents having obtained a university degree by 
2009. This impression of slight difference is compounded if we look from the overall 
student population towards more selected groups within the same subject. 
Alexander Lenger (2009) finds, in his survey of German PhD students, a slightly 
lower share of civil servants and a higher one of employees (ibid.: 114). Otherwise, 
however, the shares are very much equal across disciplinary groups.56 This is 
consistent with what we have found with the KSS data. On the other hand, there 
are also differences in educational origin, with the Economic Sciences once more 
appearing to have less of this certified cultural capital than all other disciplinary 
groups. For example, the share of students’ parents that graduated with a PhD is 
only 11.7% in the Economic Sciences, but 13.4% in the Social Sciences, 15.6% in the 
Humanities, and 25.7% in Law. Economics PhD students also have a relatively low 
share of parents holding the Abitur – 5.5% as opposed to 9.1% in the Social Sciences 
and 8.6% in Law. On the other hand, it has higher shares of parents with O-levels – 
18.6% as opposed to 14.8% in the Social Sciences and only 7% in Law (ibid.: 117).  
 
The PhD students of Lenger’s sample have a higher share of university- or 
polytechnics-educated parents than the overall student population in the KSS 
(roughly two thirds as opposed to just over 50%).This share also seems to increase 
over time if we compare these numbers with earlier studies like that of Enders and 
Bornmann (2001). Moreover, it also increases as one ascends the professional 
ladder, such as from PhD students to Assistants and Lecturers (Enders and 
Mugabushaka 2004: 11f.).   
 
Finally, the social origin of the professors (for which there are almost no systematic 
data available) seems to be distributed in a similar manner. In a study composed by 
Möller (2015), who conducted a full survey of all  professors of the largest German 
                                                           
56 Lenger, as many others, groups disciplines into groups as they are grouped by federal state 
statistics, so that Economics/Political Economy is put into one category with Economic Engineering 
and all Humanities are put together. 
111 
 
federal state of North-Rhine-Westphalia, one finds, once again, the Economic 
sciences in an intermediary position. In terms of the social origin of its professoriate 
(measured by a combination of professional status and educational qualification of 
parents) it is positioned alongside the Social Sciences and considerably below the 
rather ‘elitist’ Law or Medicine professoriate (ibid.: 226-29), which includes an 
above-average share of the lowest category of social origin. In terms of temporal 
development, the bits and pieces of data available for the past decades seem to 
point towards a general social opening of the disciplines (which should not be 
confused with social justice per se, as so often happens). This is an opening which is 
moderate with regard to lower professional rungs and which tends to be the more 
retarded the closer one gets to the elite positions, of administrative or scientific 
provenance, of the German academic system (Graf 2015). 
 
Let us conclude. There has been an evident and rather significant further expansion 
of the academic and educational system in Germany in the last decades. This 
expansion is uneven with regards to level of study, professional stage and 
discipline. From the available data it seems as if it is still privileged groups and 
classes that end up on the winning end of this process, although there has been a 
catch-up, especially in terms of gender and (less so) of social class. That, however, 
is again a process that has developed very differently in the different disciplines, as 
we have seen. What does that mean now in the light of the chosen epistemology? 
First of all, since the number of holders of definite educational certificates relative 
to the available top posts (professorships) tends to rise, so does the degree and 
intensity of competition among the students for these posts, whether they are in 
the civil service, the ‘free’ economy or in science. Secondly, it is reasonable to 
assume the stability or increase of presence of upper and middle class students vis-
à-vis lower class students in this competition, given the ever more necessary role 
(higher education) plays for social reproduction despite its increasing devaluation 
(what Heiner Geiβler 1992: 219-21, calls the 'paradox of educational expansion'). 
But this goes along with an inflow of high aspirations as well (Bourdieu 1996[1989]: 
212f.). These aspirations tend to be reflected in better or at least stable objective 
chances of entering the field as a PhD or assistant, which will tend to foster the 
112 
 
commitment to that very field, and hence the difficulty of letting go of it in the 
(objectively likely) event of not reaching a top position. But if the field as a whole 
is growing numerically, and if the number of people from privileged classes is 
growing at least proportionally with it, then the chances are likely that sociological 
divisions among and within disciplines (such as in specialisations)57 will not occur 
along simple class lines anymore (working-class vs. middle class vs. dominant class). 
This was the case in Bourdieu’s early educational writings58, but should now occur 
along more complex mixtures and combinations of various aspects or details of the 
habitus active in a given field.59  
 
Here we can assume a multitude of interconnected perceptions and selections that 
lead from the initial ‘choice’ of subject to the selection of specialisation and 
eventually to one’s professional domain, in which the specific set of dispositions as 
well as assessments of a current field are engaged. These selections themselves 
may have an impact on the perceptions and selections of other agents/habitus (for 
example by sympathy or antipathy felt for fellow students and/or staff, by 
                                                           
57 This by no means implies the obsolescence of the structural, positional class model (whose degree 
of phenomenal expression is increased), as it has been posited by various authors of ‘the death of 
class’ argument (e.g.  Clark and Lipset 1991; Pakulski and Waters 1996; Beck and Beck-Gernsheim 
2002). The problem with all these approaches seems to be their attachment to static and realist 
indicators of class differences, such as the dissociation of class and voting for certain parties (Clark 
and Lipset 1991: 403), the ‘individualisation’ of marriages (Beck and Beck-Gernsheim 2002: 9ff.) or 
the decrease of economic inequalities (Pakulski and Waters 1996: 1-7), which indeed seems to 
betray a rather peculiar fixation of analytical view towards definite expressions of social inequalities 
in a definite time. Against this peculiar proclamation of the ‘end of structures’, which also implies 
an ‘end of history’ a Bourdieusian perspective puts habitus-bearing agents into their specifically 
historical fields in which they struggle for recognition, for capital, and are thus forced incessantly to 
innovate and to redefine the proper expressions, or symbols, of their class origin by courtesy of the 
dispositional bent of their specific habitus: “The very notion of field implies that we transcend the 
conventional opposition between structure and history, conservation and transformation, for the 
relations of power which form the structure provide the underpinnings of both resistance to 
domination and resistance to subversion […]” (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992: 89f.). 
58 Though of course even there other aspects of habitus, such as geographical origin and gender, 
already play a role, depending also on the field one is interested in, such as the field of the grandes 
ecoles (see for example Bourdieu and Passeron 1979[1964]: 5;10f.). 
59 How is it possible that there might be an increased density of similar habitus in particular fields on 
the one hand, and differentiation happening according to secondary principles happening on the 
other hand? Both are part of the same process that attempts theoretically to describe the dynamic, 
practical response of habitus to changing external conditions – it is a theoretical exposition of the 
shift of the axis of differentiation that occurs when the original primary axis of differentiation 
becomes insufficient to produce distinctions. Hence the group habitus resorts to characteristics that 
were always there latently, but which are now forced to be (more) manifest – in a practical way 
which still has to be shown and deciphered by the Sociologist!   
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reactions from those who were dominant hitherto, and so on), and they might 
foster the transformation of disciplinary populations along new lines (Bourdieu 
1996[1989]: 188-229). In other words, they influence and change the ‘degree of fit’ 
of specific groups with specific disciplines, more or less. The most readily visible 
part of this process might be that along gender lines, and there might be others not 
grasped by the often rather crude statistical categories. But these deliberations 
cannot replace the empirical question what kind of privileged class one deals with 
in Economics vis-à-vis other sciences – what habitus, what forms of capital 
precisely, are at play, and why? 
What do we know so far now about these objective-personified characteristics of 
(apprentice) Economists vis-à-vis students and professors of other Social Sciences in 
Germany? We know that they are much more likely to be male, and that they come 
from middle-class families that have a relative lack of cultural capital. It thus 
seems reasonable to assume at this point that a capital acquired in social space 
that bears these characteristics at its base has good chances to be reconverted into 
scientific capital in Economic education in the academic/higher education field. 
But into what is it reconverted? What, in other words, counts as capital in that 
specific field? What is recognised as legitimate economic knowledge by the 
guardians of that discipline? And who are, and were, these guardians anyways? In 
what kind of academic field were, and are, they situated, and what was/is their 
position in it? 
Compared to some of its Social Science sister disciplines, Economics/Political 
Economy exhibits a very moderate (yet recently somewhat increasing) growth of 
female intake, especially at the influential top positions. In this it is close to 
disciplines like Law, and very different from Sociology. On the other hand, 
Economics seems relatively open to the mobility of lower social classes. Here it is 
rather close to Sociology and rather far away from Law. In terms of absolute 
numbers it seems to have undergone a relatively moderate increase of competition 
if compared to the ‘more competitive’ Sociology or Political Science. The rather 
male, rather middle-class habitus lives in the pre-constructed house that the 
institutional home of Economics is, and they will ‘ameliorate’ this house as they see 
fit. However, they do so not by answering some abstract ideal of habitus, but 
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precisely after being educated in the institutional traditions and rules of excellence 
of the very house they aspire to change or to preserve. And so we must turn to this 
discipline of Economics and outline its history and its current major lines of 
argument and method in order to make possible the formulation of specific 
expressions of abstract habitus in a concrete field. 
 
4.2 A layout of a structural History of German Economics and Economists 
 
The point of this section is to develop an idea, however vague and simplifying, of 
the historical and sociological background of the field which contemporary 
Economics students enter. It is to move towards a sketch of the genesis of the 
structure of this particular field. For this I will not only draw on literature about 
German social, economic and intellectual history, but also include biographical data 
– both in the form of statistical and individual references taken from influential 
German Economists as they appear in the literature on the history of the discipline. 
From the relationship of these variables to each other I will try to infer a sketch of 
a history of German Economics60, concentrating on the following questions: What is 
the position of Economics within academia and in relation to external forces? What 
are the characteristic social origin of Economists? What are the major currents of 
method and theory at each historical era? What is the current ideal of scientific 
excellence in this field? This is perhaps somewhat reminiscent of what historians 
would call prosopography (Stone 1971). 
 
I will proceed chronologically, starting with the period of the creation of the idea of 
the Social Market Economy. This comprises the decades of the 1920s onward. It 
encompasses the rise first of Ordo-Liberalism and second of Neo-Liberalism within 
German academic Economics. I conclude with a few remarks on the historically 
specific characteristics of German Economics and Economists. 
                                                           
60 History understood as the recognition and presentation of the social unconscious, in the 
Durkheimian sense. 
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As for the history before that time-span under consideration I refer the interested 
reader to the insightful historical work of Keith Tribe (1995), Hans Maier 
(2009[1966]), Barbara Stollberg-Rilinger (1986), Birger Priddat (1997) and Fritz 
Ringer (1979, 1992).  
 
 
1920-1970: A Discipline in Disarray, and the Construction of the Social Market 
Economy 
 
With the end of the first world war the old aristocratic-monarchic system of 
domination collapsed in Germany, making room for an alliance of the liberal 
bourgeoisie and the moderate working class (or rather their representatives). A 
multitude of interconnected causes ended this republican experiment in 1933, 
amongst others the harsh Versailles peace treaty that provoked the resurgence of 
German predispositions towards both nationalism and authoritarianism. This new 
wave of nationalism is, at first, mostly carried by the more or less disempowered 
elites, both aristocratic and militarised bourgeois. In the academic sphere a similar 
process of regression and crisis occurs due to the threat to dominant social positions 
posed by the progress of economic-technical development and the concurrent 
expansion of higher education (Ringer 1990[1969]: 61-80; Ringer 1979). With the 
advent of the world economic crisis in 1929, mass unemployment shifted the 
dynamic of this nationalism away from the old elites towards a purified version in 
Hitler’s National Socialism. This led to a considerable series of breaks with German 
traditions in science, bureaucracy and elsewhere, inducing a new beginning of dual 
institutional production in the Federal Republic of Germany and the German 
Democratic Republic in 1949. The western state, until the 1970s and beyond, is 
characterised by the concept of the social market Economy whereas the eastern 
state was a state-socialist command economy. That meant in practice – in the 
Federal republic and then later the reunified Germany -  the enactment of a rather 
corporatist organisation of industrial relations as well as the creation of a welfare 
state that has been tied to Bismarckian roots (Esping-Andersen 1989), where market 
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differences tend to be transferred to considerable degree into status differences of 
social welfare between groups. In this period of time also occurred various waves of 
higher education expansion that are matched and managed by the continuous 
enlargement of the universities and polytechnics (Fachhochschulen), with various 
re-vampings and re-foundations of both kinds.  
 
 Within German academic Economics there are also significant upheavals within the 
same time span. With the end of the monarchy and the death of Schmoller (in 
1917), the historical school – a holistic and culturalist view of the economy which 
was nevertheless aimed to erect laws of economic development by way of inductive 
(and subjectivist) reasoning - quickly deteriorated from its once dominant position 
at the summit of the discipline. This occurred, in part, because it was not able to 
explain and to make sense of the now radically different economic realities that 
called for more precise (that is, quantitative) measuring of economic key trends in 
times of hyperinflation and mechanisation (Köster 2011: 61-88). The discipline 
reacted in various ways so that, for example, it was in the 1920s that the first 
institutes for economic research in Germany were founded (such as the Institute for 
the Study of the World Economy in Kiel). These were much closer to contemporary 
‘practical’ demands, and entrepreneurial interests, than the rather ‘remote’ moral 
Economics of the historical school, and consequently acquired substantial funds 
from third-party sponsors during the 1920s and 30s. Another reaction to the crisis, 
and at the same time perhaps an expression of it, was the flurry of competing 
theories and approaches that mushroomed during these decades that tried to make 
sense of the economy. According to the literature on the subject, many of these 
approaches were short-lived, and furthermore deeply dependent on the Zeitgeist. 
Hubris, oversensitivity towards critique and a pathological language marked by 
neologisms and ornamentalisms sedimented themselves into the theoretical 
constructions of the economists (ibid. : 201-206), which reflected the wider 
deterioration of intellectual communication (Ringer 1990[1969]: 55-57). One 
example for this process within Economics apparently can be Othmar Spann’s 
‘romantic universalism’ which ostentatiously rejected all specialisations and all 
117 
 
individualisms in favour of a return to an estate-based society61. German Economics 
in this regard would give up its focus on economic growth and assess all activities by 
their contribution towards the conservation of the ‘whole’ society of estates, 
activities which could be compared qualitatively but not metrically (Köster 2011: 
180-191). Other Economists, like Werner Sombart, produced similar amalgamations 
of wishes (or value judgements) with scientific theories and analyses and so 
contributed not to a small degree, like Mandarin representatives from other 
disciplines, to a failure to rally to the symbolic defence of the Weimar Republic, 
thus serving to facilitate the rise of Nazism.It is in this social and intellectual 
environment that the specifically German idea of the ‘Social Market Economy’ was 
born.  
 
Like classical Liberalism, this German version believed essentially in the beneficial 
consequences of the free market. Unlike classical (that is, Manchester) Liberalism, 
however, it presupposed a strong juridical-administrative framework to make the 
free market work. This liberalism by order, or Ordo-liberalism, was worked out 
against the actually existing socialist and national socialist economies of the 1920s 
to 1940s. The Ordo-liberals drew a sort of teleological line back from this period to 
the very beginnings of anti-market interference during the 19th century, thus giving 
the essential policy tasks for the state in the provision of the market mechanism 
and its non-interference, which included a social welfare state that mirrored rather 
than meddled with market outcomes (via tax and credit policies rather than price 
controls or subsidies for example, see Foucault 2010[2004]: 139f.). This critique of 
the ‘homogenising’ and culture-destroying historical tendencies of capitalism, 
which were nevertheless not seen as intrinsically constitutive of it, made up for a 
kind of vigilance on the part of the state with regard to the allegedly slippery route 
towards a totalitarian regime. In this, the Ordo-liberals are very close in their 
arguments to Austrian Economists like Hayek or Mises.  
 
                                                           
61 This means that the concept of universalism refers to the objects of a science rather than its 
moral or humanistic scope. 
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This theoretical development represented, of course, a major departure from the 
earlier historical school that dominated German Economics until the 1920s and in 
which most of the representatives of Ordo-Liberalism (and other economic schools 
of the time) were educated after all. There is a very clear embrace of liberal 
market principles and the aversion against non-liberal interferences. On the other 
hand, there is still the essentially holistic outlook of Economics, combining law, 
history and Sociology (including insights by Max Weber). There is also still the 
aversion against a clear division of value judgements (understood as goals one has) 
and theoretical constructions. The difference, however, is that now the value is not 
any longer the moral superiority of a monarchical Germany (as was the case with 
many proponents of the historical school, such as Gustav Schmoller), but the moral 
superiority of a free market society that is asserted and that tends to be mixed with 
the theoretical models and assessment of reality. There is also, lastly, still the 
assertion of Economics as an essentially institutionalist, historically-specific 
discipline which implies the rejection of Anglo-American posing of universal, 
transhistoric economic laws (Häuser 1994: 57-61). It is therefore no wonder when 
Häuser (ibid. : 67, my translation) asks rhetorically: “Where else would the ground 
be laid better for an integrative solution of problems of the politics or order than 
on the ground prepared by the historical school, with its merging of Political 
Economy, Law, Sociology and Political Science.”  
 
This is not to say that there were no other schools of thought developed during this 
time span. There was also a significant proportion of Economists receiving and 
translating Keynesian or Neo-Keynesian ideas into the German context. Aside from 
this there were also remnants of the old historical school surviving for a 
considerable time, for instance with Friedrich Lütge or Erich Kosiol. In terms of the 
student population Economics remained a rather small discipline during the 1920s 
and 30s with around 2.000 to 3.000 students, except for the huge fluctuations 
connected to the inflation of 1923. According to Köster (2011: 69f.), the 
professorial chairs were less well equipped compared to those of the natural 
sciences, an underfunding that continued after 1945 and which led to an increased 
dependence on external funders (Hesse 2010: 134-140). The student population 
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seems to have changed first in terms of social participation and inclusion. Whereas 
the elite share of higher civil servants, officers and free professions (see above) is 
relatively stable at around 14%, there is a massive increase of employees’ sons – up 
to 19% from around 3% - and secondarily worker’s sons – from 0.2% to 4.5%- in 
1932/33 compared to 20 years earlier (Titze et al. 1987: 262-264). Even given the 
universal development towards expansion of higher education schooling during the 
Weimar Republic (Ringer 1990[1969]: 74), this increase of the respective lower class 
categories is still relatively high, compared to protestant theology (from 2.3% to 
around 14% for employees), Law (from 2.3% to around 13%) or Medicine (from 2.4% 
to 10%). On the other hand, Catholic Theology admitted a far greater number of 
workers (a rise from 1,5% to 13% in 1932/33) (ibid. : 244f.; 248f.; 250f.; 246f.). 
Once again therefore, one may infer that Economics, in terms of social esteem, had 
an intermediate standing.62 The Nazi-era with its preference for and pressure 
towards practical applications and aversion to theoretical considerations certainly 
helped to pull Business Administration, for the first time, closer towards Economics 
(Hesse 2010: 71-73). The discipline had first developed in separate commercial 
polytechnics from the end of the 19th century onwards (Tribe 1995: 95-139) that 
were rather despised by the representatives of the historical school. The post-war 
era after 1945 sees a massive increase of student numbers with a slow and sluggish 
increase of professorships and assistantships – so that, for example, in the academic 
year 1953/54 there are over 16.000 students in Political Economy 
(Volkswirtschaftslehre) matriculated at universities, but only 57 full professors, 
while the numbers are around 12.000 students to 136 in Law, and 2.200 to 75 in 
Protestant Theology (Busch 1956: 112).        
 
Compared to other university disciplines, post-war Economics still has a relative 
under-representation of students whose parents were higher civil servants or from 
                                                           
62Köster(2011: 69f.) reports on the popularity of National Economics among ‘active military officers’, 
citing a regional study on leftist northern German Economists after the first world war. This is not 
really substantiated by the statistics - the share of officers on the student body seems to be 
decreasing from 1912 to 1933 (Titze et al. 1987: 262-264).But then National Economics is put 
together with forestry sciences and the old ‘cameralia’, that is, cameral Economics., so that really 
reliable and detailed statements are hard to make on this basis.  
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the free professions while including a much higher share from the entrepreneurial 
elite (Ringer 1979: 105-112). This is also somewhat reflected in the social origin of 
its top professors at the time (the 1950’s), all born around 1900. Economists63 such 
as Fritz Neumark64 or Erwin von Beckerath65 came from merchant backgrounds. 
However, the Ordo-Liberals in particular seem to have originated from the 
educational bourgeoisie or higher military officer corps, in any case, from very 
established backgrounds. Thus, while Wilhelm Röpke’s father (like that of Friedrich 
Hayek66) was a Physician and civil servant67, Alexander Rüstow’s father was a 
lieutenant-general of the Prussian army68. Rudolf Eucken, the father of Walter 
Eucken, was a Philosopher and won the Nobel Prize for Literature in 190869. Alfred 
Müller-Armack’s70 and Heinrich von Stackelberg’s71 fathers were both factory 
managers, whereas the father of Franz Böhm72 was a top civil servant. This 
distinguished social origin – basically from the second or even first-tier 
establishment of Wilhelminian pre-1918 Germany - stands in some contrast to the 
rather more humble origin of the German Keynesians (or at least for those whose 
social origin could be found out). The fathers of Erich Schneider73 and Erich 
Preiser74 were both school teachers, Wilhelm Kromphardt’s75 father was a pastor, 
whereas Hans Peter’s father managed a mill76. Hence, in terms of social origin, the 
                                                           
63 I have obtained this information from the digitalised Deutsche Biographie 
(BavarianAcademyOfSciences 2010ff.), a multi-volume biographical reference work commissioned by 
the royal academy of the sciences during Wilhelminian times that encompasses many famous 
politicians, intellectuals and figures of public interest that lived or died before 1900. 
https://www.deutsche-biographie.de/, last accessed October 13, 2017. 
64 https://www.deutsche-biographie.de/sfz71570.html#ndbcontent, last accessed October 29, 2017. 
65 http://cpr.uni-rostock.de/resolve/id/cpr_person_00003346, last accessed October 29, 2017. 
66 http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/51095, last accessed October 27, 2017. 
67 https://www.deutsche-biographie.de/sfz106346.html#ndbcontent, last accessed October 27, 
2017. 
68 https://www.deutsche-biographie.de/sfz108885.html#ndbcontent, last accessed October 27, 
2017. 
69 https://www.deutsche-biographie.de/sfz19591.html#ndbcontent, last accessed October 28, 2017. 
70 https://www.deutsche-biographie.de/sfz66861.html#ndbcontent, last accessed October 27, 2017. 
71 https://www.deutsche-biographie.de/sfz107387.html#ndbcontent, last accessed October 27, 
2017. 
72 http://frankfurter-personenlexikon.de/node/1817, last accessed October 27, 2017. 
73 https://www.deutsche-biographie.de/sfz107386.html#ndbcontent, last accessed October 27, 
2017. 
 
74 https://www.deutsche-biographie.de/sfz97197.html#ndbcontent, last accessed October 27, 2017. 
75 http://cpr.uni-rostock.de/resolve/id/cpr_person_00003304, last accessed October 27, 2017. 
76 https://www.deutsche-biographie.de/gnd118740199.html#ndbcontent, last accessed, October 28, 
2017. 
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Anti-Keynesians (Ordo-Liberals) seem closer to the original British Keynesians (like 
Keynes himself, but also Pigou, or Robinson) than the German Keynesians, at least 
during the decades under focus here.     
 
Lastly, in the 1950s and 60s there were significant changes to the outlook of the 
discipline that seemed to have altered the inheritance that the Ordo-Liberals left to 
it. There was, on the one hand, the further expansion of student numbers as well as 
professorships, from 57 professors in 1953 to 78 in 1960 and finally 245 in 1975. 
(Hesse 2010: 181-191). There is, furthermore, a successive change in curricular 
affiliations, away from Humanities and Social Sciences towards the Natural Sciences 
and Business Administration, amidst and despite rather violent protests from 
‘traditionalists’ such as Friedrich Lütge (see Raiser, Sauermann, and Schneider 1964 
for a summary of these debates). This happens rather belatedly in comparison to 
Anglo-American Economics. It developed via the de facto extension of the economic 
field due to the foundation of, and massive support for, external economic research 
institutes: a change which is all the more important in the face of a scarcity of 
funding from within the scientific community in relation to other subjects (Hesse 
2010: 132-154). These institutes, like the Ifo in Munich or the DIW in Berlin, were 
supported by the German state directly and by American institutions like the Ford 
or Rockefeller Foundation with a view to promoting empirical work (Berghahn 
2004). This gives us a first valuable indication of the standing of Political Economy 
within and without the scientific community.         
 
1970-2010: The belated monetarist Revolution and Development into a fanned out 
neoclassical Discipline 
 
By the 1970s, the western German state had regained, under the leadership of a 
much more confident bourgeois elite, its economic and industrial standing within 
Europe and the world. Through the finally integrative appeasement of the 
remaining former aristocratic elite via economic and civil means (Wehler 2008: 165-
68), the new line of social struggle ran, as in other western societies of the time, 
122 
 
between capital and labour and their respective representatives and institutions. 
The relationships between these groups remain relatively balanced until roughly the 
late 1970s. The economic reconstruction after the world war and the concomitant 
start of the (predominantly economic) European integration in the 1950s, together 
with a still reasonably strong degree of labour organisation brought about a 
relatively equal distribution of wealth, unprecedented in Germany as elsewhere 
(Piketty 2014). There were strong tendencies of bureaucratisation and technical 
innovation that accompany these transformations, necessitating a further 
specialisation in education which reflected the changes in the division of labour. 
The state of relative social balance in which these processes tended to take place 
(understood in the opposites named above) increasingly eroded from the 1980s 
onwards. Trade unions lose a substantial part of their members in a context 
characterised by the constitution of a European single market, economic 
globalisation and German re-unification, all of which put considerable pressure on 
most employees and their wages (Dörre, Jürgens, and Matuschek 2014). This is 
aggravated, and perhaps also reflected, by increasingly labour-hostile welfare 
policies which start around the late 70s under chancellor Helmut Schmidt’s 
administration and culminate in the rather massive welfare cut-backs orchestrated 
by Gerhard’s Schröder’s red-green coalition in 2003ff., later rounded out, 
compounded and supplemented by governments under conservative leadership.77 In 
this era of extension of market-principles to almost all areas of life falls the 
further, unabated expansion of education and higher education, visible in the 
further sharp increases of student population, but also staff members (see above).  
 
The development of both student and staff numbers has already been shown in the 
last section. A fresh and more differentiated look at the discipline’s funding 
sources, however, may surprise: Even though the discipline evidently draws a lot of 
funding from external sources (that is, sources not mediated by scientific 
judgement) such as ministries, but also banks, foundations, think tanks and the 
                                                           
77 See http://www.portal-sozialpolitik.de/sozialpolitische-chronik (last accessed March 27, 2018) for 
a comprehensive overview of the legal changes in all areas of welfare in Germany over the last 50 
years. 
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like, it seems relatively badly represented within the broader scientific field. If one 
takes the relative representation of Economists in the academies of science, which 
are prestigious, traditional inner-scientific organisations and which work through 
co-option of members of various disciplines, most often in specific disciplinary 
divisions or ‘classes’, one can see that Economists are quite underrepresented. In 
the relevant class of the Berlin Brandenburg Academy of Sciences for example there 
are 15 Sociologists but only 14 Economists (BBAW 2016), even though the latter 
have more than four times as many professorial chairs (over 2.000 as against barely 
over 500, see FederalStatisticalOffice 2016: 103, Table 9)78. Hence, there is some 
evidence that points towards a conservation of the position of Economics’ 
intermediary position within the academic field. On the other hand there seems to 
be a rise in esteem in other, non-academic fields such as the political or economic 
one (see Nützenadel 2005; Fourcade, Ollion, and Algan 2015; also Bourdieu 
1988[1984]: 80). Therefore one might, in Bourdieusian terms, characterise German 
economics as possessing little academic, but plenty of extra-academic credibility, 
hence tending to be more subject to the sways of heteronomous forces belonging to 
the wider field of power.79 Parallel to the numerical changes and the developments 
of the rather intense consulting relationships of Economists to outside institutions 
and forces something else took place in academic economics: a thorough change of 
approach towards economic questions academically, a change quite often referred 
to as the ‘monetarist revolution’ (Spahn 2005; Janssen 2006).  
 
This revolution, which followed its American precedents that took place, under the 
leadership of the new Chicago School of Milton Friedman and George Stigler some 
ten to fifteen years earlier, seems to have had far-reaching effects both within and 
outside of academia, and thus perhaps is worth a closer look. It took place within a 
specifically German economic context dominated by the (then conflicting) 
paradigms of Keynesianism on the one hand (represented by scholars like Erich 
Schneider, Erich Preiser or Andreas Paulsen) and the influential ordoliberal School 
                                                           
78 This table includes both Political Economists as well as Economists. 
79 I am indebted to Andrew Smith for this specific implication. 
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(represented by Walther Eucken, Alfred Müller-Armack, Alexander Rüstow or 
Wilhelm Röpke and their disciples, respectively)80. The former, inspired by Keynes 
himself but also his Anglo-American interpreters (like Hicks or Samuelson), were 
already turning towards a quantitative, rather formalised empirical idea of 
Economics (see Schneider 1947), of course within a strongly interventionist 
perspective of steering the economy via economic investment and stimulation. The 
ordoliberals, however, tended to be sceptical of quantification and formalisation, 
and favoured an interventionist state which creates a market that comes as close as 
possible to the perfect market (see Eucken 1949).  
 
The monetarist revolutionaries were almost all young newcomers aged 25-40  
(Janssen 2006: 99-101) at the time. They effectively seem to have created a new 
position within the academic field by combining the liberal normative perspective 
of the ordoliberals with the use of (more and more complex) formalised tools and 
models from the Keynesians. This seems to have been aided by the concomitant 
expansion of the university system. it provided these revolutionaries with early 
chairs (such as in the newly founded universities of Siegen, Wuppertal and Essen) 
and a rising stream of income from the sale of their textbooks for the ever-
increasing number of Economics and Business Administration Students. If one 
assesses the formative works of some of the leading protagonists of this change81, 
one recurrent theme is the felt need for application and practical relevance of 
Economic research. It seems very important for them, not least as a way to 
distinguish themselves from their predecessors. Artur Woll for example distances 
himself from what he calls the “[…] l’art pour l’art as research method […]” (Woll 
1969: 5, all the quotes from German books for the remainer of this section are my 
translations). He takes such an approach as characteristic of preceding Economics 
textbooks while introducing his ‘instrumental’ view of science “The truth of a 
theory is measured on reality.” (ibid. : 13). Rather than literary ‘speculations’, Woll 
                                                           
80 This is of course an oversimplification since there were other currents of thought, such as 
remnants of the old historical school, as well there at the time. I do, however, merely sketch the 
arguably most important positions. 
81 I base this selection mainly on Hauke Janssen’s (2006) work on the monetarist revolution in 
German Economics. 
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prefers a “[…] systematic confrontation of theory with facts.” (ibid.: VI). Within 
this of course also comes out a very high attribution to a specific form of empirical 
evidence, namely a strictly formalised, quantified type of it. Consequently, 
someone like Dieter Cassel (1968) takes up Popperian philosophy of science to apply 
it to Economics. Strictly distinguishing the - psychological and therefore ‘irrational’- 
‘context of discovery’ from the ‘context of justification’, he attempts to form a 
new epistemology for Economics which may help to make “[…] the Economic 
science into a tool for the preservation and organisation of human life […].” (ibid.: 
65), which implies a strict ‘empirical’ orientation of Economics towards the 
construction of nomological-causal, general, coherent and testable laws and 
theories (ibid.: 84ff.). In the works of Timmermann (1965) on the Economics of 
development, Kösters (1974) on money demand, or Neumann (1963) on the 
relationship of company profit to economic growth we always find the same strict 
reference to ‘actually existing behaviour’ which is measured by precisely- 
constructed quantitative, formalised models. Only the PhD of Hans-Jörg Thieme 
(1968) on the socialist agrarian constitution of Eastern Germany and Otmar Issing’s 
(1961) work on the link between business cycles and monetary policies show more 
‘political’ or theoretical reasoning (that might be due to the temporary influence of 
academic supervisors – like Paul Hensel, who was an Ordoliberal and a pupil of 
Walter Eucken in the case of Thieme).  
 
The monetarist revolution, had, in its German variant, more of a general-
theoretical embeddedness than its very empirical-minded American counterpart 
(see Janssen 2006: 103-05). It was in effect a shift of the economic academic 
debate towards a more evidence-based, natural-scientific type of discourse. It 
helped to bring about the changes in the curriculum and the textbooks that we 
nowadays have in front of us so vividly, beginning with the first of many versions of 
Woll’s (1969) ‘General Political Economy’ [allgemeine Volkswirtschaftslehre]. This 
work came with an appropriate exercise book (Woll, Thieme, and Cassel 
1974[1970]) in the style of short quizzes and multiple-choice tests. Of course this 
kind of pedagogy has become the absolute contemporary standard in the discipline, 
even in many heterodox textbooks. There is an evident rootedness of these 
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textbooks in the theoretical and even literary tradition of German and international 
Economics of the time (extensive references towards both Classical, Keynesian, 
Ordoliberal and other schools are abundant and numerous in the early works of 
these revolutionaries). Moreover, there is an awareness of the limitations of 
mathematical formulations – Artur Woll for example warns in his PhD dissertation 
(Woll 1958: 4) of the temptation to replace literary with formalised statements, to 
confuse these statements with reality82. Finally, there is also the awareness of the 
dangers of simplification in textbooks – Woll et.al. note in their preface that 
“Certainly the chosen path is not without problems. Exercise books – especially with 
solutions – could foster a ‘consumer attitude’ of the students that expect ready and 
exam-proof recipes.” (Woll, Thieme, and Cassel 1974[1970]: V). Despite all that, 
one may argue that these revolutionaries, and the generations of Economists that 
followed them, may have considerably helped to produce precisely the de-
theorisation of research, the confusion of model and reality and the banalisation of 
learning that they evidently somewhat feared. But they also fostered the rise of a 
new way of being an intellectual Economist imported from the USA, a sort of 
expert-consultant who, through his evident and proven ‘objectivity’ in his more or 
less narrow field of expertise, is entitled to give ‘neutral’ advice as to what to do in 
various matters of policy or strategy. An exemplar here might be the case of Otmar 
Issing, who went on to become the chief Economist of the European Central Bank 
and worked also as an analyst for Goldman Sachs). This way economic knowledge 
has an impact in other fields with other logics of competition, different forms of 
capital and different agents with differing interests. Heinz-Peter Spahn, for 
example, notes how the German Central Bank welcomed the new monetarist view 
due to its interests vis-à-vis other banks, its autonomy from politics, and its interest 
in shedding foreign currency obligations (Spahn 2005: 32-34).  
 
What about the social origins of these monetarist revolutionaries? From those 
glimpses available through the customary information on father’s occupation and 
                                                           
82 This is somewhat similar to the warnings of Frank Knight, leading figure of the early Chicago 
School and a teacher of Milton Friedman, makes in regards to the use of models (Knight 2008{1935}) 
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curriculum vitae of the candidates provided with doctorate dissertations until 
roughly the 1970s, one sees that quite a few of the central figures of this revolution 
named here were of rather petit bourgeois origin, or what I will go on to call 
‘Parvenus’. Artur Woll’s father for example was a miner (Woll 1958)83, Dieter 
Cassel’s a master tailor (Cassel 1968), whereas the father of Otmar Issing was an 
innkeeper (Issing 1961). Even sceptics of the monetarist paradigm like Wim Kösters 
(who are nevertheless firmly rooted in the new, formalised, empirically-centered 
way of arguing) seem of rather petit-bourgeois origin ((his father being a carpenter 
master, see Kösters 1974), even though someone like Vincenz Timmermann (1965) 
has a merchandiser as a father, a category certainly too vague to make any 
reasonable judgement on social origin. Thus, it may be said that at least some of 
the central German revolutionaries had a social origin analogous of those of their 
American predecessors (Friedman and Friedman 1998: 19-24), whose works they so 
effectively used to shift the axes of debate in their own field, and influence those 
beyond. 
 
 
 
To conclude: The field of German Economics, a relative late-comer in relation to 
the Natural Sciences and Philosophy but predecessor of the other Social Sciences, 
exhibits a rather interesting history. For most of it, it seemed to hold a rather 
intermediary position (relative to other disciplines), both in terms of academic 
prestige and the social origin of students and staff. This seems to fit with the 
information gathered about contemporary students and staff. Also, Economics 
seems, compared to other disciplines, rather close to external concerns and topics – 
from the administrative needs of the aristocratic rulers, to the justification of the 
German empire state, to the philosophical and eventually technical backing of the 
social market economy – Economists, here (as elsewhere), were and are closely 
intertwined with these societies and their governing needs. Aside from the 
                                                           
83 I have obtained this information from the relevant PhD theses that were, at the time, supplied 
with a short CV of the author at the end. 
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transformation of the reigning paradigms over the decades – from Historical 
Economics to Ordo- to Neoliberalism – this might be a central, and sociologically 
pertinent, constant of Economics and Economists in Germany. Perhaps Pierre 
Bourdieu sums up this institutionalised (dis)position well:  
 
“Unlike sociology, a pariah science that is always under suspicion for its supposed 
political leanings, and from which the powerful expect nothing but a minor, 
generally somewhat ancillary knowledge of techniques of manipulation or 
legitimation, and which, as a result, is less exposed than other disciplines to 
demands likely to threaten its independence, economics is always more of a 
state science and is, as a result, haunted by state thinking: being constantly 
preoccupied with the normative concerns of an applied science, it is dependent 
on responding politically to political demands, while at the same time defending 
itself against any charge of political involvement by the ostentatiously lofty 
character of its formal, and preferably mathematical, constructions.” (Bourdieu 
2005: 10) 
 
This of course also brings into play the most recent changes to the discipline, i.e. 
the massive extension and development of its technical-mathematical apparatus 
and the concomitant spread of a causally-oriented, instrumentalist and economistic 
epistemology84. The task will be to link this profound taste for mathematical model-
building and liberal values with the rather intermediary social origin of Economists – 
a state which seems to exhibit, as we have seen, a considerable constancy over the 
years. Another result of this enquiry into the position of Economics within the 
German academic space is, if only in outlines, its seemingly subordinate position 
within this space but its dominant position with regards to demand and funding 
coming from outside of this field.  
                                                           
84 One can, in addition, add here the outspoken international-mindedness of German Economics 
, which could be shown in the share of professors with PhD’s from American universities – for Anglo-
American culture surely is hegemonic in Economics as elsewhere -  which is most likely higher than 
the still, in this respect, very ‘national’ discipline of German Sociology (Mau and Huschka 2010: 758). 
On the other hand one must question whether this is really an ‘international-mindedness’ or rather a 
specific case of what Mosbah-Natanson and Gingras (2013) call phagocytosis, a kind of acculturation 
to a dominant culture at the cost of disregarding one’s home culture.    
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Habitus and Field specified 
 
We can now collate the information we have gathered and attempt to exploit them 
within a Bourdieusian epistemology: On the one hand we have a body of economists 
and economics students that is more male and middle class, but endowed with 
comparatively less cultural capital – the latter assessed in comparison to their 
equivalents in other Social Science disciplines. On the other hand, the historical 
position of German Economics as potentially academically subordinate but extra-
academically in high demand, especially recently. One could interpret this as initial 
evidence of a bi-polar academic field with scientific capital at the one pole and 
temporal capital at the other. That would imply that German Economics is 
relatively closer to the temporal pole. Philosophical liberalism and mathematical 
model-building, in the broadest terms, in any way constitute what might be 
labelled the specific ‘doxa’ in German academic Economic discourse. All of these in 
a Bourdieusian framework must be thought in unison, as a concrete empirical 
totality. 
 
After having shed some light onto the ‘objective’ relationships of Economics and 
Economists with each other, with other disciplines and the wider society, we must 
now see how this relationship of field and habitus is experienced ‘subjectively’, 
how the interaction of habitus and field(s) lead to the adoption and advocacy of 
economistic and neoliberal thought. It appears as if there is a specific group that 
has an unusual ‘degree of fit’ with German academic Economics. On the other 
hand, groups that do not fit this profile of social origin will tend to be excluded 
and/or exclude themselves. That affects women, students from lower and very high 
classes, and also students from a background with a very high degree of certified 
education (at least relative to other disciplines).  
In view of the limitations described in the introduction, it is not possible here to 
enquire into the processes of exclusion of female, lower and grand bourgeois class 
and highly educated students, or the in situ selection of those whose social 
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profile/habitus somehow fits the discipline85. This work, on the other hand, 
concentrates primarily on exploring the processes of self-selection and self-
exclusion, through the experiences relived and recorded in in-depth interviews. The 
experiences and attitudes towards the subject (field) expectable from both those 
who fit and those who don’t have been outlined out earlier in this chapter. In a 
discipline like Sociology, for example, a daughter of a teacher holding a PhD 
objectively seems to fit much better than in Economics. So much for the ‘objective’ 
side of things, both embodied and institutionalised. What is missing to formulate an 
initial theory and model of study selection of Economics is of course how these 
relationships and resource endowments translate into the lived experience of 
‘fitting’ Economics students, how the inherited forms of capital in the given 
German social and educational fields give rise to a cognitive process in which 
Economics eventually emerges as a ‘natural’ or even inevitable ‘choice’. But how is 
this experienced?  How are the selections expressed, in what terms? What 
arguments, what building blocks, what contrasts are used and constructed to confer 
the student’s relation to their selections? And to what exact system of dispositions 
are they linked?  We must now look for the next puzzle pieces to add to this 
framework. 
In the end it comes down to a question of meaning. And so, in the upcoming 
chapters, I will endeavour to provide an exploratory comparison of motivations and 
their sociological meaning within the perspective and model adopted here. First, I 
will compare and explore those who objectively and ‘subjectively’ fit well with the 
discipline with those who don’t (chapter 5). Then, I will compare those who fit well 
with the discipline of Economics with one another, with the help of the 
construction of three heuristic and structural ideal-types (chapters 6 to 8).  
 
 
                                                           
85  The PhD project of Alice Pearson, currently undertaken at Cambridge University, might do just 
that via an Ethnography of Economics education in the British field. 
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PART II – ‘Subjective’ Perspectives 
 
 Methodology 
 
In this chapter I will try to describe the kind of methodology which follows from the 
approach that I have outlined, and how I tried to put this into practice in this case. 
I have to say once more that the way in which the progress of this work is 
structured does not mirror the initial procedures of practical research. The original 
interviews and ethnographic work were conducted in a considerably more 
‘inductivist’, impure and makeshift fashion than embedded here, after careful 
reflection, in this ordering presentation – which of course means to cast doubt on 
the sometimes very strict demands leading epistemologists make with regard to the 
purity of research (see for example Bryman 2004: 266-68; Przyborski and Wohlrab-
Sahr 2008: 18-20, the latter even denouncing the mixing of both perspectives as a 
'capital sin').  
Indeed I originally believed that knowledge of Bourdieusian epistemology and 
‘general theory’ could replace Bourdieusian knowledge of the concrete, specific 
social field under study (Bourdieu, Chamboredon, and Passeron 1991[1968]: 30f.). 
That is also why I conducted the interviews before my more systematic enquiries of 
the ‘objective’ characteristics or history of German students or German Economics 
presented in the last chapter. My initial pilot study, as well as the original stages of 
the main field study in Germany, were conducted under divisions not so dissimilar 
from those criticised in chapters 2 and 3. For example, I formulated tentative ideal-
types of the ‘mainstreamers’, the ‘institutional complementaries’ and the 
‘heterodox challengers’ after my pilot study – and while already recording socio-
demographic variables such as gender, class origin and the like, I hadn’t had linked 
these ideal-types yet to the structural characteristics in a way that Bourdieusian 
epistemology demands, that is, into a concrete theoretical model. It is perhaps fair 
to say that I hope that my work represents a progress from substantialist 
understandings – as they can be found in the works of the sociologies I criticised 
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earlier - towards more structuralist understandings of study selection, towards 
some form of theoretical induction. 
 
Selections - empirical Basis and Strategies of Enquiry 
 
The ‘qualitative’ data acquisition methods applied in this project predominantly 
consist of semi-structured interviews and (to a much lesser degree) participant 
observation. In a first phase, I attempted to refresh my acquired knowledge of 
academic Economics by (re-)studying various basic textbooks as well as attending a 
few lectures and tutorials. From March to May 2015 I carried out an initial, 
exploratory pilot study, interviewing seven Economics staff members and seven 
successful and engaged (in the sense that they all were involved in economic, 
extracurricular associations) Economics students at various stages, most of whom 
taught and/or studied at the same pre1992 British university. The point was not so 
much to enquire into study selection itself as to develop a strategy of and feeling 
for conversing about study selection. Very early it became very clear that the initial 
goal of studying the position-taking of mature Economics academics was not 
feasible with the given resources, so I resorted to a focus on the study of the initial 
processes of becoming such a scientist (or not). 
I started out with a rather broad, very ‘inductive’, approach towards my subject of 
Economics students: I wanted to figure out what they thought about the world and 
their subject. I already had an idea of students more ‘interested’ than others, and 
so concentrated my ethnographic and interview efforts on two student 
organisations within an Economics department at a larger, rather prestigious, 
British University. But quickly I recognised the differences between the 
organisations and the students with regard to their studies and to life more 
particular. One group of students was very much focussed on ‘secular’ matters 
related to putting their degree to good, and direct, economic use. Accordingly, 
their behaviour towards their curriculum (or questions about it) was rather fleeting 
and of an instrumental nature- so that, for example, they strayed into very general 
and rather vague remarks when asked about what they disliked about the subject. 
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The other group of students was much more seriously engaged in discussing the 
curriculum, and much less in business-related issues – and, indeed, there were 
certain animosities between the two groups. Obviously, this kind of dichotomy can 
indeed be described in the types examined in chapters 2 and 3 – the ‘career’ vs. 
‘science’-minded students, or the ‘conformist’ vs. the ‘critical’ or ‘reflexive’ 
students.  
But, keeping the principles of field theory in mind, it appeared (and appealed) to 
me that both groups were heading for different fields, with different 
understandings of excellence, different forms of capital and history efficient (the 
economic field for the one group, the intellectual or academic field for the other) - 
and hence adjectives such as ‘critical’ or ‘reflexive’ might need to be referred to 
different worlds, mean different things in these worlds. Since I was more interested 
in the more academic of both groups, I eventually opted to concentrate on 
‘intellectual’ students (I am sure there are also ‘intellectuals’ among business-
minded students). My initial analysis of the world-views and attitudes of them was 
still very much rooted in an epistemology described and criticised in chapters 2 and 
3 – so that, for example, I grouped these students according to their general 
attitudes towards the curriculum which, in lieu of a proper theory, had to be taken 
at face value, that is, those students ‘engaged’ vs. those ‘alienated’, or the 
‘mainstreamers’ vs. the ‘challengers’ – hence categories not so dissimilar, in their 
substantialism, from the ones criticised earlier. I didn’t yet have the knowledge 
about the institutional and positional background that is described in chapter 4 – in 
fact I didn’t want to know at that point, because I was heading for a rather 
abstract, de-historicised and general reading and interpretation of my interviews, 
as mentioned above. 
 
At that time, I knew that I wanted to concentrate on what made ‘intellectual’ 
students selecting Economics as their discipline as opposed to ‘average’ students, 
and what differences existed between them. This made it necessary to find a 
practical indicator of distinguishing these ‘intellectual’ students (the word still has 
an ethnocentric ring about it) from ‘less intellectual’ students. Thus, for the main 
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study with German Economics students in Germany, I had to come up with an 
objective indicator which needed to fulfil the criterion of ‘fit’ described in chapter 
4, that is, expressing both the recognition by the subject of Economics (being 
recognised as ‘intellectually outstanding’) and its representatives and the interest 
of the students (who ‘choose’ this activity over other paths available, such as 
internships or more lucrative student jobs). This made it sure, or at least likely, 
that I acquired ‘fitting’ students of Economics, which implies fit to an implicitly 
constructed academic field, however that may look like. Excellent marks alone 
seemed not enough in times of fast-growing educational populations, partly also 
due to potential grade inflation. So by taking tutors, holders of research 
assistantships, scholarship holders and PhDs as my indicators of recognition (and 
thus fit) I think I have chosen a more rigorous selection tool86 which generally tends 
to signify both very good marks, exceptional professional recognition of the 
students vis-à-vis their peers as well as a reasonable amount of student motivation 
and interest87 (Regelmann 2004).  
For the main study, then, I decided to recruit recognised and non-recognised 
students, thus somewhat shifting my initial interest in and definition of ‘interested 
students’ which are the operationalised forms of ‘fitting’ vs. ‘not fitting’ students.  
 
 
So, in result, my pilot study led to a certain narrowing down of focus and persons 
under the assumption that students, sooner or later in their studies, to a higher or 
lower degree, orient and concentrate themselves towards different fields. This 
effectively means to neglect and to disregard large parts of Economics and Business 
Administration students and graduates that may work at banks, large corporations, 
governments, and the like, and who of course may have a considerable influence 
                                                           
86 Estimates see the share of teaching and research assistants among the whole German student 
population at around 19%, which seems a generous estimate which is almost four times higher than 
other accounts. (Schneickert 2013: 108f.) Still, even with this number one has the top quintile of the 
student population in terms of recognition. 
87 It implies an implicit intellectual motivation, and thus self-selection, insofar as it is often rather 
poorly paid relative to more lucrative jobs or internships in other fields. 
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within these fields. On the contrary, I was interested in the more ‘intellectual-
minded’ students who might be future professors, chief Political Economists or 
Economics teachers in the not-too-distant future.    
I now wanted to contrast these future intellectuals with ‘average’ Economics 
students – i.e. all those students who are not recognised in above-defined way - to 
investigate into differences both in their ‘objective’ characteristics of habitus as 
well as ‘subjective’ differences in attitudes and views towards their subject and the 
wider world. The original plan was to create a sample that consisted equal numbers 
between both groups. But how to do that, and where? 
Should one recruit participants at universities, polytechnics, or both? And at which 
institutions specifically? The first question was easily answered: because I wanted 
to concentrate on the ‘elite’ of a discipline, and because polytechnics are not yet 
seen as the institutions where such elites are trained, I chose to recruit exclusively 
at universities. The second question was trickier: unlike the British or the French 
academic system, German academic institutions are relatively equal in standing and 
prestige, while traditionally strong disciplinary differences cut across this hitherto 
subordinate principle of hierarchy (Ringer 1979), even though this seems to be 
changing somewhat of late (Münch 2014; Dörre and Neis 2010). For this reason I 
decided to base my recruiting and observation efforts at one specific Economics 
faculty or institute which I shall henceforth call my case-study institute (CSI). The 
CSI is quite a characteristic German academic Economics institution in terms of its 
student and staff population88, and also in terms of its reputation in teaching and 
research.89 
 
This of course brought up the the issue of recruitment:  my time of field research at 
the CSI went from September 2015 to August 2016, in other words I spent almost a 
whole academic year there. In the first month or so I practiced what Paul Willis 
                                                           
88 Except for the fact that it has more eastern German than western German intake. 
89 I notice that this selection, like with that of the universities over polytechnics, might as well have 
gone for the most prestigious, most recognised institute to emphasise and investigate the ideal-
typically ‘academic’ character of its students. I acknowledge this shortcoming, but still maintain 
that a lot can be learned from the (relatively speaking) ‘average’ recognised Economists too. 
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describes as ‘just being around’ (2014[1978]: 256). Initially I talked to, and 
interviewed, various members of staff (including professors) about their study 
choice and their views on their students and on what constituted excellence in 
students. At the beginning of the academic year I went to a freshers’ orientation 
week where I volunteered as a photographer for the student council. I attended 
various undergraduate lectures and graduate courses, and I paid visits to the 
Economics student council and an Economics student organisation which, unlike 
others, deals specifically with political and scientific issues. I tried to make the 
acquaintance of as many Economics students of this kind as possible. In all but the 
undergraduate courses I eventually revealed my identity and purpose of visit. I 
attempted to recruit quite a few of them for an interview, sometimes without 
knowing whether they were recognised or not in the above-mentioned sense. Soon, 
I systematised my approach and contacted specifically the tutors of the Political 
Economy chairs at the CSI. There was some (but no total) overlap of these tutors 
with the students engaged in the student association and club. I recruited the core 
of my sample with this technique and the snowballing that it made possible 
(interviewed students asking other tutors/excellent students on my behalf). I 
attempted to supplement the existing sample with recognised Economics students 
studying elsewhere (mainly via phone calls), but this was much less successful, and I 
obtained only one additional interviewee from this procedure.  
 
Recruiting non-recognised, ‘average’ students proved harder, despite their much 
higher number. I eventually distributed surveys in 1st, 2nd and 3rd year 
undergraduate lectures90 which entailed the offer to write me an email if one was 
interested in an interview, but only obtained six interviews in this way. In addition, 
on a couple of occasions, I also distributed contact cards outside lecture theatres 
after an undergraduate course, but this method was not successful at all.  The very 
fact that one speaks of ‘study choice’ in front of (mostly) younger and less 
recognised students, and the fact I stated explicitly that I wanted to know 
                                                           
90 At this stage I planned to compare the results of the survey – which was geared along the lines 
criticised in the first part of chapter 2 – with the standard literature, but quickly realised the 
fruitlessness of this endeavour, and so abandoned any supplementary survey. 
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something about how these young students chose their subject, seemed to trigger, 
beside the usual indifference, a feeling of pressure, of an expectation that one 
really should have a proper reason to study this or that subject (even though I tried 
to soften this expression as much as possible when presenting myself). This, at 
least, would explain the rather gruff rejection on the part of a student I asked for 
an interview outside a lecture theatre (‘my student choice is not spectacular at 
all!’). On the other hand, just this ‘intellectualist’ or ‘scholastic’ technique worked 
very well with the recognised and engaged students. In any case, one must 
acknowledge that the resulting interview sample of 57 students is pre-selected to a 
high degree. It is surely skewed towards the ‘recognised’ and thus ‘fitting’ pole of 
the students. This suggests the application of other techniques of investigation, 
such as participant observation, perhaps even covert, to capture the attitudes and 
views of the ‘average’ students.     
 
 
After the pilot study, I designed the interviews around four main topics which 
basically stayed the same during the main field study period. As for the general 
strategy of conducting them, I adopted the “understanding” approach laid out by 
Bourdieu in The Weight of the World (1999[1993]: 607-26), however with a 
conversational, one might say challenging, twist (Ullrich 1999) – because these were 
‘intellectual’ students, presumably with a higher degree of self-confidence and 
sense of professional identity than ‘average’ Economics students, this allowed and 
perhaps even obliged me to probe more directly into their choices, even to 
challenge them at times, in order to elicit answers that were practical and 
relational in nature, and thus valuable from the standpoint of the given 
epistemology.  
Given the causal and rather economistic outlook and teaching of the discipline, but 
also the prevailing cognitive division of ‘normative’ vs. ‘positive’ aspects and 
dimensions of phenomena ('de gustibus non est disputandum', see Stigler and Becker 
1977), I, in time, learned that I could be rather ‘free’ when it came to talking 
about ‘personal’ aspects of study ‘choice’, and I could therefore push the students 
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rather gently towards practical, and relational, thinking in these areas. However, I 
also had, at times, to be careful to profess a sympathy for their selections and 
perceptions. This was less possible in the ‘substantive’ parts of the interview where 
I was more challenged, and in a sense, held to account, by the discipline-specific 
regulations of communication. I tried to build on my own university training in 
Economics and thus attempted to give them reassurance of them being understood 
and being interested in (such as by verbal and non-verbal signals of agreement). 
Thereby I attempted to minimise the distance between the interviewee’s and my 
own presented perspective. Still, feelings of awkwardness sometimes could not be 
avoided.91 This, as the sociological reader might imagine, was not always easy given 
the rather market-friendly statements of some of my interviewees. The generally 
rather small difference between myself and many of my interviewees in terms of 
original social position and trajectory, I think, also helped in creating a ‘natural’ 
flow of the conversation. I tried to avoid entering into too extensive or heated 
arguments about Economics or economic policy, but nevertheless occasionally, and 
visibly, put myself into the role of the ‘good-natured and indulgent critic’ in order 
to elicit responses which allowed me to infer facts that can be fruitfully used in a 
Bourdieusian perspective. This, I felt, seemed rather successful with the 
‘recognised’ students as well as with ‘unrecognised’ students that I was able to 
interview. Depending on the phase of study the student was in and her or his 
degree of recognition, I tried to adapt the ‘disciplinary thrust’ of the discourse 
accordingly, assuming this to be presumed by my interlocutor. After the interview, I 
handed out a small socio-demographic questionnaire to obtain information not 
gathered in the interview. In short, I wanted to elicit an effort of construction by 
pushing these students beyond what they most likely regarded as a ‘rational’ 
                                                           
91 In these moments the interview felt more like an interrogation than a discourse, particularly when 
the interviewees gave only succinct answers without elaborating more widely, thus not giving me the 
chance to link onto wider aspects which tend to steer the situation into more colloquial waters. In a 
Bourdieusian perspective the meeting of two interlocutors, two habitus with two histories, is 
delicate insofar as the mutual and sincere appreciation of what the other does and says depends on 
one’s habitus. Therefore knowing scientifically, through careful modelling and construction, what to 
expect from the interviewee, can perhaps contribute to control and to reflect about the gut 
reactions one’s own habitus produces when specific things are uttered. This is most plainly visible 
when it comes to disturbing, annoying statements, but should just as well be applied to pleasing 
ones. Perhaps the degree of awkwardness during an interview is a good makeshift-indicator of the 
distance of two habitus.  
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explanation of their ‘choice’ (and which indeed often fell rather squarely into the 
categories of ‘intrinsic’ or ‘extrinsic’ study choice). I structured my interviews for 
the main study into four topics which I wanted to cover but which I attempted to be 
flexible with in terms of succession, antedating a topic if the flow of 
communication suggested it. For example, when a student began by expressing his 
current attitudes towards Economics rather than narrating the history of his 
selections, I let this happen and tried to steer the interview towards this history 
when the ‘right moment’ seemed to appear in the conversation. In other words, I 
effectively attributed less epistemological necessity to the chronological character 
of the narratives than to the smoothness and ‘pleasantness’ of the discussion for 
both the interviewee and myself. I therefore tried to achieve what Christel Hopf 
(1978) calls the avoidance of ‘guided interview bureaucracy’, i.e. the mechanical 
processing of points without sensibilities to the needs of neither the interview nor 
the interviewee. In this way I hoped to permeate through to the assumed practical, 
habitual mode of construction which operates, following Bourdieu, at the base of 
study selections, even if, at that time, I had no clear theoretical idea about what 
these selections meant. 
 
 The four parts of the guideline were structured as follows: 
 
1. The ‘Choice’ of Subject – including the reasons why Economics was taken up, 
and description of the ‘personal’ events and motivations leading to this 
decision in the eyes of the interviewee. Within this context it was also asked 
- if and when the specific interview situation was opportune92 - about 
specific socio-demographic aspects of social origin, such as the parents’, 
grandparents’ (and, if applicable, even siblings’) profession, the A-level or 
Higher’ specialisations and grades, as well as favourite subjects in school. If 
                                                           
92 This in itself is a tricky issue and needs quite a bit of instinctive feeling. I felt that I was successful 
in defining and utilising this opportune moment with a lot of my participants, though not all of 
them. Issues of intimidation diminished this ‘sensibility of moment’ in the case of the most 
recognised (and often successful) participants, issues of seeming discomfort in the case of the least 
recognised student.   
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there were multiple subjects selected, or a subject/apprenticeship selected 
before turning to Economics, the student was asked to explain the 
motivations for these as well. In any case, I attempted to provoke a 
relational and practical assessment of the perceived worth of different 
disciplines by prompting participants to give me ad hoc reasons why they did 
not study another discipline (if this was not done already by the interviewee, 
which was rather rarely the case). Here I often made use of the immediately 
preceding statements – such as “I studied Economics because I wanted to 
know something about the society”- to engage in a sort of discursive 
challenge by asking subsequent questions like: “Ok, but if you want to know 
something about society, why not Sociology, or History, or Political Science?” 
This, I think, was possible only because of the relatively privileged, relatively 
‘intellectual’ character of the interview sample overall, as well as the 
relative equality between interviewer and interviewee in most cases. Where 
this was not the case, this strategy, it seems to me, was prone to lead to a 
formalisation (one might say petrification) of the interview process, the 
retreat on the part of the interviewee towards socially acceptable answers. 
Where this happened it had the effect of reducing this technique to the 
production of accepted common sense, and hence undermined the original 
goal of the interview (see Hopf 1978; Bourdieu, Chamboredon, and Passeron 
1991[1968]: 169-78; and Bourdieu 1993[1984]: 149-57). I will give an example 
of this break-down in communication below. The relationship of the two 
roles taken during the interview but also the specific relationship of the 
habitus that fill them out seem to heavily influence the ‘climate’ of an 
interview.   
 
2. Attitudes towards the discipline – this section mainly covered the 
interviewee’s attitudes towards her or his discipline (Economics or whatever 
studied), and, if applicable, the evolution of these attitudes over the course 
of studies. Here I attempted to prompt more detailed answers as to what 
exactly they (dis-)liked, and why. I encouraged them to describe this 
attitude even in fuzzy terms if they were not sure or ‘vocal’ about it, in the 
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hope to gently encourage them in a less representative and more relational, 
practical mode of thinking which a Bourdieusian perspective always assumes. 
I furthermore asked for preferred and/or taken academic specialisations (if 
applicable), scientific heroes or favourite books/authors, as well as whether 
they are engaged in any extra-curricular activities such as student 
associations or clubs. 
 
 
3. Plans for the future – mostly asked towards the end of the interview, this 
section was supposed to generate a sense of the impression the interviewees 
hade of themselves in the future, what they saw as realistic and what not. 
Again, I tried to prompt a little (where applicable and necessary) by asking 
them about alternatives they did not mention and what they thought about 
those. In that way, I hoped to generate another area of ‘practical logic’.   
 
4. General attitudes and opinions on Current Topics – in this ‘additional’ 
section I attempted to confront the interviewees with concrete current 
phenomena that can, but don’t have to, be linked with economic reasoning. I 
asked how they would generally situate themselves politically if they had to, 
and what kind of economic policy they would advise. I furthermore prompted 
them to tell me about what they thought about more specific issues, such as 
that of a minimum wage and the idea of a basic minimum guaranteed 
income, as well as the financial crisis and, lastly, about their opinion on the 
refugee crisis which was, in Germany as elsewhere, in full swing at the time 
of the field research. I mostly asked these questions after the sections 
directly devoted to the questions of ‘choice’ or (from my perspective) 
selection process. These discussions were devised to generate clear 
attitudinal statements beyond the narrow educational or academic field, and 
to compare them with statements regarding academic Economics.  
The form of semi-structured, focussed interviews (Merton and Kendall 1946) 
appeared to be a sufficient format to guarantee a certain comparability of answers 
as well as to ensure the flexibility necessary to the rather explorative character of 
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this study. The interviews were conducted at varying times and places. Most of the 
recognised students were interviewed in their offices, others in cafes or in parks.  I 
attempted to be as accommodating as possible in these matters. 
 
 
Finally, a word about the process of analysis. I first attempted to establish, rather 
inductively, what the ‘typical’ attitudes of my recognised German Economics 
students vis-à-vis the ‘average’ students were – were actually did they differ, and 
how could one see this? The results of this enquiry are put down in the following 
chapter. Then, I attempted to effectively link this contextual information I 
collected during or after conducting the interviews - about the position and History 
of German Economics and the position of German Economics students as well as 
‘my’ ‘recognised’ Economics students - to perform a kind of theoretical induction. I 
looked at my interviewees and their attitudes in their entirety and attempted to 
match them with specific habitus that seemed to me fitting in explaining the 
expressed views which adequately fit both with their social origin as well as with 
the contextual data I had collated. For that I drew on my knowledge of various class 
habitus in very different historical fields, from 18th century France to 19th century 
Germany to 20th century America. The decisive thing was to relate the 
contextualised attitudes of the groups of students with that of various historical 
groups on the basis of abstract, rather ahistorical, ideal-typical, structurally caused 
habitus characteristics (such as cultural good-will, ambivalence, loss of privilege) 
which are only given concrete form in a concrete historical situation and field. In 
other words, I formulated my hypothesis by drawing structural analogies between 
different fields and universes. This is precisely the difference to the ideal-types 
discussed before (intrinsic vs. extrinsic choice, but also my own earlier ideal-types 
of engaged vs. non-engaged students, mainstreamers vs. challengers). With those 
ideal-types the structural moment of abstraction tends not to occur, so that they 
remain on a ‘phenomenal’ level, so to speak. However, once the structural analogy 
is constructed, the attitudes of so-grouped students are naturally ‘seen’, described 
and interpreted in a specific (and I hope new) light. I will thus construct them as 
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Inheritors, Fallen Nobles, and Parvenus. I do not deny that I privilege class origin in 
this, which is partly due to my rather specialised reading in that form of 
stratification. The further confrontation with relevant statistics and in-depth data 
must show in how far this view must be qualified or discarded. This would then lead 
to the formulation of a more comprehensive, coherent Bourdieusian theory of study 
selection, and thus to a more deductive model that could be verified on concrete 
statistics and examples. 
 I will discuss empirical deviations from the ideal-types at the end of each of the 
chapters 6 to 8. I will specify the conditions of empirical rejection of these ideal-
types, and a sketch of a Bourdieusian theory of study choice, in my concluding 
discussion in chapter 9.    
 
The Interview Sample 
 
Below, I provide a summary account of my interview sample in detail. We must 
here mention a peculiarity of the German grading system which does not operate by 
letters but numbers, with 1.0 being a perfect average score and 4.0 the last 
admissible score to pass a course, both in secondary and tertiary education (5.0 and 
6.0 being failures). More often than not, unfortunately, it was not possible to 
acquire more comprehensive data on the educational trajectory of the students 
involved.  
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Table 3   Characteristics of Social Origin of interviewed Bachelor Students.93  
 
Pseudonym 
(Interview-
Nr.)/ 
(Age)/ 
Year of 
Study 
Profession Father 
(Studies Y/N) 
Profession Mother 
(Studies Y/N) 
Professions 
Grandparents 
(synoptic, studies 
Y/N) 
Educational 
Trajectory 
(Abitur)// 
Recognised - R 
John(6) 
(23 yrs) 
 
Apprenticeship 
Printing, Online-
support-Clerk 
Communal Bank (Y) 
Apprenticeship, now 
Leading Position in 
public 
Administration (N) 
Entertainment Owner/ 
Worker in Public 
Service/ Tin Smith 
1.4 
 
R 
Peter(9) 
(24 yrs) 
Economics PhD, 
Project Head for 
German Ministry (Y) 
Biology Studies, now 
Biology Teacher at 
Sec School (Y) 
- 1.0 
 
R 
Dennis (18) 
(27 yrs) 
Engineer, Army 
Officer, Driving 
Instructor, Now 
unemployed (Y) 
Appr. Office Clerk, 
now Office Clerk in 
private Company (N) 
Co-operative 
Farmer/Machine 
master, Smith, Truck 
Driver 
2.0 
 
R 
Tobias (26) 
(20 yrs) 
German Studies 
Abroad, Senior 
Executive at Medium 
Size Company (Y) 
Law Studies, Judge 
at Social Court (Y) 
Metal Worker, Forman 
in Factory/ Metal 
Worker/Bus Driver, 
Newspaper 
Distributor/Accountan
t 
1.8 
 
 
                                                           
93 Disciplinary recognition as defined above is signified with an R in the fourth column. Parents and 
Grandparents that have attended either a university or the German equivalent of a polytechnic 
(Fachhochschulen), are allocated a ‘Y’ in these columns, while all others are allocated an ‘N’.  
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Table 4   Table 3 continued 
Synonym 
(Interview-
Nr.)/ 
(Age)/ 
Year of 
Study 
Profession Father 
(Studies Y/N) 
Profession Mother 
(Studies Y/N) 
Professions 
Grandparents 
(synoptic, studies 
Y/N) 
Educational 
Trajectory 
(Abitur)// 
Recognised - R 
Claudia 
(31) 
(22 yrs) 
Appr. Accountant, 
Head of Division of 
Medium Size 
Company (N) 
Appr. Doctor’s 
Assistant, Raising 
Children, now minor 
catering Manager at 
Medium-Sized 
Company (N) 
Restaurant 
Owners/Carpenter 
2.1 
 
Stefanie(3
2) 
 
Physician with own 
Practice (Y) 
Appr. Bookseller, 
Works in Large Book 
Franchise (N) 
Optician, Shopkeeper/ 
Chemist, Politician 
2.2 
 
Jack(33) 
(20 yrs) 
Specialised Assembly 
Line Worker (Y) 
Specialised Assembly 
Line Worker (Y) 
- 2.2 
 
Thomas(34
) 
(23 yrs) 
Small 
Entrepreneur/Various 
Jobs (N) 
Secretary for Head 
Physician (N) 
Construction Worker/ 
Housewives 
1.5 
 
Heidi(35) 
(24 yrs) 
Apprenticeship 
Roofer, now Head of 
Division Industrial 
Medium Sized 
Company (N) 
Pedagogy Studies, 
then Nursery School 
Teacher, Houselady, 
now administrative 
clerk, tenured (Y)  
Craftsman, Janitor, 
Painter/Weaver, 
Kindergartner 
2.0 
 
Martin(36) 
(20 yrs) 
Apprenticeship 
Locksmith, now 
Educator (N) 
Appr.’s Chemical Lab 
Assistant/Admin 
Assistant in Public 
Service, Clerk at 
Register Office (N) 
Seaman, 
Steelworker/Middle 
School Teacher/Smith-
Entrepreneur/Housewi
fe, Weaver 
1.4 
 
Juergen(38
) 
(23 yrs) 
Engineer, Car 
Accident Surveyor at 
State Company (Y) 
General Physician 
with own Practice in 
Village (Y) 
Industrialist, Large 
Entrepreneur, Master-
tailor/Construction 
Engineer (Y)/ 
Kindergartner, 
Educator  
1.3 
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Robert(41) 
 
Catholic Theology 
Studies, Hospital 
Chaplain (Y) 
Catholic Theology 
Studies, now 
Religion Teacher at 
various Schools (Y) 
Operating Manager 
Print Shop/Home 
Worker for Print Shop/ 
Consultant for 
Industry/Housewife 
1.8 
 
Angela(56) 
(23 yrs) 
Sport Studies, Sport 
and Biology Teacher 
at Middle School (Y) 
Pedagogy Studies, 
now Sport/Biology 
Teacher at High 
School (Y) 
Architecure-
related/Teachers 
Middle School Music, 
German/  
1.9 
 
Max(61) 
(20 yrs) 
Law Studies, now 
own Lawyer Practice 
(Y) 
German/Art 
Pedagogy Studies, 
now Elementary 
School Teacher (Y) 
Political Economist 
PhD(Y)/ - 
1.5 
 
 
 
Table 5   Table 3 continued 
Synonym 
(Interview-
Nr.)/ 
(Age)/ 
Year of 
Study 
Profession Father 
(Studies Y/N) 
Profession Mother 
(Studies Y/N) 
Professions 
Grandparents 
(synoptic, studies 
Y/N) 
Educational 
Trajectory 
Abitur/BA/MA 
-Marks 
Recognised - R 
Anne(64) 
(31 yrs) 
Machine Engineering 
Studies, then small 
Entrepreneur 
building services (Y) 
Machine Engineering 
Studies, then small 
Entrepreneur 
Building Services, 
Secretary 
Accountancy, now 
Pensioner (Y) 
Construction 
Engineer(Y)/ 
Saleswoman 
2.0 
 
Johann(65) 
(21 yrs) 
Building Engineer 
Studies, Head of 
Team at Jobcentre 
(Y) 
Economics Studies, 
now Accountant in 
Charity (Y) 
Probably Worked in 
communal bank/ 
Agriculture Studies, 
Head of Agricultural 
Co-op(Y)/ Farmer 
2.1 
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Heinrich(6
6) 
(24 yrs) 
Apprenticeships 
Engineman and Law 
Enforcement Officer, 
now Judicial Officer 
for State (N) 
Pedagogy Studies, 
now Elementary 
School Teacher (Y) 
Engineman/Electric 
Engineer{Y)/Railway 
Clerk 
1.0 
 
 
R 
Ben(68) 
(22 yrs) 
German/English/Ped
agogy Studies, then 
Teacher, now Service 
Worker in Natural 
Park (Y) 
German/Russian 
Pedagogy Studies, 
then Teacher at Sec 
School, now 
Kindergartner (Y) 
Physician(Y)/Physician
(Y)/Floor 
Tiler/Kindergartner 
1.0 
 
 
R 
Jeanette 
(71) 
(22 yrs) 
Apprenticeship 
Joiner, Prison Guard, 
now Truck Driver (N) 
App. Chemical Lab 
Assistant, Working in 
Prison, now Waitress 
(N) 
Joiner/Various, 
Farmer/Miner, 
Farmer/ 
2.0 
 
 
Table 6   Characteristics of Social Origin of interviewed Master and PhD Students94   
Synonym 
(Interview-
Nr.)/ 
(Age)/ 
Level of 
Study 
Profession Father 
(Studies Y/N) 
Profession Mother 
(Studies Y/N) 
Professions 
Grandparents 
(synoptic, studies 
Y/N) 
Educational 
Trajectory 
(Abitur)// 
Recognised - R 
Jonas (11) 
(29yrs) 
MA 
Apprenticeship 
Plumber, then 
Construction 
Supervisor (N) 
Engineering-
Economics Studies, 
then Human 
Resources 
Management Clerk 
(Y) 
N/A N/A 
 
Elias (13) 
(N/A) 
MA 
Artist 
apprenticeship, then 
self-employed 
Entertainer(N) 
Artist 
apprenticeship, then 
self-employed 
Entertainer(N) 
Entertainer-
Entrepreneur 
2.2 
 
 
 
                                                           
94 The designated level of study in the first column refers to the time of the interview and includes 
both current and recently graduated students. Disciplinary recognition as defined above is signified 
with an R in the fourth column. 
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Table 7   Table 6 continued 
Synonym 
(Interview-
Nr.)/ 
(Age)/ 
Year of 
Study 
Profession Father 
(Studies Y/N) 
Profession Mother 
(Studies Y/N) 
Professions 
Grandparents 
(synoptic, studies 
Y/N) 
Educational 
Trajectory 
Abitur/BA/MA -
Marks 
Recognised - R 
Emma (14) 
(N/A) 
MA 
Book Trade 
Apprenticeship(N), 
Now Salesperson 
Multilingual Admin 
Assistance 
Apprenticeship(N), 
now in Management 
Export Division 
Medium-Size 
Company 
 N/A 
 
 
 
 
 
R 
Leon (15) 
(37yrs) 
PHD 
Executive in Quality 
Management at 
medium-sized 
automobile supplier 
firm(N) 
Hairdresser 
Apprenticeship(N), 
Housewife 
Mayor in small 
Easter German 
Town, Clerk 
2.7 
Diploma: 2.0 
 
 
R 
Sophia (16) 
(N/A) 
MA 
Studied Medicine(Y), 
then Physician 
Apprenticeship as 
lab Assistant, then 
Studied Medicine(Y), 
now working as 
Physician 
Pastor, Engineer 
PhD(Y), 
Elementary 
School Teacher 
1.4 
N/A 
 
R 
Lukas (17) 
(27 yrs) 
MA 
Physician(Y), Psycho-
Analyst, Author 
Dentist(Y) with own 
practice 
Miner, Shorthand 
typist, 
Apothecaries(Y) 
and dispossessed 
landowners 
1.6 
N/A 
 
R 
Felix (19) 
(30 yrs) 
PHD 
Studied 
Engineering(Y), small 
entrepreneur, not 
working at the 
moment 
Printing 
Apprenticeship 
Small, 
Entrepreneur(N) 
Teacher, Postal 
Worker, Medium 
Entrepreneurs 
(Services) 
2.5 
N/A 
 
R 
Max (20) 
(25 yrs) 
MA 
Medium Civil Servant 
(N/A) 
Librarian 
Apprenticeship, 
Small 
Entrepreneurs, 
Farmers 
3,2 
BA – 2.5 
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Head of Public 
Institution(N/A) 
 
Hannah(23
) 
(N/A) 
MA 
Studied 
Economics(Y), self-
employed Tax 
Advisor and Auditor 
Studied Physics(Y), 
Works in Software 
Company  
Painter, 
Employee, Self-
Employed 
Entrepreneur 
N/A 
 
R 
Jakob(24) 
(32yrs) 
PHD 
PhD Engineering (Y), 
Executive Large 
Industrial Company 
PhD Engineering (Y), 
Executive Public 
Institution 
Janitor, Farmer, 
Engineer (Y) and 
Constructor at big 
company, dental 
technician 
N/A 
Diploma: 1.3 
 
 
R 
Moritz(25) 
(25 yrs) 
MA 
Medium Executive in 
Chemical Company 
(N) 
Studied Librarianship 
(Y), now Secretary 
for private Company 
Plasterer, 
Housewife, N/A 
1.8 
 
R 
Anton(27) 
(34 yrs) 
PHD 
Studied Pedagogy(Y) Studied Pedagogy 
(Y), now 
Math/Physics 
Teacher in 
Main/Compr. School 
dispossessed 
farmer, N/A 
N/A 
 
 
R 
 
 
Table 8   Table 6 continued 
Synonym 
(Interview-
Nr.)/ 
(Age)/ 
Year of 
Study 
Profession Father 
(Studies Y/N) 
Profession Mother 
(Studies Y/N) 
Professions 
Grandparents 
(synoptic, studies 
Y/N) 
Educational 
Trajectory 
Abitur/BA/MA -
Marks 
Recognised - R 
Theo (30) 
(21 yrs) 
MA 
Studied Pedagogy 
(Y), High School 
Teacher French, 
Math 
Physician (Y), 
working in 
international 
foundation 
Elementary 
school 
teacher(Y), 
housewife, 
Apothecary (Y) 
1.3 
 
Paula(37) 
(N/A) 
MA 
Studied Engineering 
(Y), self-employed on 
construction sites 
Studied 
Journalism/Political 
Science (Y), worked 
Cook, 
Leathermaker, 
Farmers 
1.6 
N/A 
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as cleaner, now 
clerk 
R 
Anna (39) 
(N/A) 
MA 
Small Entrepreneur 
(N) 
Ergotherapy-
Apprenticeship (N), 
housewife 
Miller, 
Housewife, Civil 
Servant, Tailor 
N/A 
BA– 1.7 
N/A 
R 
Theo (40) 
(N/A yrs) 
MA 
Engineer (Y), 
technical Exec 
medium-sized 
Company 
Studied 
Pedagogy/Art (Y), 
now Housewife, 
Artist 
Engineer, Large 
Farmer 
1.9 
BA – 1.4 
MA – 1.7 
 
R 
Niklas (44) 
(27 yrs) 
MA 
Engineer (Y), now 
medium civil servant 
Elementary School 
Teacher (N) 
Farmers, Store 
Clerk 
1.5 
BA -1.8 
R 
David (45) 
(N/A) 
MA 
Studied Pedagogy 
(Y), Teacher 
German, History at 
Comprehensive 
School 
Studied Pedagogy 
(Y), Teacher Sport, 
Economics at 
Comprehensive 
School 
Merchandiser-
Employee at 
Large Company, 
Housewife, Head 
of School 
1.2 
BA – 2.3 
 
 
R 
Philipp 
(46) 
(26 yrs) 
PHD 
Economic Engineer 
(Y), Head of 
Department of 
Insurance company 
Apprenticeship 
Nursing (N), 
Childcarer 
Paramedic, 
Housewife 
1.5 
BA – 1.7 
MA – 1.0 
R 
Lina (47) 
(25 yrs) 
PHD 
Tinsmith 
apprenticeship, PhD 
Informatics (Y), Army 
Officer, Accountant 
at large Company 
Studied Languages 
(Y), taught 
Economics at various 
schools/community 
colleges, now at 
foundation 
Soldier, Store 
Clerk/Secretary, 
Policeman, Sales 
Clerk/Secretary 
1.4 
Diploma – 1.1  
 
 
 
R 
Leo (48) 
(29 yrs) 
PHD 
Apprenticeship 
Electrical 
Engineering (N), 
Instructor medium-
sized company 
Apprenticeship 
industrial 
management 
assistant (N), 
housewife 
Self-employed 
carpenter, self-
employed shoe-
maker 
1.5 
BA – 1.8 
MA – 1.7  
R 
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Table 9   Table 6 continued 
Synonym 
(Interview-
Nr.)/ 
(Age)/ 
Year of 
Study 
Profession Father 
(Studies Y/N) 
Profession Mother 
(Studies Y/N) 
Professions 
Grandparents 
(synoptic, studies 
Y/N) 
Educational 
Trajectory 
Abitur/BA/MA -
Marks 
Recognised - R 
Tom (50) 
(N/A) 
PHD 
Apprenticeship 
Electrician, Foreman 
(N), Informatics-
System Admin 
Apprenticeship as 
Civil Servant Clerk 
(N), 
Medium Civil Servant  
Factory Worker, 
Rail Worker 
2.1 
BA – 1.3 
MA – 1.8 
R 
Mats (51) 
(25 yrs) 
PHD 
 
Infomatics Studies 
(Y), Teacher for 
Informatics in 
community college, 
Network Admin 
Studied Math (Y), 
now Teacher in 
Comprehensive 
School 
Nurse, Bricklayer 
Foreman, 
Farmers 
1.7 
BA – 1.9 
MA – 1.8 
R 
Karl (52) 
(N/A) 
PHD 
Machine-Engineer 
(Y), Executive of 
Industrial Company 
Apprenticeship 
Draftswoman (N), 
now head secretary 
in civil service 
Mechanical 
Foreman/Baker, 
Housewife, 
Miner, Civil 
Servant 
1.3 
 
 
R 
Eric (53) 
(N/A) 
PHD 
Studied Pedagogy 
(Y), Higher Civil 
Service 
Head Secretary (N) Brick-Layer, 
Housewife, Sales 
Representative 
2.5 
Diploma: 1.7 
R 
Linus (54) 
(N/A) 
MA 
Journalist (N) Apprenticeship 
Childcare assistant 
(N), now employee 
at small company 
Tailor, 
Accountant, 
Farmers 
3.0 
BA - 1.6 
 
R 
Jonathan 
(55) 
(N/A) 
PHD 
Machine Engineer 
(Y), Small 
Entrepreneur 
Engineering 
Apprenticeship and 
Studies in Chemistry 
(Y),Small 
Entrepreneur 
Engineering 
Farmers, Sales 
Clerk, (Y) 
1.8 
Diploma: 1.4 
 
R 
Jan (57) 
(N/A) 
PHD 
Engineer (Y), Small 
Entrepreneur 
Engineer (Y), 
working in Industry 
Warehouse 
Worker, Office 
Worker, 
Construction 
1.8 
BA – N/A 
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Engineer, Textile 
Engineer(Y) 
 
R 
Leonard 
(58) 
(24 yrs) 
PHD 
Artist(N) Studied History and 
Roman Philology (Y), 
now Secretary 
Office Worker, 
Electrician, Nurse 
1.9 
BA – 1.9 
MA – 1.8 
R 
Johanna 
(59) 
(N/A) 
MA 
Physician(Y) Apprenticeship 
Physiotherapy (N) 
Factory Owner, 
Chemist, 
dispossessed, 
Nurse, 
Engineer(Y), Main 
School Teacher 
1.5 
BA – (N/A) 
 
 
 
R 
Samuel 
(60) 
(23 yrs) 
MA 
Admin Studies (Y), 
then Policeman/Civil 
Servant 
Studied Psychology 
(Y), now admin clerk 
Admin clerk, 
Teacher Village 
School 
1.5 
BA – (N/A) 
R 
 
Table 10   Table 6 continued 
Synonym 
(Interview-
Nr.)/ 
(Age)/ 
Year of 
Study 
Profession Father 
(Studies Y/N) 
Profession Mother 
(Studies Y/N) 
Professions 
Grandparents 
(synoptic, studies 
Y/N) 
Educational 
Trajectory 
Abitur/BA/MA -
Marks 
Recognised - R 
Yannick 
(62) 
(28 yrs) 
MA 
Engineer(Y), Sales 
Representative Large 
Company  
Engineer(Y), self-
employed translator 
Economic 
Engineer (Y), 
High-ranking 
Chemist-Scientist 
(Y)  
2.0 
BA – 1.8  
 
R 
Simon (63) 
(24yrs) 
MA 
Stonemason 
Apprenticeship, 
Construction 
Engineer (Y), civil 
servant 
Studied Pedagogy 
(Y), Teacher Special 
Needs School 
Physician(Y), 
Nurse, 
Engineer(Y) 
N/A 
 
 
R 
Vincent 
(69) 
(28 yrs) 
Electrician(N), 
technical clerk 
company 
Industrial 
Management 
Construction 
Worker, Factory 
2.8 
BA – N/A 
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PHD Assistant (N), Civil 
Servant 
Worker, Small 
Entrepreneur 
R 
Lennard 
(70) 
(28 yrs) 
MA 
Apprenticeship 
Machine Operator 
(N), Now Truck 
Driver 
Apprenticeship Sales 
Clerk (N), Hotel 
Manageress 
Waitress, Truck 
Driver, Sales 
Clerk 
1.8 
BA -  N/A 
R 
Klara (72) 
(27 yrs) 
MA 
Studied Physics (Y), 
PhD, worked at 
University 
Studied Translation 
(Y), Teacher Special 
School 
Housewife, 
Locksmith 
1.0 
BA – 2.2 
R 
Till (73) 
(26 yrs) 
MA 
Construction Worker 
(N) 
Machine Engineer 
(Y), Head of 
Construction Site, 
then Secretary 
Tailor Shop Clerk, 
Master Tailor 
N/A 
BA – N/A 
MA – 2.3 
R 
Aaron (74) 
(26 yrs) 
PHD 
Studied Law (Y), 
Judge at 
administrative court 
Apprenticeship Legal 
Assistant(N) 
Self-Employed 
Carpenter, 
Housewife, 
Lacquerer, Sales 
Clerk 
1.2 
BA – N/A 
R 
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Chapter 5 – Recognised and Non-recognised Students, or: what makes an ‘Elite’ 
Economics Student? 
 
During my twenty-year career as a student, the course that excited me most was 
the two-semester sequence on the principles of economics I took during my 
freshman year in college. It is no exaggeration to say that it changed my life. I had 
grown up in a family that often discussed politics over the dinner table. The pros 
and cons of various solutions to society’s problems generated fervent debate. But, 
in school, I had been drawn to the sciences. Whereas politics seemed vague, 
rambling, and subjective, science was analytic, systematic, and objective. While 
political debate continued without end, science made progress.  
 
My freshman course on the principles of economics opened my eyes to a new way 
of thinking. Economics combines the virtues of science. It is, truly, a social science. 
Its subject matter is society – how people choose to lead their lives and how they 
interact with one another. But it approaches its subject with the dispassion of a 
science. By bringing the methods of science to the questions of politics, economics 
tries to make progress on the fundamental challenges that all societies face. 
 
Gregory Mankiw – Principles of Economics  
 
In this chapter I will focus on the following questions: What does it mean to pay an 
‘entry fee’ in German Economics, to have an ‘intrinsic’ interest in the discipline? 
With what attitudes, biographical decisions and general views is this connected? Are 
there regularities that can be found between those who fit and those who don’t? 
Here I wish to flesh out what things, experiences and ‘visions’ recognised students 
refer to when they professed an interest in academic Economics. Indeed I am 
interested in the biographical and lifeworld surroundings of those ‘intrinsic’ 
interests of specifically selected students. It will be the task of subsequent chapters 
to make sociological sense of these surroundings and to associate them with specific 
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kinds of habitus and structures. Put briefly: what separates fitting (or ‘elite’, 
‘recognised’) from non-fitting (‘average’, ‘non-recognised’) students is an early 
exposure to economic thinking and issues that is constructed as such: a clear self-
positioning for and against specific forms of reasoning that is both normative and 
positive at the same time, and an ingrained disposition, an incarnation of these 
position-takings.    
The question here is how the data was analysed as soon as it was obtained. This 
process can be distinguished into two phases: first I examined the transcriptions of 
the interviews for ‘typical’, that is, recurring attitudes of Economics students 
towards their subject or other subjects as well as political attitudes. I also grouped 
together experiences that appeared to me to be similar in nature (this might be 
called the ‘inductive’ phase of the data analysis). In a second step I attempted to 
connect these attitudes with the information I obtained about the ‘objective’ 
History of the discipline and the ‘objective’ characteristics of its current 
(successful-recognised) students. I attempted to localise dispositions between these 
objective characteristics and the subjective attitudes displayed in the interviews 
and my complementary ethnographic study. This eventually lead me to the 
construction of various habitus with which I will seek to explain the shown attitudes 
and experiences in such as way that objective structures and ‘subjective’ attitudes 
are reconciled. I call this second phase the theoretical inductive phase. It is here 
that I use my sociological knowledge to construct possible links with other 
phenomena in order to explain the attitudes and selections observed here.  
 
Recognised and Non-recognised Students - Insiders and Outsiders? 
 
Following the distinction of ‘recognised’ vs. ‘non-recognised’ students in the last 
section (which is empirically operationalised such that all students that hold 
tutorships, research assistantships, scientifically awarded PhD scholarships, or who 
do PhD’s in Economics or Political Economy are defined as ‘recognised’ while all 
others are grouped into the ‘non-recognised’ camp), it might be asked how much 
these concepts are able to make sense of.  
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We have a majority of ‘recognised’ – that is, presumably fitting students - in our 
model, such as (such as Peter, Mats, Jan, Simon, Moritz or Hannah) and a minority 
of ‘non-recognised’ students – those who don’t fit - (such as Angela, Johanna, 
Jeannette, Klara, Timo or Anne). We are able to see from the (very long) table 
above that most recognised students have a least one parent who holds a degree 
from a university. Teachers, engineers and free professions are the most prominent 
origins. There are also quite a few of these students whose parents have studied 
Social Science or Natural Science subjects. We can also see that technical 
professions, such as electricians or IT administrators, are very common among those 
students whose parents have not studied (neither at university nor at a polytechnic 
but who are recognised nevertheless. The recognised students are also 
predominately male, and those who are female all come from rather privileged 
origins.95 This points towards the pertinence of a specific kind of cultural capital 
that might be called ‘technical’, as opposed to more the ‘literary’ capital of 
language teachers or social workers. The ideal-typical recognised student is thus a 
male with a father who has an engineering university education and a teacher 
mother, who has specialised in at least one natural science subject in his Abitur, 
and has enjoyed early success in his Economics study, especially if he studied other 
subjects in parallel. He also holds a good, but not excellent A-level score. 
 
But this is just the objective and, so to speak, ‘congealed’ side of things. How can 
one see in the interviews that a student is recognised or not? What distinguishes 
them in action, when they think, learn, ponder, speak? What is the ‘subjective’ 
experience in all this? The payment of the entrance fee to enter a scientific 
discipline predisposes the adoption of a specific world view with its own logic and 
indeed vocabulary. It is well known that every scientific discipline possesses its own 
idiosyncratic language. Economics is no exception. It is therefore possible to 
extract, from the given German text book literature of the subject, certain 
recurring, dominant concepts and indeed words that may serve as a first 
                                                           
95 This includes the question of ethnicity: virtually all of my interviewees, except one, are from the white ethnic 
group. This mirrors the near-total exclusion of non-white ethnicities from academic top-posts in Germany.  
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approximate indicator of just how much the ‘language of Economics’ has been 
adopted by the students.96 These words may be fused into an index which gives us 
the ‘subjective’ equivalents of objective recognition or non-recognition. Though 
this is not a rigorous test we can nevertheless check whether, and in how far, there 
is an overlap with the objective side of things. Obviously, this is only an 
approximation.    
 
A brief Analysis of Language 
 
For this exploration (it is not a test in the strict, quantitative sense of the term) I 
built an Index by counting the use of 15 concepts or word roots that I attributed 
specifically to an Economics discourse as it may be found in various undergraduate 
or graduate text books. The more these concepts are used, the more the Economics 
student may be adapted in his or her thinking to the required, ‘orthodox’ discourse 
of the discipline. I attempted to choose a range of words that sufficiently 
represented the technical, rather mathematical and causal epistemology of 
Economics (Blaug 2002[1980]), but which may nevertheless be used in other 
contexts as well – that is why I concentrated mostly on adjectives. I assumed these 
words to be the tools and one expression of habitus, structured structures that help 
to structure the world in a particular way (Bourdieu 1984[1979]: 171). I made sure 
these concepts and words are on average less used in every day speech. I searched 
for the root word in my transcriptions and counted the times the interviewees used 
words related to this root word. I discarded all those instances in which the 
                                                           
96 To be sure, this method has its clear limitations: the contingent character of the interviews that 
necessarily follows from their relative openness and flexibility indeed circumscribe the validity of 
this indicator. Nevertheless, one may increase this validity by choosing words that can be said to be 
relatively specific to the economic discourse as it is presented in undergraduate and graduate text 
books (Bartling 2014[1985]; Basseler, Heinrich, and Utecht 2012[1978]; Bofinger 2015[2003]; 
Felderer and Homburg 2005[1984]; Neubäumer and Hewel 2005[1994]; Paschke 2007[2000]; 
Schumann, Meyer, and Ströbele 2011[1971]; Siebert and Lorz 2007[1969]; Woll 2003[1969]). I have 
also refrained from using all too obvious root concepts that come to mind easily when one thinks 
about Economics, such as model or function or real, in order to retain the distinctiveness of words. I 
will attempt to specify the specific use of these words later in this and other chapters of this work. 
Another severe limitation is the heavy numerical bias for Master’s and PhD students, who make up 
more than two thirds of the sample.  
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interviewee used the word immediately after I used it first in our conversation. I 
used the following to construct the Index: 
 
- Normative [in German normativ]: may also be used in normativity, as one 
pole of the always-pronounced positive-normative divide present in almost 
all Economics textbooks (for example   Lipsey and Chrystal 2007[1966]: 16-
32) 
- Rational [rational]: here used in its literal translation, which is to be 
distinguished from the less ‘economic’ reasonable [vernünftig]. It may be 
used in the words such as rationality, or rationality assumptions, or 
operationalise, or purposive rationality – all concepts close to prevailing 
economic thinking 
- Effect [Effekt]: signifying a mechanistic, rather causal relationship between 
‘variables’, it may also be used as effective or in terms like ‘in the final 
analysis’ [im Endeffekt]. One finds it in Economics in concepts such as 
‘external effects’ 
- Marginal [marginal]: a term very specific to Economics, used in concepts 
such as marginal utility or marginal product, signifying a logic of change of 
‘parameters’ 
- Optimal [optimal]: used to designate production states of the best possible 
return, such as in optimal production function; also possibly used as a verb 
(to optimise) or a noun (optimum), and also in conjunction with other 
concepts (e.g. Pareto-Optimality) 
-  Mechanism [Mechanismus]: once again expressing the rather fixed, rigid 
perspective  with which Economists tend to think; used in concepts like price 
mechanism  
- Homogeneous [homogen]: used to signify the uniform quality of a parameter, 
such as a product or a market 
- Nominal [nominal]: a term to distinguish ‘appearance’ from ‘reality’, such as 
in nominal rent or nominal wages     
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- Correlate [korrelieren]: also used as a noun [Korrelation] to indicate a 
steady, and mathematically provable, relationship between two or more 
‘variables’, such as in correlation coefficient 
- Efficient [effizient]: a major tool to express assessments of economic or 
other policies for their degree of economic optimality, its efficiency 
[Effizienz] 
- Aggregate [aggregieren]: to mathematically summarise individual cases into 
greater conglomerates, such as in aggregate demand 
- Endogenous-Exogeneous [ endogen-exogen]: used in conjunction with model 
building and its assumptions, designating what factors are inside or outside 
of specific models 
- Determine [determinieren]: further mechanistic term designating causes for 
a phenomenon, also used as a noun [Determinanten] 
- Maximise [maximieren]: similar to optimise, it designates the process of 
changing an economic process towards ‘completely rational’ distribution of 
income and production factors, as in maximising production or maximising 
utility; also used as maximum 
- Preference [Präferenz]: signifying an ‘irreducible’, individual choice over 
another; also used as a verb [präferieren] 
 
One may count, and thus build the Index, in two ways: either by counting and 
adding the absolute numbers of a specific word-concept and adding these up, or by 
counting merely whether a specific word-concept has been used or not, and then 
adding the affirmed categories up. Since the economic habitus, as every other 
specific habitus, consists of a whole system of predispositions, I decided to 
construct the Index in the latter way. It obliterates the frequency with which 
interviewees use certain concepts, but highlights, so to speak, the economic 
‘perspicacity’ in the recognised sense, the results of which are summarised in table 
11. 
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Table 11   ‘The Index of Recognition’- Ranking of interviewed Economics Students – 
The Use of specific Words or Concepts common in recognised academic Discourse  
Interviewees 
Nr. of Words 
mentioned 
at least 
once 
Pseudonyms of Interviewees 
7/15 Peter (9), Mats(51), an(57),Simon (63) 
6/15 Moritz(25), Linus(54) 
5/15 Hannah(23), Anton(27), Niklas(44), Tom(50), Karl(52), Lennard(70), Aaron(74) 
4/15 John(6), Dennis(18), Martin(36), Philipp(46), Eric(53), Ben(68), Vincent(69) 
3/15 Jonas(11), Elias(13), Emma(14), Leon(15), Sophia(16), Lukas(17), Jakob(24), Jack(33), Juergen(38), 
David(45), Lina(47), Samuel(60), Yannick(62) 
2/15 Felix(19), Tobias(26), Thomas(34), Jonathan(55), Leonard(58), Max(61), Johann(65), Heinrich(66) 
1/15 David(12), Max(20), Claudia(31), Heidi(35), Paula(37),Anna(39), Theo(40), Robert(41), Leo(48), Angela(56), 
Johanna(59), Jeanette(71), Klara(72) 
0/15 Timo(30), Stefanie(32), Anne(64) 
 
 
This table can be interpreted as a first empirical approximation of an academic 
economic habitus that is or is not fitting with the requirements of the discipline. It 
serves as a bridge – admittedly brittle, but nevertheless - between initial theorising 
of study selection a la Bourdieu and empirical validation. In the theoretical 
perspective chosen here, the number of words mentioned at least once are defined 
as an expression of an economic habitus, a lynchpin between the structured 
structure of social origin and trajectory, and structuing structure of practices 
(Bourdieu 1984[1979]: 171).  
It can be seen that there is a considerable overlap between the ‘objective’ status 
as recognised students and the ‘subjective’ use of specifically economic academic 
vocabulary. All of the students that score at least 4 points on the index (except 
Martin) are recognised students in the objective sense formerly established. They 
hold research assistantships or scholarships in various forms and/or are accepted by 
professors to do a PhD in Economics. They are also almost exclusively male (the sole 
exception here being Hannah). There are also three Bachelor students in this group 
(Peter, John and Ben). At the other side of the scale, the situation is the opposite. 
The shares of recognised and non-recognised students among these outsiders is 
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much more balanced. So is gender balance. On the other hand, however, there are 
those students that would count, according to their ‘objective’ characteristics, as 
‘recognised’ but who are not ‘recognised’ as defined in the Index above. These are 
students like Klara, Anna, Paula or Leo, like Jonathan, Leonard, Heinrich, Theo or 
Johanna. All of them are, or have been, either tutors or assistants or PhD students, 
yet score low on the Index. Why is this? What distinguishes these recognised from 
high-scoring recognised students? Only a closer comparative look at the actual 
views and trajectories of the students might give some tentative answers to these 
questions. 
 
Early Exposure to Economic Issues 
 
In an earlier section it has already been established that, in terms of social origin, 
the recognised students come from a background endowed with a medium amount 
of cultural capital (Engineers, Teachers, Other Social Scientists), and are also 
predominately male, as opposed to the whole student body in Economics. This can 
also be seen in the ‘subjective’ accounts of recognised vs. non-recognised/insider 
vs. outsider students. The narratives of how these students came to study, and to 
be interested and successful in, Economics seem to display a range of 
interconnected features that I will try to elucidate. The recognised students, and 
even more those students who score highly on the Index, tend to have been in 
contact with explicitly economic questions early on in their lives and educational 
trajectories. A prime example of this is Peter (Nr.9), whose father holds a PhD in 
Economics and whose mother is a secondary school teacher. Even although he did 
not have Economics ‘on the radar’ his way into the discipline is straightforward. 
After high school graduation (with the perfect mark of 1.0) his father organised a 
gap year position at a college library in an African country for him. He explains the 
different economic circumstances in that country at the time and the presence 
there of Economics books as two factors arousing his interesting for economic 
questions: 
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I: […] so, I mean, in countries like this one you are guarded by all these economic 
things quite well, right? Of course, inflation is discussed everywhere and [raises 
voice] ‘oh, oh, oh!’ But most people don’t know what inflation is, right? 
T: I also don’t know what inflation is. Ok, money devaluation, but- 
I: Yeah, well, theoretically maybe, right? And obviously, everything gets more 
expensive, but, but this isn’t really it. […] I mean in [African country] you have a 
proper inflation, right? Like around 50 percent per year. That means, or even 
more, ah? […] Well, I say when we came there and when we left again, a 
kilogramme of rice cost two, three times as much, in that time span, right? This 
is already something, when you see how month per month your expenses rise, 
right?  Luckily our, our, our money also increased  due to the exchange rate 
devaluation. So it wasn’t that bad. But, this is just what you recognise what you 
don’t have here [in Europe] not so much, right?  Ahm, this was such a thing. I 
think that this brought me to be interested in it more. Right? The second was just 
simply because I sat idle at the library. There was absolutely nothing to do. […] 
the whole library was full with Political Economy books. Then I sat down one day, 
picked the micro introduction book from the shelf and read it through, right? 
Then I took a Macro book, and so on. And then I thought it would be quite cool 
[to study Economics]. 
 
Another example would be Philipp (Nr.46), coming from an engineering (father) and 
nursing (mother) background. He draws a connection between his curiosity about 
cartoon film and his interest in Economics: 
 
I: Ahm, and also our monetary system, I have always been fascinated by that, 
how our monetary system works. […] I have always asked myself when I was five 
years old, I asked questions to my father how this can work with the monetary 
system. And why everybody wants to have money and then I firstly learned that 
the equivalent value only gives money its actual value, ultimately. And there was 
also an episode of Duck Tales [a cartoon series produced from the late 1980’s to 
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the early 1990’s], that’s no joke, I was really young back then. There is an 
episode, I recently watched it again […] there is a remote village in which there 
is no money, and then Dagobert Duck introduces bottle caps there. And then the 
prices rise, and everybody complains that the prices are that high. And then he 
supplies an airplane which distributes new bottle caps every day. And then I 
thought as a small boy, of course, now all people are richer because they have 
more bottle caps now, but suddenly the prices rose even more and then the food 
in the menu cost ten times as much and then the penny dropped for me that 
there are deeper relationships than a fixed price relationship, and that I have 
always found interesting.  
 
Jan (Nr.57), son of two Engineers, also signifies his early interest in Economics by 
remembering how he checked an introductory Economics text-book, among other 
things, after he finished his Abitur. Mats (Nr.51), whose parents are teachers of 
informatics and mathematics respectively, links his selection of Political Economy 
with his father’s interests: 
 
I: I think History simply .. the word itself, these are stories, everybody likes 
stories, and for me this, it is very exciting to see these large relationships, 
History above all offers that. History offers the large relationships, Political 
Economy tries to explain the large relationships, in a different dimension, where 
this large whole that was, ahm, always interesting to understand, why things are 
what they are […]. Ahm, I can’t [explain more fully where this interest comes 
from] .. it was just there.  
Certainly also comes from my father, because .. he always has been interested in 
Politics and History. We have the whole basement filled with History books. 
 
Indeed, these students seem to construct their way into Economics, for themselves 
and for me as an interviewer, in a form that already resembles an autobiographical 
illusion (Bourdieu 2008[2004]: 1-3), telling the tale in such a way that their 
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selection appears necessary, natural, as if the specific experiences of particular 
events could only have been resulted in this way and in no other. But not everyone 
doing an internship in a college in an African country recognises its inflation rate, 
however volatile it might be, and not everyone derives from this alone an interest 
in Economics.  
The boundaries between rather passive exposure to economic topics, as indicated in 
the foregoing quotes, and more active ‘interest-taking’ in it are certainly fluid in 
reality. One might guess that the relationship switches to the latter with 
progressing age. On the other hand, the whole dichotomy of active and passive 
exposure to/adoption of, seems rather doubtful from a Bourdieusian perspective. In 
any case, the earliest biographical references are made by recognised students, and 
in particular by those recognised students who also score highly on the word Index. 
Indeed these are also those who seem very young for their respective progression 
through the stages of Economics education. Most of these students on the Masters 
level are around 25 years of age, and the PhD students like Jan(57), Mats(51) or 
Tom(51) are only slightly older and will likely have their doctorates before they 
turn 30, which can be interpreted as a sociologically pertinent sign of precocity 
(Bourdieu and Passeron 1979[1964]: 6f.).97   
 
More common amongst the whole ‘recognised’ sample are statements that link 
particular events during the later adolescence of the interviewees with their 
selection of Economics. For Jakob (24), this was the Iraq war: 
 
I: And there of course you get to economic questions, I mean Economics is simply 
the management of scarcities and, like most of the problems of our society some 
scarcities are responsible [for the difficulties to solve them] […] 
 
                                                           
97 According to a study by Enders and Mugabushaka (Enders and Mugabushaka 2004: 13), the average 
PhD graduate in the Economic Sciences in Germany is 31.7 years. 
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Very often, it was the financial, or Euro zone, crisis that was named as a reason for 
deciding to study Economics.  Moritz (25) describes this process: 
 
I: Ahm, yeah, I think, the biggest explanatory part [why he studied Economics] 
really is the financial crisis, which was exactly in this year, ahm. […] I mean I did 
my Abitur in 2009 […] when this really started in 2008 in September, I wasn’t 
interested in it at all, I mean .. there I knew that it existed but, they always say 
it, when they always say something about Lehmann Brothers in the media, this 
bank. When I read that, I always thought ‘Lehmann’? That was for me the 
goaltender of the German National Team [ at that time Jens Lehmann- he means 
the National Team of football], I mean, that wasn’t a bank for me [laughs]. And 
[laughs] this is how I followed the crisis, like this, yeah. And .. not much more 
interest than that. Ahm, and it actually came only after my Abitur, ahm, and I 
don’t know, I only thought it  .. exciting, ahm, I mean the dynamics behind it 
was. I mean I just started reading articles in the internet, at the time about 
which trade cycle measurements will help now, speaking of scrappage bonus 
[Economic policy by the German government to induce demand for industrial 
goods in the early days of the financial crisis] and so on, and what speaks for it, 
and against it. And this aroused my interest […] 
 
Ben (68) seems to describe a very similar process: 
 
I: And, as motivation maybe, I mean I have, yes roughly since the tenth grade I 
am interested in Economic Policy or generally in general Economics. I think I was 
influenced by the Financial Crisis a bit, because I have somehow always thought 
‘Ok, there seems to be something going totally wrong. And how could you 
approach this topic now?  
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Samuel (60) exhibits more of a focus (an admiring focus) on some protagonists of 
the crisis, equating them with dandies: 
 
I: […] I always had a relationship to [Political Economy], I mean .. I read a lot of 
newspapers, in my youth. About the crisis in particular. […] And I have to say I 
simply found the people interesting. Those who worked in the banks or were the 
protagonists, in the whole financial crisis. 
T: Hm. 
I: You have to say, these are.. somehow all cool motherfuckers. I mean, also a 
bit bad.  
T: Who do you mean now? Ben Bernanke and so on? 
I: Yeah. This is one of the kind ones, but .. Richard Fuld, from Lehman Brothers. 
Or .. I don’t know, in the last year of course Varoufakis, another mega-cool 
dude. 
T: Aha. Why, because he got on the EU’s case so much or what? 
I: Yeah, and because he also is mega, .. I mean he is quite a [in English] pimp, if 
you can put it this way.  
T: Aha. 
I: I mean to walk to some conference with a rolled-up collar shirt is quite a 
statement, at least. 
 
Martin (36) is led to his interest in Economics via his fascination for emerging 
businesses such as ‘Google, Facebook, ahh, Amazon and so on’, ‘a little bit the 
question how success looks like’ which he puts ‘in the societal, political and 
juridical context’   
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What one sees here is the construction of clear and extensive derivation from the 
selection of Economics to a general (early) interest in economic, political and 
societal questions. The more one moves from recognised to unrecognised, or from 
insider to outsider students as defined above, the more casual, accidental, brief, 
indeed ‘mundane’ (‘extrinsic’) does this construction tend to become. Whereas 
with students like Hannah (23) one finds statements such as ‘I study to educate 
myself and not to have my degree in the end.’, Jonas (11), who pondered studying 
German or Chinese studies before he turned to Economics, in the end emphasises 
professional security for his selection: ‘Like, yeah, and with Business Administration 
you actually always have a chance to get a job.’ Likewise, Jack (33) prefers security 
over interest, even though he is also in a way interested in Economics: 
 
I: Yeah, I mean, I don’t know, I mean, in the beginning I didn’t want to study 
Economics at all, rather Music. 
T: Aha. 
I: Something like that. But then I thought like [smiles], the way you think as an 
Economist, like, ah, you don’t have a future with this, like. And, in the end it 
actually was like, I got my A-level results and then chose [speaks louder] what 
could interest me, and where the GPA is right. And there Economics was the best 
option for me, like. This is how I came to it. Also had in school this Society and 
Economy, this is how the subject was called. Yeah, I always found that 
intresting, therefore I thought like ‘Economics, that might also be interesting.’  
 
A similar account can be found with Felix (19) who first aimed at studying 
Psychology before turning to Economics, following another interest after 
participation in a reading circle but also the pressure received from his father to 
study something ‘decent’, so that he states in the end: ‘That was also a pragmatic 
thing […] Then I was able to sugar-coat it for myself. I do a bit of Business 
Administration [Economics], then my old man will be quiet.’ Johanna (59) seems to 
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have similar thoughts, when she prefers the economic security of Economics over 
the excitement of studying what she actually wants: 
 
I: Dunno, I think I approached my studies also with the, with the motivation not 
to spoil what I already find interesting anyways through institutionalisation, but 
indeed I think that one motivation will in part have been, to somehow find a 
subject which somehow has the label of ‘that is something reasonable’, 
something with which you will find work later on.  
 
Claudia (31) originally planned to study Medicine but ‘went back to Economics’ 
which was ‘the original plan’ after getting to know her then boyfriend whose 
conceptions of family life led her to rethink the ‘thankless’ tasks to be performed 
by apprentice physicians. Finally, there are those students who draw a more or less 
wholly instrumental picture of their selection. Stefanie (32) is almost brutally open 
about her way into Economics, and about willingly following the advice of her social 
environment in this matter: 
 
T: And, ah, can you describe a little how, how you came to Economics? What 
were your, your thoughts when you came to this, this subject? 
I: Hm. Mm, I think it was I mean I never had this moment, like I have a lot of 
choices and then the decision came ‘Yes, it’s gotta be Economics’. It was 
somehow a process which just went further, don’t know if you are good in Math, 
got a little of logical thinking- 
T: Yeah. 
I: -and . mainly, mainly like somehow logical thinking, then you have from 
outside somehow like ‘yeah, you gotta go into the Economy!’ Like, this is good 
then.  
T: Who says this? 
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I: Ah, I don’t know, were like, parents, friends, ahem also like teachers, and 
acquaintances like, I mean it really came from a lot of sides then. 
T: Yeah? 
I: Also don’t know whether I radiated something or so where everybody thought, 
yeah, like, ‘go into the private Economy!’ But in my family this was also a lot, 
nobody is really a standard business person. […] And then, somehow it is  
[imitates voice] ‘Ah, this is exciting!’ Then it is also a bit of a standard thing, like 
‘yeah, Economics, then the child has got something in the bag and then- 
T: Hm. 
I: - you can do something with it. And I  . found it just to be the most logical 
thing simply, this this is simply. You can do so much with it, I mean you can build 
up so many different directions and top it up with something. Master, whatever, 
simply when you are doing internships.   
 
And so is Max (20), whose description of how he came to Economics is equally 
succinct: 
 
I: […] Yeah, I also have [studied with] a mate that also studied in [X], he was 
there half a year before me. And then, well, we have been friends for a bloody 
long time, so said to ourselves, let’s to study together. Then we checked what 
was there. And then I became aware of the degree, I already had Political 
Economy in mind anyway, and then this was clear for me. I then didn’t apply 
elsewhere [at other universities/for other degrees], but did this directly. […] 
Like, ‘well, Political Economy, ok, bang, we do that now’. […] I mean for me this 
was simply a continuation of school. ‘I do three more years of studying Political 
Economy.’ That is why I, yeah, as I said, I didn’t make a plan […].  
 
170 
 
It is not that these ‘mundane’ deliberations are absent in the accounts of the more 
‘recognised’ students. But there they are supplemented by strongly constructed 
motivations of intellectual interest in economic questions. This is indeed in line 
with empirical findings of the motivations of students of various disciplines 
presented in the literature review (see Figures 3 and 4 above), although, of course, 
it still would have to be properly, sociologically explained. However, the tendencies 
presented here have their exceptions as well. There is for example Linus (54), who 
is a recognised student, but has no early exposure to Economics whatsoever, not 
until his later Bachelor studies. He describes his selections in a very laconic way: 
 
I: Study choice, also was relatively .. in- .. indeterminate, in a certain way. Back 
then I listened to a lot of music, also did music myself and also was interested in 
music in school, therefore I started studying music sciences. 
T: Hm.  
I: In the main subject and I, ah, needed a second main subject, I didn’t know at 
all what was going on at uni, that meant, ok, second main subject, search, 
search, what do you take, Philosophy doesn’t have an NC [Numerus Clausus], 
Abitur 3.0, ok, then I will take Philosophy. 
T: Aha. 
I: Because I can’t play the piano and can’t read notes that fast, but I was 
instantly hooked to Philosophy, I agreed with that. 
T: Hm. 
I: And then in the second semester .. ah switched from Music sciences to 
Sociology and Political Sciences. So two side subjects. What I have also always 
been interested in. Societal and political events, and yeah, this I pulled through 
until the sixth semester in [German University location], then went to CSI-
location, and finished it here. 
T: Ok. 
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I: Then there was one year break and then it continued with the, ah .. with the 
economic sciences. 
On the other side, there is also Timo (30), who is not ‘recognised’, who 
nevertheless states an early interest in the discipline based on intense ethical 
concerns: ‘You have to work in the Economy to build a more just world.’, 
although of course this in itself seems not quite the same degree of ‘intrinsic’ 
interest as portrayed above. 
 
 
We can conclude here that those who are ‘recognised’,  and recognise academic 
Economics themselves most (judging by the Index constructed at the beginning of 
this chapter), tend to construct or recall an early exposure to economic ideas, 
often simultaneously as a cause and reason for their latter selections. They 
essentially sketch out a development that is seemingly long-lasting, direct, mono-
causal and without many (if any) detours. This somehow leads to a later (‘intrinsic’) 
interest in Economics. Although these students certainly did experience exposure to 
economic or quasi-economic issues, it seems just as decisive that they select the 
specific events which they think exemplify and indeed explain this early proximity 
(such as an internship, political and social discussion with the family, or even TV 
series). They confer upon these events a special sign as indicators. In doing so, they 
are much more confident than the non-recognised or less recognised students. The 
latter construct a more makeshift, accidental or pragmatic (‘extrinsic’) picture of 
their choice. But why this confidence? What is the basis of it, what is the method of 
extracting significant from insignificant factors? It is perfectly possible that it is 
their current position, as recognised-recognising students, which prompts them to 
construct this tale for themselves and others. But what habitus does this specific 
position presume? We must broaden our view and see not only how economic, but 
also other ways of thinking are appreciated in these narratives. 
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A peculiar Perception of the World 
 
The vast majority of recognised students of this sample, and also (but to a 
considerably lesser degree) the unrecognised students, stated that they had some 
sort of interest in ‘societal’, historical, political events, and gave this as at least 
one of their reasons for selecting Economics over other subjects. This was very 
often linked to a preference for Mathematics, as Mats (51) states: 
 
T: […] What does make [Economics] so interesting for you. Or what made it so 
interesting for you in those days [during the Gymnasium/German High School]? 
I: Well, it is .. ah, it is of course somehow connected to History and Politics. 
Actually very strongly, and simply this structured, rational analysis, also in 
connection as I said with Mathematics, because I always liked Mathematics. It 
was simply this combination out of these small parts that tied my interest in this 
way. … Yes, exactly. 
 
It seems also clear that other practical circumstances play important roles in the 
selection of one subject over another – factors like age (the older the freshmen is, 
the more conservatively she or he will tend to choose), prior apprenticeships or 
studies, existence of children while studying, general economic situation, and so on 
are pertinent factors. I am, however, interested here primarily in the perspective 
of the world of which these decisions are expressions, and which they in turn either 
compound (more likely in Bourdieusian terms) or ‘loosen up’ (less likely).  
 
The exploration of this is perhaps best done by focussing on the relational aspects 
of the students’ statements about their selections. In telling what they did not 
want to ‘choose’, and why, they practically reconstructed, at the time of the 
interview, their particular view of the disciplines at the time of their ‘choices’, 
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perhaps even their reading of the academic field98. As Bourdieu (Bourdieu and 
Wacquant 1992: 127-31) says the habitus defines itself by what it is not, ex 
negativo. 
 
The first thing that comes to mind from this view is the assessment of other Social 
Sciences and Humanities – including its languages and dominant epistemologies - as 
‘imprecise’, ‘unclear’, ‘too fuzzy’, ‘not tangible’ or ‘sluggish’ relative to 
Economics/Political Economy. This is, above all, the case with recognised students. 
It is much less so with students who are not recognised, where this sharp distinction 
that Economics enjoys over other Sciences with a similar object vanishes and only 
‘instrumental’ or ‘professional’ reasons for study remain alongside rather with 
flimsy, unspecific remarks of some concerning sort of interest. By contrast, the 
deliberations of the insiders and recognised students indicate just how important 
and deep this preference for this particular kind of thinking is, and for the 
rationality that can be found in Economics that goes with it: a true habit of the 
heart. That may be seen in the case of Tom (50) who, when asked what he sees 
special about Economics as opposed to other Social Sciences, responds: 
 
I: […] I mean what I find good on this model theoretical [stuff] that I do is…. You 
have, you have a model. And you have clear assumptions, right? I have to 
formulate which assumptions I take. How do I define the utility function. Yes, 
what are, what are the central elements? Better put, what are the central 
assumptions that produce my statements, ahm, at the end, right? I mean I do not 
produce the statements of the model, but I simply put assumptions into it, and 
out of that comes an answer to a question that I put, right? […] And the 
important thing is, you have formulated clear and succinct assumptions at the 
beginning, right? And these can be criticised […] You simply have clear points of 
attack and clear definitions, you can discuss very clearly with it, right? And if you 
compare this with many social scientific things, there it is often the case that 
                                                           
98 I would like to thank Andrew Smith for making me aware of this implication. 
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you, that you discuss, you can discuss the whole evening and somehow it does 
not progress, or you still haven’t understood the other person, because you 
haven’t put down these assumptions this specifically, right? And it is similar with 
mathematical models, right? I mean with mathematical models it is simply clear. 
Right? I can look at it, I know it is right or wrong. At least on the mathematical 
level, and then I can clearly discuss it. And that I find is often much harder and 
fuzzier with legal or social scientific questions, and I am also not that good on 
that terrain in my view. Can’t do it, there are other people that can do that 
splendidly, I can’t do that. An’ I see my strengths rather in this theoretically 
rooted discussing of questions. […] That has always been what interested me 
strongly, I mean mathematical questions, right? And it’s simply like, Math is a 
very clear language, and that is nice for me, and I find it good, ah, to work with 
it, right? This, perhaps this pushed me more and more towards this Political 
Economy direction, rather than towards a social scientific direction, and the 
questions Business Administration is answering. 
  
One can see the frustration with which these other approaches are observed. At the 
same time Tom is honest enough to admit that other, more literary approaches to 
social scientific questions are ‘much harder’ for him because he is ‘not that good on 
that terrain’. Simon (63), who switched from Political Science to Economics after 
his Bachelor’s uses a metaphor from gardening to express his point of view:  
 
I: And, ah, then I saw that the approach is similar in Political Science and in 
Political Economy, but the Political Economists have, this was my perception at 
the time, more powerful tools at their disposal. Perhaps because the object is 
better observable than, ah, than Politics. Or also Sociology. […] And I have 
noticed that even though you strongly reduce the view of man in Political 
Economy, often due to instrumental reasons, because you only can make 
statements at all like this, you get good results in many situations that reflect 
reality well enough, so as to put the models to good use. […] I mean in [the 
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course of] introduction to Political Economy this is really on a very simple level 
where you, I’m sure you know that, draw Supply and Demand curves. And out of 
such a simple diagram that starkly simplifies reality you already can draw truths, 
or, well ‘truths’, but you can draw statements that are possibly, ah, good 
statements, that means in the sense that they give an instruction to act that 
make sense. You can draw informative stuff out of it despite the extreme 
simplification. Exactly like this. 
T: This is then also efficient? That you can achieve a lot with humble means?   
I: Yes, exactly. […] And it bothered me somewhat in other parts [ of my studies] 
that, I mean it occurred to me a bit as if it was only about making a statement as 
ambivalent as possible, in order not be attacked.  
T: You mean in Sociology or Philosophy? 
I: Yeah, also in Political Science, in, in other areas where it is about  explaining 
why a certain system functions better than another one. And then you know all 
sorts of factors that could be the reason for it [the phenomenon to be 
explained], but you actually don’t have the means to say ‘ok, this is the main 
reason.’ And you don’t do it, because it perhaps might not be respectable to do 
it.  
T: Hmh. 
I: Exactly. And this convinced me more in Political Economy, that you can 
actually say there, we chip off the branches of the tree so long until, let’s say, 
we write down what the potential reasons are that we observe. And from these 
reasons I can eliminate 95 percent, and reduce it to one or two variables, and 
these explain 90% of that what I see. 
 
One may again see the objectifying, almost reductionist, materialist gaze Simon 
throws onto his former subject when he infers that statements in Political Science 
were ‘only’ made to insulate one’s argument. By contrast, his view of Economics is 
rather idealist, as is the case for many of the interviewees. This fits with what 
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Bourdieu suggested about the mutual objectifications taking place in a field (in this 
case the academic one). In it, one adversary holds the objective, objectifying truth 
of the respective other, the opponent, however in a reductive form, and has an 
enchanted view of himself.99  
 
It can be shown with quite a few recognised students that this distance from other 
forms of thought, if not directed against exactly the same object, can have early 
antecedents in school and adolescence. This is very often linked with disapproval of 
specific groups of persons, their demeanour and ways of thinking or working. Ben 
(68), for example, wrote for the school newspaper and did an internship at a local 
newspaper during his high school time. He recollects his impressions: 
   
I: But I have somehow, I mean I always found it quite good if one somehow had a 
fixed topic. For one part I have written a lot in this section on current school 
events [of the school newspaper] because there was a concrete starting point. 
Ahm, I was rarely some-, actually not at all somebody who brilliantly [elaborates] 
one’s own thoughts in the sense of ‘I simply want to tell somehow something 
what comes to my mind’. We also had a couple of people [at the newspaper] who 
then blethered on a lot. And, ahm, I also had an internship with [regional 
newspaper] and, they also wanted that I simply, somehow just like, I mean 
[names youth section of that newspaper] […] They have a youth, ah, youth 
section. 
T: Ok. 
I: And there some people somehow write what has just happened here, and what 
their feelings are. And there I thought ‘Hey guys, this is not my thing. I do not 
here have to sell myself, but I would like to write about something relevant.’ 
T: Hmh. 
                                                           
99 “Marx is more likely to possess the truth of Bakunin than Bakunin, and Bakunin is more likely to 
possess the truth of Marx than Marx. In any case one cannot be Marx and Bakunin at the same time.” 
(Bourdieu 1993[1984]: 59) 
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I: And, ahm, maybe this political aspect was a little bit of an exception, but 
there you had starting points which you could just discuss. 
T: Hmh. Hmh. 
I: I still remember this self-publicising I always found very, very tedious. 
 
Again one sees the ‘alienation’ felt from these specific kinds of behaviour, these 
‘ramblings’ or ‘showy-elements’ which seem foreign to the speaker’s habitus and 
are thus easily objectified, stripped of the enchanted self-denial which they likely 
have in the eyes of those who perform them. Against this, these students tend to 
position and model themselves as being ‘straightforward’ and ‘no bullshit’ (my 
words), by ‘fixing’ topics and being ‘purely scientific’. The very same process, it 
seems, can be observed with Aaron (74), who pondered selecting a discipline 
leading to a care profession, but was turned away, or rather turned away himself, 
after getting to know people that studied this discipline during a gap year in a 
school for disabled children after obtaining his Abitur: 
 
I: Yeah, ah, I mean […] these were of course rehabilitation scientists, I mean, 
yeah, this study must be called rehabilitation sciences or .. teacher for .. 
disabled people.  
T: Yeah. 
I: That I have met. And what I indeed didn’t like, was the handling of the 
[disabled] people there, I have to say it, ahm, the children were, in my view, too 
little supported and pushed. In that sense. I mean maybe they were supported, 
but pushed, no. Ahm, that is perhaps also because that is is a relatively, ahm, a 
work where you see relatively little progress over a long period of time. And 
therefore you get motivation problems as a teacher and ah, yeah, I think the 
children would have had significantly more potential.  
T: Hm. 
178 
 
I: Yeah, if one approached things, would have approached things differently. 
T: Yeah, yeah. 
I: Yeah, exactly and ahm, yeah. Then I went to … or following that I said ‘ok, this 
progress is not enough for me.’ 
T: Hm. 
I: And I want to accept considerably more responsibility than in this professional 
field, ahm, exactly. And I think, I think I somehow recognised, I have a different 
world view. Than ahm, than ahm, the teachers which, which were there, and 
honestly I believed and now, can’t say today whether this is really true … I 
believed that in many disciplines that I would have wanted to study, as for 
example theatre, or German studies. Those things. That I would have met people 
who would be relatively similar. 
T:  Aha. 
I: Yeah, ahm, that are not so achievement-oriented. As I had been. And then I 
would have thought, that it would have been hard for me. Exactly like this.  
T: How do you see that, that these people have a different world view, and that 
they are not so achievement-oriented. Are they then simply, somehow not, they 
simply don’t tackle things or? 
I: Yeah, exactly, you can put it like this. They don’t properly tackle things, ahm, 
or better put, … it’s often in the, in the contact with people, I mean .. on the 
one hand, I mean .. a, well, how should I put it in the best way. I think, I define 
myself strongly via, ahm, or gain motivation, via showing merit, merit.  
T: Yeah.  
I: If I go to bed at night and say, ‘You have done something today.’ 
T: Yes, yes. 
I: And in this, in this definition what, what merit means, we were, I believe, 
very, very different. 
 
Once more, one sees the different conceptions at work in the perspectives, and 
how quickly these contingent views are transformed into ‘progress’ or ‘merit’ as 
such, as an absolute standard (even though the relativising aspect, as in Ben’s 
quote, is still there as well). It also becomes clear that the operation is, at the 
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same time, a creation of an identity, of a ‘honourable’ personality, the calling-into-
existence of a life that is, in the eyes of its creator, worth living. This is why self- 
and external designation is so important for students, as for every other agent.  
This self-chosen identity might also be seen in a whole plethora of self-designations 
with regards to high-school subjects, mostly in distancing moves from languages 
combined with affiliations with the natural sciences (mostly chemistry and physics) 
and mathematics. Hannah (23) thus confesses that she is ‘very, very bad in 
languages’ and doesn’t ‘have a feeling’ for them when talking about her 
experiences in high school, while she states that Math ‘was super’ since it was 
‘nicely logical’. Theo (40) states that ‘Languages were not my thing, rather Natural 
Sciences’, whereas Mats (51) confesses that he was ‘never particularly into 
languages’. Within the natural sciences, there are also sometimes distinctions 
made. Peter (9) explains his preference of chemistry over biology: 
 
I: […] Bio[logy] I also had [at school], and I found it tedious.      
T: Why? 
I: Yeah, why? I think if one thinks about it retrospectively I think that Bio was 
just imprecise. The way it is taught. It is like [imitates voice of teacher] ‘Yeah, 
then something somehow happens there.’ or ‘The eco-system, that is how it is, 
and we don’t know so exactly, and yeah, everything depends on everything else 
and  ..’, yeah, that’s not the way it is, right? Whereas with chemistry it was. I, I 
calculated right until the last atom how many particles of, whatever, muriatic 
acid were in this, right? Or at least, I could do this theoretically. Ahm, and I think 
I found that quite cool. 
 
These students clearly value, and prefer, a specific kind of exactitude and clarity, 
which may also be seen in their frequent choice of either Chemistry, Physics or 
Mathematics as one of their A-level specialisations (often paired with History), 
more so with the ‘recognised’ students than either the ‘non-recognised’ students or 
the whole Economics student body.  
On the other hand, there are also boundaries in the direction of the Natural 
Sciences and Mathematics. Jonathan (55), even though taking Physics and 
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Mathematics as his Abitur specialisations in which he ‘did well in principle’, he 
decided ‘that [it was] probably not enough for studying’ because he estimated he 
‘can’t do that.’ 
 
 
However, the recruitment of academic Economists from graduates of various 
natural Sciences is well known (for instance Heining, Jerger, and Lingens 2008: 
316). Philipp (46) first studied Physics since it was ‘simply exciting’ for him and 
because he ‘heard from all sides that Physics would fit best to me’, after taking his 
Abitur in it as well. However, he eventually refrained from entering an academic 
career in the subject due to its ‘elaboratedness’ and sense that there were ‘more 
intelligent’ students in the discipline than him. Lina (47) started out in 
Mathematics, also after doing the subject in her Abitur, but defected to Economics 
after her Diploma because, for her, pure Mathematics was ‘too abstract’ since it 
made her feel as if ‘I don’t understand anymore where I am here’. 
These examples clearly seem to point towards a continuous, and continuously 
adjusting, self-placement of the students within their respective social microcosms, 
at school, in university, or elsewhere. But they are not always necessarily 
conscious. Yannick (62), like others, was interested in ‘why […] countries develop 
economically, some better and others worse.’ This includes phenomena like 
unemployment and the adaptation problems certain social groups have with sudden 
economic changes. But when asked why he did not choose Sociology he only replies 
that ‘[…] this did not occur to me … never thought about, that this is also a 
sociological question, I mean that is, if I let that pass again in front of my inner 
eye, these are actually economic-political .. questions, therefore I thought 
Sociology doesn’t deal with it at all. […] I mean it didn’t strike me as a possibility at 
all.’ 
  
 
Then, of course, there are other, allegedly more ‘mundane’ factors that push 
students towards the discipline of Economics. Dennis (18) for example ‘discovered’ 
his preference for Economics through his apprenticeship where he was ‘among the 
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five to ten best’ in the company which gave him the psychological conviction to go 
on in this area rather than in Engineering which required Physics in which he 
‘wasn’t so good, and also not that interested either.’ For him studying Sociology in 
any case ‘never came up’. A reason for John (6) to choose Economics over his other 
initial subject of Political Science was his sheer success in the former, despite 
working much harder in the latter. Similarly, the chance to tutor in front of a class 
was decisive in the eyes of Simon(63). He describes it as ‘the best experience of my 
[Bachelor] studies.’, his ‘high point’.  
 
What can be noted at this point is the peculiar ‘sense’ of place that the 
‘recognised’ students tend to exhibit. Closely linked to this is the exclusion of 
certain disciplines as offering ‘nothing for us’ (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992: 63f.). 
This sense, as we have seen, is not guided by purely rational assessments, even 
though these are the results of this process, but by sympathies and antipathies, and 
by everyday experiences with other groups in which these sympathies are produced 
and later remembered. These are eventually met with institutional support by the 
discipline of Economics – in the form of tutorships, good marks, scholarships, and 
the like – which tend to compound the initial sense. Somehow the exact and 
abstract method of Economics is perceived as being more pleasing and more 
scientific at the same time. It seems that these two judgments are, in practice, 
inextricably linked, as we could see very well with the statements of Mats, Tom, 
Aaron and others. This conjunction between a ‘subjective’ and ‘objective’ 
preference for the discipline is found, much more rarely and with much less clarity, 
with those students who are ‘non-recognised’. Thus, at the base of the strict 
distinction of the positive and the normative one can perhaps find, in fact, a 
specific combination of the positive and the normative. But which combination is 
that? How can the hostility towards non-causal, non-representative, non-
mathematical methods and styles of thinking and concomitant persons be explained 
within our perspective? What does it stand for, what culture is expressed by it? 
What form of habitus are we dealing with?   
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The omniferous Use of economic Thinking 
 
Before we tackle these questions, we come back to the question of economic 
perspicacity. ‘Recognised’ and ‘non-recognised’ students tend not only to be 
distinguishable by the fact that they use concepts effective in academic Economics, 
but also that they extend the use of these concepts beyond their narrow field 
origin. 
In that sense, one of the surest signs of being a ‘recognised’ student, of the 
successful internalisation of lingua economica, is the elaborate use of economic 
vocabulary and thinking in ‘personal’ aspects such as political preferences or one’s 
own study choice, like Jan (57) does: 
 
I: […] of course I weighed [the alternatives] when I did the decision [to study 
Economics], for one it interests me. 
T: Hm. 
I: Ah, what can I do after that? I mean what concretely do you do after that? Of 
course this is the hardest thing to comprehend when making your choice of 
study, because somehow there is something written there, also on the [web] 
pages of the university. But this is nevertheless fuzzy, right? I mean they then 
write […] do ‘this and that’ but this wasn’t so tangible. Aannd, third I of course 
also thought ‘can I live from it or not?’, I mean it was clear to me I wanted to 
have something from which I, ahm, I don’t want to be rich. That is not important 
to me in my study choice. 
T: Hmh. 
I: But I in any case somehow want, well, to safeguard the future, and don’t want 
to have total anxiety and insecurity that I find a job and then just do something 
which does not make any fun for me. I mean it was this area of tension. In any 
case, these were the things I totally thought about in these days. How I exactly 
came to Political Economy I don’t know, but it was a part of the things that 
interest me. Then I have, to consider whether Political Economy really is a 
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possibility for me, ah maybe I should go a step back, I mean I knew that I am 
interested in the Humanities, well, Social Sciences. 
T: Hmh. 
I: That is, questions that deal with society, with, with people in society. 
Therefore also like Political Science, Sociology, Psychology was also in it [clears 
his throat], were things that also interested me. 
T: Hmh. 
I: On the other hand I always very much liked Math in school. Aahm, I also was 
quite good in it, and I liked it to apply Mathematics. I knew that the Natural 
Sciences interested me, but that I didn’t want to do this that intensively for 
several years, Physics, Bio[logy], Chemistry. I could eliminate that for myself, 
could also eliminate Informatics. I could eliminate Languages, Literature, things 
like that. Even if it was interesting, it somehow wasn’t really my thing, I mean 
somehow Social Sciences really was the thing where I knew this is what really 
interests me. Exactly, there Political Economy was a Social Science. I mean I see 
it as a Social Science, a Gesellschaftswissenschaft. Then I borrowed a book from 
the city library, an introductory book, some book, and read it in the tram to see 
what it really concretely means [to study Economics], what you do there.  
Ah, this I found interesting, some things I didn’t understand, but the questions I 
found exciting and I also liked the relatively clear style of reasoning of Political 
Economy. This I liked. Well, and ahm I was aware that if I for example study 
Political Economy, I have better professional chances overall as compared to 
studying Philosophy. Yes, indeed, if you look at it on average, that’s simply the 
way it is.  
 
Notice, in this extract, the technical word that is used to describe Jan’s study 
choice (‘eliminate’), and notice also the reference to ‘exact’ information which 
betrays his style of thought. This is quite similar to Simon (63) - who states as his 
reason for studying Economics and Political Science - that he wanted to ‘understand 
incentives’. Finally, notice the reference to pecuniary safety which tends to be 
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named alongside “fun” or pure interest in the topic by recognised and especially 
insider students100.  Take, as another example, Philipp’s (46) thoughts about the 
minimum wage: 
 
I: There I indeed do not have a closed opinion. I mean earlier I was .. this is such 
a fine line. I mean, I am totally convinced that one needs an incentive system, to 
bring forward the whole of society, and also, to a certain degree, inequality. 
T: Hmh. 
I: But I am also an enemy of an inequality that is too extreme. Therefore I find 
the minimum wage, in itself, .. I mean in regards towards a bit better 
distribution in terms of the whole economy, I think is positive ... But I haven’t 
come to terms with just how strong now the consequences of the interference 
into free market events after all can also be harmful for certain persons or not. 
Or for certain employees or not. 
 
The assessment of the minimum wage here, even though its normative root is still 
visible, is interspersed with economic concepts and thinking (incentive system, 
distribution, interference in the free market). This recommits the interviewee to 
the process of education and scientific training, and displays sharply that there is 
indeed such a thing as pedagogic work, “[…] a process of inculcation which must 
last long enough to produce a durable training, i.e. a habitus, the product of the 
internalization of the principles of a cultural arbitrary capable of perpetuating 
itself after [pedagogic action] has ceased and thereby of perpetuating in practices 
the principles of the internalized arbitrary.” (Bourdieu and Passeron 1990[1970]: 
31). The successful drilling in economic thinking may also be seen in the lightning-
quick distinction some insiders made between ‘personal’ (i.e. the normative) and 
the ‘analytic’ (i.e. the positive) questions, even in matters not directly related to 
                                                           
100 This is in line with statistical evidence presented in chapter 2 where Economics, on average, has 
more ‘extrinsicially’ motivated students than other Social Sciences. 
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academic Economics. So that Jan (57) wraps up his recollection of his route into 
Economics in this way:  
‘Ahm, yeah, I mean this is like the explanation for, for the Social Science. But in 
the end it is just a preference, right? One person somehow doesn’t like 
chocolate, the other one dark chocolate.’  
Elsewhere he speaks of ‘purely personal preferences’. This of course reproduces the 
standard, rigid textbook distinction of facts vs. values, and the acceptance of not 
enquiring scientifically into the latter. Likewise, Niklas (44) introduces his thoughts 
on the economic consequences of the refugee-crisis of 2015 as his ‘personal’ ones. 
What seems to be expressed by this is both humility and scientific aspiration at the 
same time.  
By contrast, this work of internalisation tends not to be acquired, not internalised, 
by the ‘non-recognised’ students. These interviewees often tended to make a 
merely implicit distinction between (public) studies and private life, and also 
tended, due to their lack of investment in the discipline, to have a rather bemused 
take on the struggles within the discipline in which their insider study colleagues 
take part, as Max (20) - who studies for a Master’s degree - describes: 
 
I: Yeah, but as I said, if I see a Keynesian model I cannot see out of it the 
difference, in the mindset101, to a neoclassical model. I, I can’t. 
T: Isn’t that [difference consisting in] security and insecurity? 
I: We learn, in Macro[economics] we get to know models as, ah, as a utility 
function. And then it is derived in such and such a way, in that and that way the 
utility is maximised.  
T: Hm. 
I: And for me it does not follow that there is this homo oeconomicus mindset 
behind it, and there it is not. And, ah, I myself also find that, I can’t, I always 
                                                           
101 Translated from the German ‚Denkweise‘, which might alternatively be a mentality or a mode of 
thinking. 
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see it a bit, as I said, many people probably see that different from me, but I see 
it as well, ah, how should I put it? Ahm. I can’t, here at the uni, we are all young 
now, and we all have a bit of idealism yet, and we also want to commit to 
something. 
T: Hmh. 
I: But I don’t see the benefit to come to grips with what a neoclassical model is 
or where, so to speak, the limits of the neoclassical model are, and where not. 
That is also quite a, well, for me this is not in the foreground. Nah! 
T: What is in the foreground for you? 
I: Ahh, I have so to speak, how should I put it? If I now study Political Economy 
here, I don’t have a great vision. […] this might sound a bit flat, just thinking 
around a bit, but I always see it this way. I have my tasks, and I see it as a 
puzzle, and I have fun in solving this puzzle. 
T: Yes. 
I: But, ah, whether this state now has stark consequences for society or not, or 
whether one has to fight for a Keynesian model or for a neoclassical model, I 
think to myself ‘well, we can’t change that anyways, this, ah, will take its 
course’, and therefore I have to solve the puzzle I’d say.  
T: [laughs]: This sounds quite hopeless, one might say. 
I: Yeah, sounds like it. Yeah, I know, I know. I know, but yeah, that is my view. I 
have, I also think that you don’t always need to have the ambition to change 
something when you study, to change the world, but I see it, yeah, as I said, I 
don’t have a great vision, for my studies. 
T: You are rather pragmatic. 
I: Yes! You can call it like this, yeah. Seen from a more positive side. Yes, it’s 
true, I know, I know [slightly chuckles], yeah. That’s the way it is. 
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Indeed, as Bourdieu states, for those not invested in the game the field-specific 
struggles seem pointless and rather ridiculous (Bourdieu 1988: 778-80). It follows 
that his stance on a political project like the minimum wage is rather free of formal 
economic considerations, and has the characteristic of a ‘naked’ opinion: 
 
T: And what’s the matter with the minimum wage? That is after all always a 
controversial debate among Economists- 
I: Ahm, .. my position towards it? Ahm, I think that you don’t hurt the Economy 
much with 8,50 Euro [minimum wage per hour in Germany at time of the 
interview]. I also don’t want to say, somehow ‘All people should now get, don’t 
know, at least, 15 Euro or whatever.  
T: Hm. 
I: But, a minimum wage of 8,50 Euro I think that doesn’t hurt, you can do it once 
in a while with a clear conscience. There are so many people here who, don’t 
know, need to have two, three jobs. There I find it ok, to work in some shipping 
centres or in some meat plants where only people from Eastern Europe are 
employed because they don’t take so much money. That I find ok when you have 
8,50 Euro as a minimum wage. Yes. 
T: Most of the Economists are against it, right? […] 
I: Yeah, that may be. 
T: You don’t care about that. 
I: [I] Don’t think, don’t think economically maybe. Think beyond that, no idea, 
maybe ..  
Likewise Jeannette (71) uses her studies as a confirmation of her strong ethical and 
moral concerns. But the two remain nevertheless separated from each other, and 
the former is merely used as a buttress to support the latter, it remains outside of 
the dispositions of the person:  
T: Ok. What is so interesting with Political Economy? 
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I: Hm, you are able to make use of it somehow. If you look at it, as somebody 
who doesn’t work in a company yet, or who didn’t have to do anything with a 
company yet. Political Economy, you can make a use of it, because everybody 
knows what it means to be unemployed, or everybody can at least imagine what 
it’s like. You can make much more use of it, where you say ‘Ok, the state buys 
that.’ Because if the state spends money, then you are interested. If a company 
spends money, then, well, then this is rather not so interesting, except you have 
a relationship to this company. 
T: Hmh. 
I: It just appears to be more tangible. You also see it more in your environment. 
Like company politics, well, you have to be in it.  
 
Unlike the view of the ‘recognised’ students, who tend to compare Political 
Economy with other ways of objectifying various forms of economic behaviour, this 
perspective is less contemplative, more straightforwardly geared towards direct 
application. ‘Tangible’ here, then, is not inserted in a web of different abstract and 
competing conceptions of how to view and research human society, but rather as in 
direct comparison with every day experience – and the concept enriches and 
reinforces this experience and thus makes it ‘more tangible’. The same goes for her 
opinion of the idea of a guaranteed minimum income, which is immediately, 
absolutely, vehemently and emotionally rejected on the basis of a common-sense 
judgement (‘nobody will work then anymore’), something which, if at all, the 
recognised and insider students express only on the side (rather feebly), couched by 
rationalised deliberations: 
 
I: Complete bollocks. I mean if I would get money for just being there, and it is 
not this minimum need  as it is with Hartz IV [German version of jobseekers 
allowance], but should [be], well, a good income after taxes actually. I mean 
nothing where you would say you are super-rich but I don’t need to go to work 
there any more. 
189 
 
T: But that’s nice. 
I: Yes, of course, it’s nice, but what does that bring the country? Because if I 
only go to work to be able to have a more expensive vacation, then there is 
nothing in it for the economy, then the economy collapses. Doesn’t work in my 
opinion, it has to be produced and if not I don’t want to know what the company 
will have to pay to produce foodstuff. And foodprices of course [will] rise and 
everything. And then the basic minimum income increase, what everyone has to 
get. And that is a vicious circle, that won’t work, no way, and I also find it 
totally insane to actually get such an idea. 
 
It becomes clear here how the introduction into the game of academic Economics 
also includes a specific requirement to work on a refinement, the ‘control of 
instinctual, visceral urges’ that, in so many yet different ways, characterises 
established culture in different fields (Bourdieu 1984[1979]: 34-41). But even if 
these signs of refinement are there, vigilance is still called for. Someone like Jack 
(33), for example, at first sight seems to be a counterexample for the relationships 
postulated here. He does not come from an engineering or teacher background, and 
neither is he ‘recognised’ in any way in Economics. Nevertheless he scores 
surprisingly high in the ‘Recognition Index’ above. Moreover, he uses words like 
‘model’ rather frequently. On closer inspection, however, it becomes clear that the 
usage of his words is a rather distancing one – for example, he almost always uses 
indicative adjectives when talking about Economics concepts:  
 
T: […] were there also areas in your study that you actually didn’t like […] ? 
I: Yeah, I mean, in the first [semester] we had accounting, I found that 
interesting, and in the second semester we had it again, and I realised that it is 
nothing for me. […] Other than that everything was fun, also all the Political 
Economy subjects, it was great fun. 
T: Hm. 
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I: I mean this is all super interesting- 
T: Yeah? 
I: Exactly.  
T: Why, what is so interesting for you there? 
I: Yeah I find, I mean, Macro[economics], when we learned that, one understands 
now much more all these economic political things, like what repercussions a 
minimum wage has for the labour market. Before it was like [imitates voice] 
‘yeah, minimum wage is something positive-‘ 
T: It is something positive, isn’t it? 
I: Exactly, yeah, but then, you realise, when you had these Macro[courses] and 
all that, had a look at these models, and, you understand it simply better and 
can think your way into it, exactly. 
 
While formally exhibiting many signs of approval and enjoyment, on a closer look 
Jack’s account is one characterised by distancing and bears witness more to his 
comprehensive wish to agree with the interviewer. This might be so because his 
lower class migrant background (his parents immigrated to Germany from Asia) and 
habitus propels him to a sort of pre-emptive obedience.102  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
In this chapter I tried to explore the ‘performative’ differences between 
‘recognised’ vs. ‘non-recognised’ Economics students. I explored and probed how 
they construct their educational trajectories up to the point of the interview, what 
                                                           
102 This, however, might also be reinforced by the rather pronounced social gradient between 
interviewer and interviewee in this case, which made for a rather awkward interview altogether.   
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kind of divisions and tools they use to do that and with what specific experiences 
and events they link their decisions and intellectual formation. Recognised students 
as defined above can be distinguished empirically not only by their more highly 
probable use of economic concepts and words - their economic ‘perspicacity’ - but 
also by their general narratives. These include a construction of early exposure to 
economic thinking and issues which creates a view and self-view (and hence a 
symbolic effect) of inevitability103, of fit with the discipline and position one holds 
and the positions one prospectively might hold. All of this seems to represent an 
institutionalisation of an identity, that of a ‘legitimate Economist’. But it also 
reveals a less polished, more ‘normative’ dimension in which the chosen and 
selected students show the influence of very ‘mundane’ and rather ‘normative’ 
experiences and assessments on their selections. Their mostly early preference for 
what they perceive as technical, ‘clear’, and straightforward reasoning contrasts 
with techniques they experience as fuzzy, imprecise or as ‘blathering’. They clearly 
link these methods of enquiry to specific persons or groups (fellow pupils, students, 
colleagues at internships or civil service, teachers) for which they feel antipathy, 
which they have a clear disposition to objectify. In doing so, they clearly position 
themselves both morally and scientifically, in a specific field for which they, unlike 
the non-recognised and non-recognising, seem to have the appropriate 
predispositions early on.  
 
It might be said that the taste for topics and ways of enquiry (as well as the 
associated agents) that are perceived as ‘clear’, ‘unambiguous’, ‘logical’ and 
‘tangible’, as ‘no nonsense’, with ‘rhyme and reason’ leads these students early on 
towards a taste for general economic questions, and against topics and areas that 
are more ‘cultural’ or more ‘natural scientific’. Experiencing success earlier rather 
than later with this in his studies (the ideal-typical recognised, and especially 
insider student, is male), he feels motivated to stay in the discipline. His 
incomprehension of other approaches, never pronounced in any case, successively 
                                                           
103 This leaves open both deterministic and voluntarist interpretations in the spirit of ideologies of 
talent, the direct pointing towards which is tactfully skipped by the insiders – a clear sign of 
command of the academic art of subliminal allusion by way of lacunae.  
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hardens through the semesters and years into a proper world view, an entrenched 
perspective as regards his own personality as the ‘honest’, ‘scientific’, ‘positive’ 
(as opposed to ‘normative’) and ‘strict’ (as opposed to ‘lax’, ‘fuzzy’), anti-
metaphysical fact-finder. One Economics professor I interviewed seems to reflect 
all of this very well, when reminiscing about his study days and general experience 
with subjects other than Economics: 
 
I: Philosophy I simply found terrible. 
T: Why? 
I: That was so boring. […] I have made several attempts in my life to read 
Heidegger. I think that this ‘Time and Being’ such a great, imperial title. I find 
that great, but . I cannot find access to it at all. This is like a sort of artistic 
poet’s language that somehow makes sense in itself but where you can’t, 
nowhere, like [sighs] .. somehow logical or somehow, or somehow mathematical 
[getting louder] or somehow get access to it. I think. […] I still think that I 
wouldn’t want to study Philosophy, because Philosophy is what remained after all 
interesting disciplines pulled out, like a one-pound shop. […] Or Bourdieu [sighs], 
it is to run away.  
T: Yeah? 
I: I find. It’s just [sighs] boring ramblings about words, you don’t get, you can’t 
tackle properly, what do they really mean? 
T: Hm, hm. 
I: I, I can’t take it, somehow. 
T: This is too fuzzy somehow? 
I: Or Foucault. I have, but. Apparently he wrote something about power. But so 
general that one doesn’t know at all does he mean power over or absolute 
power, you, you [more enraged] don’t know at all what he means. And then he 
can secrete some smart-sounding sentences [sighs]. I think this is sham-science, 
partly.   
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Such a stance is materially and symbolically supported by acts of recognition from 
the discipline and its representatives, and it encourages these students to see their 
own selection as justified and scientifically correct. Bit by bit, the economic 
epistemology transforms the susceptible habitus of the successful-‘recognised’ and 
academically prone Economics student. The more or less round-the-clock exposure 
to this specific epistemology in libraries, seminars, supervision meetings, 
conferences and so on, tends to universalise the grip of it over its bearer. What had 
been make-shift words and concepts, attached immediately to discernible values 
and feelings and experiences - such as clear, unambiguous, exact - become 
rationalised, hidden really in words like efficient, effective, model, and the 
concepts and theories assembled from them. The specific interests are dissolved 
and transubstantiated into a new aggregate phase, hidden from its bearers. Reasons 
(to study Economics) that were attached to causes become rationalised reasons that 
invite approval or rejection as such. They have become objective, objectified, 
inscribed into persons who in turn re-apply the conceptual armoury, as cognitive 
tools, to institutions and to the available stock of thinking and knowledge, which 
produces the time and history of the discipline (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992: 137-
40).   
 
But if there is an ‘ontological complicity’ (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992: 128f.) 
between these ‘recognised’ students and the discipline they study, what does it 
consist of? In other words, what is the incarnated history of recognised students, 
and how is it transformed into support for the ‘economic way’ of thinking? And in 
any case, could there not be different ontological complicities, different histories 
that lead to these selections? In the following chapters, I will attempt to connect 
the perceptions back to habitus and thus social origin traits of the students. What 
are the various meanings of these selections of Economics? I will attempt to 
distinguish, in an ideal-typical way, three different, incarnated histories that can 
be found in my sample and which lead to a similar choice to invest oneself in 
Economics. This might help to explain why Economics tends to attract specific 
students, and tends to retain a specific epistemology and view of man (Kapeller 
2008).  
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Lastly, I wish to underscore the differences to the approaches criticised in the 
foregoing chapters. What this chapter has suggested empirically, at least if seen in 
a Bourdieusian light, is that intradisciplinary differences between students are 
generally more subtle than commonly assumed. The ‘recognised’ student shows his 
commitment in his economic perspicacity and the ‘contagion’ of his whole world-
view with economic vocabulary and thinking. The ‘non-recognised’ student, on the 
other hand, tends, at best, to deliver a faint copy of this commitment (such as Max, 
Jack, or Jeanette show). Methodologically, this suggests to distinguish students’ 
attitudes differently rather than by way of simple and obvious self-determination 
via a survey. It also alerts us not to ‘buy’ every display of ‘intrinsic’ interest or 
motivation in the first instance. And why should not the same caution be warranted 
for assessing ‘reflexivity’?    
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Chapter 6 - The Inheritors 
 
[…] the new middle classes are especially open to many cross-pressures, as well as 
to all those other forces that more or less define the structure and atmosphere of 
modern society.  
C. Wright Mills – White Collar 
 
In what follows I will distinguish the interview sample of ‘recognised’ students into 
three ideal-types distinguished by the students’ social class origin and trajectory. 
Obviously, the sample already is pre-selected– this sample, as is the case with the 
whole academic population of German academic Economics, is very “male” and so 
it has to be borne in mind that the resulting class habitus are its distinctive and 
appropriate expressions, which might be shown quite differently where these are 
differently gendered (also of course depending on the subfield in which it finds 
itself). But this was inevitable given the original objectives of the study. What now 
has to be done is to have a closer look at how various class origins and social 
trajectories contribute, via the corresponding perceptions and selections of the 
differing habitus, to the resulting attitudes towards Economics and other academic 
discipline, as well as towards politics and society as a whole. At this point, I 
distinguish logically three routes to the attitudes and standpoints that are 
associated with recognised and insider student: those of the Inheritors, the Fallen 
Nobles, and the Parvenus. I will try to undergird this distinction empirically by 
showing the differences in attitudes that may be interpreted in the data if this 
template is applied. This, as is the case with all ideal-types, will only fit to a 
certain degree, with some students better aligned with these ideal types, with 
others less, and sometimes even not at all. There will also be cases that practically, 
empirically, overlap with more than one ideal-type.  I will try to discuss these cases 
and spell out what they mean theoretically. Eventually I will discuss what would 
have to be done to validate further the distinction taken here on a higher scale, 
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with an improved methodology. In short, what I am attempting here is a sort of 
theoretical induction, ordering the interview sample, which inevitably means 
making choices of what is pertinent vs. what is not – choices that can be criticised 
but which, I content, are nevertheless necessary for any scientific progress. 
 
The Inheritors – A Cadre Category 
 
I put into the category of “Inheritors” all those ‘recognised’ students who have at 
least one parent that studied and graduated at a university, and who come from a 
stable petit-bourgeois to bourgeois background, both in a short- and more long-
term perspective (that is, including their grandparental generation as well), and 
who lastly have excellent or good A-level marks. The grandparents are widely 
dispersed in terms of their professions which range from self-employed craft or 
farming backgrounds, with the grandmothers often having worked as a clerk or 
housewife, to more bourgeois professions such as engineers or teachers, up to a few 
physicians and even one professor at a university. The parental generation, 
however, was more homogeneously trained and we find, above all, many university-
trained teachers (primary or secondary school, often in mathematics or the natural 
sciences) and engineers among them, but also a few lawyers and natural scientists. 
In terms of professional position, quite a few of them accordingly work as civil 
servant teachers at state schools. The engineers especially tend to be self-
employed (as small entrepreneurs), or alternatively work at intermediate positions 
in various middle-sized companies. These are mostly executive positions, although 
sometimes they even teach in these companies. This kind of social origin, situated 
somewhere between the upper and middle class, might be called, following the 
studies of Mills (1956[1951], 1956) and Boltanski (1987), a sort of cadre category. It 
is, however, less obvious to see that there seems also a specific kind of cultural 
capital privileged, namely a rather ’technical‘, natural scientific one. This fits well 
with the data collected on the social origin of German Economists and Economics 
students in chapter 4. This would imply that it is more their relative homology vis-
a-vis other social groups and class fractions in the respective professional universes 
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and social sub-spaces (such as professors and artists for teachers, major executives 
for employed engineers, or big entrepreneurs and companies for the self-employed) 
rather than their absolute similarity of condition of existence that is the unifying 
mark of this group. This might reflect, in a more specified, differentiated way, the 
selection processes taking place in the French higher education system until the 
1980s (Bourdieu 1996[1989]: 57-59), where those selected from lower classes for 
entrance into the elite sections of the system are those with more educational 
capital relative to the rest of the class. Here it could be the relative advantage of a 
specific form of cultural capital that ‘selects’ the recognised, which would mean 
that the statistical categories mostly employed (i.e. university vs. no university 
degree of parents and/or lower, middle, upper class origin) are rather insufficient 
to answer this kind of question for the contemporary academic field. I here 
attribute a primary explanatory force to the precise composition of cultural capital, 
which seems very closely linked to gender.     
 
In sum, considering this rather ambiguous social origin, the group described here 
might best be described as a sort of cadre, understood as a group ambivalent both 
in structure and identity (Boltanski 1987: 1-7). Not quite from haute bourgeois 
origins, these students are nevertheless from relatively privileged backgrounds.104 
However, they remain dominated within the academic field due to their possession 
of non-dominant technical cultural capital.  
 
Characteristics and general Attitudes 
 
The name “Inheritors” is, in my view, justified insofar as these students embody, 
within the sample discussed, to the highest degree, an objective and internalised 
                                                           
104 With these thoughts also goes a certain critique of statistical sources and their assumption of 
social homogeneity – and homogeneity along known, tested lines – of constituted social groups: if 
groups form, they must have a class origin in common, otherwise they wouldn’t form. But for 
Boltanski, groups form along lines that are dynamic and changing, with homogeneity itself being one 
of these dynamic and changing aspects: “Homogeneity is not a necessary and sufficient condition for 
cohesion.” (Boltanski 1987: 31)  
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adaptation to recognised academic Economics105. They are the students who 
overwhelmingly hold tutorships and research assistantships in the most prestigious 
specialisations of Economics (that is, economic theory, macro and micro-
economics), and it is they who tend to score highest in the “Recognition Index” 
developed in the last chapter. That is not to say that all students of the interview 
sample with the aforementioned social background are, or become, Inheritors, but 
rather that the chance of finding students with this background among the 
recognised students with an insider perspective seems extraordinarily great. One 
might therefore propose a connection of this particular cadre background with 
recognition within, and of, academic Economics (as described in chapter 4.2). How 
does this connection appear from the standpoint of these students themselves?  
 
The Inheritors describe the fact that they tend to prefer, from early on, a 
generalist and what might be called logical-naturalistic outlook. They mostly reject 
the study of languages, both in high school and in university – ‘I am super bad in 
English‘, as Hannah (23) admits, or Theo (40) who confesses that ‘languages are not 
my thing, rather the natural sciences.‘ or Mats (51) who describes himself as having 
‘never really [been] a language type of guy‘. 
 
As has already been described in the last chapter, the interest in Economics tends 
to be constructed particularly early on (constructed both in the interview and in 
actual reality), in conjunction with a tendency to reject other Social Sciences and 
Humanities as ‘fuzzy‘ or ‘imprecise‘ as opposed to the ‘clear‘ and ‘tangible‘ form 
of argument within Economics, while Natural Sciences are perceived as ‘too 
abstract‘. There is, furthermore, a quite strong demand for a ‘secure job‘ as well 
as a ‘proper salary‘, probably more so in terms of exhibited attitudes than with 
recognised students from other disciplines (see chapter 2).   
 
                                                           
105 Notice that this implies a dynamic, flexible notion of the term – see the foregoing footnote. 
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In terms of the generalist and natural scientific aspirations, the inheritors have 
these in common with more petit-bourgeois students. What distinguishes the former 
from the latter is perhaps an arguably better fit to the requirements of the field, 
and hence the chances of success. This tends to foster a rather relaxed, sovereign 
attitude towards one’s own subject. Peter (9) therefore shows a very playful 
attitude towards academic Economics, something which he elsewhere calls an 
enjoyment of being able “to fiddle about”. One can see that this, at least here, 
goes hand in hand with a defence of the prevailing methodology of the discipline: 
 
I:[…] and that means you can either believe that the world is like this, that there 
are atoms that are like this. Or you can think that [higher voice, in English] you 
know, maybe there are no atoms, but a, a model that pretends as if there are 
models can describe the world quite nicely, and can be quite useful, right? I 
mean this is this basic effect. Ahm. 
T: That is- 
I: While in the, I mean, what economic theory is, is instrument[al], or what 
economic entities are instrumental, instrumental things, right? They are just 
good, maybe there is no demand curve, but- 
T: You mean in the minds of the people, when they make their decisions? 
I: Yes, yes. I mean in general maybe you don’t have, have no [in English] budget 
line and indifference curves and whatever. Maybe that’s not the case, right? But 
a model that pretends as if these things existed may tell us ever so many, so 
interesting things, right? And as soon as you put back this point [step], and say 
‘well, everything is as if’ […] That’s how it is, right? I mean if, if people act 
economically rational then this is good and true. Good, right? And I think the. the 
the big problem is when people are not taught this distance, right? This distance 
between what is the model and what is reality, and, when people confuse model 
and reality, right […]. I mean I don’t know, that is why the biggest advantage 
that you can draw from it, that you, get from Philosophy, that you learn to take 
this step back, right? You go away from what is given and have a look at it. And 
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think about it ‘ok, let’s pretend as if, and then think further’. […] You take 
certain assumptions, and tinker so long until you have something that you like, 
right? I mean it’s like .. like, like chess, right? Chess has no reference to reality. 
You have a couple of rules, and then you play. And the game is either fun, or 
not, and you can be good, and you can be bad. Hh? The same with Economics. 
Ahm. 
T: Ok. Economics is like chess. Because- 
I: Aeh. You can do Economics like chess. It is, I don’t have a problem with that. 
The sovereign relationship to the subject might be seen in the rather theoretical, 
abstract disciplinary preferences these students take vis-à-vis all other students. It 
implies a creative possibility that is only acquired by internalisation of the specific, 
recognised logic of Economics – a capability to act rather than to merely reproduce 
statements of academic recognition, to manipulate the given instruments of 
production and perception, at least within the economic logic- which of course 
means to do so legitimately, thus finding the likely approval of German Economics 
professors, these representatives and embodiments of the discipline’s 
requirements. It also implies a naturalised ambition. One may also see in it a 
(rather theoreticist) justification for actively ignoring actual social and economic 
reality under the guise of avoiding the confusion of model and reality. Aaron (74), 
who is, like Peter, another particularly ‘precocious’ inheritor – due to his excellent 
Bachelor results he was able to skip the whole Master degree and is now a PhD 
student, still in his early 20’s, at a very prestigious German Economics department - 
records his preference for this: 
 
I: But on the other hand, I mean through my Phd […] I don’t have to do much 
[any more] with field experiments and I don’t know what, through that, I mean 
this is not my direction, I mean I will work more theoretically. […] 
T: Why is this not your direction, like? It is exciting after all, you go into the field 
and all. 
201 
 
I: Yeah, yeah of course, I mean there are certainly exciting effects, yeah, but, 
you can find them out, but to be honest this is, in many areas this is again too 
fuzzy for me I have to say, eh? 
T: Hm. 
I: I mean, I would like to, when I have to do an experiment […] have a relatively 
clear statement, whether this has a causal connection or not, yes. 
T: Hm. 
I: Only correlations .. don’t find that that exciting and also the way to work, I 
mean, I like to engage in, ahm, like, mental work. I mean the other stuff is 
mental work, too, but let’s say if I draft an experiment, then .. a part of it is, 
ah, the construction, right? 
T: Hm. 
I: I would say it is a, it is a third of the work, overall, .. Alas! If at all. Maybe 
15%, 15% of the work to develop the idea, and then the methodology. But then 
you already have 80% for, ahm, I mean this is 80% of your success. At least. Yeah, 
I mean. 
T: That is decisive. 
I: Yes, yes, exactly, that is absolutely decisive, effectively. […] And if I now work 
theoretically, then I say ok, that what I do all the time, to furnish proof and so 
on, that basically is the main part and for that I probably use my main time. And 
then I write the paper and that is again somehow, also again 10%, yeah. I really 
have devoted the main part of my time for what actually is the decisive thing. 
[…] And that I find quite nice.     
One may see here the recurrence of the clear-fuzzy dichotomy, this time within the 
subject. This time it is experimental research that is dismissed as ‘fuzzy’ in favour 
of ‘clear’, abstract theoretical constructions. One may also clearly see the taste for 
producing novel, generalising, abstract, directive and hence distinguished  (and 
therefore ‘adventurous’ and gratuitous, see Bourdieu and Passeron 1979[1964]: 
14f.) economic knowledge. It is a knowledge that sets viewpoints and aspires to 
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direct practical efforts. Inheritors deal with prestigious and large-scale subjects 
like the financial crisis, the environment, or human preferences in various 
situations, how growth emanates, and they do so mostly within the accepted 
technical, causal, model-making and rather comprehensively theoretical style for 
which (German) academic Economics is known (see again the last section of chapter 
4). This difference between the general and the particular (or between theory and 
empirical application) is the particular modus in which this generality is expressed 
with many Inheritors, namely that of the formalistic, causal reasoning within 
models. One may see this interest with Jan (57) as well, who, at one point, tried to 
specialise in environmental Economics but was, in part, repelled from it due to a 
professor who ‘mixes up’ values and scientific practice too much in his view: 
 
I: Hmm. I found there was a blending of normative and positive questions. I don’t 
find that nice if one deals with normative questions. But if one sells it a bit as a 
positive question, and has in the back of one’s mind ‘I would like to protect the 
environment’, if that resonates in there from the very beginning, I find that 
totally tainted. One should, after all, try to distinguish that clearly. That was one 
what, what I a bit, where I had the impression, but this was not the only reason. 
I simply found his research not so exciting, but this indeed is a subjective 
attitude. Yeah. 
T: And for you. Environmental Economics, what does it make so exciting for you, 
this topic? 
I: Ah, I find it very exciting because the environmental problem - I mean that of 
climate change, the changes of the earth - I think that is probably one of the 
greatest challenges of mankind. And at the core of it is an economic problem, 
right, it is about scarce resources, that is Economics. […] And that I found very 
exciting. Yeah, and I also found that in my studies. Above all I was surprised 
when I saw the models, these complicated Macro[economic]models that [his 
supervisor professor] uses. With exactly these models one can answer these 
questions really well and think about how this can take place in the future. I 
found that very interesting. […] 
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T: So for example, I dunno, how much growth causes how much temperature of 
global warming or what, or -? 
I: Yeah, one may look into models how pollution takes place, and how for 
example quality of life deteriorates. In this way you can model, you can see that 
there might be either coordination problems, because today they don’t think 
about tomorrow, that is the main problem. That is such an intergenerational 
external effect. 
T: Yeah yeah, ok. 
I: And that one you can then incorporate. You can think, what does sustainability 
mean, there is a lot of definitions, it isn’t clear. But you can take any of them 
that you can mount in, you can think, ah, if you don’t do anything, if the state 
doesn’t do anything, is there sustainability? Maybe you see that this is not the 
case and you can think what national politics is there. Taxes, CO2-trading 
systems or somehow regulation, you can compare that. So there you can, it is in 
any case a model framework in which you may think theoretically about it. On 
the one hand you can explain why pollution takes place, why it is a global 
problem, as it has happened until now. One may try to have a look into the 
future, yeah, with a caveat. And then one may think about possible political 
measures.  
 
There we have, once again, the ambivalence of clinging to very general ideas and 
problems (and hence ambitions) one the one side while conspicuously and almost 
frantically rejecting particular, less mathematically formalised and less 
conspicuously neutral approaches on the other. This may be seen as a specific 
expression of the interest in the general (both psychologically and sociologically 
conceived), that may be observed here, is arguably developing out of specific 
conditions of existence and cultural traits. Here as elsewhere one may see how the 
recognised economic language has become internalised, has become the language 
through which this modified habitus expresses itself, at least within a Bourdieusian 
perspective – notice the frequent and casual use of specific economic notions like 
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preference or external effect, or the adoption of the positive-normative divide 
which is used to enunciate the dissatisfaction with a particular approach that is 
supposedly marred by the presence of a ‘subjective attitude’. It is not whether this 
is true or not that interests me here, but rather the fact that these distinctions are 
used as justified cognitive tools to make sense of the world and of the academic 
world, and to the highest degree compared with the rest of the sample. In other 
words, they are not only used as tools, they are playfully, casually used. They are 
also rather often strictly enforced and hence seem to form a substantial pillar, and 
boundary, of the disciplinary identity that these students adopt. Hence Mats (51), 
when asked to comment on the benefits of a minimum wage for the economy, 
remarks that it is ‘Difficult, I mean, it is of course, it is not my field of study.’ The 
same goes for Theo (40) who professes that ‘[…] if I am not so much into the topic 
[…] I’m always cautious to formulate a strong opinion about it.’ The generalist 
outlook of these inheritors is therefore complemented by a specifically humble 
moment, an attitude of rather conspicuous modesty. It could thus be theorised that 
earlier experiences with what are perceived as ‘fuzzy’ or ‘nebulous’ or ‘vague’ 
approaches or persons is transformed within the context of academic Economics 
and under the guide of a cadre habitus into a sharp distinction between scientific 
versus non-scientific thought, a sort of ethical scientific norm (at least in 
appearance) that, in its specific way, follows Wittgenstein’s maxim:   “Whereof one 
cannot speak, thereof one must be silent.” (Wittgenstein 1995[1922]: 85). However,  
this logic, on the other side, also implicates that with this ‘leap into science’ that is 
achieved by the application of exact, causal thinking and mathematical modelling 
gives the student the right to utter positive truth with ever more self-confidence 
and certainty. Whereof you can speak, thereof you must proclaim. And due to the 
powers of model-building the Inheritors enable themselves to proclaim about a 
whole lot of things, which then, at least potentially, overcomes the self-inflicted 
analytical modesty of Economists. Jan (Nr.57) thus has a very well-founded view-
point against the minimum wage: 
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I: Minimum wage, I do have a clear position there. Have to think what I say now 
[…] I am against the minimum wage. Not because I find its goal bad but because I 
believe, well, believing is not 100% security, that it cannot reach the goal in the 
best possible way. The goal is to get more people into earning incomes, higher 
incomes. And I think one can attain these goals by other measures, where you 
don’t have the danger that there are somehow dislocations on the labour 
market. That means that there might be fewer jobs. That is not that clear 
because the studies are so different, but given that, there is this danger that the 
minimum wage leads to less jobs. Why don’t you do it differently, by 
redistributing more or having a negative income tax a la Friedman, which has no 
direct effect on the job market, and, the minimum wage doesn’t help at all 
those who do not have a job, those who are the poorest, those who do not have 
incomes. […] you can achieve the goal [of helping the poor] differently than 
harming the companies. Because this can lead to lack of demand for work by the 
companies […]. 
 
Karl (52) argues for a minimum wage, but within a similar logic:  
 
I: I am a big fan of the minimum wage, yeah. Less out of socio-political 
considerations, but rather out of a pure, I mean a really economic reflection, 
because we Economists always say the markets are perfect, and if the markets 
are perfect then a minimum wage really’s a disruptive element, because it 
indeed distorts the productivity wage, but if one looks deeper into the labour 
market, then one will find that it is not optimal, and especially in those areas 
where wages are paid that were beneath the minimum wage, these are 
characterised precisely through the fact that you don’t have proper competition 
there. But I have a strong concentration of power on the side of employers, 
especially with security jobs, simple services, care sector, ah, where I see their 
employees are not free to decide whether they, what employer they choose, 
yeah. And there a minimum wage protects in various ways, simply, I mean it 
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prevents utilisation and .. exploitation of these employees, because, but because 
this market does not run perfectly, then this market imperfection is 
suspended106. And now with regards to public finance we don’t have the effect 
anymore that full-time posts are subsidised via ah, via the state, via job seekers’ 
allowance. At least not for singles.  
 
Both students argue rather mechanistically, rigidly, even though with different 
inflections. Indeed, it might be quite surprising to see that the general socio-
political or political leaning of the recognised inheritors of this sample is, at first 
sight, surprisingly broad in its spectrum, given the impressions one has of a rather 
‘economically liberal’ professoriate as a whole (e.g. Frey, Humbert, and Schneider 
2007). Inheritors like Simon (63) confess that they might vote ‘perhaps eventually 
even left’, meaning the German left party, whereas Hannah (23) confesses her ‘left 
leanings’. And Ben (68) even brings in the possibility of supporting the 
nationalisation of key industries. On a second look, however, it can be seen that 
this superficial view would be distorting the attitudes of students quite a bit. 
Someone like Samuel (60) for example, while confessing his preference for Social 
Democracy as ‘politically most convincing’, leaves little doubt what kind of 
interpretation of that term he has in mind:  
 
I: […] Also in terms of economic policies, but also in all these other areas. If you 
have a look who achieved something good in the last years, that it is the SPD 
[Social Democratic Party]. I think.  
T: Yeah? But man, they have pushed through this agenda 2010 [comprehensive 
welfare deregulation policy programme executed under Chancellor Schröder from 
2003 onwards]. There was a lot of critique for that. 
                                                           
106 I here prefer a more technical term to the literal translation which would be “cushioned” 
[“abgefedert”], which seems to me not quite to transport the ‘spirit’ in which this word is uttered. 
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I: Yeah, could talk about that longer, ah. 
T: [laughs] 
I: I am for the agenda 2010, I mean. 
T: Yeah? 
I: Not in all facets, ok, but .. but what they achieved with that is in any case to 
decrease structural unemployment with that somehow. 
T: Aha. 
 I: That is huge progress. .. Yeah and they have retained the state’s ability to act 
[…].    
 
Aaron (74) professes a similar stand: 
 
I: Ahm, but for example in earlier times I found the SPD under Gerhard Schröder, 
I found that very good. Yeah. Ahm, I mean the agenda 2010 was, I think, the best 
that could happen to Germany, and I found that a very, very great achievement 
to bring that through, right? […] 
T: Why, because, because, all these things were purged like, the Welfare System 
and so on. 
I: Yes, exactly, I think it simply helped to make Germany competitive again, 
right? I mean, to become in the following seven years from the sick man of 
Europe, ah, to, to an absolute top-country, you couldn’t foresee that, but, th- 
was reasonable and I think I would see myself in the Seeheim Circle 
[economically liberal and conservative wing of the SPD], that would be relatively 
concrete, but because this is not existent at the moment .. yeah, because, 
because the SPD is led differently at the moment. 
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T: Hm. 
I: I have, ah, I vote very strategically at the moment.  
 
And then of course there are also political preferences that are rather closer to the 
stereotypical view of academic Economists, as with Philipp (46) who voted liberal 
last time and who has ‘a bit more of a conservative touch’ or Lina (47) who situates 
herself ‘not left and not right, probably in the middle’. On the other hand, it is also 
clear that this balance, with a rising degree of selection and recognition, tends to 
vanish in favour of parties that promote economic liberalism.  This may be seen in 
this sample as well, where it is the most recognised students (i.e. those in Micro- 
and Macroeconomics, as well as Economic Policy) and those who are most advanced 
(PhD and secondarily Master students) that have the most markedly liberal views, 
not in any political, but rather in a strictly economic-rational sense. This is the case 
with Jan (57): 
 
I: Ahm, difficult. I mean I wouldn’t say that there is a party that I find super. I 
also wouldn’t somehow position myself on a one-dimensional spectrum left and 
right.  
T: Hmh. 
I: And I have, in principle, difficulties to render verdicts and to say ‘Ah, I find it 
bad what the central bank does or not, precisely because I know there is science 
and the empirical studies and they say there is no unitary answer. I mean this, I 
am not one for this. I, yeah, therefore I am not, not that unambiguous, but one 
must of course choose standpoints, ah, standpoints and then somehow do 
politics. I really find that difficult […] I in any case have already voted for 
specific parties within the classic [political] spectrum that range from, like, left 
to right. […] 
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I:[ …]the minimum wage doesn’t help at all those who do not have a job, indeed 
the poorest, those who do not have an income. […] one may [achieve the goal to 
fight employment poverty] differently, more effectively, without hurting 
businesses somehow. Because this can lead to the fact that businesses don’t 
request these people, and, at the moment with the refugee situation it is of 
course really hard to find jobs for the refugees, ah. Yeah, if the employer has to 
pay 8,50 [€] and then there are others that speak better German, then 
entrepreneurs have [a reason for not hiring them], except when they are totally 
altruistic and [I] find it great when the entrepreneur [is altruistic], but I think 
most simply want to save costs and would like to have employees that contribute 
most to reaching their goals […] 
 
What does this mean? On the one hand, what it seems to express is a certain 
distance from established politics, certainly in comparison to the inheritors of other 
Social Sciences such as Sociology, a distance that is arguably there from the very 
start, at least with this ideal-type, and which tends to be compounded by the 
conspicuously neutralising mainstream curriculum of the subject with its sharp 
distinctions between positive vs. normative facts, its strict mathematization and 
causal reasoning. Of course this distance does, in its complex qualifications and 
conditions as well as its uniqueness, signify a form of ‘personal opinion’ (Bourdieu 
1984[1979]: 414-17) which overlaps here with a special claim to grasp ‘impersonal 
facts’ that marks the backbone of the arguments preferred by  recognised 
Economics students, and is thus the source of a socially and economically 
recognised, thus psychologically rewarding, identity. This no doubt is the case too 
in other (social) sciences, with other recognised students and their specific 
‘interests in disinterestedness’ (Bourdieu 2006: 51). 
 
And like them, Economists too, at least those who are most ‘recognised’, tend to 
develop a critical stance towards political parties, one which they often forcefully 
push into the public realm (one may note, in the German case, the rather numerous 
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pleas that have appeared from the profession in the last decades, as for example 
comments on the common currency area, the need for labour market reforms, or 
the stances taken on the Euro crisis). These claims are possible because their 
expertise is wanted and, to a certain degree, respected by politicians and a wider 
public which welcomes expertise and the symbolic weight that comes with the 
formalised prestige of academic Economics (Fourcade, Ollion, and Algan 2015). On 
the other hand what these quotations also show is essentially a very high 
responsiveness to political questions of many kinds, a sensibility to take these 
problems seriously and to address them rather directly, in a language easy to 
understand by politicians. This is unlike disciplines like Sociology which tend to 
more radically and readily challenge political goals and language (which does not 
mean that it is necessarily more scientific just because of that). Despite their lofty 
models, or precisely through them, the inheritors are somehow very close to the 
political conversation, whatever they might say of themselves. We remember 
Samuel’s fascination with the ‘cool motherfuckers’ of politics, the Varoufakis and 
Fulds of this world (see last chapter). This can be interpreted as an expression of 
their essential ambivalence within this specific field. It consists in a tension 
between claims to extreme forms of ‘neutrality’ that co-exist with visible and 
direct attachments to political questions and political language. One can show one 
side of this ambivalence with reference to statistics (see Figures 11 and 12)107, 
when students are asked to situate themselves politically on a left-right spectrum 
with respect to what they assume to be the general position of ‘the people’. 
Compared to a discipline like Sociology with its comparatively ‘radical’, rather 
leftist, framework, Economics and Political Economy traditionally tend to be 
conspicuously ‘neutral’ when it comes to political positionings, with most of their 
answers converging in the middle categories of this spectrum, which includes don’t 
know answers108, and only a small minority openly situating themselves either right 
                                                           
107 These graphs are not true to scale because there is missing data for the year 2000. 
108 These ‘don’t knows’ can also mean abstention from having an opinion, and their rise over time 
would correspond to the ideas developed above about the consequences of a radical expansion of 
the educational system. This interpretation would make the answer sociologically analogous to 
voting and opinion polls (Bourdieu 1993[1984]: 158-67) 
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or left.109 Clearly, then, politics in Economics has a different connotation than in 
Sociology.    
 
Figure 11   Development of left-right Self-Positioning of Sociology Students over 
the last 30 Years110 
 
 
 
                                                           
109 No doubt we must bear in mind that this is a ‘representative’ sample, and thus as such not 
comparable with my own very selected sample of recognised students. Nevertheless, it is adequate 
when applied in this perspective. But this, then, begs the question for the sociological meaning of all 
the other students’ answers. I shall come back to this point in my conclusion.  
110 Source: KSS 
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Figure 12   Development of left-right Self-Positioning of Political 
Economy/Economics Students over the last 30 Years111 
 
Surely, it has been shown that the intellectuals as a whole group exhibit a form of 
ambivalence, springing from the fact that they are a dominated group within a 
dominant class (Bourdieu 1984[1979]: 283-93). But how to make sense of this 
specific form of ambivalence? We must attempt to link their humble ambition, their 
interest in politics via conspicuously unpolitical methods, to their social origin. In a 
way the inheritors tend to gravitate to what C.Wright Mills asserted as the political 
indifference of the middle classes about 60 years ago: “They are strangers to 
politics. They are not radical, not liberal, not conservative, not reactionary; they 
                                                           
111 Source: KSS 
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are inactionary; they are out of it.” (Mills 1956[1951]: 328). But is no longer true 
that groups of this ‘politically indifferent’ cadre-type “[…] are detached from 
prevailing political symbols but have no new attachments to counter-symbols.” 
(ibid.: 326). Within Economics at least, they have found a way of expressing a 
peculiar kind of political stance that may be called ‘conservative’ in a peculiar, 
specific sense of the protection of liberal values (such as meritocracy), to be 
distinguished from ‘conservative’ in a more ordinary sense (see Stigler 1959). 
 
Mills also comments that – “Fewer individuals manipulate things, more handle 
people and symbols.” (ibid.: 65). In fact, it is precisely the great transformation in 
the professional structure from predominately manual to ‘spiritual’ tasks that might 
have provided these Economics students, and possibly substantial numbers of 
academic Economists as well, with powerful tools. These tools are powerful both 
for themselves and for agents outside of their field in developing, if not a coherent 
political position, then at least a considerable political effect. Moreover, this is 
precisely due to the overlap between the internal reasons supplied by Economists 
and external reasons of politicians, lobbying-groups and the like. This amounts to 
saying that the neoliberal power arrangement draws considerable symbolic 
consecration, and thus conservation, from cultivating hitherto more politically 
ambivalent fractions of intellectuals. It does so by furnishing them with specific 
possibilities of expressing their particular structural ambivalences, such as orthodox 
neoclassical Economics. This only works so well because of the belief in objectivity 
and neutrality that is obtained during disciplinary socialisation, and which masks 
the political implications and appropriations of these forms of Economics.   
 
It is the belief in one’s objectivity in general, which would be a result and cause of 
one’s sociodicy of specific privilege through the selection processes in Economics, 
and which, in turn, might give these positions their particular, objectively political 
punch. Since Economists have historically been rather dominated within the 
German academic field (as we have seen in chapter 4.2), is it therefore so 
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surprising that the intellectual products and position-takings that emerge from this 
position attract the approval of those dominant outside of that academic field (and 
vice versa!)? Rather than cynicism or stupidity as causes or reasons for this, it might 
be more adequate, therefore, to speak of a specific, socially caused propensity for 
self-delusion. How to explain it sociologically? 
 
Economism I – An explanatory Attempt 
 
We might try to summarise in an analytic schema (Figure 13) what we know about 
the motivations, selections and attitudes of the Inheritors. In how far might it be 
related to a particular social origin? I here define as economism all attitudes that 
prefer narrowly conceived economic arguments and assumptions in questions of 
analysing social phenomena over other, and possibly broader, conceptions.     
 
Figure 13   Proposed Relationship between Cadre Class Origin, Habitus, and 
Selection of Mainstream Economics 
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Ambivalence
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Sphere of 'subjective' motivations
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This schema obviously is very much simplifying in the sense that it obliterates the 
relational, or structural, aspect, both of the class origin and the motivations and 
attitudes of the students, both of which are situated in fields of different 
conditions of existence, resulting dispositions, and choices that these dispositions 
guide. But it might help to construct the connection between a specific social 
origin, or trajectory and perceptions and preferences of method and discipline  
within formalised mainstream Economics. This might contribute to understanding a 
social process presumably central in the (re-)production of academic Economics, at 
least in Germany. The Inheritors are born into conditions on the boundary between 
bourgeois and petit-bourgeois living conditions. Having not quite the cultural or 
economic capital of the upper classes, but certainly being better equipped than 
petit-bourgeois students, the predispositions developed are ambiguous (which does 
not necessarily mean cleft). There is a concern for dealing with the general and the 
pure, the ‘big questions’ of the time like national politics, economic crises or the 
nature of political systems. On the other hand, this sense is refracted through 
preference for rather ‘technical’ methods and indeed world-views which seem 
formed and informed by the initial impression of different kinds of rationality 
operative in various school subjects, such as languages or the Humanities which 
fellow pupils of presumptively more bourgeois origin, or at any case with more 
cultural capital, have inherited with greater ease. The initial cadre-habitus tends to 
lead to assessments of experiences that corroborate it, and thus compound it. Bit 
by bit, what had been perceived as ‘fuzzy’ or ‘imprecise’ in secondary school 
transforms into knowledge that is dismissed as ‘anecdotal’ or even ‘normative’ 
under the impression of introductory Economics courses. Under the impression (and 
pressure) of the standardised curriculum, and given the increasingly homogenised 
group and the temptations of success and distinction by excellent marks and first 
academic job, who or what should stop the Inheritor in his active cherishing of his 
particular form of ethnocentrism, in which his initial individualism is buffered by a 
historically grown ‘positive’ philosophy? The process is irreversible (Bourdieu and 
Wacquant 1992: 133f.; also Wacquant 2014: 6-8). There is no way back, only 
forward. The Inheritor has become convinced deeply, through the combined 
pedagogic work of the university, himself and his peers, of his own world-view and 
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its objectivity. There is the generally perceived toughness of the studies, the 
‘ascesis’ allegedly required to endure it – Nicklas (44) for example thinks one needs 
‘to have punch’ to graduate in Political Economy – which resembles the process of 
initiation undergone by elite students at French Grandes Ecoles, the ‘rite of 
institution’ which makes the privileged “[…] experience their privilege as a duty, a 
public service.” (Bourdieu 1996[1989]: 103f.). Surely, this latter privilege is more 
specific or differentiated, as is the resulting nobility (Bourdieu 1996[1989]: 112). 
But the point is that both institutions produce specific forms of conviction or belief 
(Bourdieu 1980[1977]).  
  
Via the concerted efforts of objectively aligned habitus, the ambiguity of 
dispositions in general social and educational space (rejection of one kind of forms 
of expression and hence of the forms of social reproduction while affirming another 
form of cultural expression and social reproduction) is transformed, under the 
impression of the existing social structures of educational differentiation, into a 
more rationalised ambiguity where specific kinds of social organisation of economic 
and social affairs, and their inherent power structures and forms of domination, are 
rejected in favour of others, mostly economically liberal ones. The original interest 
is thus superimposed, thus hidden from awareness from both its bearer and his 
commentator. One may see this ambiguity in a few examples: We have already 
shown, in an earlier chapter, Samuel’s admiration for executives and politicians like 
Yanis Varoufakis who is admired as a ‘quite an MC’, as is a famous German Social 
Democratic Politician. On the other hand he also acknowledges his limitations in 
this area: 
 
I: I mean, I ain’t keen on having a politician’s life. 
T: No? 
I: I think it is extremely strenuous. 
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T: Hm. 
I: And I don’t know, in the end you only have power games that you need to be 
mindful of and some intrigues. This only keeps you from working in fact. Also 
takes care then that only people get into these positions who are extremely good 
at these power games and then maybe not those who, who are most savvy in 
something.  
T: Hm. 
I: It is a bit sad.      
  
One wonders whether this Inheritor, son of a medium-level policeman and an 
administrative clerk who studied Psychology, has acquired this ambiguous 
disposition from every-day talks with his parents, when his father, for example, 
might have criticised the newest decision by a minister of the interior to cut the 
amount of available positions with the police force, or this or that scandal within 
the higher officer corps. It would make sense, then, that this fascinated scepticism 
is, under the impression of studying Economics, transformed into a view on the 
state and its dignitaries that is stripped of most of its ‘appearances’, such as its 
altruism, against which the ‘honesty’ of business appears more appealing: 
 
T: I always think then, like a private, a commercial company, they always want 
to make as much dough as possible, like, this is its goal. Ahm, … like a state-run 
supplier … I mean they, well. 
I: But what does a state-run supplier want? 
T: Well, to satisfy a need after all. That is the idea, although they also often 
want to make much dough, right? 
I: I mean these are also the, the .. ok, they of course don’t have that pressure, 
that they often want to line their pockets, but then they have the pressure, they 
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do somehow want to retain their status and expand it, they want to have a big 
company, because it’s simply more awesome to have a big, a big company than a 
small one. They also want to maximise something, and these are not all … 
altruists.  
 
Mainstream Economics, then, offers some sort of convenient, and rather cynical, 
haven of established, recognised sense for this ambiguous vision (think of Public 
Choice theory). The inheritors present themselves as humble persons who mostly 
‘don’t need to be chief executive’, as Jonathan (55) puts it. In his statements on 
political preferences one may again see the essential ambiguity that characterises 
the students of this ideal-type:  
 
I: Yes, I am a very liberal, market-oriented person, I mean … always learned that 
in my studies, nobody could falsify that for me, that markets function quite well. 
T: Hm. 
I: But also with a very strong social component, right, I mean I am somebody who 
… does not like what the FDP [liberal party of Germany, somewhat close in its 
positions to Britain’s Liberal Democrats] sells as liberal, that it … throws the 
weaker into the market. They go down, I should not permit that, as a state I first 
have to, I can only allow the market if I have relatively equal market conditions 
beforehand for the participants, and of course establish hard rules. So that the 
market does not get out of hand, then this may work.  
T: For example? 
I: The education system, I can’t, the children already grow, grow up differently, 
the ones have the state schools, there little money is spent, because the city 
politicians send their children all to private schools, so these schools are 
strangely enough the most beautiful, and the state schools, these are 50-year old 
prefab buildings where nobody even repaired a window in the last 10 years. You 
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may have a look in the city. […] In this schoolsystem, a top performer always has 
been a top performer and is supported, has been since generations. That doesn’t 
work. That is their thing. […] one must establish rules and create equal starting 
conditions before the competition starts and that is exactly what they are not 
doing. And the other [parties] haven’t done [anything], I mean the Greens [Green 
party of Germany], pf, right? … These are also people that want to preserve, 
they also want to preserve the old rules somehow. I mean if I have a look who 
votes Green, these are all people who are home and dry they will rather go to 
hell than to endanger that. 
 
This is borne out by empirical research on ‘mature’ Economists as well, who are 
much more likely to advise a politician than actually becoming one (Frey, Humbert, 
and Schneider 2007: 368)112. On the one hand, there is the rejection of the 
dominant political discourse and its ‘un-masking’ as purely self-interested, 
hypocritical and even cynical. On the other hand: the view that the creation of a 
‘fair competition’ between equals is possible, and in a relatively easy way. It is true 
that this attitude, abstractly speaking, can be interpreted as an attitude of 
intellectuals in general, given their dominated position within the dominant class 
as a whole, one that predisposes them to ‘unmask’ the hypocrisies of the powerful, 
to question the ‘self-evident appearances’ (Bourdieu 1984[1979]: 397).  
 
But with Economists, and with the Inheritors in particular, this unmasking takes on 
a specific direction that might be quite unique relative to other sciences, in the 
sense that the unmasking often involves part of the very same intellectual world of 
which these Economists are a part (namely, the academic field), and in which, 
speaking in terms of internal prestige, they are rather dominated scientifically (or 
at least not dominant, see chapter 4). The creation of a perfect competition in 
one’s thinking and model, the resort to ‘incentives’ and ‘purely economic interests’ 
may seem as a conceptual way out for the Economists in this situation, a way to 
                                                           
112 In a postal survey of German Economics professors undertaken for this project, 73% answer yes to 
the question whether they would take up an advisory role on economic-political grounds, but only 
40% were ready to become finance or economic minister. 
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solve their (arguably) structural, and dispositional, sandwich position. Does the 
structural ambiguity of Economics match with the attitudinal ambiguity of its 
Inheritors anyways? If this is so, could this contribute to explain why “[…] 
economics is always more of a state science and is, as a result, haunted by state 
thinking: being constantly preoccupied with the normative concerns of an applied 
science, it is dependent on responding politically to political demands, while at the 
same time defending itself against any charge of political involvement by the 
ostentatiously lofty character of its formal, and preferably mathematical, 
constructions.” (Bourdieu 2005: 10)?  
 
It is as if these students adopted, and are able to acquire and to develop in this 
particular institutional environment, a stripped down, consciously simplified (their 
opponents would say impoverished) version of the fully accepted, more 
‘ornamental’ and more ‘playful’ rationality that still reigns in other Social Sciences 
and Humanities. Even though they sometimes lament it themselves, they are still 
drawn towards ‘chopping off the branches of the tree’, as Simon (63) calls it. 
Rather than embracing a conception of rationality that encompasses all available 
elements, they reduce it to what is essential (or ‘tangible’) in their view, its 
economic dimension. This is then, in turn, defended in its centrality in all aspects 
following a thorough formalisation and transubstantiation into academic- economic 
terms. These students, then, fight for an equality which resembles, precisely in this 
stripped-down version of fully accepted culture, the meritocracy of the high 
bourgeoisie. It is a sort of transformed Jacobinism. Hence perhaps the tendency in 
the profession for what Sebastian Thieme (2013) has called the ‘misanthropy of 
Economists’, the frequent attacks on jobseekers and ‘shirkers’ who are ‘too lazy’ to 
adapt to economic necessities, as one can see with Aaron’s (74) rejection of both a 
guaranteed minimum income and a minimum wage:  
 
I: The incentive to work then simply falls very, very low for many people. Yeah. 
[…] Then we will get problems in the long term as a society. […] I mean I am 
critical in terms of that, as with the minimum wage by the way. Like this, this 
stuff, I think this is not beneficial, simply.  
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T: Although, minimum wage, the people somehow need to survive. They can- 
I: […] they did that before via topping up [the salaries by the state], in principle 
this was already there. Explicitly, implicitly, a minimum wage, yeah. Which of 
course is not optimal but on the other side you have to say that today, in many 
areas, people, for example from Poland etcetera, are prepared to work for less 
money than Germans. 
T: Hm. 
I: And .. this is a basic attitude which perhaps is a bit misguided. 
T: Yeah. How do you mean, [the basic attitude] of the Germans? Or of the Poles? 
I: Yeah, yeah, right, of the Germans. I think this is partly misguided. I mean I for 
example have in, during school, yeah, have given private tuition, considerably 
below my normal fee simply, because, because it wouldn’t have worked 
otherwise. 
T: Yeah. 
I: But the mother, she had, to feed the family, to be able to afford something, 
she had three [jobs], yeah. 
T: [in English] Hardcore. 
I: Yeah, hardcore. I mean she overall probably put in many hours, without 
exaggerating at all. [The money she earned] probably somewhere was limited. 
But, this you’ve never heard from a German family.  
T: Hm, hm. 
I: I have to say.  
T: And then- 
I: And then there was motivation to offer the kids something and to say […] that 
they should have a better life and they should get their education .. and I work 
an additional amount of time, so that my children get additionally, their 
additional private tuition etcetera, because I can’t give that to them. That is 
quite fascinating and this, ah … I also found it somehow inspiring in my view. 
 
One senses clearly Aaron’s ethical urge for a radical levelling without taking 
account of the different perspectives that economic conditions inscribe into minds. 
And could it not even be argued that disadvantaged children that go to state 
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schools and poor, aspiring immigrants are metaphorical placeholders for these 
young economists to be which express their own position in, and trajectory into, 
academia, and in a fashion which distinguishes them from, say, young Sociologists 
(or at least some of them)? Is not the imagined free (or freer) market a vision of 
society spurred by ‘people with problems’, as Bourdieu says somewhere in 
Distinction? Is this really so much different, sociologically, from competing visions 
in Sociology, Philosophy, or Anthropology?   
 
This specific habitus and its structural, positional roots, may be grasped by drawing 
an analogy with Norbert Elias’ concept of the ‘two front-strata’ (Elias 2002[1969]: 
441-47) in absolutist France. These middle-classes (the burgher stratum in Elias’ 
work), couched in their social position between upper and lower classes, tended to 
be predisposed towards producing an ideal of rationality and of freedom which 
distinguished itself from that of the upper classes by its conspicuous simplicity 
while at the same time keeping a distance from the ‘common people’. We can 
clearly see this when Elias describes their houses.  
„If we look at the structure of such a house, we find by and large the same 
elements as in the hôtel […]. The domestic architecture of the aristocracy as the 
authoritative class in all questions of styles of living is the model for that of the 
upper bourgeoisie. But all the dimensions are reduced. The courts and above all the 
two basses-cours are quite small; the rooms for domestic services surrounding them 
are of a correspondingly reduced size; kitchen, a larder and a small office are 
there, nothing else. The apartments of the master and mistress of the house have 
relative spatial confinement of bourgeois marriage as compared to the spaciousness 
of marriage for the court-aristocracy. But it is above all the society rooms that have 
shrunk. The circular salon is there but smaller and limited to one storey; adjoining 
it on one side is a longish room combining the functions of a cabinet and of a 
gallery, on the second a small boudoir, on the third a salle de comagnie. The 
antechamber to it also functions as a dining room for the family. When it is used for 
the latter purpose, the servants are sent into the entrance hall. These are the only 
social rooms to be found in these houses.” (Elias 2006[1969]: 63)   
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Indeed, I am holding that there is a sociological kinship between both 21st century 
German apprentice Economists’ study selection and 18th century French bourgeois 
housing styles. Both reduce their representative, ‘gratuitous’ expenses to a relative 
minimum while at the same time still being vigorously fixed in their ideas of 
excellence to the absolutely dominant groups of their respective societies. Can we 
not see in the economism of these students a ‘shrunk’, and perhaps somewhat coy, 
form of a more dominant form of thinking (such as philosophy, or cultural sciences), 
expressing both positions and relationships between the academic and the social 
field? Just in the same way as we can see in the shrunken ‘maisons particulières’ 
the integrated yet distinguished houses of those groups not quite yet at the top of 
their society (or field). 
 
 
 
Likewise, Pierre Bourdieu might describe another empirical exemplification of the 
same structural ideal-type when talking about French executives and engineers of 
1960s France:  
 
Although executives and engineers have the monopoly of the means of symbolic 
appropriation of the cultural capital objectified in the form of instruments, 
machines and so forth which are essential to the exercise of the power of 
economic capital over its equipment, and derive from their monopoly a real 
managerial power and relative privileges within the firm, the profits accruing 
from their cultural capital are at least partially appropriated by those who have 
power over this capital, i.e., those who possess the economic capital needed to 
ensure the concentration and utilitisation of cultural capital. It follows from this 
that their position in the dominant class is an ambiguous one which leads them to 
a highly ambivalent adherence to the firm and to the ‘social order’. When 
making demands or rising in protest, they are actuated as much by their concern 
to maintain the legitimate distance, established by academic verdicts, between 
themselves and ordinary workers, or by meritocratic indignation at being treated 
like them, as by the sense of a real solidarity of condition; and, conversely, their 
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anxious search for integration into the dominant class, either for themselves or 
for their children, always includes […] an element of ambivalent resentment 
towards prizes they can neither completely possess nor completely ignore and 
refuse. (Bourdieu 1984[1979]: 301-04) 
 
I think it is possible to interpret the Inheritors as I have defined them here in the 
same (positional) way. The ‘technical’ instruments handed down to them by their 
parents indeed do represent a specific power and hence source of capital which is 
reconverted (see Saint-Martin 2011 for a theoretical exposition and development of 
that point) into this more intellectualist, more specialised way, congruent with the 
changes in the occupational structure, with ‘de-industrialisation’. Model-building, 
then, would be the specific equivalent in this field to what Bourdieu here calls 
‘cultural capital objectified in the form of instruments’. The method and ordinary 
topics and questions of Economics then offer a way in which these students and 
young academics express their ambiguous position in social space in their new 
microcosm. In it is congealed the fascination at the power games in politics and 
Economics but also the resentful objectivation of these games. It also serves well to 
explain their opposition against other Social Sciences and the Humanities (recall, 
for example, the quote of the professor in the last chapter).   
 
Deflections and Deviations  
 
One can see that not everyone that has been classed here among the ‘recognised’ 
students as an Inheritor actually has all of the significant characteristics that I have 
associated with them earlier – for example not succumbing primarily to 
mathematical or modelling-type Economics, or at least becoming substantially 
critical of these kinds of Economics. Sometimes these inheritors even turn away 
wholly from prestigious academic Economics despite the fact they have been 
successful during their initial studies. This seems to be the case with Hannah (23) 
who at first thrives in the subject (‘… I mean I was simply good in the Bachelor, like 
1.0 [the best mark available], no problem.’) but then starts to question, also 
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through fellow critical students and their organisation, the implicit economic 
determinism of the mainstream curriculum: 
 
I: […] for which I needed a long time to understand are .. certain assumptions 
that are made in Political Economy, which, which I only understand afterwards, 
as for example this, this question whether we are in a, in a .. yeah this very 
positivistic view onto the world for example, I had totally adapted that. 
T: Hm. 
I: There I had, I still know that I had a lot of discussions with a friend of mine. 
Where I was like ‘Look, look at the reality, look at it’, and bla, bla, bla, bla, bla. 
T: Like these […] facts and so on? 
I: Exactly. […] And I had to think about it first, what does it actually mean, what 
does Positivism mean, what does normative assumptions mean, what does it 
actually mean ... ah, I mean, right, that there is a whole science that only deals 
with this question, how we cognize, that there is a knowledge generated, I first 
had to acquire [this] to then to realise how, how Political Economy works, and if 
you don’t do that then you adopt that [mainstream curriculum] very clearly. 
Then you assume […] [that] humankind consumes, always must more, always 
wants to consume more … you can only subscribe to that. Because you see that 
humankind at this point has [utility]functions, out of the data, and then this is 
not questioned .. where it comes from, and that it is just a description of the 
status quo which itself springs from that but doesn’t have to do something with 
[human] nature, like with a natural law. One, one quickly built up natural laws in 
Political Economy … which are all taken to be axiomatic somehow, because one 
is, because one is quite positivistic, for example. 
 
Another Inheritor, recognised but not scoring high on the recognition Index, who 
experienced a similar alienation from his hitherto cherished subject is Theo (40), 
who is pushed away from his early acceptance of the taught canon and its political 
implications: 
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I: Yes, the arguments, we all have, we practically have proven all [economic 
policy recommendations emanating from orthodox Economic curriculum] during 
the course, in mathematical equations, that neoliberal politics, as I simplify it-.  
T: Yes. 
I: - is profit- and welfare-maximising. 
T: Yes. 
I: And I wanted to optimise welfare. I had a thorough idealism, that was […] That 
was my conviction, that it is the best for society. 
 
This change of orientation is accomplished with the help of his experience of his 
fellow critical students that organised in a local, pluralistic Economics association, 
his reading of a specifically heterodox Economics113 book, as well as a year abroad: 
 
I: […] I mean I can’t even remember properly how this [process of change of 
mind] started. There were reading circles, discussion groups and these were all 
extremely critical [of the curriculum]. 
T: Hm. 
I: Found that interesting at first, I mean to discuss and then to see other 
perspectives, then also very left, ahm. And then I had a book, I mean I believe 
this was one of the most impor-, one of the decisive turning points, was that I 
read ‘Debunking Economics’ by Steve Keen. Do you know that? 
T: Yes, I know that. 
I: Ok, yeah it was like, after I had read it I practically couldn’t take the 
curriculum really serious anymore. [The book] blew it all up for me, this .. 
Mathematics which even isn’t logically coherent in itself. Course of wanna-be-
mathematics. I mean this really, this was a great disappointment actually, I 
mean I felt a bit .. punked. 
T: Hhh. Ok. 
                                                           
113 I define the term ‚heterodox‘ here in line with the Bourdieusian terms outlined in his Sociology of 
Science (Bourdieu 1975, 2006) as those approaches within a discipline and its representatives that 
evidently do not hold central, objectifiable positions of capital and power, such as professorships at 
prestigious institutions or specialisations or public visibility. That this orthodoxy is differentiated in 
itself, and most likely has an internal hierarchy of prestige which may be objectively found out via 
appropriate indicators, I duly acknowledge, but cannot go further into at this point.  
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I: That I was served with this in this way, and then I more and more busied 
myself with critical .. perspectives.  
T: Hm. 
I: Yeah, and this, then there was no turning back, then I saw more and more 
difficulties. […] I mean I also looked a bit into other subjects in the USA [during 
his study year abroad].  
T: Yeah. 
I: Because there I wasn’t limited in my choice of courses to Political Economy, 
but could also attend the the whole, whole course spectrum. There I for example 
also did a course on Philosophy, Politics, ahm, something else .. Anyways, this 
was, exactly, Psychology. I had a look at that, and that I found super interesting, 
I mean there I again saw the value of interdisciplinarity. 
T: Hm. 
I: And also that this was totally missing, this was also a totally important insight 
for me as an Economist that I had there, indeed from Politics, Philosophy, 
Psychology, .. exactly. I simply liked to do something interdisciplinary, but still 
with the emphasis on Economics.  
T: Hm. 
I: Virtually as an enrichment of my knowledge in Economics. 
 
Overall these students114 seem somehow to transcend the limitations of the 
Economics curriculum by questioning some of its assumptions and methods, and by 
introducing views and insights from both heterodox Economics, (such as like 
Feminist, Post-Keynesian or Marxian perspectives), as well as other Social Sciences 
and Humanities (‘Political Economy is a Human Science for me’, says Hannah).  
The question now is whether this can still be linked to the posed structural 
ambivalence of cadres, or whether we can concede an emancipation from rather 
strictly limited forms of reflexivity.   
If one is to believe the interviewees, this emancipation is indeed the consequence 
of a more or less purely intellectual, and individual, effort. Through their 
                                                           
114 The other Inheritors also refer to heterodox currents of economic thought, but there they are 
generally a side-note. It tends to be said that these forms are important and tolerance towards them 
is displayed – without however engaging deeper into the discussions they pose. 
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experiences they realise the limitations of their curriculum, start to battle for its 
reformation and ‘ideological broadening’, for a ‘real-world’ Economics beyond the 
supposedly narrow mathematical models and thinking they encounter in their 
courses. But this ‘enchanted’ view leaves out important questions: Why is there still 
a vast majority of Economics students that are arguably not involved in this 
emancipation/expansion process? What do they lack in their experiences that these 
heterodox-minded students have?  
 
In order to develop a critical attitude towards one’s own curriculum beyond simple 
rejection (‘It’s fiddlesticks!’, as Anne -64-, who, at the time of the interview is 
both not ‘recognised’, succinctly sums up her view of the Economics curriculum), a 
sufficiently thorough knowledge of it seems to be required. But the taste and 
preference for this thorough knowledge seems, as we have seen, linked to specific 
forms of social origin and thus cultural capital. It seems to be one precondition for 
appreciation of and conversion to heterodox Economics. It is likely to be a 
necessary (yet not sufficient) precondition for a true scientific revolution (see 
Bourdieu 1975: 33; 2006: 64).  
That also implies that it is again the specific habitus, for example that of a cadre 
origin as described here, which tends to be required in order for a person to be 
predisposed to ‘see’ various aspects more critically. That critical activity may 
encompass attending lectures and extra-curricular reading circles, or reading books 
on debunking orthodox Economics. It may be described as the disposition towards a 
specific connection at a specific time that sparks an experience that might be 
compared to the metaphor of a bursting dam (‘after I had read it I practically 
couldn’t take the curriculum serious anymore’, as Theo says). On the other hand, 
despite the professed plurality of the new way to do Economics, old habits remain. 
Theo, for example, admits with the typical conspicuous humility of Inheritors as 
described above, and despite his otherwise sweeping verdicts on mainstream 
Economics, that the minimum wage is ‘not necessarily my topic. I am always 
cautious to speak out on that.’ He furthermore inquires, as quite a few Inheritors 
do, about my ‘central research question’ and my way of data acquisition, having an 
ideal of representativity in mind which shows his ongoing commitment to certain 
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‘precise’ ways of doing research (and corresponding unease with methods that are 
viewed as too ‘unsystematic’, therefore not ‘precise’ enough). On the other hand, 
he does score very low on the Recognition Index, which might also be due to the 
fact that, at the time of the interview he had left academia. Moreover, it can be 
seen that one of his main points of critique of academic Economics is the 
incoherence of mathematical models, that is, the alleged lack of rational rigour. 
This is his personal meaning of pluralism: 
 
I: Methodological pluralism. 
T: Aha. 
I: I mean, away from these simplistic, mathematical calculations of equations. 
T: Yes. 
I: And then also historical analysis, I mean more like social scientific methods, 
case studies. Ah, also more complex mathematical procedures. I mean like 
network analysis for example […] which you, which is also so absurd, on the one 
hand, in the beginning I started to criticise this Math, but there is much more 
suitable Math, which is more complex but about which you don’t hear anything 
during your studies. 
 
This form of critical attitude might be called a sort of hyperbole, extending existing 
aspects of the curriculum. There is still the taste for precision, for clarity. In that 
sense, Hannah’s critique of academic Economics seems a bit more comprehensive, 
and antagonistic. Despite, or due to, her initial success in Economics and 
apprenticeship with a mainstream professor (who was nevertheless ‘super as a 
person’ and with whom she ‘learned a hell of a lot’, in a ‘dialectical way’), she now 
rejects central assumptions of academic Economics: 
 
I: These are wrong in my opinion. […]. 
T: For example? 
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I: For example, well, the classic, classic point is this homo oeconomicus 
hypothesis, that all are rationally thinking persons […] and this rationally thinking 
person thinks marginally. This alone. […] This I think is difficult. Then this nice 
term, methodological individualism. […] This general equilibrium assumption I 
also find very difficult. I mean this assumption that everything somehow tends 
towards an equilibrium I also think is not, not correct. 
 
She holds that in her central master’s courses in Macro- or Microeconomics she 
‘didn’t learn anything, that is wasted time for me’, and that the utility function of 
economic models ‘is not tenable’ because it is ‘too abstract’. She sees herself as 
‘not the type that thinks in models’. She also questions the ‘growth fetish’ of the 
subject and the wider society. Indeed, her rejection of the curriculum, and 
mainstream academic Economics, seems quite spectacular, quite thorough-going. It 
seems as if this Economics has been overcome and can now be criticised as 
‘dogmatic’. But that depends how one defines ‘transcending’ and ‘overcoming’. If 
this simply means to take an opposing view, then that might be true. However, in a 
Bourdieusian perspective, it may be that precisely by taking an opposite view to the 
mainstream one signifies one’s attachment and indeed commitment to it. That may 
be interpreted in many ways. For example, Hannah seems to fall from economic 
determinism into a sort of idealism: 
 
I: I mean it is, I mean in general I find this area very exciting, to say .. mh, I 
mean this concept of thinking Economics anew. That one says, if you think 
Economics anew, you can also, in practice .. change things. Or the other way 
around, the economy also runs as it does with a lot of things, because we teach 
them the way we do. So that means that Neoclassical Economics and 
Neoliberalism are mutually dependent. […] 
And in that moment where we start to think Economics anew, we can make 
possible a new form of economic activity. And the question is how one .. I mean 
roughly in this field I would like to work.  
T: How do you think Economics anew? 
I: Ahm, well, firstly by beginning to think plurally. 
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T: Hm. 
I: In my opinion. And that, that begins, begins with looking at different 
theoretical schools. That one asks different questions. That one rethinks the 
goals, that one has. And that we work methodically in a more varied way.  
So that we do not [only teach] these very mathematical models […] it’s not about 
abolishing them, they also have their right to existence, and sometimes one 
cannot express [things differently]. As I said, I really am no critic of 
mathematics, I actually always like to do that. But there are many questions that 
cannot be answered via, via Mathematics, so there has to be, there has to be 
after all a plurality of methods, I mean method plurality. It has to be worked 
more interdisciplinary, I mean especially with Sociology, Politics, Philosophy. 
Political Economy, I mean Political Economy is a Human Science for me. 
T: Hm, hm. 
I: And yes, most of the, most of the [teachers/professors] in Political Economy or 
in Neoclassics take themselves to be in Natural Science and that doesn’t make 
sense, as if one would erect irrevocable [axiomatic] laws that are not so 
irrevocable after all. Because this is still a system made out of, made out of a 
group of people that form a system. And as I said, […] especially in Economics 
where one always describes laws, that, in part, mainly depend on that one 
expects that someone else reacts like this. 
T: Hm. 
I: I mean it is the expectation, that the other has within the economic system 
[that] is basic for what happens in the end. Therefore you can, I think that 
Economics is a field where one, in that moment, where one thinks the Economy 
anew. I mean whatever, if we for example all would assume, ahm, .. whatever 
the price falls, then everybody walks away [from a good that is perceived as too 
expensive at that point]. But if now everybody assumes it is a mechanism for, 
don’t know, the share price afterwards will in any case be doubled, everybody 
would buy it again, so I mean it is only about what people think what happens. 
That what they think, so informed by their neoclassical thought, that doesn’t 
necessarily need to be right, which is sprinkled with assumptions that are 
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extremely sketchy, like. In that sense I think that one can do unbelievably much. 
And as I said the first point is the opening up […].  
 
 
At face value, it appears as if the economistic realm of the mainstream is left 
entirely from view and replaced by a perspective that privileges only the power of 
ideas (‘it is only about what people think what happens’). In other words, one may 
interpret this as a typical form of dichotomous thinking. It would then be the 
sometimes very visible and publicly spectacular, fierce conflict between 
‘heterodox’ students and orthodox professors115, their antagonistic struggles, that 
in fact unite them, and exert a very effective, and arguably updated, censorship on 
the field. This implies that from our perspective the differences as they are 
explicated here between orthodoxy and heterodoxy, at least with the students, 
appear less radical, more superficial, and in line with Inheritor dispositions for 
distinctions as laid out elsewhere (for example Bourdieu and Passeron 1979[1964]: 
53).116  
 
Indeed, one may interpret these position-takings as thoroughly influenced, ex 
negativo, by the orthodox, central position of neoclassical Economics. This of 
course is inevitable to a certain degree (and shows the necessarily thorough 
orientation of these students towards neoclassical Economics – in this they behave 
like Weber’s thief who orients his own actions on the generally accepted rule of law 
by keeping his thievery surreptitious- see Weber 1978[1922]: 32; see also Elias ideas 
on the mutural dependence of ‘established’ and ‘outsiders’, Elias 2009[1982]: 
140f.), but it does not seem to be apparent as such to these rebellious Economics 
students, who de facto need the orthodoxy as a foil, which they are forced to admit 
when asked why they do not leave for another field altogether if they dislike 
                                                           
115 See Hans-Werner Sinn (2014) and his debate with members of the German Network for Pluralist 
Economics (Hafele, Heuβner, and Urban 2014) for an example of this. 
116 We find similar conspicuous positions also in textbooks that are seen as heterodox. The rationally 
acting, selfish agent tends to be replaced by the selfish agent that follows inexplicable and irrational 
‘animal instincts’ (see for example Hill and Myatt 2010: 244f.). The celebration of absolutist, 
‘positive’ Economics assumed to be completely value-free is sometimes replaced by an almost 
relativist and nihilist concession that every position contains norms and a political agenda, and the 
‘sober’ analysis is replaced by moral arguments. 
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academic Economics so much (‘I first have to understand neoclassics a bit more if I 
am to criticise it’, as Hannah says). As in other sciences, orthodoxy and heterodoxy 
exert profound influences onto each other, and they most likely share certain doxic 
and even epistemological assumptions (Fourcade 2018: 6). The fundamental 
contradiction117 of the economic method – that between determinism and 
voluntarism – is played upon to seemingly dissolve the problem by taking a rather 
voluntarist position. But despite the aims of working ‘more interdisciplinarily, I 
mean especially with Sociology, Politics, Philosophy’, Hannah also acknowledges 
elsewhere that working with sociological notions like class, status or structures is 
‘not really tangible’ for her, which of course takes us right back to the initial 
dispositions of an inheritor habitus. Thus, when she talks about ‘opening up’, this 
seems to mean first a dissociation from mainstream Economics rather than actually 
commencing a deeper intellectual exchange with other Social Sciences.118  
 
Another area where the heterodox inheritors resemble their orthodox counterparts 
is in the drive to engage with, and to contribute directly to, general politics, while 
at the same time nevertheless upholding their claim to scientificity which implies a 
social exclusion of alternative approaches. This would fit with the accounts from 
various non-heterodox students of the exclusion of ‘orthodox’ students from 
heterodox social circles. Klara(72) reflects: ‘I mean, a few friends of mine also are 
stark pluralists and, ahm, [I] found that, ah, that they don’t like other people if 
these say something positive about something like Neoclassics. […] Then they are 
characterised as bad people, simply put.’ The claim to scientificity amongst 
heterodox students is complemented by the urge to ‘shape the Economy’. Theo, for 
example, is a chairman of a non-academic Economics initiative and has started to 
earn his money by being invited for talks on various economic subjects to lay 
publics. Hannah also mentions this kind of ‘education work’ as a kind of 
professional goal. This also fits with the general eagerness of heterodox Economists 
                                                           
117 What is the process of buying into doxa? It means to forget certain things and to become more 
sensible to others, a more or less thorough reconfiguration of tastes and outlook, which is also a 
shorthand definition for disciplinary doxa. 
118 One would need to validate this supposed discrepancy by a more systematic contrasting of 
heterodox student’s self-presentation and what they actually say and do, for example in reading 
groups or seminars. 
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to contribute to the political and economic process by aggressively pushing into the 
public domain, with the help of newspaper articles, consultancies to more left-wing 
think tanks such as INET or other organisations (such as trade unions), by blogs, 
videos, and the like.119 One might ask whether is this still a position-taking situated 
in a scientific field or already in a field of ‘economic activism’. That the two seem 
to blend into each other so apparently well would be a good example of the low 
scientific entrance fee that might reign in Economics. Rather, the entrance fee 
might be of a social kind, thus still functioning as an effective barrier, yet not a 
scientific one.   
 
We might therefore pose that in the case of heterodox students the cadre 
dispositions of tangibility, of precision of thinking and of the peculiar attraction to 
state politics is still there, but that it is here somehow expressed in a different 
way, sometimes by hyperbole (even more rigorous formalisation) and sometimes by 
antidote (idealism rather than materialism, altruism rather than egoism, 
irrationality rather than rationality), or a mix of both. One may interpret this as 
another expression of the aforementioned ambivalence which is suggested by a 
different point of reference that follows a different aspired position within the 
academic field. While the orthodox Inheritors take the whole academic, or at least 
Social Scientific, field as their point of reference (from which Economics appears to 
be more ‘tangible’) for assessing the curriculum, the heterodox Inheritors tend to 
have only the economic academic field as their primary focus, from which follow 
their proclaimed openness towards other Social Sciences and the antagonistic 
definition of ‘tangibility’. In any case, both groups seem closely linked by their 
commonalities in social origin and basic dispositions, namely a specific taste for 
‘precise thinking’ and the drive to acquire general, public approval beyond the 
strict limits of the academic field- two expressions of an ambivalence theorised 
earlier in the chapter. This is seen well by those who are outside of both groups, 
and hence are better placed for an economic analysis of these Economists. As an 
informant who is active in the German heterodox scene remarks: ‘Most of the 
                                                           
119     This also, once again, lets us ask about the objective possibilities – 
money support, publicity, and the like – given to these dispositions from other fields to express and 
to ‘unfold’ themselves. I will come back to these questions in the conclusion. 
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heterodox could have easily become Orthodox’ because ‘there is a certain 
proximity’ and even ‘interchangeability’, for example in terms of determinisms as 
in the case of certain forms of Neoclassical Economics and Keynesianism 
(‘Mechanics and Hydraulics’, as the informant calls it somewhat ironically). 
However, the sociological reason why some Inheritors become orthodox and others 
heterodox still remains to be explained.   
 
Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, I have tried to explore, and to make sense of, the ‘intrinsic’ 
motivations and selections of a group of ‘recognised’ Economics students that I 
have grouped according to their intermediate class origin between dominant class 
and petit-bourgeoisie. It is the group that seems to fit best to the current 
disciplinary requirements and has thus been termed the Inheritors. The Inheritors 
come from an ambivalent structural location in social space I have termed a ‘cadre’ 
origin. From this follows, I have argued, a peculiar form of general interest in 
economic questions with an outspoken disposition for the division of ‘facts’ and 
‘values’ as well as formalistic methods of enquiry. On closer inspection, this 
‘choice’ of discipline, method and specialisation appears as a expression and 
transformation of a particular cadre habitus that attempts to assert itself in the 
competition of the dominant class fractions – and by this I mean both the 
economically dominant and the scientifically dominant- by constructing an image of 
vigorous impartiality and technical competence while at the same time following 
the logic of state and political thinking very closely. Even inheritors who deviate 
somewhat from this disposition, for example by advocating less formalised 
methods, can still essentially be grouped under it, although this begs further 
theoretical elaboration and explanation. According to this, the gulf between 
‘orthodox’ and ‘heterodox’ students of this ideal-type is less wide than it might 
appear. But what, as a whole, distinguishes the motivational structure of these 
students, their ‘habits of the economic heart’, from those of other students? How 
can we otherwise empirically distinguish them?  
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Chapter 7 – The Fallen Nobles 
 
Very soon I turned away from politics and concentrated on literature. I invited to 
my Cambridge rooms the vermillion shields and blue lightnings of the Song of Igro’s 
campaign (that incomparable and mysterious epic of the late twelfth or later 
eighteenth century), the poetry of Pushkin and Tyutchev, the prose of Gogol and 
Tolstoy, and also the wonderful works of the great Russian naturalists who had 
explored and described the wilds of Central Asia. At a bookstall in the Market 
Place, I unexpectedly came upon a Russian work, a secondhand copy of Dahl’s 
Interpretative Dictionary of the Living Russian Language in four volumes. I bought 
it and resolved to read at least ten pages per day, jotting down such words and 
expressions as might especially please me, and I kept this up for a considerable 
time. My fear of losing or corrupting, through alien influence, the only thing I had 
salvaged from Russia – her language – became positively morbid and considerably 
more harassing than the fear I was to experience two decades later of my never 
being able to bring my English prose anywhere close to the level of my Russian. 
Vladimir Nabokov – Speak, Memory  
 
The Ultraliberals – Fallen Nobles 
 
I put into the category of ‘Fallen Nobles’ all those students who evidently come 
from a longer-term (that is, encompassing two generations) bourgeois or grande-
bourgeois backgrounds (such as physicians, entrepreneurs with large businesses, 
industrialists, high-ranking civil or private executives) who however, in one way or 
another, have lost some of this privilege, or capital. The reasons, or causes, of this 
loss may include the dispossession of property due to political reasons (such as in 
former East Germany under communist rule), depletion via wars and economic 
crises or a decline of cultural prestige via the decrease of educational changes of 
capital reproduction (which, again, may be enforced by politically arbitrary 
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decisions, as in withholding study opportunities, or of course simply by lack of 
educational success for the inheritors of bourgeois or grand-bourgeois classes). The 
Fallen Nobles, for the most part, take a distinctice and rather radical liberal 
standpoint within (and outside) academic Economics that is different from that of 
the Inheritors.    
 
Obviously, given the exclusive realm of this social origin, there are far fewer 
exponents within the sample than with the inheritors, no more than 7 to 9 persons 
(two of them female), depending on how strictly the above criteria are applied. 
These are Eric (53), Elias (13), Leon (15), Sophia (16), Jakob (24), Juergen (38) and 
Johanna (59).120 Of these, two (Elias and Juergen) are not ‘recognised’ students in 
the sense that I am using this term. Structurally speaking, then, the Ultraliberals- 
Fallen Nobles have a different relationship to Economics than the Inheritors.  This, 
to be consistent, also resonates with the allegedly non-dominant position and 
prestige of Economics objectively within the field of German academic disciplines. 
This position, one might speculate, is respectable enough to be a choice of refuge 
for those with privileged yet marred origins who nevertheless aspire to reproduce 
and increase their capital. Their choice would then say at the same time something 
about the position of Economics within German academia. But, once again, this 
would need to be proven by statistics, i.e. by showing that Economics is preferred, 
relative to other Social Sciences or Humanities, by students with the above-
mentioned origin.  
 
In terms of the Economics Recognition Index, the Fallen Nobles rank mainly in the 
middle (many score 3 points, merely Johanna- Nr.59- only scores one point), but 
never at the top. We thus have to explore their specific kind of economic liberalism 
and how it can be linked to their specific social origin and trajectory. 
                                                           
120 Yannick (62) and Stefanie (32) might also be counted as Fallen Nobles, the former because of his 
professor grandfather, the latter because of her mediocre grades despite a bourgeois origin. But 
both cases seem less clear and ‘dramatic’ in terms of loss of privilege than the other 7 introduced 
above. 
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Characteristics and general Attitudes 
 
The distinctive Liberalism of the Fallen Nobles might be summarised in two aspects: 
they are more inclined towards ‘literary’ means and modes of expression and later 
and concomitantly predisposed towards a critique of excessive mathematical-formal 
reasoning. This, of course, puts them in a somewhat heterodox position in relation 
to the mainstream without however touching in the slightest other important 
cornerstones of the accepted economic perspective (such as methodological 
individualism and homo oeconomicus). They are more openly political, early on, in 
their consequent support for economically and politically liberal policies and 
measures.  
 
These students seem, then, from an early age, more sympathetic to non-formalised 
ways of expression when compared to the whole of the Inheritor category.121 
The Fallen Nobles turned Ultraliberals never express any hard rejection of literary 
forms of expression (as the Inheritors often do), which does not mean at all that 
they rejected Mathematics or Natural Sciences before their selection of university 
Economics. Indeed many of them seriously pondered studying, or actually select a 
‘literary subject’ for a while. Elias (13), for example reminisces: 
 
I: […] where I also thought about Romance Languages, like, Spanish and 
Portuguese. That I found quite interesting, but there the whole literary part 
deterred me somewhere. There I thought this is somehow German and I need to 
write some texts, I couldn’t be bothered about that. 
                                                           
121 Even though one has to mention Inheritor cases like Jan (57) who actually studied a language 
alongside Economics in his Bachelor but then switched fully to Economics because the Language he 
studied was too philological for him and he ‘wanted to do more substantial’ work in it, or like Lina-
47- who also studied a language but eventually transferred to Economics due to professional 
considerations and who valued ‘actually the mathematical in a language’ such as grammar rather 
than the actual literary studies where she wonders: ‘Why do I actually need that! I just cannot think 
of anything that I can do with it later on’. 
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Sophia (16) first aspired to be a translator of literature, but then settled with a 
Bachelor degree that combines Languages and Economics, even though she would 
have liked to study Psychology as well. (‘Of course my favourite would have been a 
combo of all these three’). Juergen (38), among other things, takes Psychology into 
consideration, whereas Jakob (24) thought about studying Journalism and Eric (53) 
selected a mix of Philosophy and Economics. None of them, unlike quite a few 
Inheritors, selects a mathematical or natural scientific subject, if only as a minor.  
 
This main difference to the Inheritors in terms of their interest profile is that they 
exhibit a more outspoken political leaning. While the Inheritors tend to be 
interested in general in social and political events but tend to reject political 
positioning, the Fallen Nobles are clearer and more decisive in taking sides. While 
the Inheritors become liberal through their studies, the Fallen Nobles often are 
already politically liberal when they enter their courses. Johanna (59) accounts for 
her selection of Political Science and Economics via attendance of antifascist 
reading circles.122 The interest and motivation seems to be less that of a spectator 
and more of an involved participant as Jakob (24) expresses it: 
 
I: It’s quite hard to tell [how he came to Economics], I’d say I was politicised in a 
certain way, and, yeah with us this was of course the Iraq war especially that 
brought my class cohort or my generation onto the street for the first time, ahm. 
And because of that, of course somehow, I engage with the injustice of this 
world and the challenges that our world faces. And there of course you get to 
economic questions, I mean Economics is simply the management of scarcities 
and, like most of the problems of our society some scarcities are responsible [for 
the difficulties to solve them], and so it went that there was interest, of course 
rather via a political [interest] […]. 
                                                           
122 Leftist youth groups that vigorously combat what they perceive as fascist thought. 
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This more ‘engaged’, less ‘value-neutral’ interest in Economic matters seems also 
to be expressed via the alternative study option of journalism, or related activities 
during studies. All students except Elias (who is not a recognised student in the 
strict definition employed here) have done some journalistic or publishing work 
before, during or after their studies, that is, they worked for a newspaper, wrote 
for a blog or a website. Conceptions of justice play a large role [in these 
respondents’ accounts of] opting for Economics, as Johanna (59) describes: 
 
I: In the focus on material necessities so to speak, I mean there are manifold 
ways to illuminate society [i.e. to make it understandable] and people in their 
needs, and one of them is clearly the material side and, I think when it is about 
to somehow care for more justice in the world then the material care of people 
cannot be left out and therefore we need the Economy. 
 
One defining idiosyncrasy of the Fallen Nobles seems to be their tendency towards 
strong opinions, positions that tend to be outspoken, rather extreme and therefore 
visible among other students. This can be seen when Eric (Nr.53) describes his 
initial study choice (and once again, one sees the political motivation in his 
selection):  
 
I: So originally my [in English] first best option, ahm, was [study degree 
combining Philosophy and Economics in a German city], the P and E […]. The 
professor there, X, thought, allowed himself to affront the philosophers, that this 
study degree wasn’t to be taught in the ivory tower or seen as a value in itself, 
but he wanted to underscore the utility for society for the economy. […] In the 
end the background motivation was that, ahm, already back then I have been 
strongly politically interested and engaged. I was with the JUSOS [German Social 
Democratic Party youth organisation] and, ahm, had the feeling that every 
argument sounded suggestive as a knowledge of domination. Both conservative, 
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liberal, socialist, whatever side. And, ahm, this knowledge of domination I 
wanted to dismantle. 
 
This is in line with his earlier dispositions towards being ‘politically incorrect’ in his 
youth when he was part of a group of ‘boys who had fun with militarism’, by which 
is meant a fascination with Wilhelmine pre-1918 Germany. 
Like Eric, other students of this group stand out by their (self-)positioning during at 
least some points of their educational trajectory. Sophia (16) was recommended to 
me as an interview partner by a professor in the CSI who remembered her 
extraordinary defence of Hayekian Economics. Jakob (24) was close several times to 
being expelled from grammar school due to undisciplined behaviour. This 
‘extravagant streak’ that might also be called a ‘taste for provocation’ is usually 
accompanied by the strong tendency towards an economically and politically liberal 
stance. Rüdiger (38) for example, just in his second semester, remarks that he has 
‘always been in the liberalistic position’.  
 
In any case, the study selection of these students overall, and that of course 
includes how this selection is made sense of, seems less determined and clear, less 
driven by confessions of early precocious interest and inevitability. Jakob, for 
example, freely admits that his choice of Political Economy over Journalism was for 
more or less practical reasons, due to the fact that he could study something 
‘where you build up an expertise’ rather than having the handicraft of journalism in 
which he already had years of experience as a student reporter. Elias selected 
Economics after a few other options for apprenticeships did not materialise. He 
describes his thinking to himself: ‘Then you go studying and have a look at it.’ More 
than the actual interest, the political dimension, in the sense of the political use of 
Economics, is emphasised. Eric (53) remembers his selection of Economics as a 
motivation to ‘dismantle knowledge of domination’. This is understood with regard 
to the economic ‘incentive processes’ of what he perceives as ‘every-day ordeals.’ 
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One cannot help but feel that with these students there is some deeply-felt, 
personal political investment involved in their selection which is quite different 
from the excited, but rather distanced perspective of the inheritors. It might be 
expressed in sometimes convoluted ways, but there is an outspoken projection of a 
political purpose onto the studied (and otherwise rather casually chosen) discipline. 
Indeed, it seems as if it is explicit liberal political considerations and valuations 
that lead these students to study Economics, at least in part, whereas with the 
Inheritors it is the study of Economics that tends to lead them towards these 
explicit political values.  
 
How does this early attitude retranslate once these students enter Economics? What 
they seem to be drawn towards within academic Economics is a specific and rather 
radical form of liberalism and individualism that aspires to be more encompassing 
than that of the Inheritors, but which is nevertheless critical of, and reflexive 
about, the assumptions that made in economic models, as well as of the widespread 
trust in the objectivity of these models. 
While the Inheritors emphasise a rationality that is, for them, rather uniform and 
thus conducive towards mathematical modelling, the Fallen Nobles tend to think in 
broader terms. Elias (13) for example explains: 
 
I: Ahm, and it was after all, it was after all somehow quite theoretical and so. 
But still had a certain area of application. I find with a bit of phantasy you 
indeed can transfer that to what you do everyday.  
T: Give me an example, I am not well-versed in microeconomics. 
I: Yeah at the end of the day, to make decisions and stuff, you have a budget and 
you decide now how you divide the budget to achieve your highest level of 
utility. That I always find, I mean I do that all the time, I think, what do I have 
there, how do I make the best of it? I certainly don’t construct a mathematical 
equation at all costs, or. But in terms of the way of thinking it certainly is all, I 
mean when they assume you are homo oeconomicus and you in the end always 
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decide rationally, that doesn’t make [sense], I always like to talk about 
individual rationality, everybody has his own. Everybody has a bit his own 
preferences, that are not strictly rational in the mathematical sense, but that 
make sense for oneself. One person likes that, another that, and according to 
this they decide. And that was indeed, it was indeed [interesting]. 
 
On the one hand there is the interest in general economic matters (as with the 
Inheritors); on the other hand an acknowledgement that emphasises the unique, 
individual character of every rationality, which of course makes formalisation 
rather hard in this logic. In that sense (and to a certain degree also objectively 
speaking), this attitude can be regarded as heterodox within academic Economics. 
Sophia (16) describes her disposition to be mindful of the assumptions that go, or 
rather don’t go, into models: 
 
T: What did you like and what didn’t you like, if you had to put it down a bit 
more concretely, in your Bachelor studies? 
I: Yes. Ahm, I liked that one tried to solve problems a bit more logically, to solve 
them analytically. I mean that one sometimes says ‘Ok, yes, I got pro and cons 
arguments, I can now argue well with them’, but rather that one approached it 
in a way that you say ‘I try to solve the problem in a way that I do not alienate 
it. And then I see whether I cannot somehow build a model from that, for 
example that is what is often done. That one says ‘Ok, I simplify that somehow, 
then I check how can I express it in a way that am able to see what variables are 
influential, and what these variables influence in each case, whether they 
mutually influence themselves again. Whether there are feedback effects. […] 
Then of course, as a critique, that the assumptions that one makes are not 
criticised sufficiently, or that the result is then assessed as too secure, that one 
feels simply too certain, because somehow one has’a model, and a model cannot 
lie. The model indeed is always logically consistent in itself, but maybe the 
assumptions are false already. […] What disturbed me already during the 
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Bachelor studies, and then even more in the Master [was the lack of reflections 
on assumptions made in models], because of course you are then deeper into the 
topic, ahm, one knows more about it, thought longer about it, that, very, very 
rarely has one bothered  whether one also made implicit assumptions.  
T: For example? 
I: Ahm, yeah for example if I construct such a growth model, ahm, let’s say a 
Keynesian model, and I nicely calculate ‘Ok, I have my output, which somehow 
depends on Export, Import, Production, Consumption, Investment, and ahm, 
State Purchase […] then I already assume that I do not have a natural 
catastrophe. I, ahm, don’t have a large work movement, I mean I for example 
don’t have streams of refugees, I don’t have immigration, I don’t have 
emigration. 
T: Hm. 
I: I don’t have war. […] But in the end one again doesn’t follow up sufficiently 
and says ‘Ok, what actually happens if I hadn’t made this assumption? Would this 
influence my result now? What, ah, better assumptions could I take? What 
assumptions did I make of which I am not even conscious […]? […] That one, if 
you, ok, these are not the theoretical models, ah, with empirical models, that 
one questions too little the quality of the data, or that one assumes: ‘Ok, maybe 
I could have chosen a different empirical method.’ What would happen then?’ 
That one too rarely compares these with one another. 
 
This sceptical attitude towards unreflective constraints in models, as well as their 
arbitrary nature, can also be seen in the case of Jakob (24), who expresses this 
through the choice of the Austrian School of Economics and its proponent Friedrich 
Hayek: 
 
I: […] once one is in this Hayekian problematic of knowledge [refers to Hayek’s 
article on the use of knowledge in society] , then one is, ah, relatively quickly 
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sceptical towards all, ah, simple approaches of explanation, and therefore it was 
swiftly the case that I found and find many macro-economic explanation 
attempts exciting and so on, but this was always a certain distance to say ‘oh 
yeah, ok, I am now a proponent of the big push theory, or I am a proponent of 
bottom up, or ahm, or I am a proponent that somehow thinks that with 
institutions everything can be explained. That is, right, that is always there a 
basic scepticism towards every simple, one-dimensional explanatory attempt. 
[…] [The Solow Model] is after all a model that deals with economic 
developments, with the capital assets or capital intensity and which, ah, can 
explain certain things, but the only focus of the model is on capital, and that is 
the aim of the model. […] but of course in reality it is not the case that economic 
developments are observable via changes in the per capita capital assets 
structure [chuckles], but that [rather], as I said, institutions, ah, certain 
economic freedoms, ah, the labour market, technologies, I mean all these are of 
course decisive aspects for the economic development, for the development 
prospects of National Economies.  
T: So in other words the context, that is what counts? 
I: Ex-, yeah exactly, the context, and ahm, I don’t know how it is, I mean there I 
lack the understanding of other sciences, but with us it somehow is very of-, 
often not like, at least not in scientific terms, to say ‘Ok, we explain the world 
with model A, B and C together.’ That somehow is always a competition which., 
which model now explains the world better now. 
 
The general attitude is one that is supportive of pluralism and competition, but a 
pluralism that is uncompromisingly individualistic and which takes in this stance 
both a moral and scientific-epistemological position, as Eric (53) does when he 
justifies his preference for methodological Individualism and an extended form of 
homo oeconomicus, to which is also attached an implicit political position: 
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I: […] I mean we all have preferences, those are different, logically. And insofar 
is ah … I mean we all have a preference to earn good money. I don’t believe 
anybody who in principle first, maybe there are some, but I first don’t believe 
anybody who says ‘I am totally indifferent what future economic prospects I .. 
ah, have for that.’ That is always put with side conditions, like, that I am 
already doing reasonably well […]. And ah, to what degree preferences are 
distributed .. and how much of that is due to monetary things, maybe with status 
and prestige and who knows what could play into that as well, into a monetary 
perspective. Compared to ‘I want to do something what ah, .. what I like, or a 
deeper understanding of society, or whatever. […] Where is the difference there? 
I mean, purely normatively, I don’t get it. […] if we speak of greedy people, for 
example, then we always speak of people greedy for money, but you could also 
be greedy for smoking dope. 
T: Yes, but. 
I: Nevertheless, you wouldn’t label greedy, wouldn’t label the dude that smokes 
dope daily as greedy but as the contrary to greedy. But this is simply a 
preference for ah. 
T: Something different. 
I: For something different, exactly. Insofar, yeah. How, yeah. 
T: [You] Can also be greedy for titles, greedy for recognition. 
I: Exactly. 
T: So the aspiration is then, the decisive thing is then, that the aspiration or the 
degree of aspiration is the same and not the aspiration for a specific- 
I: Exactly. 
T: - thing, like money for example. That is correct, you are right, yes. I see that 
exactly like you do. […] 
I: I mean the investment banker thinks, I mean, he rather thinks ‘ok, you guys 
think that I am the devil’s advocate here somehow. [in English] All right, ok, 
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yeah well doesn’t bother me much, there my preferences are different, with the 
person that studies social work it may be exactly the other way around, maybe 
these are two extremes, boldly speaking, yeah. […] Then these are, these are 
two extremes on a continuum […] I don’t understand why one should put a 
normative assessment into these differences – [in English] peaks and lows […] it 
was in principle, about figures of thought, I mean whether one argues 
collectivistically or individualistically, or whether one attributes special worth 
towards .. holistic figures like .. workers or the precariate or not […] 
 
Thus, this radically individualistic attitude that is, at the same time, more critical 
towards objectivation and more open towards alternative ways of economic enquiry 
within these individualistic limits, seems almost naturally attracted to ultraliberal 
approaches like those of the Austrian School of Economics (linked to the names of 
Friedrich August Hayek and Ludwig von Mises), to Ordoliberalism (Walther Eucken, 
Wilhelm Röpke, Alfred Müller-Armack) or to anarchocapitalist schools (Murray 
Rothbard, David Friedman etc.). Hence, most of these students, such as Jakob (24) 
or Eric (53), refer to themselves as ‘classical liberals’. This often goes hand in hand 
with a marked distrust of everything collective, above all the state. Elias (13) 
confesses that he doesn’t ‘like laws’ and that ‘we have a twisted financial system’ 
which is ‘manipulated’ by the state. He favours a currency competition and has 
written his Master’s thesis about the subject (similar to Sophia who dealt with a 
very similar topic in her final dissertation). He tends to favour Austrian Economic 
theory because it is ‘surprisingly simple’ and ‘much more illuminating for me than 
other theories’. Sophia (16) favours ‘somehow free markets and really free 
economic policy’ of which she is a ‘fan’, and she adds ‘perhaps also because of my 
family history’ (her family were of rather bourgeois origin but suffered severe 
repressions under socialist Eastern Germany), once again showing a typical form of 
reflexivity that may be called a folk explanation for one’s attitudes. She 
furthermore prefers the ‘pure facts’ of news agencies over the major broadcasting 
agencies in Germany. Likewise, Jakob (24) champions Hayek’s theory of 
spontaneous order, describing himself as ‘thinking liberally and socially’. 
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Part of this adherence to ultraliberal forms of thought is moreover a marked 
interest in historical topics and data (without giving up in the slightest the 
perspective of homo oeconomicus), such as Economic History or the History of 
Economic Thought, in which the preference for ‘verbal argumentation’, as Jakob 
(24) puts it, is expressed also, again from a typical individualistic-liberal 
perspective. Lastly, these students are also the ones that tend to consider voting 
for the most openly ‘politically incorrect’ parties such as the right-wing 
“Alternative for Germany” party AfD (roughly the German equivalent of UKIP).  
 
What we find here, in conclusion, seems to be a distinct route into Economics and 
to Economism. It is an ‘intrinsic’ motivation that exhibits a greater taste for the 
literary, that is more politically outspoken and that is also rather hostile towards 
all forms of objectivation, all operations that, in their view, threaten individuality. 
This leads them to ascribe nearly all forms of social behaviour to economic 
interpretation and to an ultra-individualistic form of utility-maximising. How can 
this be explained within our perspective? What does it all mean? 
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Economism II – An explanatory Attempt 
 
Figure 14   Proposed Relationship between Fallen Nobles Class Origin, Habitus, and 
Selection of ultraliberal Economics 
 
 
What we need to explain now is how the specific conditions of existence of the 
fallen Bourgeois or Grand-Bourgeois produce a disposition that expresses itself (as 
we assume, for the sake of exploration), in the specific field of German academic 
Economics, in an ultraliberal stance, in the choice of rather strict ordo-liberal, 
Austrian or anarcho-capitalist schools of thought (see Figure 14). One might 
construct the following chain of argument: A loss of privilege for people of grand-
bourgeois or bourgeois origin, via dispossessions, misfortune in the economic or 
educational markets, creates a gap between the actually existing social position 
and their self-perception which, by virtue of the hysteresis of habitus (Bourdieu 
1996[1989]: 183-87; also Bourdieu 1984[1979]), continues to have a high view of 
itself and the expectation as to the social position that one should occupy. But 
these fallen bourgeois are caught up in a social space which does not share this 
expectation anymore, in which there is not any more the immediate harmony of 
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institutionalised and embodied structures for them. Unlike agents from other social 
backgrounds (like petit bourgeois) whose self-perception as ‘chosen’ Parvenus is 
also often not fulfilled and who, as a result of that, tend towards regressive 
attitudes as they progress through their lives (Bourdieu 1984[1979]: 346-51), these 
formerly bourgeois agents tend to have more resources at their disposal, either in 
terms of actual forms of capital (economic and social and cultural) and/or 
symbolically, in terms of self-belief. The relative incommensurability of self-
perception and ambition in relation to one’s actual position and capital-endowment 
engenders a predisposition towards conspicuous and more active distinction, 
different from ordinary bourgeois distinction that is characterised by its subtlety, 
effortless ease and somewhat ‘passive’ nature (for example Bourdieu 1984[1979]: 
280-82). The form this distinction takes will be dependent on the specific fields in 
which the Fallen Nobles live and work, and thus the specific cultural fund of 
resources on which they draw on. Distinction is likely to be attempted in such a way 
that shared cultural resources will be utilised so that they are made amenable for 
this more active type of distinction which has to produce a marked symbolic effect 
on its own, in the absence of its material-structural underpinning. Hence one has to 
expect from this type of habitus a position-taking that might be described as rather 
bold, radical and daring within its particular field. Therefore, one might say (and 
construct) that this sort of habitus of Fallen Noble turned Ultraliberal, in a social 
world dominated by the different, antagonistic yet complementary habitus, acts as 
if it tried to compensate for the loss of capital, as if it tried consciously to reinstate 
and uphold its differences vis-à-vis the lower classes, as if it attempted to close the 
gap between claim and reality. From this it follows that these are agents that are 
predisposed towards bringing about symbolic revolutions which can have a profound 
transformative influence on social institutions and social organisations within a 
particular field, if the circumstances are right and they ‘play the game well’ (see 
again in particular Bourdieu 1996[1989]: 183-87).  
 
Hence, in the field of marital relationships in the Kabylian society of the mid-20th 
century, with distant, inter-tribe relationships being assigned the highest prestige 
(extra-ordinary marriages) and local, intra-tribe marriages assigned the lowest 
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prestige (ordinary marriages), the groups that hold a structurally homologous 
position as Fallen Nobles123 will (have to) choose the least costly yet, under these 
circumstances, most distinguished form of marriage, namely parallel-cousin 
marriage, which serves to conserve the integration of the ‘basic unit’, distinguished 
both from ordinary marriages and prestigious inter-tribe marriages with their 
conspicuous generosity in terms of giving, or giving back, marriage gifts (Bourdieu 
1992[1980]: 182-84). The Fallen Nobles lack the necessary capital for this display of 
riches that produces easy ‘symbolic profit’ (ibid.: 184), and therefore choose 
another strategy, i.e. their very own ideal marriage, which they cover up, for 
themselves and spectators: 
 
 “In practice, this ideal [i.e. parallel-cousin] marriage  is often a forced choice 
which the group seeks to present as a choice of the ideal, thus making a virtue of 
necessity. As has been seen, it is often found in the poorest lineages or the 
poorest lines of the dominant groups. It tends in any case to be the choice of 
groups characterized by a strong desire to assert their distinction, because it 
always has the objective effect of reinforcing the integration of the minimal unit 
and, consequently, its distinctiveness vis-à-vis other units. It is predisposed by its 
ambiguity to play the role of poor man’s prestige marriage, and it offers an 
elegant solution for all those who, like a ruined nobleman unable to manifest his 
refusal to derogate other than symbolically, seek in the affectation of rigour the 
means of affirming their distinction. This can be the case with a lineage cut off 
from its original group and anxious to maintain its originality; a family seeking to 
assert the distinctive features of its lineage by doing one better in purism 
(almost always the case with one family in the marabout communities); a clan 
seeking to mark its distinction from the opposing clan by strict observance of the 
traditions (like the Ait Madhi at Ait Hichem), etc. Because it can appear as the 
most sacred and, in certain conditions, the most ‘distinguished’ marriage, it is 
the cheapest form of extra-ordinary marriage, obviating expenditure on the 
                                                           
123 This implies that both are Fallen Nobles, but only in the specific condition of modern German Economics 
these Fallen Nobles transform themselves into Ultraliberals.  
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ceremony, hazardous negotiations and a costly bridewealth. Thus there is no 
more accomplished way of making a virtue of necessity and putting oneself in 
line with the ‘rule’.” (Bourdieu 1992[1980]: 186f.). 
 
Likewise, in the field of life-style in 16-18th century France, a field where the 
average member of the aristocracy declined in relative prestige and power due to 
the power gains of the absolute monarch and the rise of bourgeois groups124, this 
group of Fallen Nobles was furthermore inclined towards a selection that took its 
distinctive value from its relative boldness and focus on purely symbolic effects in 
the relative absence of forms of capital. That can be seen in their rejection of the 
highly ‘rationalised’ and ‘disciplined’ ways of gardening as they were practiced in 
the main court in Versailles while favouring more freely growing plants (Elias 
2002[1969]: 374-85), and in their romantic views on ‘natural’ country life, in 
painting, in literature and even in intimate relationships when the king and his 
inner circle concentrates power more and more in and around Paris, with their own, 
highly regulated styles of life (ibid.: 385-91 and 434-43). This, of course, at the 
same time does not imply a complete overlap with ‘popular culture’ since these 
Fallen Nobles took pains to distinguish their regulated ideal of country-life from the 
‘uncultured’ life of the lower classes (ibid.: 434f.). If we remain in this universe, 
and come back to the issue of housing, we see that the Fallen Nobles of this era 
were practically forced, by their own self-view, to invest in their houses all the 
more due to the representative (symbolic) functions it fulfilled as a sort of 
surrogate for the slipping away of more material (economic, and political) powers. 
Hence we have a focus on ‘purely aesthetic’ forms of housing that are not 
‘diminished’ as compared with that of the Burgher class of that time – the houses 
are full with ornamentals which “[…] were perceived by their contemporaries also 
as the finely shaded expressions of social qualities.” (Elias 2006[1969]: 65). It is a 
form of distinction, of individualisation, which in current German academic 
                                                           
124 It becomes obvious at this point that the term ‘Fallen Noble’ has a relational, anti-substantialist 
meaning that strictly refers to the position a group has, and had, in a particular social structure 
rather than a title attributed in it.  
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Economics is achieved by students of this habitus by a conspicuous, radical 
individualism in economic analysis.       
Another historical example of Fallen Nobles in a concrete field would be the 
declining former Wilhelmine Aristocracy and Haute Bourgeoisie in the Weimar 
Republic (Elias 1996[1989]). Having been pushed out of positions of significant 
influence by the rising liberal Bourgeoisie and organised labour, and being of a 
militaristic, authoritarian cultural imprint, their ousting tended to predispose them 
towards a radicalised rejection of the Weimar Republic and its democratic 
principles, towards romantic-idealistic Nationalism and Anti-Semitism, even 
towards terror towards these people in the form of assassinations and coup d’etats 
(ibid.: 182-228), opposed both to the republican political strategies of the 
supporters of the republic and the communists’ revolutionary tactics. Elias gives 
further insight into the ‘subjective’ feelings of these groups: “There have been 
many such situations in the development of human societies. Such cases of loss of 
power by former establishments in relation to rising outsider groups trigger bitter 
resistance […] not only for economic reasons, but also because through such a loss 
of economic power the old ruling strata find themselves on the same level in the 
hierarchy of power and status as the groups they had previously despised: groups of 
low standing, of lesser human value, of rabble. As a result, they feel themselves 
lowered in their self-esteem.” (ibid.: 184). Similar processes can be observed with 
the leading intellectuals of that era, the declining German ‘mandarins’ (Ringer 
1990[1969]) as well as French philosophers (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992: 153-56). 
 
What all these cases have in common is that a distinction is attempted by a 
formerly elite group through the conspicuous accentuation and intensification of 
field- and position-specific cultural ideals of excellence that have a strong symbolic 
emphasis: extra-ordinary marriage in one case, romanticism in the other, 
authoritarianism in the next, perspicacity in one’s mother tongue in the initial 
quotation from this chapter, and finally Ultraliberalism in the field under 
consideration here. The way in which the position is expressed depends on the 
particular fields and cultural endowment of those thrown into the position of Fallen 
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Nobles. The ultraliberals in the German academic field of Economics can, and do, 
express their social position and trajectory by the choice of a highly ornamental and 
attention-seeking form of liberalism. They are predisposed to be agents for a 
conservative revolution.  
 
In the field of Economics, then, one might reconstruct that very same interplay 
between socio-cultural origin, current position and available position-takings. The 
Fallen Nobles entering the field tends not quite to have the ‘technical cultural 
capital’ that seems to promise the most ‘return’ to the Inheritors, with their 
advantage in acquiring the necessary sense of manipulating formulas and equations 
in rather abstract, theoretical models. On the other hand, the high self-esteem and 
ambition of the Fallen Nobles forbids them from entering into, and settling with, a 
mere technical speciality (so that Sophia -16- responds to the question about 
whether she considered an apprenticeship that ‘this is a question that I never posed 
to myself’), as students of petit-bourgeois origin seem much more likely to do. The 
question then still remains why they select (and are selected by) Economics in the 
first place. That might be accidental, in the sense that there may be relatively 
equal percentages of Fallen Nobles studying in very different subjects. But given 
the fact that disciplinary differences carry significant prestige, and hence capital, 
differences within the German background, I think this is rather unlikely. It might 
be that Economics as a whole is more attractive to Fallen Nobles than other 
subjects due to its overall position in the social hierarchy which might be still 
‘extra-ordinary’, yet not as ‘extra-ordinary’ as, for example, Medicine.125 Hence it 
might be, both in terms of subject selection and theoretical-epistemological 
selection, in each case rather ‘outdated’ positions that are still distinctive in the 
field and outside of it. In this field this means literary, non- or only mildly 
formalistic variants of economic thought. I hold that those appear most attractive 
to these students because they match with their specific predispositions. Part of 
                                                           
125 In that sense, the tendentially more restrained, less ‘enchanted’ stories of how the Fallen Nobles 
came to select Economics as their subject might indeed reflect a different, somewhat more 
distanced and more ‘realistic’ view on it than the Inheritors have. These more ‘extrinsic’ attitudes 
towards one’s own subject might also be facilitated by distinctive ‘intrinsic’ values, as was shown 
with Eric (53) earlier on.   
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this is obviously the partially critical, and therefore very visible, stance taken by 
the trailblazers of this position within Economics, their scepticism towards the blind 
trust in scientific, formalistic methods (Mises 2003[1933]; Hayek 2001[1944], 1945), 
which is directed both against Keynesian and Neoclassical Mainstreams at various 
times, while at the same time radically emphasising traditional liberal-economic 
values and norms (Hayek 1960; Röpke 1963[1937]). Just as the Fallen Nobles of 18th 
century France reacted to their decline by increased emphasis to ornamentals on 
their homes, so the Fallen Nobles of German Economics today react to their decline 
by selection of increased individualisation of their perspective. Both are, I hold, 
symbols of one and the same position and trajectory in their respective fields.  
 
The Fallen Nobles effectively try to rehabilitate outdated methods of enquiry 
(textual interpretation, pure logical analysis, see for example Machlup 1961) via an 
uncompromising, zealous and radically individualistic epistemology. In and through 
that zeal for the values of ‘freedom’ and ‘liberty’, they are particularly prone 
towards reaching audiences beyond their particular field, of engaging in popular 
agitation (see Hayek 2001[1944]), and their products seem particularly likely to be 
‘polyphonous’ (see also Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992: 151f.), that is, to be 
understood well in more than one field. Sociologically speaking, the Fallen Nobles 
act as if their uncompromising stance of Ultraliberalism and their fight against 
‘collectivism’ is a symbol of their particular habitus and origin within the field of 
academic Economics, a sort of institutionalised embodiment of the fears and hopes 
and perspective of a very particular group of agents with a particular social history.  
It might be objected that the stance of contemporary Ultraliberals is quite different 
from that of Ultraliberals in earlier times. That is quite true – so that for example 
some schools of current Ultraliberalism seem more radical in their free-market 
views (e.g. Stringham 2017[2007]). Accordingly, Sophia (16) asserts that Hayek and 
Mises ‘often also argue impurely’, that they ‘have taken over a lot from the 
Neoclassics’, and she detects an ‘ideological closure’, their disregard for their own 
assumptions. Others try to develop further Austrian or other ultra-liberal 
approaches, for example by comparing or even partially amalgamating them with 
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Keynesian approaches. This, of course, can be explained rather well from a 
Bourdieusian standpoint. Since the field of Economics, as the whole social field 
which harbours it, has changed considerably towards a neo-liberal mainstream 
during the last decades (for example Harvey 2005), academic orthodoxy has 
adopted quite a bit of the ultraliberal standpoint, which prompts a Fallen Noble 
habitus, at least within the academic field and its acceptable positions, towards 
position-takings that are even more radically liberal, or by extending the ‘liberal’ 
gaze towards other practices and aspects of society that are not strictly, or 
obviously, economic (which may include History). The similarity, therefore, is just 
as much about an analogical position in the social and academic field (always loss 
of high privilege,  enhanced clinging to ‘traditional’ norms that are pursued with 
conspicuous vigour) as it is about identity of substantial theoretical or political 
positions.126 Nevertheless, despite their (sometimes) felt, partial emancipation 
from Hayek and Co., it is still true that these authors serve at least as an initial 
guide, based on the sympathy due to a similarity of social position, which lets 
students of this category select this type of neo-liberal Economics. ‘He put me on a 
search’, admits Sophia (16), and Jakob (24), somewhat embarrassed, admits that he 
‘read Hayek too early’ when the interview comes to his favourite Economists. 
 
There seems little doubt that there is this overlap of initial social position and 
trajectory if one looks at some of the more famous ultraliberal, or Austrian, 
Economists and political Philosophers themselves. Both Ludwig von Mises and 
Friedrich von Hayek, as the names already state, came from the minor Austrian 
Nobility. Both lost their positions either to the rising tide of Anti-Semitism or to the 
political and economic transformations that took place in Austria in the wake of 
World War I (MisesInstitute ; Mises 1978: 45; Kresge 1994: 37-39; Hayek 1994: 59). A 
similar fate befell some leading Ordo-Liberals such as Walter Eucken, son of Nobel-
                                                           
126 This of course is an implicit answer to the question of pertinence: How do we distinguish different 
schools and styles of thought? Is it purely through forming groups according to thought in itself, 
according to whatever criteria that might be? That would mean to adjudicate intellectual thought an 
autonomy which it likely does not possess, thus to succumb to a quite un-sociological idealism. The 
parameters of pertinence shift considerably as soon as we attempt to link thought with material 
relationships and positions.    
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laureate philosopher Rudolf Eucken127, and Wilhelm Röpke128, son of a physician 
(both to be found at BavarianAcademyOfSciences 2010ff.), whose inheritor-position 
of cultural dominance vanished with the disappearance of Imperial Germany and 
the rise of Nazism (Ringer 1990[1969]: 435-49). Proponents and originators of the 
American schools of Ultraliberalism, such as Murray Rothbard (see Raimondo 2000: 
24-59) or Ayn Rand (see Burns 2009: 9-14) have similar social trajectories, as do 
lesser known libertarians such as Gerard Radnitzky (2006: 43f.)129. Indeed, the link 
between loss of bourgeois privilege and proclivity for ultraliberal positions seems 
rather cross-national. It can be found in various political and academic fields in 
various countries, such as Germany, Austria, the USA and even France (Lebaron 
2001: 101f.). 
 
And with the similar trajectory comes a predisposition towards the characteristic 
individualistic, literary Economism typical of the Fallen Nobles in this specific field. 
Sophia, for example, rejects the Marxian theory of value in favour of a subjective 
one, defined ‘already through everyday-experience’130, as she says, citing an 
                                                           
127 https://www.deutsche-biographie.de/sfz13830.html#ndbcontent, last accessed March 4, 2018 
128 https://www.deutsche-biographie.de/sfz106346.html#ndbcontent, last accessed March 4, 2018 
129 Although one must readily admit that the latter two are no academic Economics. Nevertheless, 
they too show a clear preference for ultraliberal Economics. 
130 Indeed, it might well be that the condition of loss of privilege engenders a turn towards the 
‘practical’ aspects of social and economic life, as Bourdieu (2000[1997]: 82) sees with conservative 
writers like Michael Oakeshott, which might unleash “[…] social drives strong enough to give them 
reasons to overcome the aversion to everything associated with practice […]” (ibid.), and which 
might be visible indeed in the writings of Hayek or Mises as well. Often enough, this lucidity on the 
one hand goes hand in hand with falling into the opposite trap of what one managed to avoid in the 
first place, namely irrationalism. So that Hayek’s exploration of ‘the sensory order’ essentially 
seems to recognise the existence of something like a habitus (“[…] a system of connexions is 
acquired in the course of the development of the species and the individual by a kind of 
‘experience’ or ‘learning’grounded in ‘experience […]”), without, however, posing that this system 
can indeed be investigated rationally and scientifically. (Hayek 2014[1952]: 53).  
Similarly Mises: 
“All action is economizing with the means available for the realization of attainable ends. The 
fundamental law of action is the economic principle. Every action is under its sway.” (Mises 
2003[1933]: 86) 
And again Mises: 
“Catallactics does not ask whether or not the consumers are right, noble, generous, wise, moral 
patriotic, or church-going. It is concerned not with why they act, but only with how they act.” 
(ibid.: 102) 
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acquaintance without a university degree who, in certain places, earns more than a 
professional. She reiterates that we can only ‘know a part of reality’ and the 
emphasises the constructed nature of economic models. This critical stance carries 
over into the assessment of other spheres, such as the media or politics. Or, put 
another way, these spheres tend to be politicised through the perspective the 
ultraliberal Fallen Nobles take on them. Sophia, for example, criticises publicly  
funded broadcasting in Germany due to what she sees as their one-sidedness and 
skewedness, and instead favours ‘pure facts’ by news agencies. She is furthermore 
disappointed by the German liberal party because of what she perceives is their 
catering to the ‘Economic lobby’ rather than a ‘truly free economic policy’. Thus 
her vote, at the time of the interview, tended to sway towards a libertarian splinter 
party in which, as she says, some ‘weird people’ congregate, in which there are 
‘conspiracy theories’ thriving. In the same vein, Jakob deems the liberal party ‘too 
little liberal’ and favours a more direct Democracy ‘possibly on the smallest 
possible scale’ which for him is, of course, ideally the individual level. This, once 
again, is seconded by Sophia, who expands this into an individualistic critique of 
actually existing Democracy: 
 
I: […] But […] I think the majority of people or the majority of votes is often 
influenced for example by lobbyism, and, ah, by long-existing laws. Ahm, that 
are often tightly entrenched, I mean this public opinion is then not really the 
opinion of the majority, or respectively, if I follow the op-, the majority always 
via laws, then of course I also suppress minorities through that.  
 
Like Sophia, Jakob tends to vote for small splinter parties or ‘joke parties’ – ‘the 
modern form of not voting’, as he calls it - all the while emphasising liberty and 
protection of minorities. He even includes the right-wing populist alternative for 
Germany (AfD) in this thought, yet eventually discards this option since it ‘is in 
certain areas too illiberal’. Likewise Eric (53), who, with his ‘existentialist as 
opposed to a deterministic world view’ (by which again is meant a consequential 
individualism in all areas of life) sees in the political realm, after the ‘departure of 
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the liberals from Liberalism’, ‘a gap for all middle-class people’, by which he 
justifies his sympathy for the AfD, although he is ‘to and fro’ because of the 
‘nationalist kerfuffle’ which he is prepared to concede in the interests of a wider 
societal acceptance of the ‘classically liberal’ stances that he supports. It goes 
almost without saying that the idea of a minimum wage is unanimously rejected by 
these students (although this is somewhat different from their attitudes towards a 
guaranteed minimum basic income, which is more reconcilable with libertarian 
ideas, depending also on, and to what scale, it is put into practice).  
 
These students seem to be in line with the political stances, understood in terms of 
the positions within a field, of their structural predecessors. The comprehensive 
criticism and identification of social problems and power imbalances, attributed 
exclusively to ‘collectivist’ and state responsibility from the standpoint of radical 
individualism, leads to rather gloomy and even apocalyptic predictions. Thus 
Hayek’s analysis of the 1944 New Deal world is to be read as revealing more about 
his position in this world than something about this world: 
 
“How sharp a break not only with the recent past but with the whole evolution of 
Western civilization the modern trend towards socialism means, becomes clear if 
we consider it not merely against the background of the nineteenth century, but 
in a longer historical perspective. We are rapidly abandoning not the views 
merely of Cobden and Bright, of Adam Smith and Hume, or even of Locke and 
Milton, but one of the salient characteristics of Western civilization as it has 
grown from the foundations laid by Christianity and the Greeks and Romans. Not 
merely nineteenth- and eighteenth-century liberalism, but the basic 
individualism inherited by us from Erasmus and Montaigne, from Cicero and 
Tacitus, Pericles and Thucydides is progressively relinquished.” (Hayek 
2001[1944]: 13f.) 
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Mises’ fears are in a similar vein, when he writes about the ‘red Vienna’ after World 
War I: 
 
“I knew what was at stake. Bolshevism would lead Vienna to starvation and 
terror within a few days. Plundering hordes would take to the streets and a 
second blood bath would destroy what was left of Viennese culture.”  (Mises 
2009[1978]: 15)131 
 
 
A similar mistrust is directly exhibited by Jürgen (-Nr.38- who, being just in his 1st 
year, is the only non-recognised Fallen Noble and thus not yet a complete, 
‘transformed’ ultraliberal in the above-specified sense, which would be consistent 
with the fact that he is the only one not naming an Ultraliberal, but rather a more 
mainstream neoclassical Economist as his rolemodel, however with the – rather 
typical- justification that he feels that that Economist is ‘politically incorrect’). 
From earlier work he has saved some money and decided to invest it. Due to the 
low-interest policy of the European Central Bank, a policy which he perceives as 
‘the lousiest approach one could have chosen for Europe’, he ceased to have trust 
in German stocks. He predicts that due to these politics ‘there will be massive 
problems’ for rich countries because of the easy ways in which poorer countries can 
take credit to little avail which leads to a procrastination of crisis rather than its 
solution. This is why he invested his capital mainly in government bonds (‘the only 
safe haven’) or gold (‘real gold, no certificate gold’). 
 
One may see in this strategy of ‘playing it safe’ an analogy to Bourdieu’s Kabylian 
Fallen Nobles that also play it safe by marrying the parallel cousin. Without 
                                                           
131 See for another example the statements of the following generation of Austrian Economists, like 
Murray Rothbard for example (Raimondo 2000: 39). 
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seemingly even knowing of ultraliberal economists at the time of the interview, 
Jürgen essentially follows the same logic of Austrian business cycle theory (see for 
example  Hayek 2009[1929-1937]). Perhaps one may here particularly see, with a 
Fallen Noble not yet fully ‘transformed’ into an ultraliberal stance, how specific, 
socially induced fears and perceptions are transposed, transformed, from a more 
private, individual concern to an accepted, public position-taking within or outside 
of academic Economics. In the process, these contingent and personal factors are 
eclipsed, veiled.  
 
And so, within and without the economic academic field, the Fallen Nobles tend to 
struggle for their particular way of radical individualism, their essentially 
conservative interest being transformed through their education into a stance that 
appears progressive (at least for some) from the outside. Like the fallen aristocrats 
of French absolutism, with their romanticism for rural life which exhibits a seeming 
respect for the ‘man on the street’, these Economists seem to associate with ‘the 
masses’132, via their romantic individualism transported into their institutionalist 
critique. It is therefore barely surprising to see them at the forefront of the 
‘conservative revolution’ that has swept over western societies during the last 
                                                           
132 This ‘populism‘, however, is ambivalent and remains essentially elitist, as has been shown for the 
French Aristocrats of Absolutism earlier on. Likewise, one finds a similar ambiguity of a symbolic 
strategy - one that ‘flirts’ with ‘the man on the streets’ and his practical wisdom while nevertheless 
retaining a distance - with Ayn Rand’s position. There is elitist rejection on the one hand: “When 
contrasted with other contemporary celebrations of individualism, however, it becomes clear just 
how innovative The Fountainhead [book by Rand] was. Elitism and populism were two impulses that 
had always coexisted uneasily in the defence of unregulated capitalism. […] Defenders of laissez-
faire invoked both elite privilege and the wonders of the ordinary, self-sufficient citizen, often in 
the same breath. The Fountainhead finessed this contradiction and escaped libertarianism’s fatal 
elitism through Rand’s theory of ethics.” (Burns 2009: 87f.). And then there are feelings of solidarity 
and sympathy on the other: “Before campaigning, Rand had been suspicious about American 
democracy. Instead of government of, for and by the people, she thought the state should be ‘a 
means for the convenience of the higher type of man.’ […] Now she found herself impressed by the 
questions her working-class audience asked and their responsiveness to her capitalist message. She 
said of her time in the theatres, ‘[It] supported my impression of the common man, that they really 
were much better to deal with than the office and the Madison Avenue Republicans.’ It seemed that 
the faceless crowds she condemned, rather than their social and intellectual betters, understood the 
dangers of the Roosevelt administration.” (ibid.: 56). Angus Burgin recognises this as well when he 
concludes about the early members of the Mont Pelerin Society, many of which were Fallen Nobles, 
and their populism: “A veil, however thin, needed to remain between their social philosophy and the 
world they hoped to transform (Burgin 2012: 71). 
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decades, and which still continues up to this very day. However, unlike their French 
counterparts, the more contemporary Fallen Nobles live in a much more 
differentiated society. It therefore still needs to be enquired how their field-
specific products function outside of their immediate environment, why and how 
they are adapted and potentially used for other purposes than the intended ones. 
This might be approached from a rather psychological angle as well, from the 
perspective of the ‘inner eye’ of those students. We might construct a sort of ideal-
typical psychological profile of what goes on in a Fallen Noble: You are born into a 
Fallen Noble family. Early on you recognise, at first somewhat blurry, yet 
nevertheless decisively, that something is wrong with the world. Things are not as 
they should be. The wrong persons are in power, incompetent persons. And not only 
that, the whole system seems wrong. You tend to sympathise with everyone that 
fights this state of affairs. You begin to get active as well, participate in 
demonstrations, writing articles in youth newspapers, in blogs, always the bigger 
whole in mind. Then you come across those Economists that actually kind of do 
criticise mainstream politics, and that from a scientific standpoint. After all, you 
have guessed it all the time anyways that the current system is inefficient, that if 
things go on like this there will be a crisis that will cost all of society dear. This 
crisis will not only be economical, but cultural. You feel that your culture is 
threatened by dictatorial means, some of which come in well-sounding phrases of 
the political left, transmitted by the left-leaning media What is the solution? You 
choose Economics and Humanities for your studies because it seems the right thing 
to do. You deeply value the emphasis on efficiency and individual freedom and 
responsibility that come with most of academic Economics, even though all that 
mathematical stuff really is a bit annoying after all. You like in particular that 
Austrian Economics course about the history of economic development, where they 
deal with how specific institutions made a properly functioning market possible in 
the first place. You become convinced that we can deduce from historical examples 
how to establish your own society best, including the stopping of its current 
demise. In short, you really like history and you excel in that course, which earns 
you a top mark from the Austrian Economics professor who, during the next 
semester, offers you a job on his tutoring team. Of course, since you have nothing 
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else to do, you immediately agree – after all, why not earn money with what you 
love to do anyways? The professor has excellent connections to various think tanks 
and to large corporations, so you get to know these as well over the years, in 
workshops and at conferences. Still, they do not become kith and kin. You stay with 
your professor and become his PhD student. You really feal justified, after all that 
fuzzy feeling of rage and not belonging here in your earlier youth, in who and what 
you do. The world may be far from being perfect, but you have found an island to 
rest on, a sort of safe zone from which fighting expeditions can be undertaken to 
the outside world, for a free market and against the crusted structures of politics 
and big business. After completing your PhD you start your new post as director of 
an ultra-liberal think tank, where you will find a profession, identity, a place in the 
world. Still, not everything is great – sometimes your expeditions backfire, like 
when you support an emerging, liberal-conservative party which, for some reason 
you don’t understand, bit by bit turns more into a xenophobic and anti-immigrant 
party. But this, like anything regarding individual action, cannot be investigated 
anyways, so that you just shrug your shoulders and move on with your daily 
business.  
Indeed, this brief psychological profile points towards the Fallen Nobles’ thorough 
integration into structures and mechanisms that are barely understood, such as the 
rise of the right-wing populist alternative for Germany party AfD.133 These 
experiences warrant further detailed studies, which, from a Bourdieusian 
viewpoint, concern the ‘travelling’ and adaptation of ideas in different fields with 
different logics(see also the section ‘relation between fields’ in the conclusion of 
this work). There is furthermore a dimension relating to the very fact of integration 
(both social and psychological), which points towards a specific guiding and 
channeling of the subversive powers of these young students into a final position-
taking that probably has conservative effects. But this further line of research, 
which leads us into the sociology of revolution (or lack thereof) must be developed 
at a later stage.      
                                                           
133 https://www.wiwo.de/politik/deutschland/afd-das-ende-der-oekonomen-partei/12011514.html, last 
accessed June 2, 2019. 
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Lastly, as with the Inheritors, this Ideal-type still leaves some cases unexplained. 
 
Deflections and Deviations 
 
One mustn’t close one’s eyes to the fact that some students who are not Fallen 
Nobles nevertheless favour ultraliberal Economics. This is the case with Leon 
(Nr.15), Anton (Nr.27) and Leonard (Nr.58), who are all of more petit-bourgeois or 
inheritor origin (even though their grandfathers also were either dispossessed or 
driven out of office during Eastern German socialist times). Despite the fact that 
they share most of the position-takings with those fallen noble-women and men 
who favour Austrian Economics (for example, calling themselves ‘classical liberals’, 
being very sceptical about state intervention in general, welcoming market 
solutions to as many social problems as possible) there remain a few differences in 
trajectory and positions that might be rather important in this light. First, non-
aristocratic ‘Austrians’, contrary to their Fallen Noble cousins, may be said to have 
a more inconspicuous trajectory and self-presentation. Unlike the Fallen Nobles, 
their subject selection seems less motivated by an urge to be politically efficacious 
as an individual and rather more by practical (indeed ‘extrinsic’) considerations 
about the public common good and one’s own professional advancement, as Anton 
(Nr.27) explains: 
 
I: Because this just interested me. I mean I was fascinated by it, or interested by 
it, what you can do to fight unemployment, all these things. Which factors are 
important, it was just a time of high unemployment, maybe because of that. 
Don’t know. And, yeah, also the, the differences between Socialism and 
Capitalism have interested me. […] Because there was a strong change. That is 
maybe, maybe this is from my biography, but maybe it also comes from my 
grampa or so. Don’t know. […] [talking about alternative studies] I have 
discarded that relatively quickly then, because I had a look what the starting 
salaries are in Political Science [i.e. with a Master’s degree of that subject], and 
these were roughly on a level with taxi drivers, there I thought [with a chuckle] 
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that is not necessary. […] There also were Political Science Diploma [graduates] 
back then with a mean age of 28. While Political Economy these were around 9 
to 10 semesters. I didn’t want to study forever after all!  
 
In a similar vein, Leon (Nr.15) explains his desire to finish his studies on time: 
 
I: I always wanted for myself, for myself it was always clear that […] I wanted to 
be finished in the normal study time. That was also for me, I did it after all, and 
that was very important for me. 
Likewise, Leonard (Nr.58) remembers his initial interest in the subject: 
I: […] and that you can, with his approach, this technical approach Political 
Economy, so to speak, what is welfare, I mean how you can define that on the 
one hand, and ahm, which factors play a role [in increasing it], what politics can 
do […]. After one has defined welfare at first. 
 
These more petit-bourgeois students seem on the whole less flashy and iridescent in 
their (self-) presentation than the Fallen Nobles. There are no stories by third 
parties about being outspoken (although I have to admit that I did not look for those 
explicitly). The students seem to have a more ‘humble’ view of themselves as well – 
visible for example in how they speak of their own trajectory which Leon describes 
as ‘down-to-earth’134 several times. Both Leon and Anton work or have worked as 
accountants (the former in a proper job, the latter in a student union), and have no 
history of motivation or activity in Journalism or History (‘I have my Mises biography 
at home, that is enough for me’, confesses Leon). On the other hand, the more 
petit-bourgeois Austrians seem to be more concrete, and in a way considerably 
more brutal, in their policy recommendations than the fallen-noble men Austrians. 
                                                           
134 The translation of the German term ‘hemdsärmelig’ obliterates somewhat the negative 
connotation this word has in that language which might be more adequately translated with 
amateurish, not professional. In this, too, one may see the rather petit-bourgeois inclination to 
good-will by readily admitting short-comings and mistakes. 
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Anton’s policy recommendations are perhaps the most brutally liberal in the whole 
sample. He ponders about what policies he would like to see implemented: 
 
I: Hmmm! That is a good point, that is not that easy, I think I would not pay the 
first three months of job seekers allowance. If you become jobless, the first 
three months, just a transition period. That would work quite easily, right? I 
would not start many construction projects by state expenditure. […] Of course I 
would privatise the railway, everything135.[…] I don’t know what I would do with 
health insurance because it is very difficult at the moment. We still have this 
weird system. […] I would like it better if it was private.   
He also argues against any regulation of the housing market: 
I: Yes, for example. I think people have a sort of, tradition, I just take the 
example of rent control, right? 
T: Yes, yes. 
I: They always talk about the granny who has always lived there. 
T: Yes, hm. There is always this sociological argument of gentrification. You’ve 
probably heard that. 
I: Yes. That always seems to be something bad. Why actually?  
T: Hm. 
I: [more aggressive] Why actually is it bad if rent prices in X increase, if people 
have, finally, a higher purchasing power? That granny perhaps cannot live in the 
centre in prime location anymore, that’s just the way it is. 
 
Leon ideally would like to partially privatise the educational system: 
 
                                                           
135 In Germany, up to now, the railway system has not been privatised fully yet and thus still counts 
as a state company. 
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I: I mean I as an Austrian [Economist] can now say I would be for a hundred 
percent privatisation, with all consequences. Would certainly be an interesting 
scenario [clears his throat]. But, one is also somehow for a Realpolitik […] So I 
would proceed and say ‘every student who finds a study place gets an education 
voucher from the state, and via this voucher she can go to university.  
Compare this with Jakob’s (Nr.24) reflection on Hayek’s work, which he uses in 
his own work on the tension between protectionism and liberalism: 
I: Ahm, basically Hayek is, don’t know whether this is true for any scientist that 
one deals with more intensively, but of course you recognise that although in 
many instances he is seemingly very outspoken and radical- somehow as little 
state as possible, a lot of freedom and so on  - you still feel how he weighs in 
many instances. Especially if you, ah, read the constitution of liberty, then it is 
astonishing what roles he makes sure the state gets, and with Hayek it is always 
rather the case that he tends to show what roles the state should not take, or 
not take alone, and that he, on the other hand, still leaves the state with lots of 
opportunities to get active. And that is, I mean I also found that surprising in 
dealing with this, hm. And, I mean we see the challenge one faces in the case of 
development Economics. Somehow you then find, on the one hand, concepts of a 
strong state are not really successful, but at the same time concepts such as the 
Washington consensus didn’t really work either.  
 
The decisive thing here, it seems to me, is the ‘reserved’ and ‘circumspect’ 
character of the thoughts which tends, practically, to constantly hover between 
liberalism and state involvement. The state is to remain in place, but its activity is 
to be conceived very differently from what it is now, and in this new utopian state 
it will foster the freedom of its inhabitants rather than hindering it. But how 
exactly this new state should look like seems rather unclear, and what remains for 
the reader is a rather radical-seeming and indeed primarily symbolic message which 
distinguishes the sender from other messages and senders, whether he or she is 
aware of this effect (and wants it) or not. There seems a profound difference in the 
degree of radicalism as regards the critique of existing economic and political 
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arrangements and normative liberal principles on the one side, and actual, often 
rather balanced ideas about to restructure society, on the other. It seems that, 
here again, the privileged heritage predisposes towards imagining, and working 
towards, a social vision which is different from the current state yet where the 
game of distinction is not abolished (the ‘gaming table not knocked over’ as 
Bourdieu used to say), merely altered to the favour of those who bring about a 
partial revolution. Once again we are reminded of the aristocratic French Nobles 
and their romanticism for rural life, their self-imaginagining as shepherds in their 
literary works, yet always at the same time distinguishing themselves from actually 
existing peasants. The state, after all, is still needed to protect the educated 
minorities against the ‘hordes’ and their ‘foolish ideas’ and ‘whims’136. The Fallen 
Nobles seem not to be able to shed the idea of planning and state control, despite 
all initial appearances, which leaves them with a strategy that is, willy-nilly, more 
symbolic than practical and substantial (in the sense of policies ready to be 
applied). This would help to make sense of the fact that Robert, an Economics 
Bachelor student from a rather bourgeois, yet fallen background I interviewed for 
my pilot study, justified his political provocations, such as defending far-right free 
speech: ‘I just need to do this for my own sanity, get things off me.’ The more 
petit-bourgeois students, however, not burdened with this heritage, are freer to 
develop an easier and perhaps looser relationship to Austrian Economics, one that 
corresponds better to their dispositions of asceticism and cultural good-will 
(Bourdieu 1984[1979]: 318ff.). It would therefore not be surprising to see the 
simplification and watering down of the Hayekian (or Misesian) message to a 
relatively simple one of the commodification of everything. Emphasis on the 
symbolic dimension, in the first case, emphasis on practical political 
implementation, in the second.   
 
Angus Burgin’s (2012) detached and careful account of the History of the Mont 
Pelerin Society and its main agents allows us to cast a sociological, comparative eye 
on the relationship between petit-bourgeois and more bourgeois economic liberals 
                                                           
136 These are my own summarising paraphrases of the Fallen Noble’s attitude towards ‘the people’. 
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as a concrete empirical example.137 In it one can see how Hayek’s nuanced, and 
essentially social-conservative liberalism influences, and is eventually replaced by, 
a radical, super-consistent and unconditional blessing of market-forces in and 
through the (petit-bourgeois) Milton Friedman (Burgin 2012: 175-85). Hence, the 
partial revolution is replaced by a more complete, less reserved revolution in 
mental structures, both in the academic field and in the social field. Even though 
both Hayek and Friedman might have called themselves ‘classical liberals’, as do all 
those attached to Austrian Economics in this sample, it seems they mean different 
things by that (very much in the same way as students mean different things when 
they assert their study selections as ‘intrinsic’). It seems clear now that, for the 
Fallen Nobles, the alignment with ‘classical Liberalism’ is sociologically a sort of 
attempt to symbolically reconstruct their original social position within the field of 
academic Economics. In this they follow their structural predecessors, who, as 
Lawrence Stone observes, “[…] developed a frenetic interest in heraldry, the 
diligent commissioning of family histories.” (Stone 1965: 750f.). The focus on the 
past, I argue, is a symptom of despair and wish to reconstruct vanished glory for 
representatives of this ideal-type. But for them, compared to Fallen Nobles of 
earlier ages, it seems more sublimated. This is perhaps due to the more intense and 
longer period of formal education. For the more petit-bourgeois Ultraliberals, on 
the other hand, the reference to classical liberalism is connected to hope, to social 
ascent. It has a progressive meaning, from the standpoint of these agents.138  
 
Lastly, one may not close one’s eyes to the fact that there is at least one student in 
this sample that is a Fallen Noble but nevertheless no Ultraliberal in the sense 
specified before. Yet Johanna (Nr.59) also distinguishes herself by a certain, albeit 
different, radicalism and outspokenness of her views. She was part of antifascist 
circles and reading groups in her youth. In itself this might not be an indicator for 
                                                           
137 Even if it  applies a theoretical perspective that seems close to symbolic interactionism (with 
Hayek, Friedman etc. as inter-related actors on a stage with no backstage, that is, no particular 
structural history or context other than the most general Zeitgeist) 
138 Or to quote Burgin again, Milton Friedman, at the first Mont Pelerin Society meeting in 1947. was 
“[p]erhaps the most vociferous advocate of the adoption of the language of progressivism […].” 
(Burgin 2012: 108) 
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the habitus of a Fallen Noble (her father being a physician and one of her 
grandparents owning several factories but being dispossessed), or not the only one. 
Felix (Nr.19), who is clearly of a more petit-bourgeois origin, was also engaged in 
an anti-fascist group during his youth. One would need to see which of the two was, 
or is, more probable for the respective social origins by looking for studies or 
sources that tell us something about the social origin of young antifascists. It is 
Johanna, however, who goes one better by being critical of what is happening 
within these antifascist reading circles – unlike Felix, who, to the contrary, shows 
respect or goodwill by the characteristic cautiousness of his remarks such as ‘one 
would need to have a closer look’- by stating that Adorno (a standard author in 
these circles in Germany) is ‘one of the upheld, and much too often cited, 
luminaries’. This carries on into her Economics studies. Johanna is, within the group 
of pluralist-minded students at the case-study institute, the one with the most 
outspoken and sweeping critique of mainstream Economics. She describes her 
studies as ‘actually very bad’ and concludes about the teaching: “In the end one 
could have taken Olivier Blanchard’s [neoclassical text book author] textbook and 
read it aloud to class, [but no more would] come out of it.” She feels that ‘critique 
is not admitted’ in class, and that the lecturers ‘preached up and down the 
Marshall-cross’139 and that the bibliography was filled with ‘free market preachers’. 
She concludes that it is a rather unchallenging subject which too often goes 
‘according to the book’ while ‘the [neo-classical] theory ‘has no explanatory value 
and therefore is obsolete.’ 
 
But the subject of Economics is not the only one that is criticised. About her fellow 
students she thinks that ‘there were not too many gems among them’, and her 
specialisation of international economic relations offers ‘too little critique of the 
existing world economic system’. Even her first Masters degree at a prestigious 
western European ‘heterodox’ institute ‘could have been a bit more strident’. 
During the reading group sessions of the pluralist Economics association I attended 
                                                           
139 The standard economic model of price determination as a function of the relationship of supply 
and demand. 
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she was regularly the most vociferous and sweeping in her critique of the 
mainstream literature discussed, and hence was often countered by her more 
moderate fellow students. But the critique as such is perhaps not as radical in 
terms of the actual study content (after all, there are more moderate voices within 
this ideal-type as well, such as Jakob – Nr.24) than in terms of actual economic 
policies, which implies the measurement of these policies140 according to a certain 
ideal or utopia. This utopia, or the path towards it, may be described in terms of 
the abolishing of perceived interferences, truncations, distortions and artificial 
boundaries. These distortions are examined, within the study of Economics, above 
all in terms of Economic policies regarding finance and money or currency issues. 
But then again, the actual recommended economic practice is less conspicuous, less 
radical than the critique and the norms taken. 
 
This guided analysis, then, puts those seemingly different position-takings – 
economic ultra-liberalism here, leftist radicalism there - alongside each other, as 
two expressions of the same (or at least very similar) motivation and habitus. Is 
there a feature in social origin that distinguishes the two, such as gender, 
geographical origin, or age? In any case, lucid observers of intellectual history, like 
Michel Foucault, observe the same phenomenon of fundamental similarity of 
attitudes beneath seemingly very different position-takings when he remarks on the 
‘curious closeness’ (Foucault 2010[2004]: 105f.) that exists between the intellectual 
‘neighbours’ of the Frankfurt School and German Ultraliberals (or Neoliberals, as he 
calls them) in the German intellectual field from the 1930s to the 1960s. Both, that 
is, see an ‘irrational rationality’ in Capitalism that is solved in different ways 
(creation of a new societal rationality to sublate economic irrationality in the case 
of the Frankfurters, creation of a new economic rationality to sublate societal 
irrationality in the case of the Ultraliberals). The structural reasons why this rift 
occurs need to be found out separately. 
 
                                                           
140 The Fallen Nobles are almost all specialised in Economic Policy and/or Macroeconomics. 
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Conclusion 
 
In this chapter I have formulated another ideal-type according to social class and 
trajectory. I have grouped all those students into a category that exhibit clearly a 
dominant class origin that has, however, evidently faded in one way or another. I 
have termed these students Fallen Nobles and explored the usefulness of this 
concept in making sense of their study selections and motivations as well as general 
world views. I have argued that the lack of capital emerging from a background of 
abundance of capital predisposes these students to a strategy of distinction by 
overemphasis of symbolic effects, to be seen in the specific field of German 
academic Economics in ultra-liberal, explicitly political and literary position-
takings. Even though this may seem, at first glance, very similar to the liberalism 
and economism of the Inheritors, there are important and recurring differences to 
be detected, above all the preference for literary forms and methods as well as the 
more direct, less value-free engagement in politics. In this, the ‘intrinsic’ study 
selection of the Fallen Nobles appears sociologically different from that of the 
Inheritors. And, like with the Inheritors, there are deviations whose rootedness in 
the same disposition may be posited, without, however, being able to explain, at 
present, these deviations. Starting to emerge from this is a classification of 
students that is quite different from the established lines of ‘intrinsic’ vs. 
‘extrinsic’, ‘reflexive’ vs. ‘non-reflexive’ or even ‘orthodox’ vs. ‘heterodox’. It 
seems necessary at this point to complete the set of ideal-types under 
consideration, and to look at a third group beside the inheriting and fallen 
students: those students who ascend socially, the Parvenus. 
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Chapter 8 – Parvenus 
 
The choice once made had to be adhered to, and there was no one more 
conformist, in the United States as elsewhere, than new immigrants who, with the 
exception of anarchists, regarded any criticism of their adopted country as 
sacrilege. For them America was liberty, justice, virtue ; everything predisposed 
the newest elements of American society to become conservative and rabid 
patriots.  
Marc Ferro – The Great War  
 
 
Intellectual Goodwill – Petit Bourgeois and Parvenus 
 
The Parvenus in this sample all have in common the fact that their parents usually 
work or worked in rather medium-status jobs (such as technicians, qualified 
machine operators, medium-level executives) and that none of them have studied 
at university. As with the Inheritors, there seems to be a concentration of rather 
‘technical’ professions, and hence the likely possession of a specifically ‘technical’ 
type of cultural capital. Nevertheless these students managed to obtain a certain 
recognition within the academic field, by obtaining scholarships and/or tutor-
positions, or by enrolling for a PhD in Economics or Political Economy. Again, this 
would need to be demonstrated more conclusively with statistics that prove the 
somewhat exceptional trajectory of these students relative to all other recognised 
German Economics students and relative to the other representatives of this class 
within the student population as a whole.  
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This is especially so since inflation of educational titles must be factored into the 
determination whether a student from ‘lower’ class background indeed is ascending 
socially or not. Often enough, the assessment of intergenerational mobility happens 
only on the basis of simply comparing the achieved certificates of education (see 
for instance FAZ 2013), while a relational analysis must always factor in the relative 
position of the students within the body of all students and, more generally, all 
members of a class of a particular cohort. In other words, educational 
progressiveness and inclusivity (see Ringer 1979: 22-31) are often confounded in 
these substantialist perspectives.  
John (6), Anna (Nr.39), Leo (Nr.48), Tom (Nr.50), Linus (54) Vincent (Nr.69) and 
Lennard (Nr.70) seem to fall most under this ideal-type, at least when it comes to 
recognised and/or insider students. Unlike the Inheritors and the Fallen Nobles, 
these students diverge quite substantially in their scores on the Recognition Index – 
while Tom, Lennard and John score quite highly, Anna and Leo don’t, and Leon 
figures in between them.  
 
Characteristics and general Attitudes 
 
In terms of concrete economic attitudes, this ideal-type is much harder to pin down 
to a specific theoretical or epistemological perspective. Their respective 
orientations, like their scores on the Economic Recognition Index, are very diverse. 
On the other hand they seem to have in common a more ‘practical’ (or ‘extrinsic’)  
orientation both in terms of subject selection and selection of specialisations. 
Thoughts about commencing an apprenticeship are much more prominent than with 
the other ideal-types. John (6), for example, pondered a career in administration 
before turning to the idea of studying at a university, partly because he ‘had no 
plan [what to do] after high school’. Vincent (69) completed a commercial 
apprenticeship before selecting Economics while Anna (39) was pushed by her 
parents to opt for an apprenticeship. This, at least initially, rather loose connection 
to the academic content of Economics can also be seen in their own justifications 
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for their choices which put a heavier emphasis onto aspects such as employability 
and future professional prospects than was the case with the other ideal-types141. 
Leo ‘found it good to have professional fields where you could have certain chances 
to be successful’. Similarly, Vincent states that ‘back then I had the professional 
eye’ which is why he selected Economics over Philosophy or Psychology. Tom (50) 
confesses that he thought ‘completely selfishly’ about his own wealth and ‘how to 
manage it’ when he selected Economics because ‘it seemed to me logical’. Anna 
(39) first selected a Business Administration subject because she ‘was more 
security-fixated back then’. The ‘softer’ attitude towards more ‘technical’ and 
‘practical’ aspects of the Economics subject seems to significantly shine out with 
this ideal-type. All of the students have a comparatively positive attitude towards 
Business Administration, unlike the vast majority of students of the other two ideal-
types. Anna (39), likewise, emphasises the practical character of this subject vis-à-
vis Political Economy:  
 
I mean I indeed find that quite important […] because it is a problem that 
Business Administration communicates so little with Political Economy, because I 
think the drifting off of it [Political Economy] towards unreality has one cause in 
the fact that you don’t have a connection anymore to Business Administration, 
which simply is a bit closer to reality, I think.  
 
Lennard (70) also talks about the ‘practicability’ of certain parts of his studies 
alongside Sociology: 
 
I: For me somehow nothing else was possible in the beginning. 
T: Hm. 
                                                           
141 In this they are quite close to Leon -15- and Anton -27-, who would have to be placed somewhere 
between all three ideal-types, with objective aspects  of all three of them present. 
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I: Therefore I did these Economics Introduction affair. Äh. And accounting. Like 
balance sheets, [in English] financing, that sort of stuff. Exactly. That was so 
much fun somehow, because it was a different, and it was so practical and – And 
that, that I somehow continued, and then I thought now you started it, why 
don’t you continue with it, count it towards Sociology [the degree], as a sort of 
mini-Bachelor? 
 
On the whole, then, the term ‘practicability’ or ‘tangibility’ takes on a slightly 
different meaning here compared with its use by the Inheritors – less philosophical 
and abstract, more technical, or more ‘artisanal’ so to speak.   
Even if the interest is more in Political Economy from the very start, these students 
then tend to specialise in more technical areas within the discipline, above all 
Econometrics and Statistics. Leo (48) describes:  
 
I: Yeah, I mean the practical, the practical work with data. To seek out, to find 
out relationships that are not that obvious, that fascinated me quite quickly. 
Especially if you become more stable with Econometrics in terms of theories and 
models. I found that fascinating, everything you can do with it. Effectively when 
you augmented your tool box in the empirical area a bit. Then the possibilities 
grow very fast. 
Tom’s experiences and selections seem to be very similar: 
I: Actually, overall I was drifting [towards his specialisation]. Simply by what I 
received from outside, right? Ahm.  
T: What did you receive from outside? 
I: Ahm, I had a good Econometrics Prof in X. He taught me a lot 
methodologically. And then I was interested more in the method part, right? I 
mean, how do I estimate, how, ahm, do I collect data correctly? How, ahm, how 
do I analyse correctly, right? I mean if I see econometric models, then it is often 
the case that people throw in there things that do not belong there, right? 
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Somehow estimating a regression with some nominal data where you ask yourself 
‘Ok, that is not the right approach, yeah. How do I do that correctly? […] Simply 
rather these, these theoretical questions ‚how, how do I estimate something 
correctly?’, and. And then I was drifting more into this direction.    
 
The Parvenus seem more focussed on the technical, methodical aspects of their 
studies than the inheritors and especially the Fallen Nobles. This is also valid for 
Lennard (70) whose reflexivity about the limits of his subject cannot conceal his 
clear preference for its technical aspects: 
 
I: […] ahm, statistics and the like I like, this .. translation of behaviour into 
numbers, although you partly need to be aware, because Prof. Y always said 
‘Yes, we are not Physicists who are able to determine exact experiments and 
interpret numbers directly’. 
T: Yes. 
I: We can perceive tendencies. And this translation from theory, empirical 
content and quantitative analysis was really exciting. So that you then can make 
statements. Like inference-statements of […] a sample, of a basic population. 
And this with a methodical approach, ah, how do I ask people, how do I observe 
people. Like, what can I derive from it? What could be interference factors that 
influence that. There you need to be creative, partially. You need to be able to 
be creative, so to speak, and to consider how these things relate to each other, 
which mechanisms react with each other. 
 
Vincent (69), too, specialises in econometric and statistical methods: 
 
I: I mean I first put everything into formulas, and that I only did because you can 
.. structure your data better this way, I mean I find that very helpful for me 
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simply, and I think Economists also like to do it in this way, ahm, simply to write 
down the effects formally, and I would never claim that this is the true model. 
[…] It simply helps me to structure my thoughts and to bring them across well. 
[In regards to professional activity later on] I would also try to walk towards 
statistics, data analysis, or something in this direction. 
 
It seems that a lower class origin tends to result in the selection not only of a less 
prestigious subject, but also a less prestigious subject specialisation once the 
subject is selected. This is similar to some student groups in 1960s France  
(Bourdieu and Passeron 1979[1964]: 13-15). Moreover, the lower class origin also 
prompts more reflection about the study choice and its advantages, which might be 
seen in the comparatively extensive material considerations of these students vis-à-
vis the other two ideal-types (ibid: 62-64). It cannot be fully delineated here how 
the experiences of these students in their studies, their encounter with other 
groups such as the inheritors or fallen noble-women and the assessment and self-
assessment that follows from these encounters in the framework of the Economics 
studies, lead towards the development of a disposition to serve as a ‘technical 
specialist’ within the discipline, perhaps not unlike a technician of earlier ages (and 
indeed: Leo’s -48-, Tom’s -50- and Vincent’s -69- fathers all work as, or were 
educated as, electricians). It might be fruitful to compare this sort of ‘technical’ 
approach to specialisations in other disciplines, such as Sociology, where it might 
be expressed a bit differently (such as a specialisation in qualitative methodology 
with little focus on theoretical issues). On the other hand, Anna (39) does not fit 
into this pattern, and neither does John (6). The former tended to reject statistics 
and specialised in Finance, and the latter specialised in developmental and 
heterodox Economics.    
Perhaps because they, initially, do not fit that well with their subject, experiences 
of conversion seem more numerous with this ideal-type than they are with the 
other two. This is true for both students that gravitate towards a critical view of 
their subject and those who rather support it as it is. Anna, indicatively, describes 
her ‘drift’ towards a more heterodox standpoint: 
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I: Yes, exactly. And then I worried [more fundamentally about Economics] quite a 
bit here, I mean this was quite funny because I had, like, this basic 
dissatisfaction where you thought in the beginning you mainly have it for 
yourself.  
T: Hm, hm. 
I: You only recognised in the course of study that you share it with other fellow 
students. Ahm, and then I was with [a student organisation that also hosts 
alternative Economics events], and there I somehow got to know more people, 
who thought more alternatively. And then X and I, don’t know how that came to 
fruition, .. but we somehow had the idea of founding these reading circles. 
T: Aha. 
I: Because we said, man, we want .. also to read other things, than what we 
[normally read]. And I think I somehow had, in a certain way, well, I probably 
would have finished the studies, but it has after all, it has [given] me, opened 
up, a very different relationship to Political Economy somehow. Because I then 
did [participate in the alternative Economics students organisation], worked at 
the Z-conference and again met people there, who, ahm. And then also 
recognised how my, well convictions, but like the questions that one asks 
changed and somehow also the attitude towards, towards some things shifted. 
Ah, yeah, exactly, this I experienced as very, I mean [case study institute-
location], have recognised it as very positive. Which somehow was linked to the 
university, but had actually nothing to do with university teaching. Like, more 
through this self-organisation and also through this network of pluralistic 
Economics, where I partially was, and … yeah [names another Economic 
initiative], the people that I sometimes met there, yeah.  
 
Tom (50) also acknowledges a shift in his economic, and political, attitudes since 
the commencing of his studies, but one that leads, at least at first glance, into a 
very different direction: 
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T: How would you, ah, how is your own political attitude? How would you 
describe this? Is there anything specific or? 
I: I mean in terms of party politics I couldn’t slot myself at all. Ahm, probably, I 
mean, a higgledy-piggledy mix of liberal and left. Yeah? Certainly not 
conservative. Ahm, but this is a changing process. I mean five years ago I 
wouldn’t have said that for example dairy farmers do not need a guaranteed 
price for their milk. This has been abolished, and now they need to struggle 
along quite a bit. Ahm, there I perhaps wouldn’t have said five years ago, that 
you say ‘Ok, actually there are market forces that care, ah, [for the fact that] 
those who produce efficiently on the market stay in the market and that the 
market price is justified in some way. That this asserts itself best in this form. 
Five years ago I perhaps would have said ‘the guaranteed price for milk is 
something good after all’. But in the meantime I would rather – […] [The price 
floor] has been abolished a few months ago I think. 
T: Oh I see. 
I: And, ah, ever since then the milk prices have plummeted. And now they’re 
upset quite a bit, mobilise their lobby. But, yeah. There I think I do have a 
different insight today than compared to earlier, and would say ‘They of course 
try to hold their position, their previously comfortable position. But probably, for 
the whole society, it is better if there is no- 
T: Price floor anymore 
I: Exactly. And that you leave it to the market forces to regulate that. 
T: And why do you think that? Because, like, research shows that or what? 
I: Yeah, because I think that it is an efficient result, and ah, certainly for the 
dairy farmers it is a sharp break, but for the consumers it is rational. Ahm, and if 
you start from the fact, that you say ‘before you somehow had a political 
measure that truncated the market, in a certain direction. That gave a group an 
advantage, which would’nt have been there, in that sense, if you would have had 
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a normal market price from the beginning. Ahm, there I think it is rational 
[sensible] to abolish it because a part [of the market] profits, and you would 
normally have a [better] market result if the consumers somehow wouldn’t pay 
less for the milk.   
 
Likewise, Vincent (69) ‘after all needed some time to get into Political Economy’ 
because somehow ‘this wasn’t so clear’. Leo (48), too, even though stating that he 
‘came through [his studies] quite fluently’ nevertheless also confesses: 
 
I: I also think that I, like most of the Econs [Economics students], went into my 
studies dewy-eyed. Had a look at the modules, what will come and so on, and 
thought ‘Well, it will be fine..’. Maybe not as dewy-eyed that I thought I get 
through this without Math, but.. 
 
Hence the relationship with academic Economics is less ‘inevitable’, and also less 
natural, than is the case with the Inheritors (and perhaps even the Fallen Nobles). 
The Parvenu’s experience of their study selections diverges quite clearly from those 
of the other ideal-types discussed so far. These students are exposed late to the 
idea of studying Economics, they accordingly construct their choices for themselves 
and others as much more accidental and ‘random’, in contrast to the Inheritors. 
One could say that their selections are relatively ‘extrinsic’. However, once they 
are acquainted to their new universe, they adopt with all the more fervour the 
assumptions and tenets of it, indeed not unlike the immigrants named in the quote 
at the start of this chapter. The specific focus of their creative, diligent pursuit 
towards technical, ‘concrete’ statistical-methodological problems (in the case of 
orthodox-minded students) or other ‘practical’ approaches (in the case of 
heterodox-minded students) from this particular starting point of ‘immigration’ into 
the field may induce one to coin the concept of Economic believer. How and why 
did some Parvenu’s become Economic believers? 
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Economism III – An explanatory Attempt 
 
The theoretical attitudes of the Parvenus in this sample are very varied, as could be 
seen already in the last chapter. How does the petit-bourgeois come to his/her 
form of economism? 
Figure 15   Proposed Relationship between Petit-Bourgeois Class Origin, Habitus 
and Selection of Economics 
 
 
The original living condition of the petit-bourgeois student tends to produce a gap 
between  available capital and aimed-for position, “[…] between knowledge and 
recognition […]” (Bourdieu 1984[1979]: 319). Unlike with the Fallen Nobles this gap 
tends to instil recognition rather than animosity towards cultural norms and ideals, 
at least initially (ibid.: 319-28). This gap tends to predispose towards rather 
‘disparate’ tastes and choices that are not consecrated by established rules of 
excellence and hence transform, in the course of a ‘typical’ petit-bourgeois 
educational trajectory, gaps in knowledge into gaps in age at certain stages of 
one’s education (Bourdieu and Passeron 1979[1964]: 6f.). In this case the initial 
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good-will transforms in time into a rather regressive, conservative disposition.  
Sometimes, however, a petit-bourgeois is able to ‘catch up’ with the specific 
Inheritors of a field, and to acquire the needed dispositions to play the game 
sufficiently well to be able to compete fully in it. But this comes at a price – the 
gap of ambition and capital tends to be replaced by an internalised contradiction of 
primary vs. secondary habitus that is all the greater the steeper the social ascent 
(producing, in other words, what Bourdieu describes as a cleft habitus). This can 
express itself in condescending and embarrassed views towards the original culture 
while at the same time wholeheartedly embracing field doxa. The objective 
dependence of the Parvenus on the educational system as a whole – both materially 
but also mentally – leads to a ‘subjective’ constriction, a ‘hardening’ of one’s 
viewpoint vis-à-vis alternative approaches. One clings all the more to what one has 
achieved, or what one wants to achieve, if one does not think very highly of one’s 
original culture, and one’s original self, in the first place.142 
In Economics, this encompasses the thorough acceptance of the reigning 
economistic mainstream as well as the focus on the technical prowess of model 
building. In its influence on the whole habitus, it also engenders vigour in the 
assessment of political or individual questions. The petit-bourgeois and Parvenus in 
German academic Economics tend to become radical individualists as their habitus 
transforms towards that of an Economic Believer.   
The initial gap habitus-field may be seen in the fact of their process of ‘stumbling 
into’ the discipline. John (6) too pondered about doing an apprenticeship first, but 
then decided to study due to quite non-academic reasons: 
I: But the studies only came [into focus] when I got to know my then-girlfriend, 
and I am here to study only because of her. 
T: Ok. 
I: I mean if I wouldn’t have come to X I wouldn’t have studied in Y. 
                                                           
142 This disposition to ‘clinging onto’ certain ideals of excellence, and the social standing these guarantee, is 
certainly nothing alien to German history. See  Arendt (1994[1965]) for a particularly prominent example. 
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T: Why not? No interest? 
I: I mean I wouldn’t, I wouldn’t really have known what. 
 
The trajectories presented here tend to be less smooth and friction-less than those 
of both the Inheritors and Fallen Nobles. Quite a few of the Economic Believers 
started out in a different subjects such as Political Sciences, Philosophy, Sociology 
or Business Administration before finding their way into Economics. It is therefore 
not really surprising to see them, at least initially, having a rather ‘pragmatic’ 
approach to their subject (one would say, within the epistemology criticised in 
chapter 2, ‘extrinsic’). But this tends to change rather significantly during their 
Economics studies, the more so the more success they enjoy in it, or through it. 
Theoretically, this may be explained by the specification of the predisposition 
towards cultural goodwill bolstered by the catalyst of success, to accept and adopt 
as one’s own ideal the inculcated ideals of one’s social universe. The fact that this 
happens to such a varied case may perhaps be explained theoretically by the fact 
that Parvenus by definition do not have a position carved out ex ante that is made 
for them, and so are forced to adapt to whatever they find in their fields, at least 
initially. To most, in the case of academic Economics, this inculcation will only be 
fleeting and will tend to pass quickly. But to those successful in the field, it will 
likely leave a more defining mark. For the Parvenus there is a small, yet definite 
chance that they can acquire the required habitus of an academic discipline, to 
become a ‘true Believer’. Thus, John’s (6) hard work, during the process of 
‘converting’ to heterodox Economics, can be said to be a result both of his goodwill 
as well as a hard, indeed ascetic, discipline:  
 
I: It was [a course in his Economics studies] there I still know, I have, ah […] 
before Christmas I had a look at the book list. 
T: Hm. 
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I: Then got the books. […] [Talking about a particular book] It was recommended, 
it was not necessary, but recommended as additional literature, and then I read 
it completely over Christmas  
T: But it is 400 pages or something, right? 
I: Yeah, yeah, but this was the way I was back then. In principle, in the first two 
years [of my studies] I did not do much else than learning. Right? […] Read 
incredibly much for Politics, as I said. Don’t know how this is in Sociology, but in 
Politics the reading lists are very long. I mean for each lecture there are like 10 
to 15 articles recommended, as additional material, I had a look at all of them. 
T: And you didn’t get tired- 
I: Nope. 
T: - to read this stuff? Why not? Simply- 
I: Yeah, I, I liked it after all. And I also thought I had to do it. Back then I was 
totally paranoid, I thought if I don’t do that I won’t pass.  
 
It is no accident that this is reminiscent of Calvinist ascetics (Weber 1950[1904]). 
Therefore, it is in the context of trajectories such as this that one finds quite a few 
stories of ‘conversion’ of tastes, as in the case of Tom (50), who specialises first in 
econometrics and then Macroeconomics and who may be defined a Parvenu due to 
his establishment in a rather prestigious specialisation, the degree of his 
advancement in the discipline at a relatively young age (he is in his mid-20’s, like 
the Inheritors), and lastly his high score on the Economic Habitus Index. He 
describes his change of mind on the example of specific economic principles, as we 
have seen above. 
 
One might think that, for the Parvenus, the technical-formal aspects of economic 
thinking and models represent a ready possibility within the field, a visible sign of 
recognition and discipline-specific sign of being ‘cultured’, even though it is not the 
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only characteristic one must have in order to acquire higher standing within the 
field. And so one might interpret the taking-up of statistical, methodological and 
formalistic specialisations as the field-specific version of “[…] the minor forms of 
the legitimate cultural good and practices […]” (Bourdieu 1984[1979]: 319), which 
Bourdieu describes in relation to the acquisition of a field-specific middle-brow art. 
Concentration on the technique of producing a model, of its formalised parts and 
workings, as opposed to freely drawing it from one’s ‘natural inclinations’, as the 
Inheritors do, may be analogous to the relationship of the stamp to the art 
collection, of the kitchen- or bedroom-corners in one’s flat to real kitchen rooms or 
bedrooms in a bourgeois mansion (ibid.: 321), or to the technical vs. aesthetically-
oriented use of photography (Bourdieu et al. 1990[1965]: 103-28). More closely, it 
might have its sociological analogues in subjects like Sociology in a meticulous but 
narrow qualitative analysis or commitment to ethnographic research. Once more we 
might look to 18th century French housing to see a group of an analogous position 
and to compare it with these Parvenus. It is ‘symmetry’ and ‘solidity’ (Elias 
2002[1969]: 99) that are most important for the tradesmen and small merchants of 
the time. Elias writes: „The lowest social classes did not need to keep appearances, 
they had no real obligations regarding status. For this reason they gave priority to 
building characteristics which, while they need not be absent for the others, were 
entirely eclipsed by display and prestige. Utilitarian values such as convenvience 
and solidity thus became quite unashamedly the main architectural concern of 
these classes. The need for economy became quite apparent in the outward 
appearance of the houses.” (Elias 2006[1969]: 62) 
Solidity and Symmetry, these correspond, I argue, in the field of contemporary 
German Economics, in a taste for particularly technical and statistical tasks. They 
are sociologically related to the ‘convenient’ and ‘solid’ housing of the French petit 
bourgeoisie of that time.  
What remains clear is that this acquisition of economism via the cultural good-will 
of a petit-bourgeois habitus – which is nevertheless transformed through this 
acquisition -  may still produce a neoliberal disposition although one that seems, 
implicitly or explicitly, to defend the specific technical textbook solutions to 
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economic problems. One is reminded of the way Milton Friedman, himself a Parvenu 
by origin (see Friedman and Friedman 1998) and Economic Believer, adopted and 
processed the original neo-liberalism of the Austrian Economists. His version 
became what one may describe, paraphrasing Angus Burgin (2012: 168-85) as a 
‘super-consistent, provocative apology of the pure market’ after an initial learning 
period of ‘parroting’ the original Neoliberals (ibid.: 170f.), and against the then 
prevailing Keynesian paradigm with its justification of the welfare state and 
“[…]the culture of politeness that characterized much of the academic world.” 
(ibid.: 171f.).  
There are also rather harsh statements from deviations from the accepted ways of 
doing things in Economics, visible especially in Tom’s (50) case and his reaction to 
doubts about homo oeconomicus that often come from heterodox students: 
 
I: Ahm, nope, a mean point of critique to begin with. Ahm, a lot of people that 
say that never dealt seriously with models. Because they can’t be bothered. 
Because they .. aren’t able to do it. To put it wickedly. I mean, nah, I mean I 
believe a lot of people haven’t dealt seriously with it, and, ahm, relate homo 
oeconomicus to too many things. Right? I also think that’s fiddlesticks. I mean, 
ahm, homo oeconomicus is an idea, and in the models in which it is used it deals 
with [speaks more emphatically] extremely specific styles of life, right? You 
speak of the question: how do I invest, how do I consume? And these are 
decisions that in my view are well constructible with homo oeconomicus. […] But 
I cannot somehow apply homo oeconomicus to psychological questions. I cannot 
assume that homo oeconomicus works in interpersonal relationships, right? […] I 
mean [as Economists] we do not try to describe the whole life world in which we 
are. But we describe specific, economic problems. Yes. And that you can do with 
homo oeconomicus or with ordinary mathematised Political Economy very well. 
T: Hm. 
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I: The question is what people make out of it. Yeah, do they apply it to things 
where it should not belong, right?   
 
One can interpret this as expression of a rather rigid, narrow form of economism 
that is less ‘playful’ than that of the Inheritors and Fallen Nobles. It is also quite 
strict in assessing the methodological position of other students. But indeed, the 
way in which this cultural good-will is expressed is not always the same even within 
the field of academic Economics. What are these deviations? What do they mean? 
How can they be explained? 
 
 
Deflections and Deviations 
 
The first case, that of Linus (54), who comes from a Humanities background yet is 
now quite successful in Economics, is an exception in so far as there is objective 
recognition without its ‘subjective’ counterpart. Rather than expressing a deep 
belief in Economics we encounter – and that is very rare among these students – a 
quite high degree of cynicism and pragmatic (‘extrinsic’) behaviour which cannot be 
explained with the tools at hand (although it might have to do something with his 
relatively late entrance into the field and earlier Humanities education). He 
specialises in Econometrics but is aware that the methods and models he applies 
are ‘more of a description rather than an explanation’ of economic phenomena. He 
has a knack for building models – recognised both by fellow students, who admire 
him for this ability, as well as an Economics professor who provides funding for 
further studies for him – but nevertheless criticises the ‘overly mathematicised’ 
character of Economics. Still, Linus’ (54) motto for life after all is ‘let it happen’. 
Overall, he subordinates to the existing order and forgoes his critique: 
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I: […] If you then tendentially pull the rug out from the feet of those people that 
have built up their career on certain basic assumptions. That is this Kuhnian 
theory of science, that with changes of generation there can be changes of 
paradigms, but tendentially not within the same generation of scientists. 
T: Hm. 
I: [imitates professor] I have worked for 15 years to get this professorship in this 
topic and then it is this way, nobody can tell me that everything that we have 
learned is wrong or not well-founded. 
T: Why not? 
I: Well, that is. 
T: Theoretically, this should be possible. 
I: But seems to be inside of the people. … And therefore, my plan is first to 
nicely.. to pass unnoticed in the paradigm, without much of an innovation and if 
this works out, if one actually comes out somewhere at the back [i.e. on the top] 
and perhaps [acquires] a professorship or so, then you are also free. 
T: You can stir it up from the inside. 
I: Exactly. [laughs] This was the idea, through the middle .. Oh well, honestly I 
don’t have too many hopes. Whatever will be will be, and what won’t won’t. 
But one may see here that even this ‘opportunism’ is supplemented with a symbolic 
(an ‘intrinsic’) justification, i.e. the use of Kuhnian ideas of scientific revolution 
(2006[1973]), that imply some kind of ‘automatic’ change of the science, and only 
in the long run, so that against short-term obstacles supposedly one cannot do 
anything,143 which allow one to resign oneself to the forces that be.  
                                                           
143 Incidentally, this is precisely the weakness Bourdieu finds with the Kuhnian Sociology of Science 
(Bourdieu 2006: 15-17; 1975: 32) 
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Indeed, if it was not for this caveat of a ‘better future’ this ‘opportunism’ would 
almost turn Linus - in his own eyes - into a Goffmanian theatre-player (Goffman 
1971[1959]). And one cannot but think that this attitude ends up serving a 
conservative function within the academic field. These might be those groups in 
science that are only moderately adjusted to that paradigm, at least ‘subjectively’. 
What role do they play in modern science? Is their number increasing with the 
grown of the educational system? If so, how does this work? Do they fit Bourdieu’s 
‘Academic Mediocritas’ (Bourdieu 1996[1989]: 23-29)?  
 
The two students who deviate most from the original ideal-type of Parvenu – 
Economic Believer are John (6) and Anna (39), both of whom would call themselves 
heterodox students. Anna is very critical of neoclassical Economics and model-
building overall. ‘I had the feeling I simply learn baloney’, she reminisces about her 
experiences during her Master studies in Political Economy, and thinks that it is 
‘completely irrelevant what we calculate there’. She is very active in the pluralist 
Economics student movement and in particular advocates an idea called ‘positive 
money’. She explains: 
 
I: […] I mean I have a bad conscience because I talk so much, but these are the 
topics that are, where there is so much on the tip of my tongue, exactly. And the 
[association that deals with positive money] is basically this thought to create an 
alternative [to the existing financial system] and for me this is what is behind it. 
Ahm, should there be another great crisis sometime, which will certainly come at 
some point, if not in 10 years, then in 200 years it will come. It is somehow 
reasonable144 to grapple with these alternatives, ahm exactly. And that the 
[association] does. Don’t know exactly either whether I deem it as the ideal 
solution, but it is about creating a monetary system which, ah, basically serves 
                                                           
144 I am here translating the word reasonable for the German ‘sinnvoll’ to designate the rather vague 
connotation it has in this context. In a former quote by Tom, I, on the contrary, translated it into 
‘rational’ to designate the more rigid use and meaning it seems to have in the theoretical and 
practical context in which Tom uses it. This practice is of course debatable.  
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all people, where money creation and redistribution processes are no longer 
attributed to private banks, but, ahm, benefit the general public. The general 
public in the sense of state income. And [the association] deals with that, 
exactly. How one could do this and so on. 
T: Hm. 
I: This is quite funny because they got out of this weirdo-corner to receive more 
recognition […] But that is interesting I think, because if you [deal with this topic 
in this way] you very quickly are slotted with the anti-semites. Happened to me 
as well already, somehow. 
T: Oh, ok. 
I: Which I then, then you need to somehow, this is actually, I find that difficult 
economically, if you deal with certain topics, because you then are linked to 
certain societal groups somehow. .. Yeah. But I think this is just changing with 
the money and the financial system. 
T: Hm. I mean what do you guys demand, or what do you demand in terms of 
economic policy with this positive money? 
I: That […] [when private banks give credits to private consumers they] do as if 
they issue a piece of paper where they say ‘I owe you’, and that piece of paper 
they then use as money. You can imagine it like this, and the [association] would 
want […] that this book money could not be used as a medium of exchange 
anymore. But that banks basically are pure intermediaries, and the money that 
you bring there they can lend further. But, exactly, nothing else. And at the 
moment there is this extreme instability because of the fact that money 
functions as debentures that banks actually cannot redeem, .. at least not all at 
once. But that is indeed this problem with the bankers, if we would all go to the 
bank and retrieve our money, that would not work because they don’t have 
enough cash, and so on. Out of this follows instability and redistribution and 
what the [association] would want to have is, so to speak, that only the central 
bank can create [book] money, that you can only pay with this money then, for 
example your taxes and the like […]. At the moment this profit of money 
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creation is with the private banks and then it would be with the central bank and 
this would [generate] income for the state and relieve debt, and so on.., and this 
problem of instability, where the actors in this financial system have an extreme 
power, simply because they have this large threat of instability, which is also a 
real threat. And I think if you would take out this instability further, which the 
[association] pursues, that is, ahm .. could contribute also to the 
disempowerment of the financial sector.  
 
At first glimpse, these statements seem as if they are the direct antithesis of Tom’s 
(50) attitude, discussed above. However, both have in common a very focussed, 
very passionate view of their chosen specialisations – indeed like Economic 
Believers, although with differing thrusts. Unlike Theo (40) for instance, for whom 
heterodox Economics is one activity among others, Anna (39) does nothing else, 
both intellectually and generally. In addition to that, of course, there seems to be 
the serious, heterodox challenge to economism, a broad and general outlook on the 
whole economy, a taste for tolerance in intellectual matters, that we have already 
encountered with the heterodox Inheritors.These are surely their own ‘intrinsic’ 
motivations and reflections, to be taken seriosuly. On the other hand, one may 
attempt to situate them in a material context. 
 Once again, one finds, as with the Inheritor “deviators”, what might be called the 
‘paradox of heterodoxy’: if indeed Political Economy is ‘complete bollocks’ and 
‘something that no one understands’, and if it is understood as a Social Science, to 
be combined with Sociology for ‘a truly holistic study’, why not simply study 
something else than Political Economy? Why not simply turn away from Economics 
altogether? The answers given here (and elsewhere in a similar way) – that one 
‘wants to understand it’ and ‘to follow through to the end’, since one is not a 
‘quitter’ – seem to be ex post justifications designed to hide from everyone’s view 
the still existing fundamental links to orthodoxy and to the academic field in which 
it reigns. So that, for example, Anna emphasises the normative, and practical, 
utility of economic research in sharp distinction to the ‘logical understanding of 
science’ found in orthodoxy: ‘I want to do something that benefits society.’ 
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Peculiarly, this attitude is not so far away from the preference for the ‘tangible’ 
aspects and methods that typically figure in Economist’s justifications against 
‘fuzzy’ and ‘gratuitous’ disciplines like Sociology as shown in earlier chapters – only 
that now the normative assessments of precision vs. fuzziness are reversed145. 
Relative fuzziness, rather than exactitude, is now equated with ‘tangibility’. It is in 
line with the counter-culture that heterodox Economics represents, with its 
emphasis on ‘plurality’ – but a limited plurality defined strictly in relation to 
mainstream Economics. The same goes for its emphasis on ‘autonomy’ – but a 
limited autonomy in which (self-)organisation and communication patterns are 
patterned equally strictly against the mainstream. In short, what one seems to 
encounter here are boundaries of fields and their doxa that are denied.  
 
The remarks made above, about the mutual relationship of the positive and the 
normative, the altruistic and the egoistic seem to apply here as well. Anna’s 
‘transformation’ of thinking (as that of others) can be interpreted as a 
‘changeover’, the taking of an opposite position which, however, still has the same 
distance from the opposing concept. Besides this there are also obvious constancies 
designating her discourse as profoundly ‘economic’ in the accepted term: there is, 
for example, the already discussed tendency for political neutrality: She ‘also finds 
it problematic that one thinks in these [political] extremes.’ And: ‘I wouldn’t see 
myself absolutely with one party in terms of positions.’ Perhaps then, one might 
just as well see in these changes the transposition of ‘cultural good-will’ to a new 
topic and area, which includes a new sort of utopia to be aspired to as well as a 
new expression of the idea of ‘fairness’ in the economy perhaps not so far away 
                                                           
145 This reminds one of Levi-Strauss’ analysis of the mutually alternative, alternating yet 
complementary uses of totemic systems for ancestors of neighbouring, northern Australian tribes: 
“[…] the Arabanna and the Warramunga think of their totemic ancestors as single individuals who 
are half-human half-animal and have an air of completeness. The Aranda on the other hand favour 
the idea of a multiplicity of ancestors (for each totemic group), who are, however, incomplete 
human beings and fully fledged men. In general, the distribution of beliefs and customs on a north-
south axis shows sometimes a gradual change from one extreme type to its reverse form and 
sometimes the recurrence of the same forms at the two poles but in that case expressed in a reverse 
context: patrilineal or matrilineal; the structural inversion then occurs in the centre, that is, among 
the Aranda […]” (Levi-Strauss 1966[1962]: 86f., my emphasis). The Aranda here having the same 
middle position between Arrabanna and Warramunga as orthodox Political Economy has between 
Sociology and Heterodox Economics.  
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from the ideals of Parvenus-Economic Believers that remained in the established 
orthodox pattern, like Tom (50). One may therefore construct that they have an 
interest in taking this position. I do not have the means here to explain this change-
over. Nevertheless, Anna’s positioning can be compared with that of a ‘cultural 
intermediary’, in the way in which Bourdieu talks about the non-legitimate 
popularisers of legitimate works (Bourdieu 1984[1979]: 323ff.). Against the 
‘auctores’ (i.e. the Inheritors and Fallen Nobles) and the ‘lectores’ (i.e. those petit-
bourgeois who, at least initially, accept the assumptions of orthodox Economics), 
this group try to carve out their own space within the field. Like them, Anna wishes 
one day to write her own ‘Economics book, easy to understand’. She shows the 
willingness to get into contact with agents and audiences outside the field, which 
Bourdieu derives as an important characteristic following from a heterodox field 
position (Bourdieu 1975: 30). But at the same time these external ‘flirtatons’ and 
‘irritations’ (see the remarks on Anti-Semitism above) are also rather established 
within academic Economics, as we have seen in the last chapters.  
 
Conclusion 
 
In this chapter I have constructed a relationship between a petit-bourgeois or 
Parvenu habitus and a disposition of goodwill within the economic field that I have 
termed the Economic Believer habitus. This habitus is characterised by strong, 
diligent attachment to the orthodox, or heterodox theories and methodologies of 
the field, which sometimes implies rather harsh, open depreciations of other 
approaches. With the tools at hand I cannot say why some Parvenu choose orthodox 
or heterodox standpoints. What may, however, be sketched, is how their social 
origin and the accompanying interests are exhibited, in a transformed, field-
specific way, compared to (most) students of the other two Ideal-types. The 
orthodox Economic Believers, in relation to them, tend to accept and welcome the 
delegation to technical, statistical duties and specialisations. Other than that the 
Parvenus usually construct their study selection as much more accidental than the 
other two ideal-types, and consequently experience their initiation into the field as 
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a form of conversion, which sometimes extends to their very attitude to academic 
orthodoxy. One may therefore conclude that this is yet another distinctive form of 
‘intrinsic’ motivation and reflection which is unique insofar as it is the expression of 
a habitus that is more predisposed and dependant on institutional benevolence than 
others146. 
Perhaps one must now attempt to organise the insights gained in this section 
towards a fresh theoretical statements towards study selection. Finally, we will 
return to the questions posed in the introduction and see how far we can contribute 
to answering them. 
  
                                                           
146 The concept of the ‘oblate’ comes to mind (Bourdieu 1988[1984]: 100f.). I would like to thank Prof. Bridget 
Fowler for making me aware of this. 
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Chapter 9 – Conclusion 
 
“No doubt relationships between any two societies would be made easier if, 
through the use of some kind of grid, it were possible to establish a pattern of 
equivalences between the ways in which each society uses analogous human types 
to perform different social functions. Instead of simply arranging meetings on a 
professional basis, doctors with doctors, teachers with teachers and industrialists 
with industrialists, we might perhaps be led to see that there are more subtle 
correspondences between individuals and the parts they play.” 
Claude Levi-Strauss – Tristes Tropiques  
 
Recapitulations 
 
In this work I have attempted to combine research questions that fall both in the 
field of the Sociology of Economic Knowledge and the Sociology of Education, or, 
more precisely, study selection. I started from a critique of the substantialist 
German and British literature on study selection – substantialism denoting a one-
dimensional meaning of ‘intrinsic’ and ‘extrinsic’ study ‘choices’ in the former and 
a one-dimensional, partial meaning of ‘reflexivity’ in the latter. Against this I 
opposed the basic principles of a Bourdieusian epistemology which holds that 
meanings of actions, whether they concern the selection of study disciplines or 
reflections on one’s life, are not simply what they appear to be in common sense 
(or even alternative sense), but are the expressions of particular necessities of 
social condition that have been inscribed into the dispositions, the thinking reflexes 
so to speak, of the acting people. They are also influenced by the specific social 
environment in which they are in. This, then, forces us to see study selections 
within a conceptual chain of original field-habitus-current field-‘choice’, where all 
the concepts are influential at any time during the educational trajectory of a 
person. It opens up another, structural, dimension of interactions (of students with 
the academic field, with their field of selection, with other students, with staff and 
professors, etc., with the curriculum of their selected subject etc. – in other words, 
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between an embodied history and another embodied, or institutionalised, history) 
that takes place beyond the immediately visible ‘choice’ that is given to the 
interviewer or ticked in a survey. This dimension is not simply mirrored in empirical 
phenomena or not. It is a vital part of them, and it is so through the habitus, the 
lynchpin between structures and actions of people, that these dimensions are 
practically linked and realised. I hold that they are two sides of the same coin, so 
to speak.  
Figure 16   Synopsis of a theoretical Sketch of a Bourdieusian Theory of Study 
Selection 
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But this makes the question of study selection more complex – we cannot, as with 
other approaches, simply pose group specific selections as ‘genuinely’ ‘intrinsically’ 
or ‘extrinsically’ motivated or deem certain groups as ‘reflexive’ per se while 
others are not. It is only through reconstructing the specific histories of the agents 
and the field they are in that one can make a better statement. This, of course, 
also implies to grant the possibility that some ‘intrinsic’ motivations are closer to 
some ‘extrinsic’ ones than originally thought, and, conversely, that some ‘intrinsic’ 
motivations are further apart. The point is to show how and why.  
For this I interviewed around 50 German Economics students of varying disciplinary 
recognition and in varying stages of their education on their study selections. I 
contextualised their statements with their own original position in social space, 
their educational trajectory up to the point of the interview as well as with the 
field of academic Economics and its peculiar standing and history. This field, it 
seems, was and is characterised by a rather mediocre standing within the German 
academic field but a dominant one in terms of relations to extra-academic fields. 
This fits with statistical indicators of the social origin of both its students as well as 
its staff vis-à-vis those of other disciplines. Based on this contextualisation, and by 
way of theoretical induction, I first explored differences in attitudes and 
motivations between what I call ‘recognised’ and ‘non-recognised’ students before 
further exploring the differences between different groups of ‘recognised’ 
students, the Inheritors, the Fallen Nobles, and the Parvenus. I believe it is fair to 
say that in these interviews, as well as in other complementary sources, there is at 
least initial evidence to be found for the adequacy and explanatory power of these 
distinctions. There are, first, discernible differences between the attitudes of the 
‘recognised’ and ‘non-recognised’ students in that the former tend to construct an 
earlier, perhaps more mystical, relationship to Economics than the former. 
Curricular concepts and terms – the typical economic liberalism and propensity 
towards mathematical modelling that prevail in the discipine - tend to fit much 
more to their thinking, and tend to be more far-reaching, extending onto areas not 
directly linked to their academic expertise. Second, there seem differences in how 
this acquisition of economic concepts and assumptions is done and inflected, 
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namely according to class origin. The Inheritors, students from a parental 
background of middle and technical teaching as well as engineering and natural 
science, tend to be most at home and at ease with the concepts offered by 
Economics. They thrive in mathematical and abstract model-making and exhibit an 
outspoken disapproval of more ‘literary’ forms of enquiry into social phenomena. 
The Fallen Nobles are coming from a dominant class background that has been 
deprived of its dominance. They value above all the liberal philosophy and 
individualist epistemology of Economics but are nevertheless critical of the 
discipline’s mathematics and model-making. They are fervent advocates for 
extending the meaning of homo oeconomicus to all spheres of life. The Parvenus, 
coming from petit-bourgeois backgrounds with a strong technical emphasis, 
particularly tend to value the statistical, methodological aspects of their curriculum 
while adapting to its new social philosophy with outspoken fervour. 
In a sense, then, this work is somewhat reminiscent of Bourdieu’s and Passeron’s 
early work The Inheritors (1979[1964]). Not only does it thematise and show social 
reproduction via educational selections and dispositions of the ‘elect’ of Economics. 
It also helps us to make sense of certain differences in position-taking within that 
group of recognised, ‘elect’ students, that is, their choice of specialisations and 
even to a certain degree their conflicts among themselves (orthodox vs. heterodox) 
as being part of the specific academic distinction games that are somewhat 
reminiscent of the ‘mutually opposing Trotskyisms’ presented in The Inheritors 
(ibid.: 47-52). And, like in that specific French world, there are empirical indicators 
that seem to point towards the fact that the rift orthodox vs. heterodox or intrinsic 
vs. extrinsic positioning might actually help to hide more profound differences that 
are grounded in a different class trajectory of the students. Surely, this also means 
to invest psychologically in the specific form of the ‘charisma doctrine’ which in 
German Economics is inextricably bound with mathematical model building. This is 
least possible for those not recognised who therefore, somewhat like working-class 
students in Bourdieu’s and Passeron’s work, “[…] cannot fail to wonder what they 
are doing.” (ibid.: 62-64). On the other hand, most of the students in my sample 
certainly do not seem to exhibit, apart from occasional displays of good-faith into 
the values of the discipline, much of a gap between objective position and 
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subjective expectation as it was described for those without family experience in 
schooling in France in the 1950’s and 1960’s. This would point towards a higher 
degree of integration of hysteresis, in the sense described by Bourdieu in On the 
State (2014[2012]: 358-62), with philantrophy being linked to such relatively new 
institutions as think tanks. But at this point, one may only speculate why this is.       
 
Fresh Views 
 
What do these explorations point towards when re-thinking study selection with a 
Bourdieusian lens? First of all, there seems a case to be made for theoretical 
distinction of groups of students within a discipline. In times when the function of 
tertiary education seems to change more and more from a reproductive arena of 
intellectual circles towards an indispensable way station to any professional 
distinction, it becomes important to develop and devise indicators to distinguish, 
say, a scientific-educational from a rather professional orientation. These are not 
anymore ‘genuine’ motivations, but rather aspirations towards specific fields that 
have particular requirements. One should think about possible empirical indicators 
for this. Those should be adapted to discipline-specific doxa and assumptions. In 
any case, there seems little reason to assume, neither theoretically nor empirically, 
that there is such a thing as one unified ‘field of study choice’. One should 
differentiate the students much more than has been done hitherto. As an 
epistemological rule we might therefore establish: do not say: ‘People of this or 
that social origin and history will be likely academically successful and interested 
Economists or Sociologists or Philosophers.’ Rather, say: ‘Among academically 
successful and interested Economists or Sociologists or Philosophers you are more 
likely to find people of such and such social origin and history.’  
Second, within scientific-educational orientations it seems to make sense to 
theoretically distinguish not between ‘intrinsic’ and ‘extrinsic’ motivations as such, 
but between motivations that are embedded in a system of relations constituted by 
the habitus of the students and the particular field they are in or want to be in. In 
this way study selection acquires a more theoretical and at the same time practical 
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meaning. In how far a particular student exhibits a more ‘intrinsic’ rather than 
‘extrinsic’ motivation depends now on the position of the student and her habitus 
relative to the field, not simply on her ‘free’ motivation. This structural 
relationship is the abstracted dimension of the likely experience of the students 
and the likely actions that follow from it, how their habitus ‘presents’ the field to 
them and thus suggests and guides further selections and actions. It is the ‘other 
side of the coin’ that is to be illuminated by the Sociologist.  
This explains why the Inheritors seem, from all the recognised students I have 
considered here, ‘naturally’ as the most ‘intrinsic’ ones, at least at first. Their 
particular ‘interest in disinterestedness’ is obliterated early from their view and 
those of most observers (except in Economics, of course, by critics such as those 
listed in my introduction above, who are pre-disposed, by their marginal position in 
the field, to critically objectify these selections, but also to reduce them, either to 
intellectual inadequacy or to cynicism). This is unlike with those less-fitting (i.e. 
the Fallen Nobles and Parvenus), who, by their relative mis-fit to the field’s 
requirements, tend to be reminded of their gap. ‘Extrinsic’ motivation, experienced 
and voiced, is therefore in any case a clear sign of a gap of impersonalised history 
and institutionalised history of the field. And even if it in time gives way to more 
‘intrinsic’ motivations (as we have seen with the Parvenus in particular), I have 
argued that these ‘intrinsic’ motivations are quite different in terms of their 
circumstances of genesis and meaning than those of the Inheritors, and thus need to 
be grouped into different Ideal-types. In the case of the Inheritors, it is the 
expression of an ambivalent position in social space (and, later, academic space) 
which predisposes them towards developing a keen interest in ‘clear’ and ‘tangible’ 
and ‘positive’ and thus mathematical-modelling ways of reasoning while at the 
same time anxiously responding to political or extra-scientific demands. This, of 
course, overlaps significantly with the disciplinary requirements of German 
academic Economics which has allegedly a homological position in the academic 
space. With the Fallen Nobles ‘intrinsic’ motivation for Economics denotes, on the 
other hand, a predisposition for symbolic enunciation – the surrogate of those 
formerly privileged groups that have declined in their position – by the taking up of 
a conspicuous individualism and radical liberalism while also showing a very 
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sceptical attitude towards mathematical modelling. With the Parvenus, ‘intrinsic’ 
motivation signifies yet another meaning, that of an aspiration (a good will) towards 
a field and status formerly unknown, which results in a specific selection of 
technical, statistical aspects combined with extensive adaptation of the neoliberal 
field doxa. But using the word ‘results’ is probably too mechanistic, because we 
always need to empathise how the original structural resources of these students 
show themselves in specific perceptions, impressions and classifications which 
provide orientational guidance in the maze of possible choices of disciplines and 
specialisations. 
 
 Moreover, it seems clear that the selections themselves, even with the Inheritors, 
change the dispositions and the habitus to a certain degree, so that people with an 
original cadre origin, even though having lots of common social ground with 
Inheritors in Economics, are still somewhat different. But how are they different 
from one another? Following the data analysis I would argue that it is their deep 
belief in the objectivity and truth of academic Economics, and thus in their own 
objectivity, that distinguishes the finished Economist, the orthodox Inheritor, the 
Ultraliberal or the Economic-Believer statistician from his or her otherwise socially 
similar Cadres, Fallen Nobles or Parvenus (Bourdieu 1980[1977]). The study of 
Economics (as that of other disciplines, one might argue), that is the transformation 
of normative assessments into legitimate ‘truth’, and first in the eyes of the 
Economists themselves. It is the firm grafting of economic principles and 
assumptions onto the existing and required social characteristics of its elite 
students, and hence the transformation of the dispositions of the habitus. This can 
go even so far that areas that are not strictly economic in the narrow sense of the 
word (such as study selection itself) are viewed through the ‘economic lens’. 
Economic thinking becomes tendentially omnifarious – this, incidentally, might be 
another way to produce more reliable empirical indicators of habitus change. We 
might pose as an epistemological principle for further studies: Find out what the 
major assumptions of the legitimate way of doing a science are, and then enquire 
whether they are applied in areas remote from the actual remits of that science.  
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With these results in mind, one may return to the sociological specialisations 
discussed in chapters 3 and 4 to spell out the implications of this study. For the 
sociology of education it makes the case for a materially grounded and anti-
substantialist and anti-essentialist epistemology. ‘Intrinsic’ and ‘extrinsic’ study 
‘choices’ as well as ‘reflexivity’ are not simply concepts that are the same 
everywhere and with every student. They are, like study choice as a whole, 
integrated into the individual history and trajectory of a person and hence need to 
be interpreted and grouped according to the relationship and interaction they 
entertain with these structural characteristics. In the end this calls for a re-
grouping of disciplines and groups of students according to analogical similarities of 
this relationship rather than according to superficial similarity.   
For the sociology of science (discussed in chapter 4), I hope to have shown, firstly, 
that ‘betting’ on Bourdieusian epistemology can yield at least some fruitful insights 
and results that were hitherto hidden. If this is so it means that controlled 
reduction, understood as a theoretically guided decision to emphasise some 
relationships over others in analysis, is a necessary practice both in epistemology 
and resulting specific theory. The case is to be made for the development not of 
abstract economistic, but specific economic theories of interaction of specific 
habitus in specific fields. This leaves the sociologist to construct a theory of what 
he sees and hears from the subjects’ constructions he observes in the ‘as if’-manner 
– ideal-type so and so acts as if they were Inheritors, Fallen Nobles, Parvenus’s, and 
so on. This also implies that we need to take subjects’ constructions, and thus their 
values, seriously rather than to dismiss it as a part of ‘tinkering’ or simple power 
games. This means granting the existence of a common stock of disciplinary norms 
of which various groups within the field have different and contrasting 
interpretations for which they then struggle with the allowed methods.  
 
Relations between Fields 
 
If the major results of this study hold true, then of course it also has implications 
for for the questions posed in the introduction, and by heterodox Economists and 
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critical observers of academic Econonics alike. We might now reformulate them 
into Bourdieusian terms: What is the relationship of academic Economists to their 
own intellectual products? What relations do exist between the Economic academic 
field and other fields like Politics or the economic field, and why?   
With the anti-intellectualism inherent in Economism, it seems barely surprising that 
the intellectual products of many Economists attract the approval and support of 
those fractions of the dominant class that “[…] expect their artists, their writers, 
their critics, like their couturiers, jewellers or interior designers, to provide 
emblems of distinction which are at the same time means of denying social 
reality.” (Bourdieu 1984[1979]: 293). But they do so in and through their good faith 
in the objectivity of what they are doing. It is this belief in objectivity – the 
specifically formalised form of objectivity which they ‘intrinsically’ believe in - that 
prepares them to fulfil conservative functions in society. If the analysis above is 
adequate, then this means that these Economists are not stupid and not cynical. 
They are, mostly convinced of their ways, and that conviction is a social product, to 
be investigated sociologically. What they perceive as neutral tool of seeing and 
judging the world becomes a tool of domination in other fields, against trade unions 
or against the state and its respective agents. Now, beside the functions of 
delivering scientific justifications for the rule of the market over the whole of 
society, Economists peculiarly seem to partake also in other aspects or forms of 
domination, namely in the political field. For example, it is known that academic 
Economists have played quite a role in the setup of the new rightwing party politics 
and movements in Germany during the last years – both directly, by helping to 
found parties such as the Alternative for Germany (AfD) and lending their symbolic 
weight to it, but also, indirectly, by an attraction exerted to at least some of the 
voting groups of these parties through their intellectual products. My sample gives 
evidence that this may be particularly true for the Fallen Nobles. How may this be 
accounted for? Here, too, I believe one can make sense of this with Bourdieusian 
tools.   
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For example, one could forward the hypothesis that there is a homology of position 
and of trajectory between the two groups. It is known that it tends to be the 
declining petite bourgeoisie that is most attracted to various forms of conservatism 
(see for the recent case of Pegida protests in Germany: Daphi et al. 2015: 9-13, 
who show that the supporters of this movement are disproportionally male and self-
employed; Vorländer, Herold, and Schäller 2015: 43-49, who in addition find above-
average earnings but below-average education of these protesters ; and of course 
Bourdieu 1984[1979]: 346-51). Ultraliberalism as it is discussed here must appear as 
a highly attractive option to these social groups and their political leaders. This is 
because it gives prestige and rationalised foundation to a good part of their own 
living conditions and private grievances, their perceived attack by new regulations 
and lack of support by the state. Ultraliberalism’s radical individualism, its 
seemingly radical critique of the state, of bureaucracy (and the oppression and 
power that is executed within these arrangements), its view of the world that may 
border on conspiracy theories (the political elite trying consciously to control the 
rest of society) are part and parcel of that attractiveness. Hence it seems no 
accident that it was Economists, including some influential Ultraliberals (i.e. 
Austrian Economists and Ordoliberals), that helped to launch the right-wing populist 
Alternative for Germany party in 2013, in which they were successively 
marginalised by more and more outspokenly right-wing (and particularly racist) 
forces.147 In the same vein, it is not so astonishing to hear from Anton (27) that 
when a libertarian friend of his tried to open up a libertarian discussion group: 
‘those right-wing people came along pretty damn quick’. Sentences like these point 
towards a peculiar, and ill-understood, ‘dynamics of fields’, here between the 
academic field and the political field. On the other hand, this potential demand, 
and the resources and power and recognition attached to it, likely also serves as a 
temptation in itself. Hence it is no surprise to see the German Hayek-Society rocked 
by fissures between more ‘liberal’ and more ‘conservative’ forces (Plickert 2015), 
or that American libertarians’ links to the alt-right are sometimes exposed (Ganz 
2017). This may be explained by the very ambiguous character these agents are 
                                                           
147 This is not to say that Economists of a different category – such as Inheritors – can’t be tempted 
to involuntarily help to bring about the birth of such a right-wing party. But their way and reasons, 
and causes, to this are presumably different from those of the Ultraliberal Fallen Nobles. 
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forced to take with regards to ‘the masses’ due to their position in social space, 
which predisposes them towards a symbolic revolution (for which they must 
mobilise support), but one that retains the distance to these very masses they need 
to bring about a revolution in their favour. It goes without saying that the fact that 
these ultraliberal Fallen Nobles help to bring about socially conservative and 
repressive politics (that may justify racism even in everyday life such as described 
by  Smith 2016) does not make them identical with those who stand to gain most 
for these politics in the very same way that the fact that Heidegger helped to 
justify Nazism philosophically does not make him simply a Nazi functionary like any 
other (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992: 151f.). Again, the fact that someone like 
Hayek believes that he is ‘not a conservative’ (Hayek 2006[1960]) does play an 
important role in helping him to do what he does. It prepares him to retain his 
innocence in regards to the origin of his intellectual products, and his objective 
function as an ideological battering ram of social forces (see Stone 1965 for another 
analogical, historical example) which he does not consciously support, but which 
helps to bring about the realisation of the ‘essence of Neoliberalism’ (Bourdieu 
1998) as “[a] programme for destroying collective structures which may impede the 
pure market logic.” (ibid.). Such a programme Hayek, of course, salutes, but he 
does not see that that effects the essential concentration of power in fewer hands, 
the exact opposite of what he had intended. This, obviously, also shows the 
inadequacy of his original view of how society works or should work. 
 
Might there perhaps be a way, through a Realpolitik of reason and executed by 
politically and socially progressive forces, to specifically target students with this 
background, offering them material and ideological support (perhaps by offering 
studentships for challenging received ideas, something long done by conservative 
forces), in order to win over to a more progressive cause agents that are inclined 
above all to symbolic revolutions, who quite naturally and rather easily are able to 
mobilise support and create public attention, and therefore bind them towards this 
more progressive cause? The socially produced inclinations towards partial symbolic 
revolution, towards radical stances, may thus be put to much better use for the 
common good than in the current arrangement. Indeed, once one takes this into 
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account, it is much easier to agree with Norbert Elias’ recommendation that 
“Perhaps it would sometimes be less costly for a society to build bridges to these 
people who have no way out.” (Elias 1996[1989]: 227). Surely this is the case 
already, the question then remains who (that is, what social groups with what 
interests) offer ways out, and where they lead to within the socially caused limits 
of perception and cognition.   
 
Moreover, if one thinks about the close connections of Economics and Economists to 
external fields and demands in general – and heterodox Economics, in its close ties 
to certain left-leaning and well-educated social groups (Eversberg 2015) seems no 
exception in this regard – one is led to ask, from a Bourdieusian perspective, 
questions of how this relationship of interests is balanced, how it works in practice, 
and under which attitudes and perceptions by its executors. Eventually, one might 
be able to reconstruct if, and how, these ‘flirtations’ with outside needs and 
demands may compromise the (probably frail) disciplinary autonomy of academic 
Economics.     
 
One may pose, for now, that Economists tend to provide symbolic weapons to 
specific, and often privileged, groups in other fields – above all the economic elite. 
How can this (dis-)function of supplier of symbolic justifications of the domination 
of already dominant groups be altered? What role can Sociology play in remedying 
it?  
 
The Task of Sociology 
 
If this perspective of the social and historical embeddedness of study selections is 
adequate, Sociologists must include themselves in it as well. They could venture 
into exploring their historically grown dispositions, the social characteristics of the 
discipline’s Inheritors as well as Sociology’s position both within academic space 
and in relation to outside forces.  
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The hypothesis developed in this work is that Economics tends to require and 
reward male students that possess a specific form of cultural capital that might be 
called technical. It is associated with specific ‘technical’ professions such as 
Engineers, Medium-level teachers in natural scientific topics, but also technicians 
and IT administrators. But what about Sociology, or other Social Sciences, for that 
matter? We know already that they are quite different in terms of the degree of 
feminisation compared to Economics, at least in Germany (and elsewhere too 
probably). But what about other social characteristics? One would have to create a 
sample of ‘recognised’ students in various disciplines to compare their precise 
social origin. Are there less ‘recognised’ students with this relative preponderance 
of technical cultural capital in other disciplines? What is their precise combination 
of social characteristics of Inheritors relative to that of other disciplines? Which 
factors are the most decisive ones, and how, in each case, do they tend to 
transform, in the course of studies, the habitus to that of a convinced insider of 
academic field-specific truths. To do this one would have to devise indicators both 
for disciplinary recognition for each discipline, as well as obtain precise data on the 
social origin of the students – for example by making the question on social origins 
an open one, supplemented with the invitation to briefly describe the tasks of their 
parents, as it was done by Bourdieu and his team in Distinction. So far, this kind of 
data for recognised students does not exist yet. A similar check may be made with 
the comparison of recognised students within a discipline. If I am correct, there will 
be a statistically discernible concentration of Inheritors in Economics in ‘orthodox’ 
specialisms like Macro- and Microeconomics as well as Economic Theory, while 
Fallen Nobles should be over-represented in Economic Policy and Economic History 
and Parvenus in Statistics and Econometrics.  
 
But what are the distributions of specialisations to different Ideal-types in other 
disciplines? Are these Ideal-types useful there anyways? That is of course an open, 
empirical question. If something like a group of Inheritors could be identified, on a 
bigger scale, in Economics and in Sociology, one might compare their attitudes 
towards study selection on the basis of their very similar relationship of their 
habitus to their respective discipline’s requirements (namely, initial fit) – even if 
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there are differences in the social characteristics, in that resource endowment that 
the word Inheritor means in these disciplines. From another analytical angle, one 
might furthermore trace and compare specific original class origins (say, Fallen 
Nobles) and the habitus transformations happening through studying various 
disciplines – this may help to highlight the specific effect of different ‘disciplinary 
socialisations’ with a particular habitus. Quite logically, then, one would then work 
towards a new grouping of disciplines – not anymore according to substantial, 
‘obvious’ lines – Sociology with Cultural Sciences, Economics with Business 
Administration, and so on – but rather according to a sociologically constructed field 
perspective, based on relationships between elite students and their subject but 
also on the relationship of the subjects among themselves.  
This all sounds very objectivist, I know. But once this objective dimension of 
underlying structures, and the habitus that are embedded in them, are constructed 
it might foster a better mutual understanding of scientists across disciplinary 
boundaries, and their experience dimensions when selecting ‘their’ disciplines. 
After all, is the Economist’s aim for ‘tangibility and precision’ really so much 
different to the Sociologist’s striving for ‘myth-busting and reflexivity’? Is not 
reflexivity, in its own way, bound with tangibility, as precision is with busting 
myths? Surely, it is not the goals themselves that diverge, but the ways to achieve 
them, the differing meanings attached to them. What to do with these meanings? 
How to evaluate them? How to draw lessons from them? What I am proposing here is 
a stronger, more concerted effort of self-objectification, to link meanings to 
dispositions of habitus, and to structures that made this habitus. Rather than 
writing more ‘critical’ treatises about this or that variant of neoliberal Economics 
and its shortcomings, why not, as Sociologists, reaching out to those Economists 
willing to submit their expertise and experience to sociological scrutiny? Why not 
attempting to build up a trans-disciplinary, perhaps even trans-national, forum of 
Social Scientists which aims at scientifically singling out and understanding differing 
disciplinary approaches? This might be done not in an effort to define or to exalt 
the ‘true reflexivity’ or ‘true tangibility’ of social scientific procedures and 
theories, but in order to remove obstacles – social obstacles – that lie in the way of 
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achieving perhaps more autonomous versions of these meanings – practically and 
collectively.      
In other words, the sociology of Neoliberalism should take more seriously those 
intellectuals that promote Neoliberalism. It should distinguish them both from non-
intellectual neo-liberals as well as from each other. This distinction, in my view, is 
needed for a more thorough and precise understanding of just how this social 
system we live in now works, which is an indispensable precondition for efficient 
political action to change it. And even more: Sociologists should put into greater 
focus the relationships of these neo-liberal intellectuals with those intellectuals 
that usually struggle against them in the political and/or scientific arena. This is a 
demanding task for Sociologists, especially those on the left, who have many 
reasons, and inclination, to more or less openly follow activists who just lump 
together all symbolic support for Neoliberalism under one label (see exemplarily 
Klein 2007). Their criticism should be more effective once they complement a close 
textual critique with complex and reflexive social scientific insights of these very 
texts and their authors. As with any other obstacle to progress, it helps to describe 
and to understand it as completely as possible in order to help to overcome it.  
   
 
 
 
-  
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Appendices 
 
 
Appendix 1: Consent Form Interviews 
 
Consent Form 
Title of Project:  German Economics Students' academic trajectory and                 
economic attitudes  
Name of Researcher:  Tim Winzler 
    
1. I confirm that I have read and understand the Plain Language Statement for the 
above study and have had the opportunity to ask questions. 
2. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw 
at any time, without giving any reason. 
3. I understand that: 
 • written summaries of the results will be made available for me if requested at 
the end of the research period in July 2017, and that I can request a copy of the 
final thesis, once this is completed, from the researcher.  
 • I will be referred to by pseudonym only in any publications arising from the 
research, and that any relevant personal detail shall be properly de-identified. 
 • anonymised data from this research might be made available to other 
researchers to foster the advancement of scientific knowledge 
  • the research data arising from this research will be archived for up to 10 
years.  
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4. By signing this consent form I also waive copy rights to the data arising from 
this research. 
5.    I agree / do not agree (delete as applicable) to take part in the above study. 
6.    I consent that the above mentioned researcher can retain personal data of mine 
(Email-              Address, Mobile Number) for up to 5 years in order to do follow-
up interviews. By ticking the box below, I also consent that I may be contacted for 
another interview within the upcoming 5 years.  
 
(please tick this box if you agree to be contacted for a potential follow-up 
interview)  
           
Name of Participant Date Signature 
Tim Winzler 
 
Researcher Date Signature 
 
 
1 for subject; 1 for researcher    
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Appendix 2: Interview Guideline  
Interview Themes with students at Leipzig University/other German 
Universities:  (re: point 3.3a) 
 
1. Choice of Subject: 
- Why do/did you study Economics? How did you come to it? 
- What else do/did you study with it? Did you change your subjects during your 
studies, or do you plan to? Why is/that? 
- Is there anyone in your family or environment who advised you to take Econ, 
or who recommended it to you? 
- What do you think one needs to successfully complete Economics studies?  
- Do you have any siblings? What do/did they do? 
 
2. Attitudes towards the Discipline:  
- How did/do you like your subject? What did/do you like about it? What not? 
Can you say why? 
- What do your specialised in and why did it come this way? Do you already 
have an idea what you would like to know more about, in mean in terms of 
topics/fields? 
- Do you have any scientific heros? If so, who would that be, and what do you 
like about them? 
- How would you actually define your discipline, say, also as against other 
Social Sciences such as Sociology, Anthropology or Political Sciences? 
- So far, do you have any favourite Economics books which you really liked 
reading during your study time? That can be any book related to Economics. 
Which subject is for you the ‘natural’ complement/ally to Economics? Why? 
314 
 
- Are you organised in events outside the classroom that are, in one way or the 
other, about Economics or Economic topics? What would that be (student 
associations, political parties, NGO’s, other voluntary work, internship with 
companies)?              
- What else do you like to do in your free time? 
3. Plans for the Future: 
- Do you have any idea what you will do after you graduate/in the next couple 
of years? What kind of field are you interested in, and why?  
 
4. Opinions on current topics: 
- What’s your stance on the Greek debt crisis/the Euro crisis? 
- How would you fix the national (British) deficit problem and why do you 
think this is? 
- The field of Economics and the profession of Economists have come under 
attack after the 2007 crash --- do you think the critique is justified? Why or 
why not? 
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Appendix 3: Participant Information In-Depth Interviews 
 
 
Plain Language Statement PLS Students/Participants in Observation: 
(Please note that all participants will be presented with a German version of this 
statement to ensure maximum understanding) 
Plain Language Statement (or Participant Information Sheet) 
 
Study title and Researcher Details 
German Economics Students' academic trajectory and economic attitudes 
 
  
You are being invited to take part in a research study on Economics students’ 
economic attitudes. Before you decide it is important for you to understand why 
the research is being done and what it will involve. Please take time to read the 
following information carefully and discuss it with others if you wish. Ask me if 
there is anything that is not clear or if you would like more information. Take your 
time to decide whether or not you wish to take part. Thanks a lot for reading this.  
 
Tim Winzler 
 
Tim Winzler Sociology PhD student      
 Könneritzstrasse 82 
316 
 
College of Social Sciences            04229 
Leipzig/Germany  
Adam-Smith-Building/Room 701         Tel.: 
0049/15110793194 Glasgow University/UK                   
Tim.winzler@glasgow.ac.uk  
Mobile: 0044/7549681190 
 
 
 
What is the purpose of the study? 
To make a contribution to explain and to understand why the science of Economics 
is the way it really is and not otherwise, by looking at those who study it at various 
stages of their university education. This will help to dismantle prejudices that 
people have about Economics teaching and research by showing the perspective and 
standpoint of those involved in it. 
 
Why have I been chosen? 
You have been chosen because you study Economics in one form or another and 
because you are thus relatively interested in economic questions and everything 
that surrounds it. As a future or contemporary economist you ‘embody’ your 
discipline in a certain way, but you also have your own ideas what makes the 
Economy work the way it does and if/how you would change that. I am interested 
in how you see the Economy, and how you would manage and organise it. 
 
 
Do I have to take part? 
Of course, I am not forcing anyone to take part in this research. Just let me know 
that you don’t want to have your comments and thoughts used in my research and I 
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will respect that. None of your comments, assertions or opinions shall then be 
published or recorded, and I will not ask you any questions regarding your view on 
the subject. And even if you take part, you can withdraw at any stage, just let me 
know. Your participation in this study is strictly voluntary. 
 
What will happen to me if I take part? 
I will attend the meetings of your student society regularly and simply take notes 
on what happens there, in terms of what is said and discussed. I might also ask you 
to take part in an interview about your personal background and your way into your 
Economics. If you want, I might offer to organise a reading group for getting your 
concrete opinion of various pieces of Economics literature. I would like to record 
both the reading group sessions and the personal interview if this is ok with you. At 
the end of the process I might distribute a small questionnaire regarding your 
attitudes towards various topics and your social background. This is basically it, 
there is nothing else involved. 
 
Will my taking part in this study be kept confidential? 
Your contact data, notes of your views and from my research as well as any audio 
recordings will be kept safely in accordance with the very strict rules of data 
storage and management that are enforced by the College of Social Sciences Ethics 
rules as well as those recommended by the British Sociological Association (BSA). I 
will also anonymise sufficiently any quotes that I will submit/publish for my 
Sociology peers so that nothing can be traced back to particular persons. 
Please note that assurances on confidentiality will be strictly adhered to unless 
evidence of wrongdoing or potential harm is uncovered. In such cases the 
University may be obliged to contact relevant statutory bodies/agencies. 
 
What will happen to the results of the research study? 
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The results will inform the main empirical stage of my research project that will 
deal with Economics students within the German context. They might also be 
included in the final version that will be submitted as my PhD and eventually might 
appear in Sociology journals and periodicals, as well as in academically minded 
public journals. I will archive the data from this research in a secure location. I 
will, with your consent, retain your personal contact data (Email, Mobile Number) 
for up to 5 years in order to use them to do follow-up interviews. I might make the 
fully anonymised research data available to other Social Scientists to further the 
advancement of scientific knowledge. Again, any comment you make will be 
properly anonymised in order to protect your privacy and identity. 
 
Who is organising and funding the research? (If relevant) 
The research is funded partly by the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) 
and partly by the University of Glasgow College of Social Sciences (CoSS). 
 
Who has reviewed the study? 
This study has been reviewed and approved by the Ethics Committee of the College 
of Social Sciences of the University of Glasgow. 
 
Contact for Further Information  
If you have any concerns or complaints on how I carry out my research that you find 
objectionable and don’t want to raise with me personally, you can always contact 
the College of Social Sciences Ethics Officer, Dr Muir Houston Via Email: 
Muir.Houston@glasgow.ac.uk Or Via Phone: 0141-330-4699 
If you have any concerns regarding the conduct of this research project, you can 
contact the College of Social Sciences Ethics Officer Dr Muir Houston, email: 
Muir.Houston@glasgow.ac.uk 
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Appendix 4:  Participant Observation Pro Forma Form:  
 
Date:  
 
Location: 
 
 
 
Time:  
 
Event:  
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Observations:  e.g. 
 
      -       Number of people present, gender and age distribution, type of 
event 
 
       -      Assertions on economic attitudes 
 
- Presentations and discussions of certain schools of economic thought 
 
- Arguments exchanged for and against different theories/standpoints 
in Economics 
 
- General atmosphere of the meeting and (if appl.) informal pub 
session afterwards 
 
- Statements on personal trajectory of the person outside and inside of 
Economics 
 
- Expression of values/intentions behind studying Economics/pursuing 
a career in it 
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